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THESIS SUMMARY:
The thesis critically examines the main theories of union growth, 
especially white-collar unionism, and argues they have inadequately 
analysed the labour process and its precise importance in understanding 
the development of unionization. It is suggested that unionization 
is better understood through analysing (a) the various pressures which 
imply changes in the labour process; (b) the impact of these changes 
on the relationships between employees and not just those between 
employer and employees; (c) how this shapes the patterns of employees 
experience and their response in terms of collective organization and 
action. This allows a clearer understanding of how certain conjunctural 
influences may affect union organization and activity; in particular, 
the role of employers policies, state intervention and the autonomy of 
trade unions from the labour process. These arguments are developed 
in the context of a detailed analysis of the Bookmaking Industry, the 
rise of The Union of Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) in the early 1970s, 
and its subsequent merger with the TGWU.
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INTRODUCTION
Author's Preface and Acknowledgements.
"He does more than treat them when they are 
ill; he is the objective witness of their 
lives. They seldom refer to him as a witness.
They only think of him when some practical 
circumstance brings them together. He is in 
no way a final arbiter. That is why I chose 
the rather humble word clerk: the clerk of 
their records.
He is qualified to be this precisely because of 
his privilege. If the records are to be as 
complete as possible - and who does not at times 
dream of the impossible ideal of being totally 
recorded? - the records must be related to the 
world at large, and they must include what is 
hidden, even what is hidden within the 
protagonists themselves."
(Berger (1969) p.109).
John Berger's description of one facet of the life of a country 
doctor has more than a passing resemblance to the activity of the social 
researcher: the recognition of the efforts of people to cope with the 
world in which they find themselves, of trying to effect change within 
their society; while simultaneously developing an understanding of the 
sources and implications of those activities within the wider framework 
and structure of society. But here perhaps the similarities end.
The doctor can offer something more to his patients: his recording and 
recognition of their existence combine to assist medical diagnosis to 
provide help and hope for their future. The researcher too often
xi
utilises the information received from workers and ordinary people 
against them at a later stage; and in any case may provide little 
in return for their efforts. The researcher is parasitic, and why 
anyone should assist someone involved in research remains a very pertinent 
question.
Nevertheless, in this respect I have been lucky and have received 
extensive and often welcoming co-operation from those people actively 
involved in the area I have researched. They are too numerous to mention, 
but many of them appear regularly in the text of this thesis. However,
I would like to give particular thanks to George Sawford, the former 
TUBE General Secretary for his immense help and encouragement and for 
providing the vast range of historical material which now comprises the 
main part of the TUBE Archive.^ In addition, Bernard Weston in 
Birmingham and Roy Brown in Scotland gave me much appreciated assistance 
in my research in those regions. I would like to think this thesis in 
recounting the struggles of bookmaking employees will in some small way be 
a contribution in return.
But merely to acknowledge the very important practical assistance 
given by those involved in the Bookmaking industry is insufficient. It 
is always of interest to learn why someone looked at a particular subject 
in the way they did since it necessarily informs any understanding of what 
they have produced. My personal interest in bookmaking should be made clear. 
Both of my parents (and one grandparent and other members of my family) 
have worked in Bookmaking most of their lives. I also worked in the 
industry on a casual basis during the period which preceded the formation 
of TUBE.
!• See Bibliography for the detailed contents of the TUBE records.
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This lifelong connection with the industry has been combined 
with a developing interest in why trade unionism developed and the 
potential which the emergent debate on the labour process could 
provide in this direction. When I began my research Braverman's 
'Labour and Monopoly Capital' had just resurrected the significant 
chapters of Marx's 'Capital' in connection with the labour process.
Soon afterwards Carchedi's contribution on class ambiguity was produced.
During the subsequent five years a whole range of literature has appeared 
in this area, with titles resplendent in the use of the 'labour process'.
But the general inspirational sources have been those mentioned above.
Finally it remains to acknowledge the assistance of those who have 
experienced the many ups and downs of my thesis. Many friends have 
given me general encouragement over the years. In particular I would 
like to thank Richard Hyman, my supervisor, who has received and read 
many drafts at different stages and given me invaluable help and encouragement 
at crucial moments of writing-up. Yet most of all I must thank 
Jill Hardman, without whose support, encouragement and constructive 
criticisms of both my field research and draft chapters this thesis would 
not have been written. I am also indebted to Norma Bainbridge for 
her excellent typing of an often straggly hand-written original.
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Methods and Problems of Research.
The reader may be interested to kndw precisely how the material 
used in this thesis was obtained for there must essentially be certain 
biases in what is written according to the source and manner of 
obtaining the information. I used four particular methods of research:
(1) Participant observation
In retrospect my periods of employment in Bookmaking during the 
summers of 1968-71, provided an essential background to my understanding 
of unionization. This comprised, in total, a period of twelve months 
working in different LBOs in London for a range of employers when major 
changes in the industry were taking place. Since I had no intention 
at that time of doing any research in the industry, there are no records 
of my experiences - only what I can recall.
(2) Formal Interviews
One problem of the research was the general lack of information 
on Bookmaking and its history. It was essential to gain an historical 
perspective if the connections between the labour process and unionization 
were to be established or discounted. In consequence a good deal of 
the initial period of fieldwork was spent in merely talking to the 
representatives of a number of bodies who could provide general background 
information on the industry. This shortened the time available for formal 
interviews of union activists and employers, but nevertheless the 
following interviews were secured:
(i) TUBE activists for their accounts of how the union had begun, 
developed, and operated. Total - 15 interviews.
(ii) TGWU representatives in the West Midlands area, using a
structured interview formal. Total - 5 interviews.
(iii) TGWU Full-time officers who were involved in areas 
where there had been TUBE membership and/or current 
TGWU membership. Total - iO interviews.
(iv) National Bookmaking Employers (i.e. all the 'Big Four'
some more than once) , and some local employers in various 
parts of the country. Although the National Companies 
were at different times extremely co-operative, many 
smaller employers refused any communication. Total - 
12 interviews.
(v) Representatives or past members of other bodies such as 
the CIR, ACAS, HBLB, and the CCOG.'
With the exception of the West Midland interviews, the research 
involved widespread travelling throughout England and Scotland which 
necessarily restricted the number of interviews; nevertheless in no 
sense were the number of interviews inadequate or disadvantageous, except 
where key employers declined to reply to my requests.
(3) Continual Association
The inherent inadequacies of formal interviews necessary demanded 
closer contact with union activists in order to discover how the union 
operated. During a period of some three years, 1974-1977, I maintained 
a regular liaison with union activists in different parts of the country. 
These continuing associations cannot be called formal interviews and they 
are listed separately:
(i) Regular contact with TUBE activity in the West Midlands
between 1975-1977, involving membership recruitment, 
union meetings, industrial tribunal cases, etc.
(ii) In depth case study on Connor and Forbes Ltd Liverpool in
1974 and 1976.
(iii) Detailed study of the Ladbroke dispute in Glasgow,
1975.
(iv) Working with the TGWU on their submission to the Royal 
Commission on Gambling, 1976-1977.
(v) Involvement in the initial stages of the campaign to 
gain recognition in the J.Coral Group, 1977.
All of these activities involved continuing contact with members 
of the union at all levels as well as employers and other bodies.
(4) Use of archival material
During the research I was given the bulk of the documentary 
records of TUBE which now comprise the main part of the TUBE Archive. 
These records, the details of which are set out in the Bibliography, 
proved an invaluable source of information and reference as to how the 
union developed and most of the precise dating prior to 1974 is derived 
from them.
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Thesis introduction
"In the trade union world, all marriages are apparently blessed, 
however bigamous or unnatural; but all births are now illegitimate" 
Turner (1962) p.308.
In 1971 a group of workers decided to form a union in the Bookmaking 
Industry. It has scarcely been noted as a major event of trade union 
history, which perhaps tells us something about labour historians and 
industrial relations writers. Try finding a reference to The Union 
of Bookmakers' Employees (TUBE) in any account of trade unionism in the 
1970s. Yet the foundation of TUBE was an event of particular interest:, 
the formation of a new union in an area of employment without any 
traditions of union organization.
Why the lack of interest in the development of unionization in an 
industry of 100,000 potential members? Ignorance? Possibly but why 
are people aware of some things and not others? The answers lie 
elsewhere: Bookmaking is not to be taken seriously. It is not
central to the economy. The workers are not in trade unions. It is 
therefore not worth attention. The chroniclers of the labour movement 
too often reflect those sections who are only interested in'organized' 
labour and ignore the'unorganized1.
This thesis is an attempt in some small way to rectify that imbalance; 
to consider the problems of workers in one sector of employment not 
in the mainstream of 'normal' trade union traditions; to understand 
how unionization developed amongst the workers; and to gain some insights 
into the role of the labour movement, the employers, and state agencies 
in relation to this process.
Areas such as bookmaking are normally treated as being part of the 
growth of 'white-collar' unionism, which has arguably been the major 
feature of the expanding union membership in the post-war period. ^
1. See Bain and Price (1976) for details of this expansion.
Bookmaking, in the official classification, is part of the 'private
sector services'. This, as Table (1) shows, is the great area of 
non-union labour, where only 12% of workers are in unions; but the 
potential, in terms of numbers, is larger than in the whole of the 
public sector.
The extent of this potential depends, of course, on how private sector 
services are defined. The above figures, from Bain and Price, are 
based on the Department of Employment classification, where private 
sector services comprise:
"....... professional services; hotels and catering;
entertainment and media services; insurance, banking, 
and finance; distribution; business services; and 
miscellaneous services (hairdressing, laundries, 
dry-cleaning, motor repairs, boot & shoe repair, and 
betting and gambling)". (1)
Such a collection of activities illustrates the breadth of the term 
"service sector" - which raises immediate problems. Firstly, how to 
specify the "service sector"? Presumably the intention is to 
differentiate manufacturing from services, physical products from 
intangible commodities. Yet what is virtually the same task may be
classified in either manufacturing or services depending on the context of
( 2)the work.
This underlines the descriptive basis of the above distinction between 
manufacturing and private sector services; there appears no coherent 
analytic division, merely a lumping together of the bits and pieces which 
do not seem to fit into the public sector or manufacturing. This raises 
a second question: does the categorisation of 'service sector' in this way
obscure divisions that might be made otherwise? Within the Department of 
Employment list of 'services' some definitely operate in a different way 
to others in relation to capitalist economy:
1* Bain and Price (1976) p. 342. See Braverman (1974) pp. 360-1 for a 
fascinating discussion of the classification of the service sector in U.S. 
Government statistics.
2. An example can help to clarify precisely what is meant here: The cook
in a hotel clearly does produce a physical product which can be seen as a 
direct parallel to the preparation of frozen dinners in a food factory;
the cook forms part of the service-sector, while the food operative works 
in manufacturing.
Table ( 1)
Union Membership and Density by Sector in the UK, 1974
Sector Labour Force 
(OOOs)
Union Membership Density
Public Sector 6,112.6 5,079.4 83.1
Manufacturing 7,778.9 4,836.4 62.2
Manual 5,678.6 4,164.2 73.3
White-
Collar 2,100.3 672.2 32.0
Agriculture, 
Forestry,
427.7 99.7 23.3
Fishing.
Private 6,689.3 810.0 12.1
Sector
Services.
Source : Bain and Price (1976) p.342
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"The function of middle-men, which expands in the course 
of the growing social division of labour and which can be 
ascribed in capitalism to enterprises dealing with trade, 
transport, storage, credit, banks and insurance, only 
constitutes a part of (the so-called services) sector, 
which sociologists and bourgeois political economists 
make into a pot-pourri of the most various activities, 
stretching from pure commodity producers (gas, water 
and power production) to parasites and crooks."
(Mandel (1976) pp. 383-4 F/N) .
So in approaching the problem of the lack of unionization amongst 
the private sector services, the problem itself must be reformulated 
since the category of private sector services remains conceptually 
inadequate. Can the various dimensions of those activities grouped 
under this heading point to the questions that could be raised?
Firstly, developing Handel's position, there is the important 'middle-man' 
function, those activities which lubricate the wheels of capitalist economy. 
Mandel's formulation reflects an important distinction in Marxist theory: 
that between the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation.
While the former is concerned with the expansion of value through 
production, the latter concerns the realisation of value through the sale 
of products and the provision of finance for new periods of production.
This leads to a second general distinction: that between productive 
and unproductive labour. In the sphere of production, labour can be 
seen as productive since it creates surplus value, while in the sphere of 
circulation, value is not created, only redistributed, hence labour is 
unproductive. Can this provide a basis for understanding differences 
in the degree of unionization?^
A second possibility concerns the characterisation of large sections of
the service sector as white-collar. Given white-collar workers are less
unionised than manual workers, can this distinction serve as basis for
( 2)understanding the lack of unionization in private sector services?
1. The terms 'productive' and 'unproductive' are given, following Marx,a 
specific meaning in terms of the production (or non-production) or surplus 
value. See below Chapter 2.
2. One crucial problem that emerges here concerns the category of 'white- 
collar' . See below, Chapter 2.
Thirdly, can any explanations be put forward to lower levels of
analysis? Is the problem with private sector services the fact 
that they are private, that public sector employers are more 
supportive of trade unionism, while private employers are more 
hostile? Or do, perhaps, the various activities have particular 
occupational characteristics which tend to promote or inhibit trade 
unionism? While such aspects may be important, it would be difficult 
to sustain them as influences explaining general tendencies in 
unionization. They might be useful in explaining individual differences 
around a general level, but not the general rise in unionization itself. ^  
In this brief discussion some wide-ranging questions have been raised 
about approaching an understanding of unionization in the private 
sector services; and, in doing so, the usefulness of the categorisation 
has been queried. But the implications go further than this. Once
the specification of 'private sector services' has been questioned 
the whole basis of the general categorizations between sectors of 
employment becomes problematic. Thus to approach the development 
of unionization amongst any group of employees, whether in private 
sector services or not, demands an understanding of the general basis 
of trade unionism and any subsequent justifications for drawing 
generalised analytic distinctions within the structure of the labour 
force. 1
1. It would be highly circular to "explain" trade unionism
in terms of employers' attitudes and policies towards trade unionism; 
and it would be equally nonsensical to explain trade unionism in 
terms of the strength or lack of occupational solidarity. Such 
explanaations must be considered in the context of general tendencies 
towards the growth of unionization.
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The first part of :he thesis is devoted to just this task. In
Chapter 1 the various approaches aimed at explaining the growth of 
trade unionism are considered, both in general terms and in relation 
to explanations of general divisions across the workforce. The
latter receive disproportionately greater attention given the particular
c  . . ( 1 )concern witn tne oasis of those division.
In Chapter 2, an attempt is made to overcome the inadequacies of 
these various approaches and reformulate a general approach to trade 
unionism within, broadly, a Marxist perspective, including an analysis 
of potential divisions which may be useful in understanding unionizaticc, 
and putting forward the labour-process as the central feature. 1
The second part of the thesis explores the usefulness of this approach
by applying it to 1the growth of unionization in the Bookmaking
industry. This c:tnsiders the changes of the’ labour process in the
historical develop!tent of the industry and derives an understanding of
unionization withii the framework. Subsequently the impact of formal
union organizations, the employers, and the State are considered in
the context of the labour process approach.
The final part of tthe thesis consists of a concluding discussion which
returns to some of the themes developed in Part One and offers an
appraisal of how t:le evidence of the Bookmaking industry has specific
implications for tlle general proposition that unionization must be
understood in relattion to the labour process.
1. Therefore there is an accentuated focus on Bain (1973) and 
Lockwood (196C as the main preponents of an orthodox approach to 
white-collar unionism, while Klingender (1935) is considered at some 
length as representative of a Marxist tradition in this area.
- xxii -
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Chapter 1: The Basis of Trade Unionism
The initial problem is two-fold. To understand the 
development of unionization amongst particular groups of employees 
requires a prior consideration of the general basis of trade unionism. 
This necessarily demands an answer which can explain not differences 
between levels of unionization, but the existence of trade unionism 
as a widespread social phenomenon. Nevertheless, there are wide 
differences in the level of unionization across different employee 
groups, which raises a second question: is it necessary to suggest
specific explanations for certain groups of workers in understanding 
how trade unionism develops? And if so, how can these be specified?
One starting point is to consider the work of previous contributors 
to the debate on trade unionism. These, broadly speaking, can be 
divided into two categories: on the one hand, the so-called "orthodox" 
approaches which depend on divergent strands of theoretical ancestry, 
but which all can be criticised in not considering the specific nature 
of capitalist society and the consequent implications for understanding 
trade unionism.
On the other, there are a number of approaches which attempt to 
overcome this problem and which are termed "Marxist" in that they broadly 
follow a class analysis of society within an historical materialist 
perspective. These tend to emphasise the importance and specifity of 
wage-labour as the basis for understanding trade unionism.
There are limitations with both general approaches. In consequence, 
an attempt is made to reformulate an understanding of trade unionism 
within a Marxist perspective. This necessarily involves a more precise 
specification of the problems in terms of union growth, organisation, 
and activity. And it is within this context that the labour process
is put forward as crucial in tackling these questions.
(a) Orthodox approaches to understanding trade unionism.
The way in which problems are defined informs relevant areas 
of concern and structures modes of explanation. Looking at American 
and British traditions in approaching trade unionism, it might be 
generally concluded that American writers have focussed rather more 
on trade union growth, while their British counterparts have emphasised 
union activity. In consequence, the American literature embraces 
grandiose schemes of wideranging 'variables' which 'explain' union 
growth; the British writing, in contrast, has become channelled within 
a fairly narrow institutionalism which concentrates on'bargaining 
arrangements' between employers and trade unions. In consequence, 
the problem of 'why trade unionism' is not of equal concern or 
importance in these different traditions.
Despite their best endeavours, the concern of American industrial 
relations theorists, particularly in the early post war period, has not 
generated a coherent theoretical model of union growth. A host of 
'variables' have been 'established' as 'significant' in 'explaining' 
union growth, but these cover a wide variety of influences. ^  Of 
these approaches, perhaps of most pervasive influence has been the work 
of Dunlop.
Having briefly surveyed a variety of approaches to union growth,
Dunlop (1948) brings these various strands together:
"The labour movement,or any similarly complex social 
organisation, may be fruitfully explored by an examination 
of four interrelated factors: technology, market structures 
and the character of competition, community institutions 
of control, and ideas and beliefs." (ibid,p.174). 1
1. For instance, Bernstein (1954) who concluded unions grow in periods of 
social disaster (!); Shister (1953) who identified work environment, socio- 
legal influences, and trade union leadership as the main influences; and 
Lester (1958)whose decisive factors were missionary spirit, inter-union 
rivalry, and active rank and file members - the decline of which led to 
the maturity of trade unions.
Dunlop, who is seeking to explain the origin, growth, and 
goals of the labour movement in America as well as the psychology of 
individual nemcers, is unwilling to present these variables as other 
than a "comprehensive scaffolding"; this "method of approach does 
not ir. itself trust it .t-: a t o . try ;f the lab cur r.tv r. at" it:.! p . 17 5) .
That, it subsequently appears, arises from the interaction of 
these variables ibid p.192) .
In effect, Dunlop argues that trade unions are merely another form 
of "complex social organisation (s " which require no special explanation. 
The pattern of the overall blueprint for exploring such organisations 
fits very neatly - it merely remains to apply it. Such a position 
is entirely consistent with Dunlop's advocacy of organisation theory 
and is subject to the appropriate criticisms^ . It might also be 
added, that tner. is absolutely no basis presented as to why these 
variables should be selected and not others. This is arguably due 
to the inability .or refusal?) to consider the specific nature of 
capitalist society.
The British tradition in approaching trade unionism has shown 
rather less interest in union growth; increasingly, emphasis has been 
placed on how trade unions conduct their activities, with particular 
stress on tne processes or collective bargaining. To a large
extent this is a partial and distorted inheritance of the work of the 
Webbs. The descent of the Oxford School of the 1960s can be traced 
directly. That of the Fabian movement even more so. All of which 
suggests the importance of the way the Webbs have influenced mainstream
1. See Herding (197i) pp.65-69 for a brilliant criticism of organisation 
theory and which is discussed later in this chapter.
2. Given the generally high level of manual (and now'white-collar1) 
unionism in Britain, it is, perhaps, not altogether surprising that issues 
of union growth have taken a back seat in favour of union activity.
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emphasises the significance of their definition of trade unions:
"A trade union, as we understand the term, is a continuous 
association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining 
or improving the conditions of their working lives".
(Webb (1920) p. 1) .
Closer examination shows two aspects in that succinct definition. 
Firstly, trade unions are seen in terms of a continuing organisation 
of wage-earners. For the Webbs spasmodic collectivism was an insufficient 
criterion for defining a trade union, while collective organisation 
by non-wage earners was considered qualitatively distinct. Secondly, 
the objectives of trade unions, while widely defined, concerned the 
substantive conditions of those wage-earners.
These two aspects were brought together through collective 
negotiation with employers, commonly known as collective bargaining.
The continuity of bargaining between the employer and his employees, 
represented as a collectivity, was predicated on a continuity of 
union organisation itself, while collective bargaining was the means 
of negotiating the wages and conditions of the employees.
While for the Webbs collective bargaining was only one aspect of 
trade union activity, the subsequent inheritors of their position 
have placed collective bargaining as a central feature of 'industrial 
relations'. This is an important shift. The focus has now moved 
to definitions of 'industrial relations' rather than 'trade unions', 
while the accenuated portrayal of collective bargaining minimises the 
substantative conditions of employe s, in favour of the method of 
agreeing such conditions. This is evident in Flanders' concept of 
'job regulation', which also underpins Bain's approach to white-collar 
unionism. ^  'Job regulation' is developed within the notion of an
1. See especially Flanders (1975)pp.38-47 . My emphasis.
industrial relations thought and practice this century. This
bargaining issues between management and unions. 1 ^
Such a position necessarily implies a narrower view of employer-
employee relations (as well as relationships within these groupings):
"Most experts on industrial relations would treat it as 
virtually self-evident that certain kinds of relations 
in industry should be disregarded and that they should 
concentrate their attention on, for example, the collective 
bargaining activities of trade unions". (Hyman (1975) p.9).
Emphasis shifts to management-union bargaining relationships
rather than those between employer and employees, accentuating the
institutional arrangements of industrial relations to the detriment of
the wider economic and social processes involved. This necessarily
obscures how and why trade unionism develops, for the answer to that
question lies outside the institutional patterns of industrial
relations. Approaches which develop from a collective bargaining
perspective tend to assume that trade unionism already exists. The
development of trade unions thus becomes an increasingly irresolvable
•• ¡lem, yet simultaneously a less important one, since the source
(2 )of trade unionism has become separated from trade union activity.
If the British tradition has steered away from general explanations 
of union growth in recent years, nevertheless those same theorists have 
had to come to terms with the dramatic growth of unionisation amongst 
'management' - the development of 'white-collar' unionism. Attention 
has specifically been turned to this problem with the result that 
'explanations' of 'white-collar' unionism have been put forward 
despite the absence of a generally accepted framework of union growth.
1. Flanders' theory of union growth is penetratingly analysed by Pickard 
(1978). For a partial discussion of his model see below Che . Only Bain of 
the main preponents of Pluralist Industrial Relations has decided to pursue 
the avenue of Union Growth with any vigour.
2. This contrast, however, between American and British industrial relations 
thought must not be overdrawn. There are strong links between these 
traditions, perhaps best exemplified in Flanders adoption of the concept of 
the 'industrial relations system' as developed by Dunlop.
industrial relations 'system' and is central to the processing of
• I . —
Two major contributions stand out in offering explanations of 
•white-collar' unionism: one is that of George Bain who stands within
the institutional traditions of British industrial relations, yet 
nevertheless also draws on the North American notions of organisation 
theory; the other is that of David Lockwood who, in contrast, relies 
almost exclusively on the work of Max Webber in tne manner of European 
sociology. Can these explanations provide insights on the specific 
problems involved? Since Bain, in some sense, writes in opposition 
to the sociological approach of Lockwood, it seems appropriate to 
consider Lockwood's position first.
Lockwood's analysis of the 'Blackcoated' worker remains the most 
widely influential work on the development of trade union organisation 
amongst clerical workers.^ As such, he set the framework for
(2)future research and debates which ensued at the beginning of the 1970s.
It is important to note the historical context of Lockwood's contribution.
The Blackcoated Worker was first published in 1958. Taking issue 
with the crude proletarianisation thesis of Klingender^, Lockwood, 
at the height of the 'cold war', sought to discredit the notion that 
clerical workers possessed a 'false' class consciousness. Yet Lockwood 
set out not to criticise Klingender within the Marxist tradition, but to 
refute the relationship between a Marxist definition of class and the 
development of clerical unionism. The distinction of ownership/non- 
ownership as the fundamental class division is "insufficient to explain the 
problem of false class consciousness which it poses". (Lockwood (1966) p.213)
1. Lockwood (1966). As Crompton (1976) p.409-9 comments: "Any account
of the sociological tradition of analysis in this field must begin with the 
work of David Lockwood ... Lockwood's work has profoundly influenced research 
and theorizing in the study of white-collar unionism ..."
2. Blackburn (1967) and Blackburn and Prandy (1965) can be considered 
inheritors of Lockwood's position. Crompton also derives from this tradition.
3. Klingender (1935), whose contribution is discussed below.
Lockwood instead tries to reformulate the relationship between 
class and trade unionism. He introduces three elements which 
comprise his notion of 'class position': firstly"market situation”
which embraces the economic position of the clerk in terms of income, 
job security, and possibilities cf promotion; "work situation" which 
is concerned with social relationships at work deriving from the 
division of labour; and, thirdly, "status situation", which relates to 
the position of the individual in the wider s o c i e t y . I t  seems 
that "status situation" is relatively unimportant in relation to trade 
unionism; for Lockwood eventually concludes that while variations in 
the degree of blackcoated unionization are related to "work situation", 
the "market situation" accounts for variations in union character, (ibid
pp. 211-12).
Lockwood develops this reconstruction of the link between class 
and trade unionism in identifying 'bureaucratisation' as the driving 
force which generates the conditions for unionization in the "work 
s; :nation":
"It would not be straining the facts excessively to argue 
that the unionization of blackcoated workers has been very 
closely associated with what may be called 'bureaucratization'.
By the latter is simply meant the process by which bureaucratic
rules come to predominate in administrative organisation”, (ibid p.141)■
Lockwood juxtaposes two 'ideal-types' of office organisation: on
the one hand Paternalistic administration where working conditions are
"determined by the personal relations of employers and clerks,-" (ibid p.141)
and, on the other, bureaucratic organisation where working conditions
are "regulated by impersonal rules which strictly exclude all forms of
personal consideration between employer and clerk"; (ibid p.141).
Adding that bureaucratization may be associated with a "blockage of clerical
1. See ibid p.15 for full definitions.
promotion" and the"isolation of a separate clerical class" (ibid p .142),
Lockwood concludes:
"Thus defined, bureaucratization represents a set of 
conditions extremely favourable to the growth of collective 
action among clerical workers. It is not too much to argue 
that in fostering black-coated solidarity bureaucratization 
has played a role analogous to that of the factory and labour 
market in the case of manual workers". (ibid p. 142) .
Lockwood's position has been strongly criticised, not simply by
the institutionalism of Bain who denies the importance of linking class
and trade unionism, but from sources who see Lockwood's reformulation
of that link as inadequate. While Lockwood in fact argues that the
combination of 'market situation' and 'work situation' amounts to what
Marx "essentially understood" as 'class position' (ibid pp 15-16), his
model is developed within a Weberian framework - not a Marxist one.
This provides the case for Crompton's critique:
"Lockwood's account of social class ... is essentially a Neo- 
Weberian market-oriented approach, and, because such an 
approach fails systematically to take into account the structures 
and relationships underlying work and market situations, explanations 
deriving from this approach to social class can only be partial.
That is, Lockwood may or may not have established a more or less 
accurate correlation between trade union membership ... and 
social class - as he has defined social class. However, his 
analysis fails to explain why the white-collar market situation 
is as it is, or why the white-collar work situation is as it is - 
and provides no guidance or explanation as to why they have 
changed recently". (1)
The 'market situation' and the 'work situation' "can only be fully 
understood if they are seen as being mediated through capitalist 
production relationships". (Crompton (1976) p.409).
Hence, through not realising the primacy of production relations 1
1. Crompton (1976) pp. 409-410. Consider also the different understanding 
of class by Lockwood: "'Class' like any other sociological concept, 
is a device by which social facts are understood". (op.cit. p.213 - 
my emphasis), as compared with Braverman (1974) who views class as a 
process: "we are not dealing with the static terms of an algebraic 
equation, which requires only that quantities be filled in, but with a 
dynamic process the mark of which is the transformation of sectors 
of the population", p.24 emphasis in original.
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in the determination of class, Lockwoods formulation is itself
inadequate in understanding class and the link between class position
. . . . (1 )and trade unionism.
Leaving this discussion to one side for the moment, it is initially 
useful to look more critically at the internal consistency of Lockwood's 
model, rather than its general inadequacy. This implies some
consideration :: his pt of . ir lucratisati n »nd its rt : :ugs.
1. Crompton, however, fails to draw the full ii lications of her critique. 
In her argument, while class position determines whether a collective 
response is made by employees, the ambiguities in class position are 
responsible for the "varying and often contradictory nature of much white- 
collar collective representation..." .Crompton (1976) p.422). Consequently, 
some white-collar workers opt for unions and others for staff associations; 
the use of class ambiguity overcomes any theoretical problems of false 
consciousness:
"That some white-collar workers should see their interests us 
being best fulfilled by co-operation with management (or the 
capitalist function) - for example, in staff associations - 
and others in the same occupation see their collective interests 
as being best served by identification with the labour function - 
in trade unions - is, I would argue perfectly compatible with 
their ambiguous class situation", (ibid.p.422)
This seems to be the main gist of Crompton's argument. Class is the 
important determinant of trade union organisation, but white-collar workers 
may possess contradictory class positions hence their collective response 
may be contradictory and take different institutional forms.
This is a brave attempt by Crompton to overcome the fruitless debate 
between the 'sociologists' and the 'industrial relations' schools. In order 
to do so, she attempts to synthesise an orthodox Marxist approach to the 
capitalist mode of production, and recent theoretical enunciations on the 
potentiality of contradictory class positions, with her own inheritance 
from industrial sociology. The result, however, is not entirely convincing. 
There are some very real problems. The most immediate and, indeed, surprising 
is her persistent use of 'white-collar', which she manages to haul right 
through the sociology-industrial relations debate and into her Marxist 
framework with scarcely a misgiving. At one point she does appear to see 
something of a diffict '.ty:
"...... the approach I have been developing has revealed
considerable variations in class situation within the 
'white-collar' sector as a whole - in fact, perhaps it is 
misleading to refer to the class situation of white-collar 
workers" (ibid, p.420).
Perhaps it is. Perhaps it is also misleading to refer to white- 
collar workers at all. This reticence in discarding concepts more 
readily associated with the approaches she has already discredited scarcely 
aids understanding. While criticising the use of market and work situation, 
she affirms that both " .... are useful starting points for the analysis 
of white-collar trade unionism" (ibid p. 424). This leads her into 
real difficulties when discussing concrete examples:
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"As the class situation (she means structural class position 
otherwise it does not make sense) of technicians has become 
less ambiguous - as they have been truly 'proletarianiscd' 
so have their market and work situations changed in the 
manner described". (ibid p. 421. Who or what is 
'proletarinized' - the technicians or their class position?)
So Lockwood's 'work' and 'market situations' rise from the ashes, 
somehow determined by the changing class situation of the technicians.
This is merely a false separation. As the technicians increasingly 
began to perform the function of the collective labourer rather than 
acting as agents of capital, their class position changed; yet in 
Crompton's framework this amounted precisely to a change in their position 
in the production process. Lockwood could no doubt argue that his 
concepts of work and market situations encompass just these changes; and 
Crompton will have paid the penalty for transposing the concepts.
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There seems a particular ambiguity regarding form and content in 
the concept of bureaucratization. It is not at all clear whether 
merely the imposition of impersonal rules is involved or 
if the content of those rules is relevant. There seems an emphasis 
on bureaucratic rules per se - which can give no indications on the 
important question of the content of the rules. In fact, while 
Lockwood attempts to employ bureaucratization in a technical sense 
within his framework, at the same time it serves to cover over all 
the various changes which occur within Lockwood's defined'work situation' 
as a result of that process. In that sense bureaucratization serves 
as a blanket term to condense the experiences of employees, as wage- 
labourers, into one amorphous mass. One aspect which Lockwood 
thus successfully obscures constitutes a second point: the way in
which the control of the employees and their work is subsumed within 
bureaucratic, impersonal rules. The imposition of control by the 
employer or management on work activity and the way in which the employees 
experience it are both neatly glossed over.
Thirdly, Lockwood's use of bureaucratization is unable to pinpoint 
the differential impact that it might have on employees. The loosely 
defined category of 'clerks' are seen less as workers performing 
different job tasks within a labour process, than a mass of undifferentiated 
labour. Through abstracting from the concrete processes of work Lockwood 
eliminates the question of the contradictory effects of bureaucratization. 
Hence all 'clerks' are seen to experience bureaucratization in the same 
way and with blanket consequences.
In the light of the above discussion, what understanding of the 
development of unionization amongst blackcoated workers does Lockwood's use oi 
bureaucratization provide? Just as Crompton has questioned the explanatory
powers or Lockwood's overall approach, so bureaucratization can be 
seer, to explain little.
efforts to pose a link between class and trade unionism, Bain is, 
perr.ars, the foremost critic of the class based view of trade unionism
A-.ar. Flanders, and Hugh Clegg 1 . Hence while Lockwood emphasises
consequence, Bair, has sought to play down the central position of clas 
within the' sociologists' approach. He has, in fact, addressed part
In Bair. 19~3) he attempts to show, armed with an extensive 
collection of counter examples and empirical data, that the connection 
between social stratification and union membership and character is 
inadequately formulated by the sociological approach and that social 
stratification constitutes an inadequate explanation of unionization. 
He concludes, firstly:
".... no matter how wide and various were the definitions of 
social position, there was no easy correlation between them 
and patterns of union growth". (Bain (1973) p.154).
Secondly:
"... there is no close and simple relationship between the 
social position of an organisation's membership and that 
organisation's goals or behaviour", (ibid p.154)
and finally:
"no easy equation could then reasonably bo expected between 
social position, social imagery and trade unionism".
(Ibid p.154) 1
ton used the inadequacies of Lockwood's
mere tea .e empirical legacies of the Webbs, G.D.H. Cole
the s tess-ts which generate unionization, Bain focusses on
oral arrangements in explaining the same phenomenon .n
.< soe
1. And also the North America:; emphasis on organisation theory.
- 1  <-
These conclusions are, however, scarcely controversial. Even 
the 'sociologists' against whom they are aimed would not wish to 
contest then; for Bain's approach, attempting as it did to draw 
together many strands of the sociological position, only managed to 
set up a 'straw man’. This meant that his general model of the
sociologists explanatory framework was far too simplistic. v*
And in consequence his criticisms can be deflected for, so
generalised, they merely constitute misrepresentations of particular
(2)positions.
But the crudities of Bain's theoretical challenge must not hide
two important aspects of the institutionalist-sociologist debate.
Firstly, the empirical evidence cannot be as easily shrugged off as
the theoretical argument. Crompton, a self-confessed heretic of the
sociological tradition, takes the point:
"Although I would broadly reject the industrial relations critique 
of the sociological approach, their criticisms do reveal some 
serious weaknesses. In particular, the countless examples 
provided by Bain et al in order to contradict or destroy the 
relationship between class position and trade union membership 
or character, which the sociological approach seeks to establish, 
cannot simply be dismissed as the exceptions which prove the 
rule. For the pattern of white-collar union membership and 
activity does show many inexplicable variations which are 
sociologically embarrassing if we are seeking to establish a 
more or less coherent relationship between union membership, 
character, and social class". (Crompton (1976) p.412).
1. As Mann (1974) p.323 comments:
"... it is a 'demolition job' on some of the crudest sociological 
arguments I have ever encountered".
2. As Crompton (1976) argues :
"Bain's comment that there is 'no easy correlation' between 
social position and union growth is scarcely a criticism of Lockwood who 
postulated a relationship between work situation and union growth." p.412.
Crompton's critique of Bain only explicitly amounts to a refutation of 
Bain's criticisms of Lockwood, Blackburn, and Prandy. She does not take 
issue with the core of Bain's argument as set out in Bain (1970), but 
merely tackles him on his weakest point - a point not essential for 
Bain's position to remain largely intact.
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The sheer force of Bain's empirical weaponry thus makes some 
impression on the sociologists position. Yet the substance of the 
disagreement is not entirely obvious; what is the status of the 
debate? Consider Bain's alternative to a class understanding of 
trade unionism:
"What is being suggested here is that possibly union 
growth can more fruitfully be explained by concentrating 
on the properties of trade unions as organisations 
rather than on the properties of the individuals or 
groups which they seek to organize". (Bain,(1973) p.159).
Within this perspective, Bain enlists the assistance of the
Flanderian notion of 'job regulation' which is defined as the "making
and applying of rules to employment relationships". (ibid p.159-160).
Union growth now "becomes predominantly a function of union participation
in job regulation (ibid p.150).
This, however, does not place Bain in fundamental opposition to 
the sociological position: the debate really turns on the centrality 
of different concepts, rather than the incompatibility of different 
theoretical frameworks.^ This is shown in Bain's view of the
relevance of social stratification in his approach to white-collar 
unionism :
"If the relationship between social stratification and 
trade unionism is to be adequately understood, then it must be 
fitted into a much wider approach to the study of trade 
unionism". (Bain (1973) p.157).
Social stratification does have a part to play in Bain's analysis, 
but not a central part. Instead, he focusses on job regulation as the 1
1. As Mann (1974) observes (p.324):
"(Bain et al) suggest, right at the end, that a better theory 
of unionization must be based on the concept of 'job regulation,' 
that is, the union's role in determining the distribution of 
work rewards. But why is this an alternative theory? May 
we not hypothesize that it is also related to the stratification 
system?. "
motive force within a framework of institutional influences.
Those influences Bain had identified in an earlier work, making 
extensive use of econometric methods.^ Basing his analysis on
white-collar workers in British Manufacturing industry, Bain 
concluded there were three significant factors: firstly, the degree
of employment concentration; secondly, the degree to which employers 
are prepared to recognize unions representing white-collar employees; 
and, thirdly, the extent of government action which promotes union 
recognition. The limitations to Bain's institutionalism are, perhaps, 
more aptly expressed in a more general discussion of the limits of 
the orthodox approaches. 1
1. Bain (1970); in utilising econometric methods Bain appears as far 
less arbitrary than his N.American predecessors, such as Dunlop, in 
identifying variables; but the establishing of a negative theoretical 
point still does not generate a positive theoretical framework.
The limitations of the orthodox approaches.
Having considered some of the general approaches which seek to 
explain union growth and activity and, in some depth, those writers 
who have sought to explain 'white-collar' unionism as a specific 
area of unionization, what can bo concluded? Firstly, some writers, 
within the broad traditions of different strands of thought, have 
seen 'white-collar' unionism as an area of concern requiring specific 
explanations. Not only that, but they have derived different, even 
opposing opinions as to why 'white-collar' unionism has grown - although 
this is partially explained by the way they have posed the 'problem'. ^  1
1. The distinction between Lockwood and Bain is related to how they 
conceptualise the 'problem' they try to explain. Lockwood is 
trying to tackle a social phenomenon and understand the 
processes involved; starting with workers and a Weberian 
perspective of 'authority' relations, he aims to explain the 
conditions under which white-collar unionism develops. In 
contrast, Bain begins with the 'problem' of a growing 
membership of 'white-collar' unions, emphasising patterns 
of unionization, and treats workers as subsidiary. In this he 
shows a definite positivist orientation, very much in accordance 
with Durkheim's principle that:
"Sociological Method ... rests wholly on the 
basic principle that social facts must be studied 
as things, that is, as realities external to the 
individual." Durkheim (1970). pp. 37-38.
It is not surprising that, starting from opposite ends, Lockwood 
and Bain do not meet in the middle.
Do these approaches assist in understanding how trade unionism 
develops. ^  Lockwood and Bain do point to important questions:
Lockwood raises the issue of the significance of social class in 
understanding trade unionism, while Bain correctly emphasises the 
role of institutional arrangements. The main limitation is, however, 
the same in both approaches: the failure to consider the specific 
nature of the capitalist mode of production. This has profound effects 
on the explanatory power of their conceptual frameworks.
Lockwood, it will be remembered, was criticised by Crompton for 
not considering class position as primarily mediated by production 
relations. This failure to understand the primacy of production 
relations is related to a more general failure to grasp the nature of 
the capitalist production process as a whole.
Following Marx, the predominant feature of capitalist production 
is wage-labour; this implies the potential of exploiting the wage-labourer 
through the expropriation of labour beyond that for which the labourer 
is paid. This enables the capitalist to expand the value of his 
capital (valorisation) through appropriating the surplus value created 
by the wage-labourer. Surplus-value is therefore created in the sphere 
of production; yet the surplus is also contingent on what is paid for 
wage-labour which is determined not in the sphere of production, but 
circulation. This is a crucial question for Marx. Does money change 
into capital (as self-expanding value) in the sphere of production or 
circulation? The answer is both: 1
1. In this respect Bain and Lockwood can be considered as
representative of their particular traditions - Bain as straddling 
the North American concern with union growth in relation to 
organisation theory, and the British institutional tradition; 
Lockwood as representing the mainstream European sociological 
thought. As such, comments concerning their specific explanations 
of white-collar unionism do carry wider implications.
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"This whole course of events, this transformation of money 
into capital, both takes place and does not take place 
in the sphere of circulation. It takes place through the 
mediation of circulation because it is conditioned by the 
purchase of labour power in the market; it does not take 
place in circulation because what happens there is only an 
introduction to the valorization process, which is entirely 
confined to the sphere of production". (Marx (1976) p.302)
While the sphere of production is determinant, the production
of surplus value is dependent on the interrelationship between the
spheres of production and circulation. Within a Marxist framework,
therefore, not only is it inadmissable merely to lump together, as
Lockwood does, supposedly distinct components of class position; it
is not possible to make that differentiation in the first place. The
purchase of labour-power and the utilisation of labour-power (which
Lockwood parallels with market and work situation respectively) are
essentially interrelated in the very logic of capitalist production.
The implication must be that in ignoring this connection, Lockwood
cannot fully comprehend the relationship between the capitalist production
process, the structural formation of class, and the emergence of trade
unionism.
Such inadequacies in his overall approach are reflected in his 
utilisation of key concepts within his framework, most notably that of 
bureaucratization. For Lockwood, it describes a process - the content 
of which has already been questioned - but it is a process without any 
historical or material basis. Why does bureaucratization emerge?
Other than references to the size of organisation or the development 
of modern industry, there is no answer. Why does it emerge when it 
does? Again, no answer. In Lockwood's analysis, bureaucratization
presumably develops as the inexorable consequence of the
growing size of organisations.^ To omit any consideration
of the capitalist mode of production and the historical context of
changes in the capitalist economy suggests fundamental shortcomings
in Lockwood's approach. If he develops the ownership/non-ownership
criterion of class in understanding unionisation amongst biackcoated
workers, he must posit the emergence of unionisation both historically
and analytically within capitalism as well. Yet, despite his
empirical material, Lockwood fails to do this:
"It is true that the wealth of historical material 
presented by Lockwood provides many suggestive indications 
as to why clerical and market and work situations should 
be as they are, but these indications are not related to a 
systematic body of theory." (2)
Bain's non-consideration of the specific nature of capitalist 
production is perhaps more blatant than that of Lockwood, since his 
emphasis on the institutional arrangements of the industrial relations 
system is more abstracted from wider social processes. For instance, 
in attempting to deny Lockwood's postulate that bureaucratization and 
the growth of 'white-collar' unionization are dialectically related ^  he 
argues:
1. There is clearly a direct link here between this absence of any 
critical discussion of bureaucracy in Lockwood's work and the Weberian 
tradition. Weber " ... identifies the advance of 1 ir< iuci »tic rationality 
as an inevitable component of the growth of capitalism." (Giddens 
(1972)p.47). Since it is "inevitable" it is quite understandable why 
Lockwood should not concern himself with such trivia. A further indication 
of the Weberian influence in Lockwood is the acknowledgement to Dahrendorf 
in the Preface to Lockwood (1966). The parallels between Lockwood and 
Dahrendorf (1959) in apparently developing a position from Marx's 
understanding of class, yet merely using it as a peg for a Weberian approach, 
are interesting and perhaps not coincidental.
2. Crompton (1976)p.410. It is interesting to contrast Lockwood's empirical 
work which draws on the first 50 years of this century, with that of 
Braverman (1974) ch.15, to give an indication of how the position of the 
clerical worker has changed in that time.
3. In line with this persistant non-usage of Marxist terminology, Lockwood 
prefers Myrdal's term "mutually cumulative". See Lockwood (1966) p.142.
".... the findings of this study suggest that the degree
of interdependence between bureaucratization and unionization 
is very slight. Employment concentration and the 
bureaucratization associated with it are primarily a function 
of the techniques of production and as such are exogenous 
to the industrial relations system". (Bain (1970) pp.16-1-5 
My emphasis).
This separation of the "industrial relations system" from the 
wider economic and social processes of society traces back to an 
important influence in Bain's thought: that of organization theory - 
a school of thought, which Herding convincingly argues, has been 
characterised by an inability to adequately explain trade union behaviour:
it fails to reveal that the very assimilation of 
organisational structure of unions to that of business 
organisations, as well as the specific problems and 
cleavages this process causes for unions, depend on the 
inherent conflict within them between acceptance and 
reinforcement of the conditions created by the economic 
system and attempts to change it". (Herding (1972) p.69).
Hence Dunlop's (1958)"subsystem"approach to industrial relations
has :
"placed unions in a technocratic vacuum, aloof from the 
larger societal conflict which they are based on and 
cannot escape entirely". (Herding (1972) p.69).
In this, Bain is Dunlop's disciple. Employers, unions, and
government all appear "aloof" from the reality in which they must
essentially be located. Despite the weight of this empirical material
it is a major paradox of Bain's approach that his theoretical formulations
do not approximate the reality from which they are supposedly drawn.
As with Lockwood, this general inadequacy is reflected in the
effectiveness of Bain's explanatory variables. Perhaps Bain's major
contribution has been his emphasising of the employer's role in
influencing union growth:
"The employers' role in union growth has generally been 
neglected ... even the most superficial reflection should 
indicate that employer policies and practices may profoundly 
affect the growth and development of trade unionism",
(Bain (1970) p.122).
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Clearly, employers do play an important part in shaping the 
pattern of industrial relations. In a society based on capitalist 
relations of production, where employers own and control the means 
of production - in vivid contrast to the worker whose means of living 
rests merely on his labour power - employers hold a dominant position. 
Their "policies and practices" are distinctly linked to the perpetual 
changes inherent in capitalist development. And the imperatives here 
point to the inseparability of "industrial relations" from other aspects 
of employers' policies.
Yet despite his concern with the neglect of the employers role 
in industrial relations, it is precisely at this point that Bain's 
analysis is most inadequate. For instance, he identifies two 
"employer policies for discouraging white-collar employees from joining 
trade unions", (ibid p.131). These are: "peaceable co-operation" 
and "forcible opposition", and he then describes the various strategies 
which fall under each category. There is, however, no indication under 
what conditions these different practices might be adopted, or towards 
which group they may be directed. This represents the limits of Bain's 
framework. He cannot transcend this institutional perspective and 
hence employers policies are essentially separated from the logic of the 
capitalist economy from which they fundamentally derive.
If Lockwood and Bain, and the schools of thought they represent, 
are thus limited in providing an understanding of trade unionism, can 
the tradition which does consider the specific nature of capitalist
society provide any better insights?
(b) Marxist approaches to understanding trade unionism.
For Marxist approaches to trade unionism, the omissions of the 
Industrial Relations theorists are not merely undesirable, but crucial.
The processes of collective bargaining can in no sense remain contained 
within the institutional arrangements of the Industrial Relations System, 
but must be seen in terms of a society based on a capitalist mode of 
production. Such an approach necessarily emphasises power relationships 
within society, focussing cn the ownership and control of the means 
of production.
Marxist approaches, as understood here, broadly contain three 
components. Firstly, they embrace the specifity of capitalist society; 
in other words, capitalism is an historical stage in the development 
of society and cannot be seen as, in some sense, eternally given.
Secondly, within the specific context of capitalist., the basic struggle 
between groups within society takes on a particular form; class struggle 
is seen as endemic within capitalism, but not peculiar to it. While, 
thirdly, the basis of that class division and the operation of capitalism 
as a whole is the exploitation of -age-labour. Therefore, a Marxist 
perspective embraces a class view of capitalist society based on the 
material conditions of the exploitative relationship of wage-labour. 
Furthermore, the development of this form of class domination is essentially 
understood within the historical progress of society in its various stages.
The immediate central focus is that of wage-labour, whose generality 
is the most significant defining characteristic of capitalism. Its 
fundamental importance for capitalism, Marx sets out in Volume I of Capital. 1
1. The discussion that follows must be essentially cursory of what is a 
complex and rigorous argument. The reader is referred to Marx (1976) Ch 1-6 
for the source of the arguments which follow.
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Here he analyses the underlying logic of the capitalist mode of 
production, arguing that it is based not so much on the usefulness 
of objects, but on the expansion of value (measured by the necessary 
social labour embodied in commodities) and the constant pursuit of 
generating and acquiring surplus value. However the only source of 
surplus-value for the capitalist is labour-power, the productive potential 
of labour. The capitalist can buy labour-power paying only sufficient 
for the labourer to exist; yet the capitalist now possesses the use of 
the labourer's labour-power which potentially can create value of a 
greater magnitude than s/he receives.
Capitalist production thus relies on the freedom of the wage- 
labourer :
" .... and this worker must be free in the double sense 
that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour- 
power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he 
has no other commodity for sale". (Marx (1976) p.272)
Yet in selling his labour to the capitalist, the labourer finds
that he now "works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour
belongs" (ibid,p.291) Not only this,but the product of his labour is
now the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, the
"immediate producer" (ibid, p.292). These are the key characteristics
of capitalist relations of production: a relation built upon coercion,
not of the direct kind as, for instance, in slavery, but indirectly through
wage-labour. That "free" labourer who possesses only his labour-power
is, of course, not free. In order to survive s/he must sell her/his
labour-power. Hence production takes place on the basis of antagonistic
social relations: on the one hand the wage-labourers who possess only
their labour power; on the other, the capitalists, who own and control
the means of production and who expropriate the product.
Within the Marxist framework, trade unions are seen as an expression 
of the antagonistic form of the social relations of production; as the
means of raising, or at least maintaining the price of the sole commodity
of the wage-labourer - her/his labour-power. Trade Unions operate
to ensure wage-labour receives the value of labour-power and that the
price (i.e. wage) does not fall below it.
".... the value of labour-power constitutes the conscious 
and explicit foundation of the trade unions, whose importance 
for the English working-class can scarcely be overestimated.
The trade unions aim at nothing less than to prevent the 
reduction of wages below the level that is traditionally 
maintained in the various branches of industry", (ibid p.1069)
Combination on the part of the wage-labourers is necessary, stresses
Marx, because of the inequality of the employment contract. Quoting
a contemporary Union Secretary at some length:
"The workers combine in order to achieve equality of a sort 
with the capitalist in their contract concerning the sale 
of their labour. This is the rationale (logical basis) 
of the trade unions". (T.J.Dunning quoted in Marx (1976) 
p. 1070).
This emphasis on the market role of trade unions is reflected 
in the whole tradition of Marxist approaches to trade unionism.
'Economisin', since Lenin's sharp criticism of trade unions, is used 
to denégrate efforts which do not consider wider political aspects, and 
characterises trade unionism as both deriving from and concerned with 
the market position of labour-power.
Gramsci, too, emphasises the limitations of trade unions. He
argues that the origins of trade unionism can be seen as a mirror image 
of capitalism itself:
"It can be maintained that(trade unions) are in a certain 
sense an integral part of capitalist society, and have a 
function which is inherent in the regime of private property.
In this period, when individuals are only valued as owners 
of commodities, which they trade as property, the workers 
too are forced to obey the iron laws of general necessity; 
they become traders in their sole property - their labour 
and professional skills. More exposed to the risks of 
competition, the workers have accumulated their property in 
ever broader and more comprehensive 'firms', they have created 
these enormous appartuses for the concentration of work energy, 
they have imposed prices and hours, and have disciplined the 
market". (Gramsci (1969) p.ll).
"Objectively, the trade union is the form that labour as 
a commodity necessarily assumes in a capitalist regime when 
it organises to dominate the market". (ibid p.14).
There is not a substantial body of literature which attempts to
relate this general perspective to specific categorizations of
wage-labour. One particular effort to do this was Kingender's work
on clerical unionization where he sought to explain this phenomenon
primarily in terms of economic proletarianization.^ In his short
monograph, Klingender tried to tackle two important problems: the
historical expansion of the 'right arm' of capitalist control into a
pattern of highly differentiated and routine job tasks and the potential
(2)allegiance of those workers with the Fascist Movement.
Klingender argues that proletarianisation has been the crucial process 
in the historical devaluation of the position of clerical workers.
Their interests now lie with the manual working class, and Fascism, while 
it may succeed temporarily in "maintaining the petty-bourgeois masses in 
a state of intoxication", will eventually turn on its militant supporters 
with the same "savage terrorism" it had hitherto reserved for its working 
class opponents, (ibid p.101).
Throughout there exists a tension in Klingender's work between 
this political purpose and analytic clarity. In his enthusiasm for 
separating the clerical workers from the "intoxication" of fascism, he *1
*
1. Klingender (1935)
2. Klingender (1935) p.vii Introduction by W.J.Brown.
"A widespread and clear understanding by clerical workers of what 
is happening to them and why, is essential to preventing their use as the 
raw material of Fascism in Britain. To this end the study which this 
book provides is a valuable initial contribution".
In the context of the developing Fascist influence in Western Europe 
Klingender 's work, published in 1935, had a fundamental political purpose: 
to argue the case that a substantial section of the British petty bourgeoisie, 
the clerical workers, were objectively in common accord with the mass of 
the British proletariat.
Wage-labour thus provides the link between the source and
activity of trade unions:
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simultaneously simplifies and confuses the concepts of class and
proletarianisation, and their relationship to trade unionism ^ .
Starting with the basic Marxist distinction of class, that between
the bouregois class as owners of the means of production, and the
proletariat as wage-labourers, Klingender concludes:
"That social strata which lie between the capitalists and 
the proletariat do not constitute a class in the true 
sense of the term, for they perform as a group, no specific 
economic function". (Klingender (1935) p.xi).
This intermediate group may, therefore, place its allegiance with 
either of the main classes. Historically, however, Klingender argues, 
clerical labour has formed part of the capitalist class, yet within the 
logic of the capitalist mode, the process of proletarianisation has 
meant a separation between the capitalist class proper and its one-time 
assistant, the clerk. Now the confusion begins. Nowhere is proletarian­
isation defined. In the early part of the book, where Klingender 
describes proletarianisation as "complete" by 1914 (ibid p. 18) 
he seems to understand proletarianisation in terms of the historically 
declining wages of clerical workers relative to other groups. In this he 
follows through orthodox Marxist notions regarding the devaluation of 
labour-power. Subsequently, however, proletarianisation begins to shift 
in meaning. Klingender talks of how office mechanisation "completes 
the technical proletarianisation of clerical labour", (ibid p.61)
He also argues that the "social isolation" of clerks from the working class 
had "definitely broken down" thus confirming the proletarianisation of 1
1. This allows criticisms like those of Lockwood to carry the force 
which they would scarcely otherwise possess. Lockwood is able to produce 
this caricature of Klingender, which carries little validity against 
current Marxist theorists (or, indeed, Marx himself): "The internal skill 
differentiation of the propertyless class with the advance of industrialisation 
and the increasing heterogeneity of interests associated with this 
development, was definitely discounted in the Marxian concept of a class­
conscious proletariat. Homogeneity of position and interest were rather 
the order of the day. The increasing impoverishment, insecurity, and caste­
like character of the propertyless class world, according to this theory, 
override internal differences and provide the principal dynamic of the class 
system of late capitalism. And into this vortex of 'proletarianisation' the 
blackcoated workers were to be irresistibly drawn to experience their latent 
community of interest with the working class"
Lockwood (1966), p.203
clerical labour - which suggests a wider social content in his
notion of proletarianisation (ibid p.64) . But Klingender places most
emphasis on economic proletarianisation^. That he regards as
"established" by the facts of his interesting and fairly thorough empirical
work. His accentuation of the primacy of the economic would no
doubt set his contribution firmly in the category of 'vulgar' Marxism and
with the label of 'economic reductionism'. This would not be unfair.
But in common with many of his potential critics of today, for Klingender 
trade unionism flows naturally as a class response to the impact of 
proletarianisation:
"The preceding chapters have, I hope, produced ample 
evidence of the value to clerks of one typically working- 
class means of defence that is of great importance in 
the former phase: that of trade union organisation.
It is the only available means of safeguarding the 
economic interests of clerks as a class in face of the 
ever-present desire of the employers to economize 
at the expense of their staffs", (ibid p.102)
Klingender thus echoes the economic/political dichotomy of
Marxist writing. Trade unions arise amongst clerical labour through
the economic proletarianization of the latter, and thus seek to rectify
the market position of their members. 1
1. This would also include the loss of security of employment:
" .... the final barrier against their complete economic 
proletarianization". (Klingender (1935) p. 98).
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The limitations of Marxist approaches.
The major strength of the 'Marxist' approaches over those of 
the 'orthodox' theorists is the way in which capitalism is considered 
as a specific historical epoch which is premised on particular kinds 
of social and economic relationships. This allows an understanding 
of why trade unionism emerged through pin-pointing the exploitative 
relationship of wage-labour and the underlying logic of capitalist 
economy - the expansion of value. Nevertheless, there are severe 
problems with the approaches set out above: firstly, in the neglect in
not following through the precise relationship between wage-labour 
and trade unionism; secondly, in the theoretical and political 
consequences of this neglect which served to emphasise the economism 
of trade unions, thus obscuring the origins of trade unions. Furthermore, 
it is arguably these problems which underlie the inadequate exposition 
of any understanding of unionisation amongst specific employee groups, 
e.g. clerical labour.
Initially, consider wage-labour as the 'necessary' condition for
trade unionism. Throughout Marxist perspectives, trade unionism is
conceived as the collective organisation of wage-labourers; of those
who own only their labour and are exploited by the capitalist class.
Indeed, it is this division between the owners and non-owners of the means
of production, the exploiters and exploited, which constitutes the basic
class division within capitalism. Yet while this distinction possesses
conceptual clarity at higher levels of abstraction, al more concrete
levels of analysis, it becomes clear that wage-labour is a condition
common to widely disparate groups.
"Class is to be defined, not as a concrete entity but 
in terms of a set of relationships : specifically, for 
Marxists,in terms of social relations of production.
But in modern industry, the complexity of these relations 
is considerable. White-collar employees, like manual workers, 
sell their labour-power as a commodity: but so, it could be 
added, do the most senior levels of management, whom few would 
regard as "working class". (Hyman (1973) p.59).
unionism are the same as defining it as a precondition of class position:
while theoretically necessary it is of limited usefulness in
differentiating at the concrete level. Rather more needs to be done
than specifying the exploitative relationship of wage-labour if
trade unionism is to be understood; yet the neglect of the major
Marxist theorists in not pursuing the link between wage-labour and
trade unionism with more endeavour is apparent and is reflected in the
work of some modern inheritors such as Allen (1972).
His framework illustrates the potentially schematic and crude
extensions that can be made of Marxist approaches to trade unionism.
Quite correctly he begins with wage-labour as the 'necessary' condition
for trade unionism, noting that where labour is freely bought and sold,
trade unionism is "endemic, universal, and permanent" (ibid p.11)
But other than this, Allen declines to specify any particular
influence which structures the development of trade unionism. Instead
he states it is necessary to consider "sufficient conditions". These:
".... consist of any factor which injects the realities 
of the labour market situation into the lives of people 
who were previously not conscious of them". (ibid p.14)
Besides the obviously fallacious implication that trade unionism
is reducible to wage-labour plus consciousness, it is equally clear that
if this is all Marxist theory has to offer it does not compare favourably
with the work of the orthodox sociologists and institutionalists - for
at least they try to identify these "sufficient conditions" and, in
some instances, explore how they may influence the development of trade
unionism.
The failure of Marxist approaches to move beyond wage-labour in 
any systematic fashion in relation to trade unionism is a consequence of 
how the 'problem' of trade unionism was specified: this was not so much
The problems of defining wage-labour as a precondition of trade
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in terns of origins, but activities. The dominant Marxist approaches
to trade unions have embraced specific political motives - the
exposure of trade unions as inadequate social institutions for the
transition to socialism. The problems of the working class could not
be resolved by the policies of the trade unions, but needed a wider,
political response embraced in a relationship between the mass of the
proletariat and the advanced sections of the class, the revolutionary
vanguard, in the form of a party. ^
Intellectually, this involved a conflation of the sources and
activity of trade unionism which provided a one-sided account of the
origins of trade unionism: that in terms of the inequality of the labour
contract, trade unions arise to sustain the market value of labour-
power. This explains the origin of unionization while simultaneously
positing the source of trade union economism. There is more than a suspicion
of circularity here, that the origins of trade unions are being explained
(2 )in terms of current actions. But, in any case, this emphasis on the 
market role of trade unions tends to dispense with one whole area of 
possible explanations of trade unionism: the conditions under which the 
work was performed as against the level of remuneration for doing it. The 
accentuation of the market role of trade unions thus serves to obscure 
the whole question of the control and structuring of the labour process.^'
1. Scathing attacks on the trade unions are not limited to those with a 
"Leninist" viewpoint. Consider also Rosa Luxemburg, who partly rejected the 
predominant role of the party in favour of the "sponteneity" of the "mass 
strike", albeit partly derived from her experience of German trade unionism.
2. If trade unions arise from inequality in the labour market, it might be 
anticipated low paid workers would be unionized - but this is scarecely borne 
out historically.
3. and indeed, how changes in the labour process might carry implications 
for wage levels. It is interesting that Marx, despite emphasising the 
primacy of production for capitalism should stress the role of trade unions 
within circulation (i.e. on wage levels), and not explore the relationship 
between the control of production and trade union organisation.
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To conclude: there appear two major limitations within the 
Marxist approaches as generally put forward: firstly, the inadequacy 
of the link between wage-labour and trade unionism; secondly, the 
neglect of the conditions of production in understanding the source 
of trade unionism. These are not, however, problems of the same 
order as emerged with the orthodox approaches. They do not imply the 
inherent failure of the general perspective to come to terms with an 
understanding of trade unionism, merely inadequacies within it. If 
these two problems are overcome, then perhaps something can be said about 
the source of trade unionism in general and unionization amongst specific 
employee groups - which given the undifferentiation of wage-labour is 
scarcely possible at this stage. It new remains to attempt a 
reformulation of an approach to trade unionism .'ithin a Marxist
perspective.
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Chapter 2: Trade Unionism and the Labour Process.
In this chapter there are two major tasks: firstly, to 
reformulate a Marxist perspective on approaching trade unionism 
generally; secondly, to develop this analysis in an effort to determine 
what basis, if any, there is for a differentiation between different 
employee groups.
The deficiencies in the Marxist approach, identified at the end 
of the last chapter, were two-fold: the uncritical linking of wage- 
labour to trade unionism and the relative non-consideration of production 
relations as a source of trade unionism. The resolving of these 
problems is not achieved individually, but simultaneously. In an 
attempt to do so, three conceptual categories are introduced: 
interests, the collective labourer, and the labour process.
Wage-labour is not simply the position of one individual 
in relation to another; it is a generalised social phenomena expressing 
the prevalence of a particular form of exploitation. Wage-labour is, 
therefore, a common condition and experience for many individuals,- 
and it is this position as wage-labourers which represents their common 
denominator as a social group. As such, wage-labour may be seen as 
defining a relationship where interests are in common.
Potentially this can provide a link to trade unionism, if the 
latter is seen as the translation of common interests to collective 
action. For this connection to be justified, two particular questions 
must be successfully tackled: how are interests structured and how 
does this lead to collective action? In answering these questions, 
the impact of production relations is directly confronted: how the
labour process can be seen as the source of collective action amongst 
wage-labourers; and the consequent implications of the collective worker
as the basis of common interests and collective action.
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But even if these links are established, this does not move the 
analysis beyond collective action - which is not synonomous with 
trade unionism. Collective action is problematic. Why do certain 
forms of action occur in some instances and not others? What is 
the relationship to trade unionism? Such questions are integral to 
any attempt to formulate a general approach to trade unionism.
The first part of the chapter is therefore concerned with outlining 
a general approach to trade unionism. It then remains to tackle a 
further complex problem: divisions within wage-labour, in particular 
posing alternatives to that of 'white-collar'/'blue-collar' which 
pervades the orthodox literature on union growth. Having refuted 
the traditional distinction, two potentially fruitful areas are 
investigated as alternative bases for such a division: that between 
productive and unproductive labour; and ambiguous (or contradictory) 
class positions. After some discussion, the latter is put forward as 
the most useful framework when analysing the unionization of workers 
in the 'problem' category of 'white-collar'. In particular this 
indicates a suitable focus for approaching concrete labour processes - 
that of patterns of control and domination over the labour process.
The final and concluding section of the chapter draws on the 
discussions of the previous two. In doing so, it sets out the tasks 
to be attempted in order to discern the utility of labour process 
analysis in understanding unionization.
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(a) General Approach to Trade Unionism.
The first stage of the approach concerns the interests of 
wage-labourers and how these are structured. The concept of 
'interests' can be a little slippery, and perhaps for that reason 
has been avoided by industrial relations 'theorists'. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean interests have not been implied - for instance, 
in the utilisation of co-operative and conjunctive bargaining - nor 
that they should continue to be omitted. That conceptual problems and 
categories may involve methodological difficulties is not a reason 
for ignoring them. In consequence, this section begins with a 
discussion of the concept of interests, drawing on the work of political 
theorists who have not shirked this particular issue, in the anticipation 
this will provide some guidance on its use and potential in 
understanding unionization.
(i) The concept of interests.
The significance of the concept of 'interests' is immediately 
realised once it is shown to be essentially related to the problems 
of political obligation and power. The fundamental issue of political 
oblitation - how power is legitimately exercised by one group over 
another - leads directly to interests: are the governed, in giving 
consent to the governors, acting in their own interests? How can such 
interests be specified? ^
The traditional response in classical liberalist theory was to 
equate interests and expressed wants. This emphasised both the 
importance of individual determination of one's own interests, and the 
reliance upon observable phenomenon as the crucial defining characteristic.
1. The discussion of interests in Lukes (1974) is entirely in terms of 
power relations.
2. For a critical discussion of interest in the classical liberal 
tradition see Balbus, (1971).
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More recently, writers in this tradition have attempted to 
come to terms with the significance of groups, rather than individuals, 
in the political process; interests are assigned to groups, but 
again are defined in terms of observable phenomena - professed 
policies or action. Any conflicts between the groups are seen as 
conflicts
" .... between preferences, that are assumed to be 
consciously made, exhibited in actions, and thus to be 
discovered by observing people's behaviour. Furthermore, 
the pluralists assume that interests are to be understood 
as policy preferences - so that a conflict of interests 
is equivalent to a conflict of preferences".
(Lukes(1974) p.14. Emphasis in original).
The assertion that interests are equatable with observable 
social phenomenon, with expressed wants, is open to serious criticism. 
Two writers who challenge this approach are considered here: Lukes 
(1974), who finds that the treatment of power by pluralist writers^ 
is inadequate and, in consequence, so is their approach to interests; 
and Balbus (1971), who argues that such an emphasis on subjective 
interests ignores how interests are socially determined.
Lukes is primarily concerned with the way "power" is understood 
within various pluralist and radical perspectives. Most of the 
pluralist approaches, he argues, only consider observable conflict (and
observable interests). Once Lukes concludes that non-obsorvable or
"latent" conflict is essential to an understanding of power, he is forced
to take issue with the pluralist conception of interest:
"(The pluralists) are opposed to any suggestion that
interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and
above all, to the idea that people might actually be
mistaken about, or unaware of, their own interests." (ibid p.14) 1
1. Lukes (1974) suggests such a label is misleading and uses the 
term "one-dimensional" instead. Nevertheless, his characterization 
does apply to the broad sweep of pluralist writing, particularly the 
American tradition. The components of the "one-dimensional" view 
are summarised by Lukes on p.25
r*
(
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But where there is a potential conflict which "may never in
fact be actualised" (ibid p.24), there may appear ....
" .... latent conflict, which consists in a contraction 
between the interests of those exercising power and the 
real interests of those they exclude. These latter may 
not express or even be conscious of their interests...."
(ibid pp. 24-25. Emphasis in original). (1)
While Lukes is concerned to argue in favour of an approach which 
focusses on both "subjective and real interests" (ibid p .25) , Balbus 
(1971) asserts that the pluralist reliance on subjective interests 
and the disregarding of the objective component, has left the sources 
of interests unquestioned. He argues the Marxist approach is superior 
since the integration of the objective and subjective dimensions of
(2 )interest allows an examination of how wants are socially generated.
So both Lukes and Balbus argue the case for "real" and "objective" 
interests, respectively. Whatever their differences and deficiencies 
in doing this, the essential argument takes the analysis beyond observable 
social phenomenon.^
1. Lukes amplifies this in a footnote (ibid p.25) where he argues "This 
conflict is latent in the sense that it is assumed that there would be a 
conflict of wants or preferences between those exercising power and those 
subject to it, were the latter to become aware of their interests."
2. The limitations of the pluralist approach in understanding the sources 
of interests have been admitted by self-confessed "radical pluralist",
Aldridge (1976): " .... despite their repeated emphasis on the crucial role
played by consent, pluralists have been slow to examine the origins and 
character of that consent". p.xvii.
3. Lukes' discussion of real interests is slight (see ibid p.34-35). He
cites Connolly (1972) and suggests he (Lukes) would "connect real interests wi 
(relative) autonomy and choice" .p.34. His use of Connolly, however, implies 
real interests could be discerned if the individual had perfect knowledge of 
the consequences of choosing various options; this would seem to imply 
ideological neutrality. Furthermore, it develops from a fundamentally 
philosophical, non-materialist position. The position adopted here will 
suggest expressed interests must be understood in relation to positions within 
society - not some hypothetical 'what-might-be-chosen-in-a-different situation 
Balbus1 (1971) definition of objective interests tends to be both
positivist and empirical. See below.
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But once this has occurred, they are faced with the full rejoinder on
false consciousness*1' and, in Balbus' case, vehement denunciations
of the prescriptive nature of Marxist analysis:
"(The Marxist) tells us what desires we ought to have.
That is what he means by our objective interests; and 
false consciousness consists precisely in our adherence 
to 'false' goals and profession of 'false' needs. The 
falsity is a quality that can be determined objectively 
and irrefragably by Marxist analysis. Whereas pluralists, 
in the liberal tradition, act as midv^jyes to desire,
Marxists gladly practice abortion".
There is really only a need for one response to this kind of 
criticism: that ideology is not neutral - as the tone of Aldridge's
near-hysterical outburst clearly indicates.*1' Once that is established 
then, whatever the methodological problems, false consciousness is a 
possibility. But this may well prove a fruitless discussion unless 
there is something other than a mechanical juxtaposition of objective 
and subjective interests.
!. See for instance Polsby (1963) pp. 22-23, quoted in Lukes (1974) p.14-15 
Aldridge (1976) makes a lamentable attempt to ensure the compatibility of 
pluralism with an investigation of the ways in which wants are socially 
generated, with the concept of false consciousness, while upholding all- 
important liberal values. See Aldridge (1976) p. 121. He fails, amongst 
other things, to discuss the source of wants, but merely suggests the "shaping 
and modification of aspirations in the light of experience", (ibid p.122)
2. Aldridge (1976) p. 121, who matches the ignorance of Marxism with an 
insensitivity to the women's movement. It is, of course, highly 
hypocritical, since pluralists are more usually found in the corridors of 
power in Western Capitalism than Marxists, and there seems little shortage 
of proclamations of the short-sightedness of trade unions, or the real 
interests of workers in relation to pay policy.
3. Aldridge's distasteful analogy does reveal his pre-occupation with 
procedures: it does not matter how good the midwife is if there is 
nothing to deliver - and since the collapse of the post-war boom, there
is little the pluralists can deliver. For a discussion of the procedural 
emphasis in pluralism see Hyman (1978).
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What can be concluded from this discussion of interests?
Firstly, it is insufficient to remain at the level of exprsssed 
wants and preferences, if the intention is to understand how 
interests are structured and how they may develop. This implies, 
secondly, that there must be some consideration of the sources of 
interest, and that, thirdly, these must be related to expressed wants.
Consider the definitions of the subjective and objective 
components of interests which Balbus develops. The subjective 
component,
" .... refers to a psychological state in the mind of 
the person who is said to have the interest".
(ibid p. 152) .
This is distinguished from objective interest in terms of the
impact of external processes which do not necessarily alter expressed
wants. The objective component,
" ... refers to an effect by something on the individual 
which can be observed and measured by standards external 
to the individual's consciousness". (ibid p.152)
Such a definition of objective interest is open to criticism
as both positivist and empirical. It is not so much the "observable
and measurable standards" which are important, but the understanding of
the way in which the positions of individuals, groups, and, ultimately,
classes are structured by the nature of capitalist society. Nevertheless
the main thrust of the argument that Balbus puts forward - that it is
important to move beyond expressed wants and explore the source of
interests - is necessarily convincing for any approach which tries to
understand social processes.
It remains important, therefore, to link the objective and 
subjective components of interest. Subjective interests are not, however 
random, but ultimately structured in a specifically capitalist form:
" .... an individual's subjective interests are not
merely given or randomly generated, but rather are 
systematically determined by the way in which his life- 
chances are objectively affected by objective conditions".
(Balbus (1971) p.153).
Subjective interests must therefore be understood in relation to 
objective interests which are identified through the historical and 
materialist study of capitalist social relations. This necessarily 
involves power relationships, the struggle between and within classes. 
Subjective interests are thus in no sense an outcome of some neutral 
experience of an objective position: political and ideological levels 
of analysis are important in understanding subjective interests and 
the disjuncture between them and objective interests. It must be 
remembered that ideological and coercive power within any society can be 
used to uphold the prevailing social and political order and can strongly
influence the perception and expression of interests of subordinate
.  ( 1 ) classes.
Finally, it must be added that using the concept of interest is not 
straightforward and not without problems. The derivation of objective 
interests is in itself a controversial process, since any postulates 
must necessarily reflect the general approach adopted. Indeed, it might 
also be argued that the separation of interests into objective and 
subjective components is itself a false dichotomy and may lead to 
crude determinist approaches to understanding social processes. 1
1. As noted by Fox (1973) p.216.
"The few can use ... power ... not only directly in determining 
the behaviour of the many, but also indirectly through their 
effect on the many agencies of socialization, communication, and 
attitude forming, in inculcating beliefs, values, and assumptions 
which render the many amenable and submissive to the social 
structures which the power holders wish to maintain".
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The contention here is that the concept of interests can prove 
useful in understanding social position and social action; that the 
distinction between objective and subjective interests can, on balance, 
be usefully made; and that the prior task is to specify objective 
interests. ^  It now remains to approach wage-labour and the
labour process and explore how objective interests are structured.
(ii) Wage-labour, the labour-process and the structuring of 
common interests.
Objective interests,within a Marxist approach can be derived 
theoretically using an historical and materialist analysis of capitalism 
as a specific mode of production. The objective interests of the mass 
of wage-labourers are thus understandable from their position as wage- 
labourers and constitute a reflection of the fundamental class division 
within capitalist society. The categorisation of wage-labour and the 
conception of class divisions both derive, in Marx's analysis, from an 
examination of the processes of capitalist development over a given historical 
period. Thus objective interests are seen as rooted in the material 
conditions of capitalist society and identifiable historically. The 
growth of wage-labour therefore as an historical process constitutes the
development of the proletariat with an objective common interest as 
(2)exploited labour.
1. The justification of these assertions partly derive from the 
inadequacies of alternative approaches, but, more positively, rest 
on the understanding such a perspective provides in the second part 
of the thesis.
2. Some critics of Marx, however, do not seem to understand this
fundamental method of analysis. The petulant criticism by Aldridge
(1976) of Marx, for instance, rests on his (Aldridge's) notion that 
objective interests within Marxism are developed from an ideal 
conception of man - totally ignoring the importance of historical 
materialism. See Aldridge (1976) p. 121.
-41 •
While this may represent the limit of many Marxist approaches, it 
is really only a theoretical starting point. In the first place, the 
question of a common interest amongst wage-labourers must be examined 
more closely. As shown in Chapter 1, wage-labour, at lower levels of 
analysis, cannot be viewed in an undifferentiated way; in consequence, 
a simplistic common interest amongst wage-labourers cannot be read off.
For instance, a dichotomy in the working class might be posed between 
'organised' and 'unorganized' labour, where the 'organised' group can 
make gains to the detriment of the 'unorganized'working-class.Or 
the division might be more precise: an occupational group which can
make gains at the expense of the rest of the working-class; or a crucial 
workgroup within a factory, e.g. skilled engineers, who are able to 
secure gains at the expense of other work groups within the factory. The 
bases for achieving such gains may vary substantially, but the important 
point for present purposes is that interests may differ between wage-workers 
it these different levels of analysis; that these interests may be
( 2)conflictual; and only in the last analysis need they be in common.
The relationship of wage-labour is an exploitative one, in both social 
and economic terms. And, as such, it runs through the whole spectrum of 
life within capitalist society, influencing the structuring and developing 
of relationships. At root, however, it depends upon a particular context: 
that of production, i.e. the exploitation of wage-labour as the generator 
of value and surplus-value.
1. This kind of discussion is evident in Herding (1972); see below, Chapter 6
2. This applies to interests within, as well as between, groups; this 
necessarily raises the question of contradictory interests, depending on 
the level of analysis used, which might usefully also bo seen in short and 
long term components of interests. fialbus (1971) hints at contradictions 
of objective interests, but does not pursue it. Once it is seen that 
objective interests are not unequivocal, this approach might well be used 
to forestall the critics of 'false consciousness'. One interesting 
division is suggested by Wright (1979) who differentiates fundamental and 
immediate interests, (p.197).
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If wage-labour is considered in terms of production, then any
attempt to move beyond wage-labour as a source of common interests must
deal with the question of how production is organized. It implies
a consideration of the labour process in its capitalist form; how the
structure, and changes in that structure, of the labour process can
generate, through common interests, the basis of collective action.
What is meant by the labour process? Following Marx (1976)
the labour process can be defined as:
" .... the universal condition for the metabolic interaction 
between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed 
condition of human existence, and therefore independent 
of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all 
forms of society in which human beings live". (Marx (1976) p.290)
For Marx, the labour process is fundamental for human development.
Here he discusses the labour process as the production of objects of
utility to man - in other words the production of use-values - a process
which Marx does not regard as specific to any historical forms of society.
Clearly the production of use-values underlies the continuity of man's
survival.
At the same time, the labour process assumes different forms in 
different societies in different historical epochs. It is important, 
therefore, to note the conditions under which the labour process is performed. 
At any given point in time, Man is confronted by given conditions of 
production. These take two forms: on the one hand, there are the
instruments of production, the tools, and the raw materials on which s/he 
can work, representing the technical conditions of production; on the 
other, there are the social relations under which the production of use- 
values takes place which may vary historically, e.g. the contrast between 
tribal societies and the conditions of capitalist production.
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Now, in any given historical epoch, the production of use-values 
is subservient to the underlying logic of the mode of production under 
which it takes place. This will throw up particular social and technical 
conditions of production. As noted in the previous chapter the 
rationale of capitalist production is the expansion of value. As regards 
the individual capitalist:
"His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; 
not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but 
also surplus value". (1 )
It is the creation of surplus value (valorization) which distinguishes
the capitalist mode of production:
"The production process, considered as the unity of the 
labour process and the process of creating value, is the 
process of production of commodities; considered as the 
unity of the labour process and the process of valorization, 
it is the capitalist process of production, or the capitalist 
form of the production of commodities", (ibid, p.304).
The labour process is thus unified with the valorization process,
but it is a relationship where the labour process is subservient to the
logic of valorization. The labour process has now become a capitalistic
, , (2) labour process.
The shift in the objectives of production consequently give rise to 
the reorganization of the labour process within capitalism. And while each 
individual labour process may be altered in a specific way, there are 
tendencies which shape the patterns of labour processes in general, and 
which provide the basis for common interests amongst wage-labourers in a sense 
other than their common exploitation. Here two such tendencies are considered 
the socialization of production and the devaluation of labour power. 1
1. ibid p. 293. There is not a direct equation between value and exchange 
value, but the latter exists as the phenomenal form of value. See Marx (1976) 
Chapter 1.
For a fuller discussion see Marx (1976) Chapters 7 and 8 .2.
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(1) The socialisation of production: the interdependence of 
capitalist economy.
"All the contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production can be summed up in one general and 
fundamental contradiction, that between the effective 
socialisation of production and the private, capitalist
form of appropriation ........ It is the objectively
co-operative labour of all men that makes production 
under modern capitalism function". Mandel (1974) p.170 .
The interdependence of the capitalist economy is reproduced at 
different levels: here, Mandel points to its most general application, 
yet it appears both in the interrelationships of different sectors of 
the economy and in the objective co-operation of employees within 
specific labour-processes.
The logic of capitalist production implies that some sectors will 
expand while others contract, changes ultimately dependent on the rates 
of profit within those industries. This becomes more complex when 
considering the relationship between general sectors of economy: between 
financial and manufacturing capital. Overall movements within the 
capitalist economy imply shifts in this relationship which may carry 
implications for the expansion/contraction of different sectors, 
industries, and firms and hence changes in the labour processes which 
prevail at that time. Therefore, changes in the labour process are not 
arbitrary. The structuring of individual labour processes must be located 
within the development of that particular industry and ultimately in the 
context of the overall capitalist economy.
But in terms of the general tendency of the socialisation of 
production, the interdependence within the economy as a whole is paralleled 1
1. As Eiger (1979) p.70 suggests ..... " ....  the analysis of the
development of the capitalist labour process must be set within an 
analysis of the organisation of capitalist production as a whole."
-45-
by a growing interdependence within and between labour processes.
The capitalist labour process is necessarily one of co-operation amongst 
the wage-labourers, bringing together workers in order to produce 
commodit ies.
the co-operation of wage-labourers is entirely 
brought about by the capital that employes them. Their 
unification into one single body, and the establishment 
of a connection between their individual functions, lies 
outside their competence. These things are not their own 
act,but the act of the capital that brings them together 
and maintains them in that situation". (2)
Commodities are now produced on a collective rather than individual 
basis. This tendency is continuously exaggerated through the application 
of division of labour, and the emergence of "specialised" workers who 
become proficient at partial operations. These "specialised" workers 
do not individually produce commodities. Only as combined labour power, 
as the collective labourer, do they produce commodities (ibid p. 475).
In consequence, not only do wage-labourers have their position of 
exploited labour in common; they are now mutually dependent within the 
labour process, since they do not produce commodities individually, but 
collectively. This unity of the collective labourer as a productive 
power for capitalism is therefore paralleled by the development of a common, 
collective, interest on the part of the wage-labourers. With the developmen 
of the collective labourer, the conditions under which wage-labour takes 
place becomes a collective question.
1. It is important to note that co-operation is not simply applied to the 
organisation of a specific labour process, but also to their interrelationship 
For instance, distinct labour-processes may be developed to produce components 
in the case of a physical product; or, regarding a less tangible commodity, 
specialised workers may carry out the same tasks in different sections, e.g. 
licensed house managers who co-operate to produce profits for the brewery 
companies, rather than competing within the same firm.
2. Marx (1976) p.449. This is in contrast to the era of petty commodity 
production since co-operation is now effected not through the exchange of 
commodity producers, but is "mediated through the sale of the labour-power of 
several workers to one capitalist". Ibid p.476
3. Marx (1970) p.53: " Further, the division of labour implies the contra­
diction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual 
family and the communal interest of all indivisuals who have intercourse with 
one another. And indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the 
imagination as the "general interest", but first of all in reality, as the 
mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom labour is divided .
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(2) The Devaluation of labour-power.
The continuing socialization of production which implies the 
co-operative and interdependent nature of the capitalist labour 
process is, in effect and intention, the expansion of social productivity. 
Yet the conditions under which this increasing social productivity occurs 
are capitalist ones; where the expansion of value predominates over the 
use-value of the commodities. Under capitalism, therefore, the 
increasing social productivity is not an end in itself, but a means to 
the creation and appropriation of surplus value. This implies a general 
tendency within the structuring and development of labour processes: 
the continuous effort to increase surplus value through the devaluation 
of labour-power:
"Capital ... has an immanent drive and a constant tendency, 
towards increasing the productivity of labour, in order to 
cheapen commodities and, by cheapening commodities, to 
cheapen the worker himself." (Marx (1970) p. 4J7).
The ability of capital to expand value depends on the special
%
property of labour - that its use-value is a source of value. Hence 
labour receives a wage sufficient for its own reproduction, while it 
may add labour of a greater value to the objects on which it works.
In order to obtain the maximum surplus value, therefore, the capitalist 
attempts to make the most effective use of the time when the labourer is 
working for him and to reduce the cost of her/his reproduction (i.e. the 
value of his/her labour-power). It will be seen, assuming the length 
of the working day either to be fixed or at a maximum, that these two 
points are interrelated. In order to make the most effective use of 
labour-power, the capitalist must increase the productiveness of labour.
Yet in order to increase productiveness, the capitalist will tend to 
reorganise production in a way that devalues specific labour-powers; and 
as a consequence of increased productivity, the commodities produced become 
cheaper and hence devalue labour-power in general.
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It is the direct devaluation of labour, of specific labour- 
powers, which is of particular importance for the organising of the 
labour-process. Within the generally socialised labour process, the 
direct devaluation of labour-power constitutes the basic underlying 
tendency of the determination of relationships between different 
groups of wage-labourers, in both a technical and social sense.
Through the logic of the law of value, it carries the imperatives for 
changes in the technical components of job tasks, usually in terms of 
deskilling, and thus the interrelationship of revised job tasks in 
a restructured labour process.^ In consequence, this allows
an examination of the basis of co-operation within the labour process, 
how this may change and how this may affect the structuring and patterns 
of interests. For while the socialisation of the labour process may 
generate a general common interest for the collective labourer, it may 
simultaneously structure divisions of interest amongst the wage-labourers 
based on the self-same interdependence. Whether there is a tendency 
towards solidarity or differentiation of interests depends on the basis 
of co-operation of different groups of wage-labourers within the labour 
process; yet this in turn is ultimately structured by the law of value.
Through focussing on the underlying tendencies which structure 
and change the capitalist labour process, the development of common 
interests can be more clearly understood. This approach moves beyond 
the ultimate unity of wage-labour as exploited labour, to a position where 1
1. It is recognised that the whole question of 'deskilling' is both 
complex and problematic. It is perhaps necessary to point out that here 
it is assumed the devaluation of labour-power is a general tendency of 
capitalist economy, whereby all labour would notionally, in the last analysis, 
be reduced to a general level. Nevertheless this is only a tendency and 
can be considered as entirely consistent with the counter-tendency to 
revalue labour-power, which is likely to occur simultaneously with 
devaluation-tendency. Thus, in general terms, the devaluation of labour 
power is likely to generate a basis of co-operation within the labour 
process commensurate with a growing common interest amongst the wage- 
labourers involved; while simultaneously it may provide a source of 
division of interest as the position of some employee groups is revalued.
For an interesting discussion of deskilling, see Eiger (1979).
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collective interests can be understood and specified in terms of the 
co-operative interdependence of the labour process - personified in the 
collective labourer - and the basis of that co-operation, which may be 
a source of common or conflictual interests, and which can be approached 
through examining the devaluation of labour-power. This represents 
an advance from the monolithic category of wage-labour while simultaneously 
placing the relations of production at the forefront of understanding 
collective action.
Yet the main proponents of Marxist positions, as shown in Chapter 1, 
emphasised the market role of trade unions, of the level of wages as 
the important determinant of collective action and, implicitly, the 
structuring of common interests. While here the conditions of wage- 
labour have been emphasised rather than the remuneration, this does not 
mean the latter can be ignored. Indeed, it is important to integrate 
the analyses.
Wage issues focus directly on the general relationship of wage-labour; 
as such, they potentially transcend production and workplace relations 
implying a common interest as widespread as wage-labour itself. 
Simultaneously, however, as wage-labour expands, so the effect of socialized 
production and the tendency to devalue labour-power generates an 
increasing intensity of competition amongst homogenised labour for wages. 
This gives rise to a position where the immediate interests of some groups 
of wage-labourers are in conflict with wage-labour in general; thus 
wage-issues are simultaneously a source of solidarity and sectionalism.^  ^1
1. This should not be seen as an adoption of Wright1s (1979) p.197, distinctioi 
of fundamental and immediate interests. For Wright "immediate interests are 
defined primarily in terms of market relations” while fundamental interests 
are " defined at the level of the mode of production". The former take "a mode 
of production as given". This schematic division is important in raising 
different levels of interests; yet sidesteps the question of immediate 
interests in relation to the mode of production. In terms of the above 
discussion the casting of immediate interests as concerned with market relatioi 
(i.e. wage issues) cannot bo separated from production relations. Wage 
issues can challenge the mode of production; equally demands about the 
conditions of work may not constitute the posing of choices between alternativi
social relations of production.
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While wage-labour provides a basis for a common, collective, 
interest as exploited labour, the labour process provides a context for 
collective interests which is fundamentally work-based. In the 
latter case, the collectivity revolves around a particular capitalist 
social formation - the firm - which implies a narrower structuring of 
interests. Immediate achievements can and need to be made through 
that employer.
However the disjuncture between wage-labour and the labour process
as a source of common interest in relation to wage-issues is by no means
complete. For insofar as wages are tendentially related to the value
of labour power, so the process of the devaluation of labour-power as
it affects the organisation of the labour process will also affect wage 
(1) (2) 
levels. Indeed, as suggested in the criticism of Lockwood , the
interrelationship of production and circulation implies the non-separation
of market and work situations. Thus it is entirely consistent to integrate
the questions of the remuneration and conditions of wage-labour within
the context of the labour-process.
So far, while suggesting a framework for approaching the question 
of common interests there has been no attempt to link interests with 
collective organisation and action. What are the mechanisms which allow 
the transition from common interests to collective action? And is this 
merely read off as trade unionism? These questions are taken up in the 
next section.
1. As Crompton and Gubbay argue (p.154) ... we can best begin to
understand the unequal structure of incomes from employment if we examine 
the development of the capitalist labour process, and the associated 
emergence of the global function of capital on the one hand, and the 
collective worker on the other". See also the discussion in section 2 
below.
2. see Chapter 1.
.
-50-
Common interests, workplace activity, and trade unionism.
The preoccupation of bourgeois academics with the issue of social 
control rather than understanding implies they have little to offer 
when it comes to developing the links between common interests, workplace 
activity, and trade unionism. Bain's emphasis on number counting as 
an indicator of union growth - to the exclusion of any analysis of 
the growth of trade unionism as a social force - is one dimension of 
this tendency; while the sociologists have concentrated attention on 
union character and "unionateness", which are concerned with the patterns 
of union behaviour and sources of collective strength. ^  In
consequence the crucial questions of collective action and organization 
have been largely ignored.
Consider for instance Lockwood's contribution to this problem in
his discussion of the basic precondition for "concerted action" :
"Concerted action is a function of the recognition by 
the members of the occupational group that they have 
interests in common." (Lockwood 1966,p.137).
In one sense this is undoubtedly correct, since it is virtually a 
truism: furthermore it does allow the observation that it is not merely
the objective position of workers which must be understood in approaching 
trade unionism; it also demands the consideration of workers experience 
as exploited labour. This necessarily opens up a discussion on the 
visibility of capitalist social relations and the way in which ideological
and political forces consistently invert the real nature of those 
( 2)relationships. Yet while these pressures may tend to hide the way
1. Lockwood (1966) discusses union character in an attempt to integrate 
social class as a determinant of the patterns of collective behaviour. 
"Unionateness" is developed by Blackburn (1967) to help explain the potential 
and actual disjuncture between the density of union membership and collective 
strength. See Bain (1973) pp 79-108 for a critical evaluation of the use of 
these concepts by Lockwood and Blackburn.
2. This is a major recurrent theme in Marx's writings. See Marx (1976) 
pp. 163-177.
(iii)
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in which labour is exploited, the operation of the underlying economic
forces of capitalist production continuously throw into view the
contradictions of the system. This may be on a large scale, e.g. high
levels of unemployment combined with a shortage of commodities; or it
may be at the level of the workplace. But arguably the general tendency
of the growing interdependence of capitalist economy involves an
increasingly complex and volatile interrelationship of general sectors;
and here the antagonistic basis of the social relations of production
may tend to become increasingly apparent. For the moment, however, this
discussion is left to later chapters. ^
While Lockwood invites discussion of the question of consciousness
his comment is profoundly misleading, for it implies a movement from
inactivity to action on the part of workers. But through focussing on
the labour process, it becomes clear that workers are already organized
and act collectively - for capital:
".... we must, first of all, keep in mind that unions are 
associations of members who, before they can become 
members of unions, are already members of other organizations, 
namely employees of capitalist enterprises. Thus, unions 
are "secondary" organizers, and capital itself functions 
as a primary organizer". (2 )
So if workers are already acting collectively, what is this "concerted" 
action that Lockwood refers to? By implication it can only refer to 
particular forms of action or action in particular contexts. But how can 
these be delineated from the everyday functioning of the collective worker? 
Is it indeed possible to do so?
1. See below Chapters 3 and 4.
2. Offe and Wiesenthal (1979) p. 72 (emphasis in original).
The point, in less academic style, is forcibly made by Draper (1955).
"Workers are taught organization not by their superior intelligence 
or by outside agitators, but by the capitalists themselves. They are 
organized on the assembly lines, in the factory gangs, in shifts, in work 
teams, in the division of labour of capitalism itself. Capitalism cannot live 
and cannot grow without "organizing" its workers and teaching them the virtues 
of a form of "solidarity", of working together".
In the first instance it is necessary to link the way in
which workers act to their position as exploited labour, to the inequality
of the employment contract. The peculiarity of labour-power as a
commodity in that it remains under the physical control of the worker,
yet belongs to the capitalist, allows for certain forms of resistence
inherent in the functioning of the collective worker:
"The work can only be done by the worker, although his 
labour legally "belongs" to the capitalist. If the 
capitalist wants to get the work done, he has, for better 
or worse, to rely on the willingness of the worker 
to "give away" his/her physical and intellectual 
capacities by applying them to concrete labour tasks.
In this way, the quantity and the quality of actual work 
performance remains subject to a permanent conflict that is 
not to be resolved by formal contractual relations in which 
both sides have engaged. Therefore, both "partners" of 
exchange try to improve their respective positions by 
resorting to a wide variety of positive and negative 
sanctions. This is the only way in which the "equivalence" 
of a certain amount of labour and a certain wage is 
established, challenged, and reestablished." (Offe and 
Wiesenthal (1979) p. 73).
Once it is recognised that merely in performing the work of the collecti 
labourer, workers are taking collective action, then certain forms of 
resistance are possible, independent of any formal organization. But 
there are inherent limits to this kind of response. The general 
processes of socialization of production and the devaluation of labour 
power imply the options of taking action of this kind diminish or that they 
can only rectify certain kinds of problems. Most obviously, it 
scarcely permits any articulation of positive demands on a variety of 
issues, e.g. pensions and sick pay; while the development of multi-plant 
and multi-national companies increasingly undermine the potential of 
informal workgroup practices.
The expanding interdependence of different groups of workers, 
through the labour process, illuminates the limitations of informal modes 
of resistence. It carries a functional imperative: that, on the one
hand, new forms of action are necessary for which the existing
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organization is inadequate; and, on the other, that the same kinds of 
action must be utilised within a different context. This implies 
the development of a formal organization, perhaps within the workplace, 
but also going beyond it. At this point trade unions enter the 
discussion as an outcome of collective action, as a mode of expression 
of common interests through certain forms of workers' action.^
But clearly trade unionism is not synonomous with collective 
action. Trade unionism is not the only form of workplace collectivism;
furthermore it embraces wider components than those merely derived
( 2 )from workplace experience. Trade unionism cannot be "read off"
as workplace collectivism because it is both historically and socially 
determined:
"The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon. It
becomes a determinate institution, i.e. it takes on a
definite historical form to the extent that the strength
and will of the workers who are its members impress a
policy and propose an aim that define it". (Gramsci (1977) p.265).
The nature of trade unionism is thus not once and for all determined,
nut undergoes constant revision; and in consequence the sources and
explanations of trade unionism are historically specific.
At the same time, trade unionism exists as a particular form of
workplace activity; and again whether collectivism takes this form is
both a social and historical question - although for many years trade
unions have existed as by far the most predominant institutional form
of workplace collectivism. In consequence, it is a relationship which
demands empirical analysis at the level of individual labour processes and
workplaces.
1. The development of formal organization must not be seen as replacing, 
but co-existing with, informal practices. The relationship is indeed 
complex since certain informal practices may continue in this way, while 
others are taken over by/administered through, the organizational structure.
2. Although it has been argued that workplace experience remains the 
primary source of trade unionism.
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Because of the mediating role of workers experience, the precise 
links between common interests, workplace activity md trade unionism 
cannot be specified, in that the transitions between forms of iction 
and organization will differ between different groups of workers 
according to their different experiences. But some general points can 
be made. Firstly, that the conditions for collective action and common 
interests are simultaneously determined through the development of 
the collective worker. Collective action must be understood in 
relation to the labour process with the potential of collective resistonce 
inherent in the organizing of the labour process by capital. In 
consequence little can be said about the particular forms of resistance 
other than that they arise from within the concrete labour processes 
through workers experience as structured by their collective interests.
Secondly, formal workplace organization will appear increasingly 
as an option with the development of capitalist economy, whereby informal 
workgroup practices have less potential and/or unable to achieve desired 
objectives. In this way collective organization becomes both the means 
and the consequence of collective action. This seems scarcely controversial, 
but interestingly it does carry implications for how forms of action 
are analysed: it implies looking beyond the immediate appearance of 
workers resistence to its context and is necessarily opposed to typologies 
such as individual and collective responses. * " 1
Finally, a distinction can be made between workplace collectivism and 
trade unionism, although they are interrelated through the commonality of 
trade unionism as the socially and historically determined response of workers 
to their exploitation.
1 . See the discussion in Chapter 4.
- Divisions within wage-labour: An alternative to the 'white-collar'
- 1b 1 ue-ccllar' iistinction: class ambiguity and collective interests.
Having laid the groundwork for a general approach to trade 
unionism, the question of the validity of making broad divisions within 
the workforce is considered which, perhaps, underlie the notion of 
'white-collar' unionism. But what of the conceptual status of 'white- 
collar'? It is interesting to note that neither Lockwood or Bain 
actually spell out the nature of the distinction between 'white' and 
'blue-collar', nor why this is important for understanding trade unionism 
amongst 'white-collar' groups. While Lockwood sidesteps the problem 
by focussing on ’clerks* - scarcely an natic categ Lther -
3ain implies a distinction should be made, though in an operational 
rather than analytical sense.
It is not difficult, perhaps, to come to the same conclusion 
as Sraverman, that the white-collar/blue-collar distinction is an 
historical ana;hr •: . sm. And, as :lea*ly portrays, ' - -
of clerical workers in terms of changes in the labour process, paralle*.
( 2)those of manual workers in earlier periods. " This is not, however,
to dismiss the basis of the ’white’collar'/'blue-coliar’ iistinction.
As Braverman, himself, points out:
"It was not the colour of the employee's collar, still less 
the mode of payment on an annual or monthly basis as 
distinguished from the daily or hourly wage of the manual 
worker, that in themselves had a determinate meaning, but 
rather the whole complex of social position and position in 
the enterprise and the labour process that these terms 
symbolized." (ibid d . 349) 12
1. 3 rave man (1974) pp. 325-6
«___ the traditional distinctions between "manual" and 'white-col*ar
labour, which are so throughtlessly and widely used in the literature 
on this subject, represent echoes of a past situation which has 
virtually ceased to have meaning in the modern world of work .
2. Braverman (1974) Ch.15.
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Dismissing the terminology leaves different questions. Can any 
categories be developed which more accurately reflect the basis on 
which that distinction rests? Is that kind of distinction meaningful 
in any case?
In this section two approaches within a Marxist analysis are 
considered which might potentially provide a basis of such a distinction: 
the first relates to the fundamental nature of capitalist exploitation, 
the production of surplus value, and explores the potential of a 
distinction between those sectors and activities which produce value 
.'and, potentially, surplus value) and those that do not. The second 
refers to the structure of class divisions within capitalism and fellows 
recent work on the patterns and potential ambiguity of class position.
(i) Productive and Unproductive Labour.
The inadequacy of the orthodox socioLogical distinction between 
white and blue collar workers is met in Marxist approaches by 
formulations which root the position of wage-labourers in the very nature 
of the capitalist production process and which generate divisions cutting 
across the 'white-collar'/blue—collar' distinction. Capitalist production 
rests on surplus value; it thus provides a basis for a dichotomy 
between those wage-labourers who produce value, and are thus a source of 
surplus value, i.e. productive labour, and these who do not, i.e. 
unproductive labour.^
In the first instance.productive labour can be defined as labour 
exchanged with capital to produce surplus-value. Hence whether an activity 
is productive is not contingent on the con tent of that activity, but on 
its social form - the production of surplus value within capitalist 
production relations.
1. Braverman (1974) provides a highly readable discussion of this 
distinction. Gough (1972) examines in some detail Marx's analysis of 
productive and unproductive labour and provides a useful starting point 
for more complex analysis.
-57-
"The distinction between productive and unproductive labour 
refers neither to the usefulness of the product nor the 
type of work required, but to the social relations in which 
the wage labour is embedded". (1 )
Given this definition, any discussion of the relationship between 
productive and unproductive labour must not only focus on specific
activities, but the relationships within capitalist society as a whole;
( 2)it must consider both specific capitals and capital in general.
Crompton and Gubbay (1977) recognise this in discussing the class
"situation" of unproductive workers:
".... if we are to understand the class situation of
unproductive workers in industry, as well as that 
of non-industrial workers, we have to examine the manner 
in which surplus value flows through the system as a whole, 
and how different groups of workers are related to this system." 
(Crompton and Gubbay (19771 p.76).
Analysing specific capitals from the perspective of productive 
and unproductive labour emphasises the acticity as a source of value, 
rather than its content. It raises the question of the social 
relationships of production, of what functions are performed by whom 
in the labour process. Ultimately that distinction is between carrying 
out the function of capital or the function of labour. On the other hand,
capital in general indicates the importance of different sectors of 
activity and their function within the economy.
1. Crompton and Gubbay (1977) p.75. see also Gough (19.'-) p.50.
In terms of what labour is productive or unproductive, Gough gives some 
guidance (ibid p.51). Subsistence farming is unproductive, for the crops 
are not produced for exchange; also, services paid for out of revenue (the 
income of the capitalist) are unproductive, for they merely relate to the 
capitalist as consumption and not production.
2. As Braverman notes, the movement of unproductive labour into 
productive labour ".... is the very process of the creation of capitalist 
society". (Braverman (1974) p.4131 .
-58-
JÀI
Bringing these two dimensions together can result in some sterile 
debates over the categorisation of sectors.^ There is broad 
agreement that activities outside capitalist relations must be 
unproductive (since by definition no surplus value is produced); and 
that private capital production of physical commodities is productive, 
since this comprises the sphere of production; furthermore, activities 
in the sphere of circulation, primarily concerned with the financing and 
realisation of value (but not its creation), are considered unproductive. 
However, once the complication of intangible commodities and state-
( 2 )controlled production are introduced, differences of opinion emerge.
The important point is that by analysing capital in general, certain 
sectors are ruled out from being productive, irrespective of the kinds 
of job tasks performed in them, and whatever function is carried out within 
the labour process as a whole.
Looking at the delineations within specific capitals, the division 
between productive and unproductive labour is apparently straightforward, 
but becomes immediately more complex. Since wage-labour is the only 
source of surplus value, only those performing the function of labour 
can be productive; those performing the function of capital are consequently 
unproductive. The difficulty arises when trying to identify who does 
what function. Is someone who is paid a wage necessarily a wage-labourer 
and merely carrying out part of the function of labour? . Put another 
way, it is virtually the problem of defining the working-class - not a
(4very fruitful pastime since it denies the importance of class as a process. 1
1. For instance, whether the 'service' sector is productive. Crompton and 
Gubbay (1977) argue that it is (p.76 and pp.81-85), while Handel (1976) 
argues it is largely unproductive (pp.403-406); see also the brief discussion 
at the beginning of Chapter 3 which raises the issue of how bookmaking can
be categorised.
2. This debate is not pursued here. See Gough (1972) and Crompton and Gubbay 
(1977) Chapter 5 for similar perspectives. For more restrictive views of 
productive labour, see Mandel (1976), Chapter 12 and Poulantzas (1975)
pp. 209-223.
3. "Although every worker is a wage-earner, every wage-earner is certainly 
not a worker, for not every wage-earner is engaged in productive labour". 
(Poulantzas (1975) p.2 0).
4. See Wriqht (1976) for a discussion of the way the working class can be-- -—  delineated.
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Merely to try and categorise sectors and/or job functions 
as productive or unproductive is often a contentious and unrewarding 
exercise. As with any other concepts, the significance and 
usefulness of the productive-unproductive distinction must depend 
on what it is intended to explain. Whatever the arguments at the 
margins, this distinction does allow some means of drawing a division 
between sectors and functions within the capitalist economy which might 
have some implications for unionization. Gough (1972) concludes that 
the "political implications" are not unambiguous, and allows two "extreme 
views" to be held:
"The first rigorously identifies productive workers with 
the working class, thus deduces the political class 
structure of capitalist society from these economic 
categories. The second denies any theoretical link or 
practical correlation between the two". (Gough (1972) p.69).
While allocating these positions to various writers, Gough also
traces both perspectives to Marx's own writings (ibid p.69). The
first emphasises the differences between productive and unproductive
workers, while the second focusses on their similarities. It is,
perhaps, most useful to consider each proposition in reverse order.
One strand of Marx's thought was to suggest commercial wage-labourers
share common characteristics with their counterparts in surplus value
production: firstly, their labour is exchanged with capital; secondly,
they perform surplus labour, in that they work part of the day for nothing
thirdly, wages are determined in a similar fashion - the cost of
production of their labour power. This perspective has been taken up
and extended to unproductive wage-labourers generally:
". ... the situation of 'unproductive' workers resembles 
that of 'productive' workers in so far as control over 
their labour has been relinquished - an essential 
similarity that will fail to bo sufficiently emphasised 
if exploitation is simply seen as the appropriation of 
surplus product". (Crompton and Gubbay (1977) p.33).
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Following such a view to its logical conclusion, Wright finds:
"It is hard to see where a fundamental divergence of 
economic interests emerges from the positions of 
unproductive and productive labour in capitalist 
relations of production". (Wright (1976) p.17).
This perspective can be summarised as follows:
(1) That the objective interests of unproductive workers
and productive workers may well coincide through the commonality of the
social form of exploitation.
The second position emphasises the productive workers as the 
working class, arguing there is a fundamental difference between the 
activities of various sectors of the economy, however they have been 
developed and utilise wage-labour (1). The existence of
unproductive-workers is necessarily predicated on productive workers
and the former therefore have an objective interest in the exploitation 
(2 )of the latter. Crompton and Rubbay (1977) accept, for instance,
that
"...... although we have argued that class situations
within productive and unproductive spheres are basically 
similar, it is still the case that the fact that work is_ 
unproductive does complicate the class situation of 
the unproductive worker". (Crompton & ' .:■ i iy_ (1977) p.96).
It may imply a mutuality of interest between labour and capital
in unproductive sectors (ibid p.96) and/or divergent interests between
productive and unproductive workers (ibid p.97). A second proposition
car. therefore be put forward:
(2) That the interests of unproductive and productive workers are 
fundamentally dissimilar; that productive workers alone constitute a 
potential revolutionary group; and that the objective interests of 12
1. The two perspectives would therefore seem consistent with the distinction: 
between specific capitals (performance of social functions of labour or capita 
and capital in general (spheres of productive and unproductive activity).
2. The most forthright preponent of this view of class identification is 
Poulantzas. See Poulantzas (1975) and also Wright (1976) for a very useful 
exposition and critical analysis of Poulantzas1 position. For a discussion 
of this position as arising in Marx's work see Gough (1972) pp.70-71 .
income rests or. the crcducticr. of sort.is va-ie bv croductive workers.
. nc c  : :u c t _ / e  c a s t  v,,.- t o e  c a p i t i - i s c  t . ' s s ,  ; . n c ;  t c e i r
Gcugr. tries to move ceyond the ocr.oir.es of the apposing 
theories" .cii p.~- »yet this only comprises an attempt to eliminate
this important contradiction between the commonality of the social
. . - . ( l i ­toral or exploitation vis-a-vis tr.e means oo existence. The
analytical abjective, however, is not to eliminate the contradiction,
out to explore its implications.
What is the importance of this contradiction for specifying
common interests and any potential for collective action? While the
commonality of wage-labour provides a prima facie mderlying commet
objective interest as exploited labour, the predication of the income of
unproductive workers or. the surplus value created by productive workers
ides it inherent abjective basis for an flicts af interest aetween
these two groups. This tension, however, is not relevant to the internal
r? 1aticnsnips w .thin these groups.
The implication is that the productive-unproductive distinction
is mere or less important, depending on the questions that are asked.
In considering the concrete relationships between these groups, the
or, must be considered,- yet looking at each group independently,- —•=--
Tespite his effort? to the contrary, Gough's own perspective of trade 
union activity rests upon this distinction and tension. Initially he 
seems to go seme way to agreeing with proposition (1).
"... it would seem evident that white-collar and commercial 
workers are increasingly displaying trade-union and political 
militancy on a par with associations of productive workers 
a.g. ASTMS,. This spread of political consciousness follows 
from the increasing proletarianization of the workforce, forecast 
by Marx long ago. To this extent, his distinction between 
productive and unproductive workers is not relevant for 
deriving political attitudes". (ibid p.~1)
there is no reason to suppose that chances in the social organisation 
of wort will not generate collective interests and responses amongst 
unproductive labourers, just as they do amongst productive ones.
The extent to which this is valid depends initially on how unproductive 
workers have been affected by changes in the labour-process; and there 
is substantial evidence to suggest that experiences amongst some 
sections of unproductive workers, e.g. clerical labour, have matched 
those of their productive counterparts. But ultimate validity
depends on whether unproductive workers are exploited in the same way, 
i.e. as wage-labour, as productive workers. Clearly, there is a 
difference, since the former do not produce value; yet it would be 
nonsense to talk of unproductive labourers being paid a wage commensurate 
with the equivalent of labour provided by them. This leads Carchedi, 
for instance, to conclude:
"Even though, strictly speaking we cannot talk of exploitation 
of unproductive workers because these workers do not produce 
and thus cannot be expropriated of surplus value, we can talk 
of economic oppression of these workers". (Carchedi (1975a) p.18).
Exploitation still exists for unproductive workers, but in a
different form:
".... While the productive worker is expropriated of his 
labour in the form of value, the unproductive worker is 
subjected to a direct exploitation of labour". (ibid p.19)
Thus insofar as productive and unproductive workers are similarly
exploited, there remains a fundamental common interest. And while
unproductive labour is seen in terms of wage-labour, the potential of
collective action based on the twin structures of wage-labour and the
( 2)changing, capitalistic, labour-process can be specified. Yet this 12
1. See, for instance, Bravermar. (1974) Ch.15.
2. That wage-labour is a social relationship is crucial to understanding
unproductive labour. Most workers are paid in what is commonly called 
"wages", but this does not necessarily denote 1 wage-labour'.
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would really imply the comparative irrelevance of the distinction of 
productive-unproductive labour in analysing work-based collectivities 
except where considering relationships between different groups; and 
even here the prior development of collective organization is assumed.
In focussing on the development of workplace collectivities, therefore, 
the conclusion must be that the productive-unproductive distinction 
does not provide us with a sufficient basis for drawing distinctions 
within wage-labour.
(ii) The ambiguity of class position.
The earlier discussion of the link between common interests and 
collective action emphasised the importance of understanding how 
interests are structured as a prior task to exploring the social 
experience of workers which may lead to certain forms of collective action. 
The categories of 'white' and 'blue-collar', despite appearances, do not 
really reflect a structured division of class position in any consistent 
sense. ^  And it is not merely a question of anachronism^. It also 
reflects the comparitive neglect of the sources of class position in 
orthodox sociology:
".... to focus on the forms of consciousness exhibited by 
class agents and the associated question of how indidividuals 
achieve class membership through mobility - the 
institutionalized obsession of British sociology - leaves 
the prior question of the determination of class positions 
unanswered and,therefore, subject to arbitrary operationalism". 
(Johnson (1977) p.195. Emphasis in original).
This opens up the possibility of reconstituting the links between 
class and trade unionism, inadequately made by Lockwood and his 
followers and denied importance by Bain and the institutionalists of 
industrial relations. The question is quite straightforward: can 12
1. See, for instance, the efforts of Bain & Price (1972) to draw the 
line between these categories.
2. See Braverman (1974) p. 325-6 and quoted above p.'^S
a link be established between class position and the structuring of
objective interests, particularly at the level of production relations,
which goes beyond the general categorization of wage-labour? The
answer is less simple; and involves an exceedingly complex path
thr ugh the debate on the new middle class to the consideration of
( 1 )amoiguity in class position.
The fundamental distinction between wage-labourers as non-owners 
of the means of production, and capitalists as the owners of the means 
of production does not apply unequivocally to all groups. Historically, 
there have been non wage-labourers who nevertheless could not properly 
be characterised as capitalist. Such groups e.g. self-employed 
shopkeepers, have been referred to as the'petit bourgeoisie' indicating 
the intermediate character of their class position.
But of more recent significance has been the growth of a new 
intermeduate strata; the characteristic of this new group ls that while 
they do not own the means of production in any real sense, they nevertheless 
perform the function of capital as opposed to the function of the 
collective labourer. They are neither owners of capital nor exclusively
wage-labourers. This indeterminancy presents the possibilities of
. (2) ambiguous class positions.
1. It is not intended to make a detailed study of the new middle class 
debate, merely to specify some of the problems involved. The reader is 
referred to Carcr.edi (1975a) , Poulantzas (1975) , Urry (1973) , and
Mallet (1975) as an "introduction" to the debate within a Marxist tradition.
2. How this class is identified is indeed different according to which 
writer is considered. This distinction is that broadly developed by 
Carchedi.
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One of the most recently influential formulations of ambiguity 
in the position of the new middle class is that of Carchedi In 
what is often a difficult article to understand, Carchedi derives the 
essentially contradictory position of the new middle-class by exploring 
the capitalist mode of production at two high levels of abstraction: 
the pure capitalist structure and the capitalist socio-economic system.
While he draws a distinction between capital and labour at the 'pure' 
level, at the socio-economic level this becomes a distinction between 
'agents' who are defined in terms of their 'position' within production 
relations. They perform correspondingly different functions of both 
a social significance (i.e. the function of capital and the function of 
labour)and technical quality (job description).
Within capitalism the function of labour soon takes on a specific 
form - the function of the collective worker. But historically,
Carchedi argues, the function of capital itself also becomes fragmented.
It becomes:
"the task of a structure, not of an individual; that is 
transformed into the global function of capital (Carcl;< -1 i (1975a) 
p. 29. Emphasis in original).
But what does this function of capital involve? Here Carchedi
builds on Marx's two-fold characterisation as a basis for specifying
contradictory class positions. Marx noted that:
"The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a 
special function arising from the nature of the social 
labour process, and peculiar to that process, but is at 
the same time a function of the exploitation of a social 
labour process (Marx (1976) p. 449).
Thus Carchedi divides the capitalist function of supervision and 
management into, on the one hand that deriving from the exploitative 1
1. Carchedi's main theoretical statements can be derived from Carchedi (1975 
Among those who draw extensively on his approach are Crompton and Gubbay (1977 
while Wright (1976) also takes the notion of contradictory class positions 
from Carchedi's work.
relationship of capitalist production from, on the other, that
deriving from the technical problems of organising a social labour 
he
process. The first/calls the work of control and surveillance, the 
latter the work of co-ordination and unity. (Carchedi (1975a) p. 24).
The core of Carchedi's argument is that these two aspects can 
be analytically distinguished; and that the former can be seen in terms 
of the function of capital, the latter as the function of labour. Now 
when the function of capital becomes fragmented, these two aspects 
become seperated. Within any given firm, the higher echelons now only 
perform the work of control and surveillance, while those at lower 
levels may perform both. The new middle class which does not own 
capital in either a legal or real sense, thus performs both the function 
of the collective labourer and the global function of capital (in a 
variable balance (ibid p.33) This is the basis for their contradictory 
class position: on the one hand they are non-owners of capital and 
perform the function of the collective labourer which implies a 
commonality of interest with wage-labour, i.e. those performing only 
the function of the collective labourer . On the other hand they 
simultaneously perform the global function of capital which separates 
them from wage-labour and provides a greater identification with the 
capitalist class.
This characterisation of an intermediate strata with ambiguous 
class positions can provide some potentially useful insights in the 
specification of objective interests at the level of production relations. 1
1. The suggestion that this is a more potentially useful approach than 
the productive/unproductive labour division gains some support from 
Crompton and Gubbay (1977) in their assessment: " ... the distinction we 
have been emphasising between global capital and collective worker 
overrides the distinction between productive and unproductive labour.
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An initial approximation would suggest that the interests of this
new middle class at the economic level will reflect their
contradictory position in production relations.
A further inference that can be drawn from Carchedi's analysis
is the dynamic quality of this ambiguity and the general tendency
for the objective interests of the new middle class to become
increasingly predicated on the basis of wage-labour. This derives
from the transient position of this strata, the performance of either
the global function of capital or the function of the collective worker
being part of a process whereby an 'agent' carries out either function
to a greater or lesser extent. As Carchedi is at pains to point out:
"... whatever time is spent in performing one social 
function is detracted from the performance of the 
opposite social function." (ibid p.2 1 )
Carchedi argues that there is a general tendency within capitalism 
to reduce the component of the global function of capital in any 
given contradictory position. This he links to the process of the 
devaluation of labour-power: while it is characteristic of earlier 
phases of capitalism that the function of the collective labourer underwent 
persistent reconstruction in the simplification of job tasks, the same 
subsequently applies to the differentiation of the capitalist function.
The devaluation of the technical aspects of positions performing 
both the global function of capital and the function of the collective 
labourer goes hand-in-hand with the devaluation of the social aspect of 
that position; i.e. the diminution of the global function of capital 
and the expansion of the function of the collective worker, (ibid p.64) 
Therefore the dynamic is two-fold: the reduction of labour-power to 
an average, unskilled level combined with the elimination of the global
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« , (1 )lotion or capitau The ultimate result or
rchedi characterises as the proletarianisation
LCi.0 CIdS S ii.0i.ci p . G 4 / .
Carchedi does not discuss the implications of these changes on the 
labour process. But quite clearly the tendency to devalue positions 
within the new middle-class will result ir i . - ms of control
and surveillance, perhaps the removal of control functions to higher 
levels within the firm; while 30c tasks will beccme more routinised 
and simplified. It will mean changes in the basis of co-operation 
within the labour process.
Proletarianisation will also have an impact on remuneration 
for 1 abc .r-pcwer. Carchedi argues this .'.as two components: a
reduction in wages as labour-power is technically simplified and 
a reduction in revenue as the global function of capital is diminished.
In summary, it might be argued true t.'.e devaluation of the 
position :o one new middle class at toe level :: :::i.::i:r. relations 
a; a ieterminmo effect or. the structuring of toe objective interest
( 2 )
t.oat class. not merely reflected m  a changing els
position, out also m  terms of mere immediate interests involving work 
relations: creasing inter deter, der. ue iitr-it toe ~a cc~r process provio:
toe oasis for collectivism m  the context of the social relationship 
of wage-labour. It is this change which arguably underlies the 
phenomenal demands concerning working conditions, routinized job tasks, 
and insufficient wages.
1. Crompton -and Gubbay (1977) in their discussion of foremen (p.190) miss 
the point. Their suggestion that "even if the foreman only supervises labour 
in accordance with rules laid down from above, this does not make his control 
over labour power ... any less real" indicates a basic insensitivity to 
the impact of chancing patterns of control or social relationships at work. 
Their intimation that this does not result in a changing class position 
seems totally at odds with their acceptance of class ambiguity.
2. ibid p.64; see also pc.54-39 for a discussion of the income of the 
new middle-class.
n
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There are two major problems in developing Carcnedi's analysis 
in this way. The first concerns the partial quality of his analysis: 
his discussion is entirely concerned with the "economic identification" 
of the new middle-class and omits any discussion of the implications 
of integrating this analysis with political and ideological 
"identification". This is a major conceptual problem and has provoked 
some debate about the separation of these levels of analysis.
A second, related, problem concerns the relevance of Carchedi's 
abstract theorizations at more concrete levels; in particular can the 
distinction between on one hand surveillance and control and on the 
other unity and co-ordination be sustained in analysing specific labour 
processes? If not, what are the implications?
Both of these problems are considered below; the discussion of the 
former difficulty will provide some insights into how the latter one 
car. be resolved.
Taking the first problem, the partial quality of Carchedi's analysis,
( 2)it is interesting to contrast his approach with that of Poulantzas 
Arguably, Poulantzas has made the most thorough and comprehensive attempt 
in recent years to identify class position in terms of economic, political, 
and ideological dimensions. It does little justice to Poulantzas in 
summarising his concepts in such a short space, but it is important to 
see hew they are developed and mter-relate. Firstly, at the economic
level, there is a broad distinction made between productive and 
unproductive labour; any labourers who are not involved in the
1 . this discussion is taken up below.
2. Reference is made here primarily to Pculante as (1975), but see also 
Poulantzas (1973). His style is a little easier than Carchedi, but 
his particular use of concepts can lead to a misunderstanding of his 
arguments if not closely followed, e.g. his restrictive use of productive 
and unproductive labour. See Wright (1976) for a discussion of how 
Poulantzas uses some of his main conceptual categories.
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production of surplus value (and that, for Poulantzas is "material 
production") are not part of the working class at the economic level.^ 
There still remains the political and ideological levels. These 
it should be noted, are concerned with class position and not practice.
The characteristic of political relationships within capitalism in 
terms of production relations is the subordination of the working
class through the hierarchy of capitalist control. In terms of the
( 2)new middle-class , their social function as exercisers of capitalist 
control dominates their technical functions of co-ordination, which 
implies their identification with the capitalist class at the political
i i (3) level.
Poulantzas draws the distinction at the ideological level between 
mental and manual labour. Again this is not concerned with ideological 
practice, but the material possession of knowledge arising from the 
position within the capitalist process of production. Nor surprisingly, 
Poulantzas concludes that the foremen, technicians, etc. who make up 
the new middle-class, do exert ideological domination over the working 
class, since they have the possession of knowledge, denied to the workers, 
which can be used for the continuing reproduction of class relations.
The combination of these different levels, for Poulantzas, generates 
a class position for members of the new middle-class which will place them 
within the caoitalist class. As such, he necessarily opposes the view
of contradictory class positions as put forward by Carchedi. (4).
4.
Poulantzas (1975) p. 221; but the discussion runs throughout pp.209-223. 
Poulantzas calls it the "new petty bourgeoisie".
ibid pp.224-230. This discussion is in terms of supervisors; the 
position of technicians, etc. is not so clear cut, ibid pp.239-250.
Poulantzas specifically refutes the notion of contradictory class 
positions (ibid p.223).
!
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In consequence, the most interesting critique of Poulantzas in this
context is that of Wright, who in refuting the former's analysis,
argues in favour of contradictory class positions. Wright develops
two main criticisms' of Poulantzas' approach:
"....1. That there is little basis for regarding the 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour 
as determining the boundary of the working class at the 
economic level; 2. That Poulantzas's use of political 
and ideological factors effectively undermines the primacy 
of economic relations in determining class position".
(Wright (1976) p.13).
Despite a somewhat schematic presentation, the points are well 
made. The core of the critique concerns Poulantzas's specification 
of the economic and political/ideological levels. In particular 
Wright suggests:
".... he incorrectly identifies the technical division of 
labour with economic criteria whenever he discusses the 
role of political and ideological factors". (ibid p.19)
The autonomy which Poulantzas appears to give to the political
ideological levels can be overcome:
".... rather than viewing economic criteria as being rooted 
in the technical division of labour and political- 
ideological criteria in the social division, both should 
be considered dimensions of the social division of labour".
(ibid p.19).
Wright's own way out of this problem is to develop a framework
of contradictory class positions from the social division of labour,
similar to Carchedi, at the economic level and then to argue that:
".... the extent to which political and ideological 
relations enter into the determination of class position 
is itself determined by the degree to which those 
positions occupy a contradictory location at the level of 
social relations of production". (ibid pp.39-40. Emphasis 
in original).
The more contradictory the position at the economic level, the more 
influence is exerted by the political and ideological relations.
Now, quite clearly, Wright sees this as only a modification of 
his basic premise of contradictory class positions at the economic level.
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The fundamental arguments are not challenged. As such the
approaches of Wright and thus Carchedi have merit and validity
for social explanation even when located at the level of the economic.
In consequence , any challenges to their approach must be made 
in terms either of a denial of the notion of contradictory class 
positions itself, or in the non-separability of the economic/political/ 
ideological levels. Nichols (1980), while accepting Wright's work as a 
"thorough critique", seems to incline to Poulantzas’ view against 
contradictory class positions. He emphasises the following passage 
from Poulantzas:
".... there is no division or co-ordination of tasks that 
simply corresponds to purely "technical" requirements of 
"production", and exists as such". (Ponlantzas (1975), 
p. 227 and quoted in Nichols (1980) p.214).
This inseparability of the social and the technical, and the 
essential political domination (in Poulantzas's terms) of foremen and 
supervisors over workers, disallows any notion of contradictory class 
position. Nichols, it seems clear, feels the "something to be learnt" 
is Poulantzas's insistence
", .... that foremen and supervisors, for instance, do not have 
a double class membership (working class and capitalist); 
implicitly, he denies that they are marked by a contradictory 
class location either. As Poulantzas sees it the work 
of supervision is simultaneously the performance of a co- 
ordinative function and a process by which the capitalist 
consumes labour-power". (ibid pp.214-215).
Now this constitutes the major argument against notions of
contradictory class positions. In some ways it is obviously correct:
the co-ordination of the capitalist labour-process is not somehow a
a separate activity from surveillance and control, for the co-ordination
of a capitalist labour-process i^s surveillance and control.
Nevertheless, there is rather more to it than that. And here,
not merely is Carchedi's partial analysis at stake, but also his use of
levels of abstraction. For the question is not so much whether the
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distinction between co-ordination/unity and surveillance/control can 
be made, but at what levels of analysis it can be made. Quite 
clearly, the study of concrete labour processes will not permit 
that kind of s e p a r a t i o n . B u t  does this deny the utility or 
validity of making that kind of distinction at higher levels of 
abstraction? If it does, few Marxist categories will be left untouched.
The justification for analysis at higher levels of abstraction 
must be in terms of whether this aids understanding of concrete 
society. This underpins Marx's analysis and whole approach to 'Capital'. l2) 
The inseparability of unity/co—ordination and surveillance/control 
at the concrete level does not deny the utility of the distinction in 
understanding events at this level. What it does imply is the 
distinction cannot be studied directly, but through an interventional 
form.
Similar comments might be made about the separation of the economic 
political, and ideological levels. All constitute forms of domination 
arising, as Wright correctly argues, from the social division of labour: 
that between capital and labour, the social relationship of wage-labour.
In terms of production relations, it is the wage-labour relationship and 
the organising of the labour-process which embrace the patterns of 
economic, ideological, and political domination, again inseparable at the 
concrete level. 1
1. The inseparability, at the concrete level, of these two aspects,
Carchedi appears to consider, but does not follow through. His appreciation 
of this is limited to a footnote:
"But to give orders can mean both to co-ordinate the labour 
process and to help perpetuate the system based on exploitation. 
Similarly, to carry out orders can mean both to perform 
the function of the collective worker and to perform the 
global function of capital ...." (Carchedi (1975a) F/N. 58 p.79).
2 . See Fine and Harris (1976) pp. 141-145.
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It is in drawing these two strands together, the relationship 
of different levels of abstraction and the patterns of domination 
arising from the social division of labour, that the necessary focus 
for approaching an analysis of concrete society must be made. In 
terms of the discussion on contradictory class position and its utility 
in understanding patterns of unionization, the focus must centre on 
the resolution of this ambiguity at the concrete level: the way 
in which control is exercised in the labour-process.
At the level of concrete society, the different functions of unity/ 
cc-ordinaticn and surveillance/control, simultaneously performed, are 
embodied in the control of the labour process. Furthermore, the tendencies
to devalue labour-power, where agents perform both functions, can be 
identified in terms of shifts in control of the labour-process. This 
provides a possible focus for how the structuring of shared interests 
operates and how such interests may develop into a collective expression.
The question of how the labour process can be approached at the level 
of concrete society in terms of the way control is exercised, the 
consequent changing patterns of interests, and how this relates to 
workplace collectivism and trade unionism, is tackled in the last section.

experience of labourers takes place within the labour-process: thus 
it becomes a basis for exploring the relationship between objective 
and subjective interests.
The theoretical standing of these three points is not, however, 
the same. The first point is a fundamental theoretical link at a 
higher level of generalisation than the second and third. In 
consequence it is the latter points which must be tackled empirically: 
the validity of the first point depends on its derivatives - points 
two and three.
The problem now remains of transferring these various theoretical 
interconnections into empirically testable hypotheses. In order to 
focus on changes in the labour process as a basis for the structuring 
of interests, it necessarily implies that the sources of those changes 
must be considered. Such changes are not arbitrary, but must be 
understood in terms of general tendencies within the capitalist economy
This implies it is insufficient to examine specific labour 
processes merely at the point of production. The development of 
the labour process must be traced historically in the context of 
overall movements within the particular industry and the shifting 
relationships within the economy. It is precisely this kind of analysi 
which is neglected by both the industrial relations and 'sociological' 
explanation:; of 'white-collar' unionism. Therefore tin,* initial task 
is to explore the relationships of changes in the labour process to 
overall capital movements and relationships in capitalist production. 
Empirically this implies tracing the changes in the labour process 
in a specific industry within the context of changes in production 
relations within that industry and between that industry and the wider 
economy.
A further question involves the precise focus on the labour proces
- '/■/-
itself. Since it is not merely the technical performance of job 
descriptions and how these alter which is important, but the social 
relationships which this involves, the central question of managerial 
control of the labour process is raised. Of particular concern 
are those groups whose capitalist control of the labour process is 
diminishing; yet, at the same time, the way in which management 
exercises control determines the form of social relations within and 
between employer and employees.
Thus a second empirical task is to explore the historical changes 
in the labour process by focussing on the control of that process by 
management and thus identifying both the social and technical 
aspects of those changes and the implications for the structuring of 
interests amongst employees.
Within this various questions may arise. Firstly, can such 
changes in the labour process be seen to have an unequivocal one-sided 
impact on the structuring of interests or are they in some sense 
contradictory? Secondly, is collective organisation best understood 
as arising out of changes in individual positions in the labour process, 
or in terms of a response to a changed basis in the form of co-operation? 
Thirdly, if changes in the labour process are emphasised as a source 
of trade unionism, how can the importance of the remuneration of wage- 
labour be specified rather than the social and physical conditions under 
which it works? All these questions must be tackled empirically as 
well as theoretically.
As the concreteness of a specific labour process is approached, 
the issue of subjective interests becomes more important. Having specified 
objective interests, it now remains to confront the question of workers 
experience. Hence the third empirical task: to explore the relationship
between objective interests and workers experience and to attempt a
reconciliation between expressed interests concerning collective
organisation and the objective conditions of the labour process.
If these tasks are successfully completed, this will represent 
a substantial step forward in explaining the development of 
unionisation. It remains to outline how they will be approached.
Any consideration of these three empirical questions necessarily 
involves a highly detailed examination of the historical developments 
within industries and labour processes. In view of this, the 
validation of these relationships will be explored using one case 
study: the Bookmaking industry. In Chapter 3, changes in the labour-
process are located within the changing structure of the Bookmaking 
industry and the relationships between bookmaking and other areas of 
the economy. This allows an analysis of the important changes in the 
labour-process, how the interests of employees were affected and how 
this structured the rise of trade unionism within the industry.
Chapter 4, explores the relationship between these changes and the 
response of the employees involved, attempting to show how expressed 
interests related to the development of unionisation and simultaneously 
reflected changes in the labour-process.
The use of only one case study is far from limiting. Positivistic 
assumptions that the argument might only prove sufficiently strong if 
raised in the context of a handful of case studies are unfounded. And 
in this case, singularly inappropriate, for the full complexity of the 
relationships involved would be obscured given allowable space. 
Bookmaking, in fact, has distinct advantages as a case study. Firstly, 
since the development of the industry was historically limited by 
legislation, the processes of capitalistic development have only recently 
come to full fruition. Until 1960, Licensed Betting Offices did not 
exist and it is the development of cash betting which constitutes by far 
the major thrust of the emergence of the industry. Secondly, in 1971,
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some bookmaking employees started a totally new union - The Union of 
Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) - which covered all of the Bookmaking 
Industry. Thus their response can be directly related to internal 
processes within the industry rather than external efforts by existing 
trade unions to organise them. ^
Both aspects permit a relatively clear understanding of the 
empirical relationships: the condensed time period of expansion 
allows the interrelationships between the labour process and developments 
within the industry and economy to be viewed with some precision; 
while the emergence of TUBE as a new union again permits a close scrutiny 
of the links between the labour process and unionization.
Using the example of the Bookmaking industry to explore the 
three tasks developed above can therefore provide an understanding of 
the origins of unionization - but it only reaches the point where a union 
is formed or where employees decide to join a union. Is this the limit 
of the labour process approach, or is it useful in understanding the 
course of unionization? The evidence of TUBE suggests this is indeed 
the case. Having outlined the history of the union in Chapter 5, the 
relationship between changes in the labour process, branch formation, and 
the autonomy of union policy is explored in Chapter 6. It will be argued 
that changes in the labour process can provide a basis for understanding 
the course of union development.
But even if the labour process can be established as an important 
structural influence on unionization, a trade union is hardly free to 
choose within such constraints. Trade unionism is fundamentally a 
response to the initiatives of capital, actual or potential; and 1
1. This, of course, is not to argue that trade unionism in bookmaking 
can be explained entirely in terms of internal processes.
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the success or failure of unionization is dependent on the inter­
relationships with employers, as the personification of capital, 
and the state, in its political and ideological upholding of capitalist 
society. Consequently, Chapters 7 and 8 represent attempts at 
understanding the role of employers and the state in the development 
of unionisation. Chapter 7 concentrates on the policies and strategies 
of employers towards TUBE and links them to the development of the 
industry at that time. In consequence, the labour process provides 
a useful starting-point leading towards a materialist analysis of 
employers policies towards unionization.
In Chapter 8, there is an attempt to understand the impact of 
industrial relations legislation on the development of unionization.
The conclusion is that such legislation is contradictory and its impact 
must be understood not merely in relation to institutional structures, 
but in terms of contingent patterns of capital accumulation. Again, 
the labour process approach provides a useful focus in understanding the 
impact of labour legislation on union organization and activity.
The Bookmaking industry can provide important insights on all the 
six areas of concern detailed above. Clearly, some will establish more 
tentative links than others; on occasions the analysis may be considered 
only partial. Yet it is contended this approach does constitute an 
improvement on many previous analyses; and, in consequence, Chapter 9, 
will conclude the study by considering the potential of labour process 
explanations, particularly in relation to other areas of employment. But, 
firstly, the Bookmaking industry is considered in exploring the strengths 
and weaknesses of the labour-process as a basis for understanding
unionization.
PART TOO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOOKI'AKING INDUSTRY 
AND THE RISE OF TUPE
Chapter 3 : The historical development of the labour process in
Bookmaking■
/
In this chapter there are two objectives. Firstly, to locate 
the development of the labour process within the overall pattern 
of the changing structure of the bookmaking industry. This 
will show that how the labour process is organized is not arbitrary, 
but is subject to the continual imperatives of capital accumulation 
and is sensitive to the wider inter-relationships between sectors 
of the economy. Secondly, to explore how these concrete changes 
in the labour process have generated a basis for collective or 
contradictory interests amongst bookmaking employees.
The first objective raises the immediate question of what are 
the significant elements in understanding the changing labour process 
in relation to the history of bookmaking; in other words, the problem 
of périodisation. The bases of périodisation will depend on what 
it is intended to investigate. Looking at the relationship between 
the labour process and trade unionism, the principles behind any 
périodisation must relate to the changes in the labour process which 
reflect qualitative developments in the Bookmaking industry. This 
allows for the identification of three key periods, although internal 
divisions are also important within them:
(a) the transition of bookmaking from sidestake 
wagering to a capitalistically-based industry;
(b) the two-fold development of bookmaking in the 
first half of the 20th century: legal credit offices and 
illegal street pitches;
(c) the expansion of legalised cash betting in the 
post-1960 period.
The main focus will be on the third period, for it is in this phase 
that trade unionism developed in bookmaking at the beginning of the 1970s.
But within this period itself, there were significant qualitative 
changes in bookmaking with vital consequences for the labour processes 
in the industry. These can be broadly divided into two parts:
(1) the initial expansion: the atomized, localised 
expansion of Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs);
(2) Bookmaking as retailing: the rise of the betting 
chain and the relationship between bookmaking and 
established capital.
The changing nature of bookmaking at the end of the 1960s provided 
the basis for a rapid reconstruction of the labour process in the 
industry, which underlay the development of trade unionism. This is 
the transition from (1) to (2). Subsequently, the involvement of 
'established capital' exaggerated the impact of these changes while 
simultaneously introducing new aspects to the relationship between and 
amongst employers and employees.
Within this general périodisation, the historical development of 
bookmaking can be viewed both externally, in terms of the relationship 
of the industry to the wider economy, and internally in terms of the 
nature of bookmaking in relation to market size and structure. The 
more general question of the external relationship involves the 
immediate problem of whether bookmaking falls within the sphere of 
production or circulation; whether it involves the production of surplus 
value or its redistribution.
Two seemingly well-balanced arguments can be put forward which 
produce opposite conclusions. It might be argued that bookmaking produces 
a commodity - structured chance - which when produced
capitalistically^, involves the expansion of value and the acquisition 1
1. That is as against the provision of a personal service, which would be 
unproductive of surplus value. See the discussion on productive and 
unproductive labour in Chapter 2 and the distinction between personal 
service and capitalistic production later in this chapter.
Ih
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of surplus value by the employer. On the other hand, it might 
be suggested that chance exists naturally: the bookmaker is merely 
trying to expand money capital and secure a redistribution in his 
favour of existing surplus.
The resolution of these two contradictory possibilities involves
a detailed examination of the relationship between productive and
unproductive labour. It is a debate which has not always proved
fruitful and has not been assisted by apparent inconsistencies in
Marx's own treatment of the question.
Nevertheless, the broad lines of distinction can be drawn, as
they were in Chapter 2. On the one hand, there is the sphere of
production, which is the fundamental source of surplus value through
the exploitation of labour-power; while on the other there is
circulation, where surplus value is not generated, and merely assists
the realization of value, contributing to the production of surplus
value only i n d i r e c t l y . M a n d e l  has attempted to build on this
broad distinction in analysing the 'problem' of the service sector,
a contribution which might usefully be applied to bookmaking:
"The frontier between productive capital and circulation 
capital ... runs between wage-labour which increases, 
changes, or preserves a use-value, or is indispensable 
for its realization - and wage-labour which makes no 
difference to a use-value, i.e. to the bodily form of a 
commodity, but merely arises from the specific needs 
involved, i.e. altering (as opposed to creating) the form 
of an exchange value. Extending this definition by 
Marx, we may therefore conclude that actual service 
capital - so long as it is not mistakenly confused witli 
capital which produces commodities - is no more 
productive than circulation capital." (Mandel (1976) 
pp. 405-6. Emphasis in original).
1. For further discussion of this debate, including the problems in 
Marx's treatment of the question, see Gough (1972),
Braverman (1974) and Mandel (1976).
Such a restrictive approach to the nature of commodities would 
seem to rule out any possibility that bookmaking is productive of 
surplus value. But relaxing Mandel's assumption that commodities 
are physical objects, would bookmaking rest more easily in altering 
the form of an exchange value rather than creating it? Consider 
Mandel's subsequent argument, that the extension of the service 
sector is merely a lesser evil from the perspective of the capitalist 
class in general, hence:
"The logic of late capitalism is therefore necessarily 
to convert idle capital into service capital and 
simultaneously to replace service capital with productive 
capital, in other words, services with commodities."
(ibid, p. 406. Emphasis in original).
This characterization of the service sector as some sort of half-way
house between "idle" and "productive" capital appears convincing in
some instances: the replacement of transport services by cars,
theatres and cinemas by television sets. But what commodities can
substitute for bookmaking? While Mandel has emphasised the process
of replacing service capital with productive capital, he omits the
alternative possibility: that service capital may be developed towards
circulation rather than production. As will be shown, bookmaking,
as legal cash betting developed, functioned increasingly as a source
of cash, emphasising an affinity with the sphere of circulation.
Thus, in an area of controversial debate, it seems appropriate
to view bookmaking as unproductive of value; and that the mechanism
of expansion for bookmaking therefore rests in the accumulation of
money capital rather than productive capital.
Viewed internally, the development of the Bookmaking industry
and the consequent changes in the labour process can initially bo seen
in the context of the size and structure of the ’market'. The size
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of the market is necessarily dependent on a suitable betting medium; 
without the expansion of a betting medium, bookmaking itself was 
restricted. In this sense, betting is necessarily dependent, 
parasitic, on other activities. Bookmaking, as a social form of 
betting, has been linked historically to sport, notably horseracing; 
therefore the volume of betting (thus bookmaking) is necessarily 
limited by the amount of horseracing.
This does not merely carry implications for the size of the 
market, but also its structure: while the various technical conditions 
of communication were undeveloped, betting could only take place, to any 
great extent, where the sporting event was held, i.e. 'on-course'; 
while betting away from (or 'off-course') was further restricted by the 
legal prohibition of cash betting.
Yet as the various legal, technical and social divisions were 
eliminated, the market for betting grew; as, in consequence, did 
bookmaking, thus providing opportunities for restructuring the labour 
process within the industry. ^
Within this general perspective of the inter-relationship of 
externality and internality, the tendencies of the generalized 
capitalist mode of production inform the development of the labour process. 
Here the concepts developed in Chapter 2 are important. Initially 
it implies an examination of the development of wage-labour within the 
industry, the movement from the era of personal service to exploited 
labour. Assuming that bookmaking is unproductive, workers in the
1. The determination of the market size and structure is not merely 
economic. The focus has been largely centred on the general economic 
motive for expansion (capital accumulation), and the removal of obstacles 
to that expansion in terms of technological/social/legal restrictions.
Yet there is the wider question of gambling and leisure in capitalist 
society.
industry are not exploited in terms of value, but, following the 
discussion in Chapter 2, their labour.
In consequence, the expansion of the exploitation of labour 
is developed in terms of an absolute and relative direct 
exploitation of labour, which parallel Marx's exposition of absolute 
and relative surplus value. And given that the extent of betting 
opportunities is the crucial influence on the volume of betting, 
this exploitation can be identified in three ways:
(a) the expansion of the working week, i.e. that 
betting can take place every day since horseracing 
takes place everyday;
(b) the expansion of the working period per day, i.e. 
extending the time period covered by horseracing;
(c) a more intensive use of the working period per day, 
i.e. by expanding the number of horseraces and 
betting opportunities in that period, and perhaps 
staggering the time of races.
Now (a) and (b) can be seen as an expansion of the working period 
in an absolute sense. This is clearly not the case with (3). This 
concerns the exploitation of labour in a given period, which can be 
referred to as relative exploitation. Hie phases of development of 
the betting medium can be understood through the efforts of the 
bookmaking employers acting upon the direct exploitation of labour in 
both these ways.
With the expansion of the Bookmaking industry, the emphasis is 
now placed on the growing socialization of the labour process; how 
job tasks are structured within different historical periods and how 
the basis of co-operation alters; how this involves a differential
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rate of the devaluation of labour-power as some job tasks are 
simplified and routinized and others not; and, finally, the 
implications for how the labour process is controlled both in terms 
of the changing managerial levels at which control is exercised 
as well as the systems of control utilized.
It is these processes which throw up the objective conditions 
for common interests amongst wage-labourers in the industry; just 
as they generate the basis for divergent and contradictory interests. 
Ultimately the guestion that is tackled in this and the next three 
chapters is how far does this approach lead to an understanding of 
the development of trade unionism? This chapter represents the 
first stage: how far does the emphasis on the labour process lead 
to an understanding of collective interests?
(a) Bookmaking in the nineteenth century: the transition from
sidestake wagering to a personalized service; and to the 
brink of a capitalistically based industry.
Bookmaking is merely a specific historical and social form of 
betting. Predicated on a multiple choice outcome, the under-lying 
principle is to ensure that, whatever the outcome, the bookmaker 
retains a percentage of all stakes. In an effort to achieve this, 
the bookmaker offers various odds on each possible outcome, attempting 
to secure an even staking of money. He must therefore make each 
possible outcome an attractive proposition for backers, but ensuring 
that overall the odds will favour the 'book'. In this way, while 
the bookmaker cannot be certain he will win on every event, the 
probability remains that over a period of time he will retain a 
percentage of stakes. ^
Particular social relationships are involved here. Firstly, 
there is a separation between those who bet on outcomes and those who 
take bets on outcomes: on one side the backer and on the other
the layer (of odds). Secondly, it implies that for one layer there 
are a mass of backers, otherwise the layer's liabilities on a given 
outcome will not be offset by the other possibilities. But not all 
forms of betting imply such relationships.
The historical origins of bookmaking in Britain can be traced 
by focussing on sidestake wagering on horseracing, which was based 
on social relationships quite distinct from those of bookmaking:
1. For a more detailed exposition see Note 1 at the end of this chapter
each person involved is simultaneously backer and layer, while the
basic relationship is between two individuals. Bookmaking begins,
therefore, when one person accepts wagers from several individuals
who back different outcomes.^ It thus appears as a personal service.
The bookmaker in providing this facility for betting thus parallels
the self-employed independent commodity producer who exchanges a
commodity for the revenue of the capitalist, rather than her/his labour
( 2 )for the wage of the capitalist. And, for the bookmaker, the
exchange was very much against the revenue of the capitalist since 
the medium of betting was horseracing, originally a leisure pursuit 
of the aristocracy.
The transition of sidestake wagering to bookmaking raised immediate 
possibilities for the expansion of this form of betting. The 
separation of layers and backers, combined with the atomisation of the 
latter, implied a potentially massive enlargement of betting 
opportunities: while one bookmaker could accommodate a substantial 
number of backers, betting could also take place on a larger scale away 
from the scene of the event. But this was only a potential. Eventually 
bookmaking would undergo a large-scale capitalist expansion, but at 
this stage various preconditions needed to be fulfilled for even 
bookmaking as a personal service to become generalised.
1. Ford (1977) pp. 82-83 indicates that the early 'bookmakers' offered 
one horse against the field - an adaptation of sidestake wagering 
where the bets are only placed on one of two possible outcomes.
2. This is an attempt to draw parallels in the social relationships 
involved. It is not meant to imply that bookmaking as a 
personal service could be productive of surplus value or 
indeed value.
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Such conditions can be seen under two headings. Firstly,
the shaping and developing of betting, in its bookmaking form, as
a recreational activity of the working class. In part this depended
on the mass of people being able to financially afford recreational
pursuits; or, to reverse the point, that the proportion of the
wage spent on the physical means of existence had fallen, thus allowing
some of the wage to be spent on leisure activities. But more
specifically it involved the promotion of betting as a suitable pursuit;
and since this was historically linked to horseracing, the popularisation
of this particular sport. This latter point opens up the whole
question of working-class leisure activity, its particular forms
and transformation within capitalism:
"The cultural achievements of the proletariat won by the
ascent and struggle of the modern working class (books,
papers, self-education, sport, organization, and so on)
lose those features of voluntary self-activity and autonomy
from the processes of capitalist commodity production
and circulation, which defined them in the period of classical
imperialism, .... and become drawn into capitalist production
and circulation to an increasing extent." (Mandel (1976) p.393).
In the context of bookmaking and horseracing, this process is
twofold: on the one hand the form of recreation changes, emphasising
the vacarious pleasures of spectator sport rather than direct
participation; on the other hand, this process is reinforced as
bookmaking replaces sidestake wagering in providing a new form of
recreational activity, resting parasitically on its chosen medium: sport,
and in particular, horseracing. ^  The transition to bookmaking was
1. There is something of a difference with horseracing, insofar as this was 
primarily an area of aristocratic participation. Nevertheless, the general 
emphasis of capitalist relations on spectator sport, on the passivity of 
working class pursuits, applies just as clearly. However, it is important 
in such a cursory account not to overdraw this pattern of determination.
Ford (1977) cogently argues that the sporting activities of the working class 
were a consequence of their desire to gamble. He also argues: "Sport as 
a form of relaxation for the lower classes is a concept which was not 
mentioned until the end of the eighteenth century and certainly had not 
general acceptance until well into the nineteenth.p. 75. For a very 
interesting account of gambling in relation to a range of sports, see pp.74-86
It does illustrate the importance of distinguishing bookmaking as a 
particular social form of gambling.
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not necessarily clearcut. An individual might be both a backer
and a bookmaker at the same or different times.^ But by the
1850s it seems likely that two hundred men were 'standing up' around
(2)the country's racetracks.
But the extensive expansion of bookmaking would have remained 
essentially limited without the development of specific technical 
preconditions. Horseracing and betting would have remained fundamentally 
localised forms of recreation, without the major technical advances of 
the nineteenth century. A variety of important developments at 
this time provided necessary preconditions for the national system of 
bookmaking. The extension of the transport system, in particular the 
railway boom of the 1840s, provided a wider potential audience for 
horseracing as well as a means of travel for the bookmakers. This 
assisted the development of betting at the racecourse.^'
Betting away from the course ('off-course' betting) was facilitated 
by improvements in other forms of communications.
1. An early example was John Gully, who lived a colourful existence 
in the mid-nineteenth century. See Kaye (1969) p.23
2. ibid p.24. 'Men' is chosen deliberately, illustrating the male 
domination in the industry. The way in which bookmaking developed, 
co-existing with sidestake wagering, in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century is evident in Rees (1977) which provides a 
fascinating account of horseracing and hunting in West Wales in
this period. Ford (1977) suggests there was a significant change in 
betting in the first years of the nineteenth century.. Then
Bookmaking became a profession" pp. 82-83.
3. It also enabled the horses to be transported, thus allowing a national 
rather than regional sport. See Ford (1977) p.141. Betting was not 
entirely confined to the actual racecourse itself, but continued in 
tile locality during the period of tin' racomocting. For instance, the 
evening before the 1867 Grand National might profitably have been spent 
at the " ... Washington Hotel, at Liverpool,where all the chief 
bookmakers and backers resorted, with the idea of either doing a 
little betting, or hearing the latest news of the big chase."
Rees (1977) p.15
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Of particular significance was the Press, as acknowledged by one 
of the stalwarts of Carmarthen races in 1867:
without the aid of (The Press) we could do very 
little, and very few would learn of the proceedings in 
the town of Carmarthen. Without the aid of a liberal 
and expansive Press the world would not hear of our 
meeting, or the other side of the world know the result.
For that reason, therefore, "The Press" is very powerful 
and important, especially as regards our proceedings...." (1)
This, however, was before the development of a popular press and the
publicising of results in this way was restricted. The invention of
the telegraph assisted the diseemination of results, but it also made
the backing of horses at a distance a real possibility and so opened
(2)up the opportunity for highly successful betting coups. Later
in the century the introduction of the telephone added a further 
dimension - this not forgetting the Penny Post of 1840.
Such improvements were not simply preconditions for the development
of horse-racing and bookmaking, but continued to encourage the expansion
( 3of more sophisticated forms, with the establishing of bookmaking firms.
With the development of the bookmaking firm, bookmaking as a 
personal service was challenged by a specifically capitalistic expansion 
of the industry:
"The private relationship between the seller of specifically 
qualified labour power and the spender of private revenues, 
which still predominated in the 19th century ... becomes 
increasingly converted into a capitalist, but at the same time 
objectively socialised, service business." (Maude 1 (1976) p.385)
1. The Chairman of the Carmarthen Stewards' Ordinary, February 1867, 
recounted in Rees (1977) p.7
2. The first ever racing results machine was reputedly installed 
by the Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. in the King Lud Public House,
Ludgate Circus, London, in 1879. See Kaye (1969) p.31
3. Kaye traded the development of off-course betting back to 1820 
in London, but it was sometime, probably the 1860s before bookmaking 
firms became formally established. Who was the first firm seems 
contentious: Kaye opts for the London-based Valentine and Wright
as the first starting-price bookmakers; yet the Manchester-based firm 
of Seymour (now Seymour & Story) claims to be the oldest bookmaking 
concern, being established in 1868. See CIR (1974c) p.2.
The hall-mark of capitalist relations is wage-labour. The
transition from personal service to a capitalist business is
precisely a reflection of the increasing prepondercncc of waged work,
where labour is now employed and necessarily exploited. That this
development should take place in bookmaking might be explained in
terms of what Mandel calls overcapitalisation, ^  where there is a
secular fall in the rate of profit in the areas involved in the
direct production of surplus value; hence new capital moves into
areas which are non-productive.^
The development of bookmaking can be seen as part of that
general tendency; yet at this point this expansion was confronted
by a particular obstacle which distorted this transition, hindering
the process generally and promoting a dichotomy within the structure
of the industry: the impact of legal restrictions. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, while the law did not prohibit
betting, it was illegal to "resort to a place" for betting.^
The precise judicial interpretation of this law carried crucial
implications for the development of book-making. In the first instance,
on-course betting was unquestionably legal:
"....... bookmakers on racecourses were nominally
peripatetic and thus not deemed to be in a 'place'".
(Hood (1972) p.184)
1. Mandel (1976) p.387
2. ibid p. 387-8
see Hood (1972) p.184 for a more detailed exposition of the legal 
position regarding betting.
3 .
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Yet similar cash betting off-course was illegal. Bookmakers 
who stood on street corners, in regular pitches, were considered as 
"resorting to a place". To confuse the issue still further, some 
off-course betting was legal. The improvements in communications 
in the previous century now meant that individuals could bet without 
'resorting', simply by using the telephone or telegraph, given the 
readiness of bookmakers to agree to credit accounts. Off-course 
credit betting was legal, but not off-course cash betting.
The effect of the law was to accentuate on-course cash betting 
and off-course credit betting at the expense of off-course cash 
betting. The underlying rationale behind this decision no doubt 
rested on the presumed immorality involved in the visibility of 
betting. If it took place behind closed doors or in a limited, out 
of the way, geographical area, this did not imply an offence to public 
morality: bookmaking on street corners was rather too obvious.
There is another side to this distinction: the class division 
which it embraced. Those who could legitimately bet off-course 
needed access to telephones and credit accounts - which meant they 
required money to begin with. The Street Betting Act of 1906 attempted 
to specify just this distinction: the poorer sections of society were 
denied the opportunity of legal betting while the richer groups could 
carry on betting without risk - so to speak. ^  The outcome was an 
exaggeration of the distinction between credit and cash betting off-course, 
whereby credit betting as a legally acceptable method of bookmaking 
continued to develop into the predominate section of the industry; while 
off-course cash betting was pushed underground, continuing on an illegal 
basis, but necessarily limited by the legal restrictions.
1. The legal class distinction in gambling goes back more than 400 years. 
An Act of 1542 prevented the lower classes from taking part in a range of 
activities including cards, dice, and 'games' generally. This was still in 
force at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 'Gentlemen' could pursue 
gambling interests as they wished until the Act of 1712 which limited the 
amount of a gamble to £10. See Ford (1977) pp. 74-75.
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(b) The two-fold development of bookmaking in the first half of the 
20th century: legal credit offices and illegal street pitches.
(i) The Pattern of Development
The main characteristic of off-course betting in this period 
was the simultaneous separation and integration of legal credit and 
illegal cash betting. The number of bookmakers in the first quarter 
of the century increased dramatically. By 1926-27 there were 12,834 
licensed bookmakers ^ . While nominally in business for credit 
and on-course betting, many of these bookmakers had links with off- 
course cash betting. The distinction between clienteles, the
credit and cash backers, was not generally reflected in divisions
( 2)between bookmakers. Ostensibly legitimate credit bookmakers
operated networks of street pitches with the kind assistance of the 
local police. And in addition, there were a host of unlicensed 
bookmakers, whose numbers were not known, operating in factories, 
cafes, or on their own street pitches.
The inter-war years were a period of some buoyancy, particularly 
in the early phase. Concrete evidence is not always easy to find, 
but in 1949, just after the dramatic post-war betting boom, the NBPA 
stated:
".... it is our considered opinion that today less money is 
being spent on betting than at the time of the last Royal 
Commission (1933)." (RC (1949-51)b p. 352).
1. Figures from H.M.Customs. See Royal Commission (1949-51)b p. 352
2. It was on this point that the ineffectiveness of Churchill's 
betting tax rested. See Hood (1972) p. 187 Ladbrokes were 
one of the few exceptions to this general integration of credit 
and cash betting. Formed at the end of the 19th century for the 
purpose of backing horses, it was taken over by Arthur Bendir who 
steered the firm towards the exclusive clientele of the aristocracy. 
Ladbrokes did not need the illegal cash betting. See Kaye (1969) p.34f
V .
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A further comparison between the inter-war and post-war periods 
also indicates a substantial fall in the number of bookmakers.
By 1949, the NBPA claimed the number of bookmakers was now only 5,000, 
less than half the figure some twenty years earlier, although again 
the extent of illegal bookmaking is not known.
Such a decline might be explained in terms of a downturn in 
betting or a period of unusually unfavourable results for the bookmakers. 
Without substantial monetary backing, bookmaking could prove insecure.
In part the bookmaker depended on his skill of "making a book", 
attempting to spread his liabilities through laying most of the horses 
in a race and ensuring that his liabilities on any particular outcome 
were not excessive.^ Nevertheless, for the individual bookmaker,
luck could play an important part; the actuarial skill only places 
the probabilities in the bookmaker's favour, but he cannot make backers 
support the horses he wants them to. A run of bad results for the 
book could therefore mean the whittling away of money capital. Bookmaking 
skill could reduce the impact of bad results but could not eliminate 
their consequences altogether. While there may be some truth in
this explanation, the evidence that is available suggests the ranks
of individual bookmakers were constantly changing with new enthusiasts
.  ( 2 )replenishing the numbers as many lost all their money.
A second explanation may be of greater importance and of particular 
significance: the degree of monopolisation. During this period, 
individual credit offices had expanded; not perhaps dramatically, but 
nevertheless significantly. In 1950, D. Summers of the NBPA stated 
that the number of employees that an individual bookmaker might have .....
1. By turning backer himself and betting with another bookmaker. This 
is known as "hedging".
2. RC (1949-51)b p. 358.
.... is very difficult to estimate. There are large
(bookmakers) and small ones. There are men whose sole 
staff is their wife who answers the phone when he is out; 
there are others who have 20,30,40, in some cases 100 
or 200 ......" (1)
The transition from 'personal service' to 'capitalist service 
business' was scarcely complete even by mid-century. With a few 
exceptions, most firms were small-scale, while the vast majority 
were individual bookmakers. That a degree of concentration and 
centralisation had taken place is not at all surprising. This, after 
all, was part of a general tendency in capitalist economies. What 
is, superficially, surprising is the lack of concentration and 
centralisation. Why did off-course bookmaking remain on such a small 
scale for so long?
An explanation can be offered in terms of the extent of the market.
As legitimate bookmakers, credit betting was essentially the core of any 
large-scale expansion; yet this market was severely limited, 
eliminating the mass of the population. Those bookmakers linked to off- 
course cash betting could/furn to this as a reliable source of funds 
for expansion: its illegal nature restricted the extent of this 
dependency. In any case, the illegal nature of cash betting meant that 
from the bookmaker's point of view, that market was sorely underdeveloped. 
So it can be argued that expansion was limited by the extent of the 
market for betting, given the importance of legal restrictions.
A second aspect concerns the structure of the market for 
bookmaking rather than its extent. Legal restrictions on cash betting 
not only meant it was underdeveloped; they also meant the essential 
localisation of cash betting. To understand this point more clearly we 
must look at how illegal cash betting operated.
1. ibid p. 359. In comparison with the size of bookmaking firms some 
25 years later, these are comparitively small employers of labour.
For instance, at the time of writing, Ladbrokes employ more than 
3,000 workers in their LBOs alone.
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There were two main systems of illegal cash betting which 
were related to geographical divisions: in the north of England, the 
most popular method was to use a shop for betting purposes, with the 
bets being passed under the counter; in the south, the tradition 
was to use street corners, or street pitches, where the bookmaker 
or his assistant would stand. Now the legal problem really concerned 
the visibility of betting, not betting itself. Therefore, to 
continue illegal activities, either in the shop or on the street pitch, 
the bookmaker could not make his prescence too apparent. The impact 
on the extent of his potential market was immediately significant: 
only those who knew where to look for a bookmaker could make a bet.
In other words, the market was essentially localised: the illegal 
bookie might cover an area, rather than have one pitch, but access to 
his services was both local and partial.
While cash betting off-course remained illegal, its development 
was severely limited; at the same time, that part of the industry 
which was legal had only a limited market. This restriction of the 
development of the industry, while continuously challenged during the 
first half of this century, remained an insurmountable stumbling 
block to the wholesale capitalistic expansion of bookmaking: a position 
not resolved until 1960. Even so, had that obstacle been removed 
it is questionable how rapid that expansion would have been since it 
would also have needed a substantial development of the betting medium.
In looking at the betting medium two different aspects must be 
considered: firstly, the relationship between bookmaking and sport and
how the latter changed as a consequence of the influence of betting. 
Secondly, the specific technical improvements which assisted bookmakers 
and provided qualitative encouragement to betting.
The overall relationship between bookmaking and sport has already 
been discussed. The general tendency within capitalism to emphasise the
_<)()
passivity of the working class is reflected in the promotion of
spectator sports rather than participation in the sport themselves.
This makes sport a highly suitable medium for bookmaking: outcomes
can be varied and sometimes unpredictable, while betting gives a
certain edge to the vicarious pleasures of being a spectator. ^
Bookmaking, however, was historically linked to horseracing. In an
age without television this exposed a weakness and a tension between
the two: could bookmaking rely on a sport which most people did not see?
Consider also a second point. Bookmaking was almost entirely
dependent on horseracing. Was an alternative betting medium possible?
One major possibility was football on which both pool and fixed odds
betting developed in this period, but that only involved one event per
week - bookmaking demanded a sport where events were frequent, since
the greater the number of events in a given period, the sooner the
law of probability would operate through the 'book'.
These two influences, the relative inaccessability and dependency
on horseracing, provide the background to the réintroduction of Greyhound
racing to Britain in 1926, after a break of fifty years. The first
track was opened in Belle Vue, Manchester in July 1926 and was soon
( 2)followed by White City, London, in 1927. It provided an immediately
popular form of entertainment. In contrast to horseracing, it 
was easily accessible to those in towns and did not clash with normal 
working hours. For bookmaking, it provided a regular 'long-stop' to 
horseracing as a betting medium.
1. Rees (1977) describes the scene on the day of the Carmarthen Open 
Steeplechase, in 1867, at the time one of the most important races 
in the Racing Calendar:
"Crowds of pedestrians from early morn wended their way to the course. 
All sorts and conditions of men, some women, and many children 
succumbing then as now, to the unfailing attraction of horse-racing, and 
its attendant chance of a gamble." p. 4.
2. See Wimhurst (1961) Ch. 7
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The general expansion of off-course bookmaking, however, 
depended on the development of suitable technical services. In the 
earlier period, these had been general in nature, such as the 
telegraph and the telephone. Now they were more concerned with 
specific developments. And here the most significant was the 
introduction of the 'Blower1. Officially known as the London and 
Provincial Sporting News Agency, the Blower was developed as a means 
of relaying information on horseraces actually taking place at that 
moment, through the GPO telephone system. Thus up to the minute 
information could be sent to bookmakers throughout the country ^  on 
declared runners, changes in betting, results, starting prices, and, 
indeed, commentaries on races as they happened. The 'Blower' which 
became a public company in 1929, also performed a different and 
important function: placing bets on the racecourse on behalf of
off-course bookmakers who felt their liabilities were larger than they
.  .  .  ( 2)wished.
1. In this instance, 'country'
2. For more information on the
refers to England and Wales. 
L.P.S.N.A. see RC (1949-51)b
p. 87-90.
(ii) The dual expansion of bookm.iking ami tho labour process
The restricted expansion of the bookmaking industry had 
important implications for the labour process in the different sections. 
The illegality of cash betting necessarily meant limitations 
in the socialization of the labour process, whereas in the credit 
offices, despite the limits of the market, a systematic division of 
labour was evident by the middle of the century.
The tasks involved in bookmaking comprise three technical 
stages: the taking of bets, their calculation, and payment of
winnings. But in terms of street pitches a further task was important: 
a careful eye for the police. The typical organization of a street 
bookmaker thus involved three key positions: firstly, a bookmaker who 
might or might not be a legitimate credit bookmaker , and who would 
settle bets, acquiring the excess of stakes over payments: secondly, 
a 'runner', who would take the legal risks of standing on the pitch, 
receiving bets before the start of the day's racing and paying out 
the previous days winning bets; the 'runner' would also take the 
bets to the bookmaker, with the stakes, and collect payments of winning 
bets; thirdly, a 'look-out', who could warn the 'runner' of any 
policemen.
In many respects the operation of street pitches represented a 
limited extension of bookmaking as a personal service, with the 'runner' 
as an adjunct to the bookmaker. Clearly the relationship, like all 
wage labour, was exploitative, but the generalization of this 
relationship was limited by legal restrictions; and tho number of 
'runners' that a bookmaker might employ was severely restricted by 
the essentially localised nature of his business.
The bookmaker was the employer, the 'runner' and 'looklout' 
nominally wage labourers. But it was not the characteristic form of 
wage labour, since there was a lack of continuity in employment. The
emphasis was on flexible, mobile, casual labour. Since the
work of the 'runner' was illegal, s/he could not remain on the same 
pitch indefinitely; while the work was not a full-time job - the 
'runner' was only needed for part of the day and horseracing did 
not take place every day of the year.
This pattern of work permitted the use of a variety of workers 
whose main activity was not this particular job or indeed wage labour 
itself. In some cases the 'pitch' might be in a factory or cafe; 
while the street pitches often used the casual layers of the reserve 
army or the hidden unemployed mass of married women. Whatever 
common interests such disparate groups possessed as 'runners', that 
this was not a central activity emphasises the greater significance 
of other influences in structuring interests, e.g. the position of 
women as housewives indicates the importance of considering their role 
in performing domestic labour in understanding their interests.
Clearly, the influence of external pressures must always be considered - 
interests do not only arise through the labour process - but they are 
arguably of particular significance when analysing situations where 
work is not a central activity.
In contrast, employees in the credit offices were neither part 
of an illegal labour force, nor were they widely distributed in 
carrying out their work. While the extent of concentration and 
centralization was not dramatic in this period, this was far from 
saying that some systematic division of labour was not possible in the 
larger credit offices. Consider the following account (written for 
the benefit of the backer) of the labour process in David Cope Ltd in 1948, 
a major London credit firm. ^  1
1. David Cope built up one of the largest credit firms in the country - 
the business eventually being sold to William Hill in the early 1960s.
Born Badenkof, he changed his name to Cope when coming to England from 
Poland at the end of the last century. Developing a network of street
pitches, he first opened a credit office in 1895.
The telephone room had more than 100 telephones, open for 
business from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. every day except Sunday. On phoning, 
the backer is transferred from an "experienced" switchboard operator 
to a "waiting" telephonist:
"The clerk has in front of her a list of the day's runners 
and a book, each sheet of which has a carbon back so that 
at all times there is a duplicate record of every wager 
that is written down. The clerk takes your bet; calls 
back (for checking purposes) your name (or nom-de-plume), 
and number, your bet and the total amount you have invested.
The deed is done, you are 'on'. " (Cope (1948) p.53 my italics).
The telephone room is also provided with up to date racing results,
runners, prices and other relevant information which the telephonist
can tell the caller. Having performed this routine task, the female
telephonist passes on the carbon copy to the "field Table" where it
is "timed, numbered, and photographed", before the bet is recorded.
(ibid p. 54)
The bets are now taken in "locked" boxes to the"making-up room"
where "scores of 'settlers"' are "waiting to analyse" the bet.
One settler calculates the bet which is passed to a second settler
who "checks the figures of his predecessor." (ibid p. 54. My emphasis.)
If there is no agreement, the bet is passed to the Supervisor.
Next the bet passes to the ledger where "high speed electrical
adding machines" record the profit or loss on the bet. From there,
it goes to the collating section for the attention of the ledger clerk:
".... at the end of the week, the clerk has before her 
your statement form, showing, with winnings or losses, 
the various wagers you have placed." (ibid p.55, My emphasis).
Before dispatch, the statement is checked by the Section Supervisor
against the bets placed. Then losing and winning bets (complete with
cheques) are passed through a machine which automatically seals and
franks the envelopes.
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In contrast to the era of personal service, where the 
bookmaker performed a range of functions, the labour process had 
now become more socialised. The employment of wage labour on an 
increasing scale implied the potential breaking down of job 
functions, with the workers collectively performing most of the 
activities previously undertaken by the bookmaker himself. The 
taking, settling, and paying out of bets had been delegated and 
separated out according to the principles of the divison of labour.
It is apparent that in breaking down the various job tasks, the 
devaluation of labour power (or deskilling) had not been evenly pursued. 
There was a routinization of various tasks, notably in the telephone 
and ledger rooms, which allowed the use of cheap labour; yet there 
had been little progress in devaluing the settling function which 
still required "a searching mathematical examination." (ibid p. 54)
The growing size of the firm and the consequent increases in 
the number of employees posed problems of control for the bookmaker.
In David Cope Limited, there had only been six settlers in 1925, yet 
by 1948 there were forty, rising to sixty in the 1950s; and employment 
in the phone room had risen in similar proportions. For the employer, 
the problem of control changed fundamentally in this period, given the 
greater size of the business. The paternalism of the inter-war
period was replaced after the war with a more stringent attitude to 
labour discipline - as the above description suggests.
In some instances direct supervision was used, to ensure the 
routine tasks were performed ^ ; yet the control of each specific 
labour process was also structured into the job itself. For instance, 
the duplicate recording of bets by the telephonist was not merely 1
1. Cope (1948) p. 55, where there is a photograph showing male 
supervisors sitting at the end of rows of women workers.
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a safeguard for backer and bookmaker, but represented a structured 
system of control over the performance of her job. The post-war 
period did not so much imply new systems of control as a general 
tightening of labour discipline, e.g. through the elimination of the 
pre-war system of 'job and finish'.
This tightening of control over the labour process was not 
equally applied to all employee groups; this reflected the technical 
functions performed. For instance, while those who worked in the 
phone room taking bets had a workload spread throughout the day, the 
settlers had to wait for racing to start before they could begin work.^ 
So while lunch breaks for the phone room workers were 'tight', those 
for settlers were often 'extended'.
While this leads to a source of potential division within the 
workforce, it is important initially to identify the bases of common 
interests. The immediate point is the technical functions of 
receiving, settling, and paying bets were all performed by wage labour; 
hence the basis for a common interest as exploited wage labour.
Secondly, those performing these job functions all performed 
exclusively the function of the collective labourer. Despite the greater 
demand on their skills, the settlers did not exercise any more 
capitalistic control over the labour process than those in the more 
routinised job tasks. The bookmaker had delegated the settling function 
but not control. The task of the settlers was merely to settle bets 
and they were controlled both through direct supervision and system of 
work: they were set in motion with the transfer of bets from the phone
room, while the pressure of having to send out regular payments of winning 
bets limited allowable settling time. 1
1. Some work was performed in the morning - viz. any bets left over
from the previous day and any bets taken on evening greyhound racing.
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The basis for collective interests can, therefore, be 
identified both in terms of their common exploitation and their 
interdependence as the collective labourer. Yet the influences 
which had prompted this collective interest had also generated the 
basis of divisions. Firstly the technical division of labour implied 
a greater affinity between the employer and the settlers, than with 
other employee groups. Both were immediately affected by whether 
it was a winning or losing day for the 'book'. Bets which lose 
do not have to be settled; but they still have to be taken, recorded, 
entered in the ledger, and the accounts dispatched. A good day for 
the 'book' meant less work for the settlers, but not for the other
i ( 1 )employee groups.
If the technical division of labour implied an intrinsic 
difference of interest over workload, the way in which the specialised 
job tasks resulted in the physical isolation of employee groups also 
served to promote divisions in interests. The continuing references 
to the "telephone" room, the "making-up" room, and the "ledger" room 
in the above account of David Cope Ltd, indicate the extent of physical 
separation along the lines of job tasks. This, however, has more to 
do with the workers experience of the labour process, rather than the 
structuring of interests and this discussion is left until Chapter 4.
Secondly, the structuring of the division of labour was not random: 
and the differences in the skills required of different employee groups 
both reflected the contemporary inability of breaking down the skill 
of settling and provided a source of differentiation within the workforce. 1
1. Clearly a day when many losing bets are placed might mean that 
backers do not make so many bets, which in turn lessens the 
workload, but this applies to all employees generally, i.e. to 
settlers as well.
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The skill of settling was crucial to the overall labour process 
in bookmaking; it was specific to the industry and, therefore, 
unlike telephonists, clerks, and typists, not readily available 
on the labour market. And this distinction was also reflected in 
the differential wage rates between the groups. ^
This distinction of skill and remuneration provided a basis for 
divergent interests between these groups. The less, but more 
generally, skilled employees were neither crucial for nor dependent 
on the bookmaking industry. The settlors, however, found themselves 
in an important position in the labour-process, yet simultaneously 
dependent on the bookmaking industry through their degree of skill 
specifity. And this skill division simultaneously reflected and 
was reflected in the unevenness in the control exercised by the 
bookmaking employer over the labour process. The built-in systems 
of control within the labour process did not constrain the activities 
of settlers in the same way as other groups, notably the telephonists. 
In part this can be seen in terms of the content of the work involved; 
and in part it reflects the time period over which job tasks could 
be performed - the settler could take longer over his work than the 
telephonist over hers.
While differences in skill and remuneration provided a basis 
for divergent interests within the workforce in terms of relationships 
between employees, they also influenced and were influenced by the 
social relationships between employer and employees. The obverse 
side of skill is employer dependency. The existence of a group 1
1. In the inter-war period, settlers in David Cope Ltd received 
E5-E6 per week while telephone room operators would only get 
E3-E3.50 per week. Unfortunately, there is little concrete 
evidence on wage rates at this time and in any case would not 
take into consideration bonuses etc.
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possessing a specific technical skill, yet objectively performing 
only the function of the collective labourer, implies that the 
employer must pay particular attention to the integration of that 
group at the political and ideological levels. The development 
of the settling "pool" in the large credit firms, demanded a 
certain concentration at the political and ideological levels, to 
compensate for the gradual devaluation of the position of the settler. 
And readily to hand was the mechanism which had united bookmakers 
from the early days: occupational solidarity, which now encompassed 
employees as well.
Occupational solidarity in bookmaking derived from two particular 
sources: the predominance of Jewish origins amongst those working
in the industry and the social antipathy towards bookmaking as an 
activity or occupation. Both aspects implied a certain isolation of 
bookmaking - and those who worked in it - from other parts of society.
And the illegality of off-course cash betting both reflected and prompted 
this isolation. Historically, these pressures had resulted in a 
particularly strong occupational solidarity amongst bookmakers and, to 
a lesser extent, their employees, operating as additive to the general 
determinants of occupational solidarity. ^
Paradoxically, the strength of settlers in the bookmaking process, 
their irreplaceability, made them particularly vulnerable to social 
antipathy against their work. Hence, occupational solidarity provided 
the means whereby the employers and settlers could share interests, 
despite a growing difference in interests as employers and employees.
But such a solidarity could never be specified in these terms for the 
telephonists and clerks: while on the one hand employer dependency 
was less significant , the non-specifity of their skills made them less 
dependent on bookmaking.
1. See Note 2 at the end of this chapter for a more detailed discussion 
of the sources of occupational solidarity.
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The first two sources of the structuring of different 
interests have been identified through the technical and social 
relationships embodied in the labour process. The third, however, 
emphasises the importance and direct impact of generalised social 
relationships other than that of employer-employee in specifying 
interests at the workplace.^ Here, the most notable influence 
is that of sexual divisions, reflected in a pronounced sexual division 
of labour in the labour process and predicated on the uneven devaluation 
of labour-power.
These sexual divisions were strictly maintained, (at least as
far as the men were concerned) and followed the now familiar separation
between the relatively skilled task of settling, which was predominantly
male, and the routinized work of the telephone and ledger rooms,
( 2 )where women were employed as cheap labour. Neither did women
play a part in controlling the labour process, for the supervisors 
were men.
The significance of this generalised sexual division of labour 
is that the interests of men and women at work may diverge; and this 
is due to the more demanding position of women in relation to domestic work.
1. This is not to deny that the relationships in the labour process
as discussed in the first two aspects are not related to wider social 
considerations: skill, for instance, is not merely technically, but also
socially determined, and any use of "skill" as a concept necessarily 
implies this ambivalence. But these might be seen as "indirect" rather 
than "direct" influences in specifying interest.
2. In Cope (1948), there are photographs of various rooms which clearly 
show the extent of the separation of male and female work, pp. 52-55.
Yet the women were used to "help out" in other areas of the office 
(including settling) when required. No such 'flexibility' was demanded 
of the men.
3. Hardman (forthcoming) argues that unionization amongst women must 
be understood in the context of their position as wage and domestic 
workers.
- l l o -
Thus, in the credit office of the bookmaking firms, the sexual 
division of labour served to reinforce the wider societal domination 
of men over women and provided a further dimension to the differences 
of interests between the employee groups.
To conclude: the development of off-course credit betting, 
combined with limited avenues to cash betting, resulted in the 
growth of bookmaking firms on a relatively small scale. The 
consequent increasing socialization of the labour process embraced 
the development of the collective labourer and the segregation of job 
tasks. Yet while this provided, on one hand, a common interest amongst 
the settlers, phone room operators, and clerks, it also generated the 
basis for divisions in terms of job content, skill, remuneration, and 
the degree of control exercised over them. This division was 
further compounded by the sexual division of labour.
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tc) The expansion of legalised cash betting in the post-1900 
period■
(i) The Initial Expansion.
(1) Legalisation of Cash Betting.
The legal restrictions placed on off-course cash betting 
remained in force until 1960, and necessarily contained the 
persistent pressures on the expansion of cash betting. The law 
was commonly brought into disrepute with the existence of 'known' 
betting shops and street pitches and continued to operate with 
the connivance of the local police; given the prevalence of betting, 
the law was also very difficult to enforce; while the 
discriminatory effect of the legislation was challenged by the 
'champions of the working-class punters', such as Bob Mellish and 
George Wigg in the House of Commons.
While the legislation was persistently 'stretched' by the 
activities of the illegal cash bookmakers, any changes in that legal 
position required a political solution. It required some change in 
the positions of key interested parties. Traditional opposition 
to legal cash betting had come from the Churches and the institutions 
who controlled horse and greyhound racing; the former had taken a 
moral stance while the latter felt their sports would suffer.
Successive Governments, while sensitive to these pressures, were not 
convinced; there was, after all, the major carrot of revenue from a 
betting tax. And in the context of the post-war betting boom of the 
late 1940s, the Labour Government set up a Royal Commission to investigate 
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries. ^
The Royal Commission reported in 1951, advocating the legalisation 
of cash betting. Amidst governmental changes the report was initially
1. RC (1949-51)(a)
shelved; but the recommendations could never gather too much
dust given the obvious fiscal temptations and as the post-war boom 
began to diminish, the attractiveness of this source of taxation 
grew.
While the Government, no doubt under the prompting of the 
Treasury, saw the increasing possibility of a successful betting tax, 
other interested parties began to move in favour of legalising cash 
betting, sensing the potential source of income. With horse-racing,
in particular, suffering from falling attendances, the possibility of 
using money from betting to supplement the ailing finances of the sport 
became more acceptable. This switch of allegiances by the 
horse-racing institutions left the Church isolated as the main opponent 
of legal cash betting. Thus the general economic force within the 
bookmaking industry itself, ever challenging its imposed legal limits, 
now found new allies in the government*1* and the horse-racing institutions. 
Tlie juncture of these various forces resulted in the legislation of 
1960 which lifted the barrier to the economic development of the 
industry, thus allowing for an imposed levy on cash betting for the 
benefit of horse racing, and establishing the preconditions necessary 
for the introduction of a betting tax later in the decade.
While the balance of forces now shifted in favour of legalising 
cash betting, if the Government of the day was to retain some control 
over its development, then a blueprint for the legalisation had to be 
produced. Given the existence of illegal off-course systems of betting - 
betting shops and street pitches - the choice was not an open one; 
debate centred around these alternatives and when the Bill came before 
Parliament, it was the betting shops which won the day. This did not
1. This is, of course, something of a simplification. There is no
attempt here to differentiate between 'Government' and 'State' or within
'Government' itself.
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receive unequivocal support. The Parliamentary champions of the
working-class punters, Bob Mellisli and George Wigg, wore now left
behind. Adopting a fundamentally conservative approach in arguing
for the legalisation of existing practice, they found themselves in
an unholy alliance with the large credit bookmakers, who feared the
various implications of betting shops. ^
Such a position, however, was a yearning for the past, and it
had no relevance for the future.
".... licensed street pitches would not have suited Northern 
betting shop operators, the police or large bookmakers, 
since it would have kept the trade on a strictly personal 
basis, which would also have militated against effective 
taxation." (Hood (1972) p. 191).
Hood, correctly, points to the various institutional pressures which 
would always favour betting shops rather than street pitches, once the 
decision to legalise off-course cash betting had been taken. Yet street 
pitches were also an irrelevance to the economic expansion of the 
industry, since they would quickly restrict the developing division of 
labour and also prevent the full utilisation of the various technical 
developments which would enable continuous betting. The importance of 
betting shops, or Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs) as they are formally 
called, was to allow a qualitatively distinct expansion of the bookmaking 
industry. 1
1. "During the passage of the Betting and Gaming Act, Mr. Mellish 
took an active part in the debates. He strongly opposed the 
establishment of betting offices, considering that the existing 
street runners should be licensed". CCOG (1962) p.34
See below for the position of the credit bookmakers in relation 
to LBOs at this time.
( 2) The Pattern of Post-legislative expansion.
Following the legalisation of cash betting, the bookmaking 
industry developed dramatically. As can be seen from Table 3.1, 
by June 1962 the bulk of the licences which were to be taken out 
had been granted. The peak number of licences, 15,741, was reached 
in 1966. (1)
This indicates the most important aspect of the post-legislative 
period: the rapid growth of LBOs. Apart from this, Table 3.1
gives few clues as to early development of the industry. While it 
can be seen that Bookmakers' Permits grew at a slower rate than 
office licences, this tells little since credit bookmakers needed 
permits too. Again the decline in betting agency permits - 
introduced where 'demand' was 'insufficient' to warrant a betting 
shop - suggests different possibilities. Were they simply unviable 
or so successful that they were exchanged for fully fledged betting 
office licences? In view of the overall expansion of the industry,
the latter is most likely.
Perhaps the most useful indication, and it is little more than 
that, of the way the industry developed is given in the magnitude 
of bookmakers' permits. Bookmaking was apparently an industry of small 
firms - and remained so for most of the decade.
1. For the moment the subsequent decline is passed over. It is 
interesting to note that by 1975, licences had fallen below
the 1963 figure.
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TABLE 3.1 Permits and Licences in Force on 1st June in
Enqland, Scotland and1 Wales, 1961-1978.
YEAR BOOKMAKERS’ PERMITS BETTING AGENCY PERMITS
BETTING OFFICE 
LICENCES.
1961 9,944 326 8,802
1962 10,712 352 13,340
1963 11,061 143 14,388
1964 11,114 113 15,025
1965 11,235 93 15,638
1966 11,253 84 15,741
1967 11,138 68 15,535
1968 11,069 54 15,732
1969 10,723 46 15,490
1970 9,917 35 14,644
1971 9,414 31 14,462
1972 9,131 33 14,812
1973 8,731 32 14,873
1974 8,602 29 14,837
1975 8,369 23 14,371
1976 8,221 23 13,865
1977 8,082 21 13,254
1978 7,960 
Source: derived from:
15 12,812
i) Betting and Gaming Act 1960 - Annual Reports.
ii) Betting, Gaming and Lotteries 
schedule. Annual Reports.
(LONDON, HMSO).
Act, 1963 - Permits and Licences
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These impressions are, perhaps, confirmed by the rather 
more revealing employment statistics. Table 3.2 shows the 
official statistics for employment in the'betting industry"; 
while this is not identical with LBO employment, it is probable 
that changes in employment patterns are primarily a reflection of 
the developing Bookmaking industry. What features are of interest? 
Firstly, employment has risen by more than 50% beyween 1960 and 
1966, indicating the general expansion of the industry. But within 
that, the bulk of the increase (and during 1960-64, All of it) is in 
terms of male employment. Now given the virtually rigid sexual 
division of labour in LBOs this indicates the most significant 
development of the initial expansion: the generalisation of
the settler-manager. Given the structure of the industry, this 
movement laid the basis for the future unionization of the employees, 
since, in part, this was the transition from self-employment to waged 
work.
This trend apparently co-existed with a growth of small concerns. 
Not only did male employment increase until 1965, after 1964 female 
employment increased as well. The last year in which both male and 
female employment rose was 1966. This was also the peak year for 
Betting Office Licences and perhaps marks the culimination of the 
period of initial expansion.
The pattern of this first phase of the development of LBOs perhaps
owes more than a little to the reluctance of the large credit
bookmakers to become involved in this expansion:
"when the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 legalised 
Betting shops, both Ladbrokes and Hills were at first 
disinterested. Alfred Cope, then head of one of the 
largest bookmaking businesses in the country, told me 
that he strongly disapproved of the idea of betting shops 
as he thought it would lead to protection rackets and 
gangsterism". (Kaye (1969) p. 266).
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No. of employees in employment in the "Betting Industry" 
1959-68 
(U.K)
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The objections of the large credit firms were not simply moral 
ones. In their evidence to the 1951 Royal Commission, the 
representatives of the trade associations had expressed concern that 
betting shops would "gobble us up".ll) This threat to those who 
had already made the top was thus countered by a developing conservative 
attitude towards bookmaking: the defence of the status quo.
Others, however, were quick to seize the new opportunities the
legislation now offerred, in particular the existing illegal cash(2 )bookmakers. Mark Lane , operating on the outskirts of London's 
East End, was well-prepared:
"Convinced before the end of the 1950s that legal betting 
shops were only a matter of time, have began acquiring 
options and leases: when the Act did go through he had
17 offices all ready for opening." (Caulkin (1973) p.69).
In 1971, Lane secured control of J.Coral Ltd and became Chairman
of one of the largest bookmaking companies in Britain.
The rapid expansion of LBOs - 9,000 licences by July 1961 and
13,000 by July 1962 - was not, however, simply the old illegal systems
appearing in a new form. It reflected the involvement of the outsiders,
always willing to replenish the ranks of bookmakers.
"The shops were opened more by entrepreneurs than by 
bookmakers. The entrepreneurs saw the opportunities 
and the bookmakers didn't. The multiples didn't enter ^
the field for five or six years and they bought their way in".
1. RC (1949-51) (b) p. 369.
2. Having run a book in the army during the 1939-45 war, Mark Lane 
had set up in Dagenham after the war, relying heavily on street pitches 
and the workers in the nearby Ford factory:
"With two ex-Army colleagues. Lane set up in Dagenham after the war with 
a capital of £200 and a couple of year's experience running a book in 
the forces. He quickly lost the money; but with some help from his friends, 
he made a second start and this time never looked back". (Caulkin (1973)p.69
3. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.
By the tire the major credit firms - Ladbrokes and William Hill - 
decided to become involved, the new cash betting industry had 
already begun to experience the initial processes of concentration 
and centralisation with the growth of the betting chain. As yet, 
these chains were relatively small and restricted to limited localities.^ 
They had been built partly through the granting of new licences, 
but increasingly through the takeover of an existing bookmaker and his 
LBOs. Those that built the chains tended to have a bookmakers 
'pedigree'; no doubt for some entrepreneurs, LBOs had not proved the 
'licence to print money' they had hoped for.
The basis for this expansion rested on the ability of the bookmakers 
to accumulate money capital; and this in turn was dependent on the 
betting opportunities that could be provided - largely through the 
expansion of horseracing. The 1960 Act allowed LBOs to remain open 
between 9.00 a.m. and 6.30 p.m.; in other words betting could take place 
continuously throughout the day - provided there was something on which 
to bet.
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the direct 
exploitation of labour could be achieved in either an absolute or 
relative sense depending on how the betting medium was developed.
In the period of initial expansion, the bookmaking employers were 
particularly concerned with the absolute direct exploitation of labour 
which implied an effort to develop the betting medium in a particular 
direction. Firstly, the expansion of the working week could be secured 
by ensuring horseracing took place on every weekday. While Sunday 
racing was illegal, there were still blank days throughout the racing 
calendar. The first priority was to fill those gaps. Secondly, the 1
1. E.G. Mark Lane in East London, James Lane in South London, Jack
Windsor in Leeds, and John Joyce in the Stockton area.
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expansion of the working day implied extended race meetings or 
staggered start and finish times on days when there were more than 
one race meeting; in this way the period of racing would be expanded.
The success with which bookmakers pursued these objectives is 
in part reflected in the development of horseracing at this time.^
The historical dependency of bookmaking on sport now became 
apparently reversed as horseracing increasingly accommodated the 
demands of bookmaking. In Table 3.3 the trends in scheduled and 
actual race fixtures and in racecourse attendances can be clearly 
seen. While total public racecourse attendance fell by 18% between 
1961 and 1973, and the average attendance per daily fixture by more 
than 30%, in the same period the number of scheduled fixtures actually 
rose by 18%. A sport which was being supported by fewer and fewer 
people was managing not simply to hold its own but to expand operations.
The clear implication is that the importance of the 'sport' lay not 
so much in those who attended the racecourses but in what it offered 
to those interests away from the courses.which leads us to bookmaking.
A more detailed look at Table 3.3 shows that the most rapid rise in 
scheduled fixtures occurred between 1965-69, accounting for nearly 60% 
of the total increase 1961-73. The trend had begun slightly earlier, 
but had not taken off properly until then. It is, perhaps, not co­
incidental that at that time the bookmakers had found strong allies.
The institutions that controlled British Horseracing had been 
successful in gaining a quid pro quo for their support of legalised 
cash betting: the Horserace Betting Levy Board (II.B.L.B) had been 
established by the Government to administer the levy charged on bookmakers' 
profits for the 'good' of horseracing. By 1963, the HBLB had found 
its feet. Its controllers also knew where their best interests lay: 1
1. Trade Associations were long established and provided a suitable
means to articulate these kinds of demands.
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Table 3. 3 ; Horseracing fixtures 
in Enqland, Scotland
and racecourse attendances 
and Wales 1961-73.
1. 2. 3. 4.
YEAR SCHEDULED
FIXTURES
FIXTURES 
TAKING PLACE
TOTAL RACECOURSE 
PUBLIC ATTENDANCE
AVERAGE
ATTENDANCES
FIXTURE
1961 778 750 5,409,474 7,213
1963 787 682 4,594,777 6,737
1965 804 753 5,219,213 6,931
1967 837 747 4,665,762 6,246
1969 888 792 4,110,085 5,190
1971 898 853 4,270,495 5,006
1973 924 894 4,426,176 4,951
Source : Horserace Betting Levy Board
Racing Statistical Information Digest.
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higher bookmaking profits meant more money for racing, but those 
profits depended on the availability of races to bet on. As the 
Chairman stated:
"The spread of race fixtures is the responsibility of 
the Turf authorities. It has a relationship to the 
volume of betting and hence of the levy. In theory 
the ideal way from the point of view of promoting the 
volume of betting would be a minimum of one fixture 
every week d a y .... " (1)
In March 1966, the state took a stake in the expansion of
horseracing: the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a new betting
tax of 2*j% on turnover, i.e. amount staked. In contrast to the HBLB,
who took a proportion of profits, the taxation was on stakes. The more
races on which to bet, the more the tax would roll in. This
effectively gave the state an interest in the expansion of bookmaking,
( 2 )in contradiction to the rhetoric, and even conditions of the 1960 Act 
While the 1960 Act had supposedly aimed to restrict betting by legalising 
it, the interests of state agencies rested in expanding betting: for 
the treasury who saw betting as a suitable source of taxation; and 
for the HBLB who wanted increased betting to finance horseracing.
The coinciding of the interests of bookmakers and the state 
institutions thus had its impact on the quantitative expansion of the 
betting medium. Yet bookmakers were also concerned with qualitative 
improvements which would encourage an increase in the volume of betting.
One important development in the conduct of horseracing itself was 
the introduction of overnight declarations of intended runners at race 
meetings. The significance of this was to enable potential backers to
know definite runners before the day of the races. The daily papers
1. Lord Harding, Chairman of the HBLB, quoted in Daily Herald 10.4.63.
(and also in CCOG (1963) p.37).
2. Various restrictions had been integrated into that legislation in
an effort to curtail the extent of betting. In the first place, to obtain 
a licence for a LBO, the onus was on the bookmaker to show the local 
licensing committee that there was sufficient 'demand* for his services. 
Other parts of the Act which aimed at restricting betting included the 
limitation on opening hours, and legal sanctions to be used where betting
(Footnote continued
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....Footnote continued ....
offices were advertised or where bookmakers induced any person in 
a betting office to bet. This reflected the emphasis in the Act 
merely to legalise the existing level of betting rather than 
generate conditions under which it could expand. A clear example 
of this was the position taken by R.A.Butler, then Home Secretary 
on continuous betting.** In November 1959, he said:
"I think it would be wise for all to bear in mind 
the undesirability of doing anything, in the final 
form of the Statute, as it emerges, that might encourage 
continuous betting." (HC Official Report 16.11.59 
col. 812).
** The opportunity to bet race by race.
could now list definite runners rather than a long list, many of 
whom would not race. The benefit for the bookmaker was clear: a 
reduction in bets on non-runners, which were otherwise void bets 
and of no use to the bookmaker. 1
On the technical side, there was an important extension of the 
Exchange Telegraph Service to LBOs, enabling virtually instant 
relaying of racing commentaries, information on horses, betting odds, 
and results. This allowed the bookmaker to inform backers of their 
fate immediately, and for him to settle bets without delay, thus 
permitting any returns to be restaked; it also encouraged the 
interest of backers in their betting by providing commentaries on the 
races.
1. Previously trainers had been allowed to make 4-day declarations 
until the day of the races, when they would announce non-runners. The 
extent of non-runners on this system inhibited backing because punters 
would not know till towards race-time which horses would be running. 
Overnight declarations were introduced in 1963.
. •
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(3) The labour process in the period of the initial expansion.
The period of initial expansion was characterised by the rapid 
development of LBOs, where ownership was widespread witti a small-scale
development for employees in bookmaking?
The demands of the new LBOs were different from their predecessors, 
the street pitches and credit offices. In contrast to street pitches, 
the legalised LBOs implied the legitimacy of cash bookmaking as 
an occupation and permitted an open labour market. Furthermore, LBOs 
were physically fixed and demanded staffing while they remained open; 
it implied regular employment rather than the casual nature of street 
pitches.
In relation to credit offices, the cash betting in which LBOs 
operated implied extensive decentralisation taking the facility to bet 
to the backer. The degree of integration of the labour process in 
the credit offices was therefore broken down: staff were widely 
distributed in small units.
The structure of the labour process in the LBOs did, however, 
inherit the same traditions of division of labour that had existed 
before in the industry. The division between taking bets and setting 
them remained the fundamental one, and formed the basis of the 
differentiation of job tasks. The bets were taken by a counter clerk 
and settled by the bookmaker himself or the settler-manager. Paying 
out winning bets might be carried out either by the counter clerk, 
employer (or settler-manager), or, in large LBOs, a specialist cashier. 
The generalised integration of the large credit offices was thus 
replicated within each LBO, the degree of differentiation dependent on 
the volume of betting.
emergence of betting chains. ( 1 ) What were the implications of this
1. Not until the late 1960s did betting chains reach the 100 mark.
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The structuring of the labour process in LBOs developed around 
a uniform pattern, as set out in figure 3.1, and which shows the 
heirarchy of control. Settlers would only be required where there 
was a large turnover of bets; while the boardman would be responsible 
for displaying results and betting odds.
Figure 3.1: The Basic Employment Structure of a LBO.
MANAGER (or EMPLOYER)
SETTLER
I-------------------- ICOUNTERHAND BOARDMAN.
The control of the labour process, to begin with, was exercised 
by the employing bookmaker through direct supervision. Yet with 
the development of betting chains, physical supervision was no longer 
possible, and increasing reliance had to be placed on the manager of 
a LBO. With the expansion of the business, the employing bookmaker 
had to delegate control over the labour process as well as the technical 
functions of bookmaking. This problem was of a different order to 
that of the credit offices, where the settlers and phone room operators 
could be directly supervised; the wide distribution of employees in 
smell units implied a measure of control had to be delegated to 
employee(s) working in the LBO. Hence the creation of the settler- 
manager.
The functions of the settler-manager involved not merely the 
control of the operations of the LBO in terms of job tasks, but also 
aspects of the bookmaking function itself; this does not merely refer to 
setting. This reflected the new form of bookmaking which LBOs implied. 
In contrast to street pitches, LBOs offered race by race or continuous
betting. It implied settling had to be carried out as soon as 
possible to allow the backer to restake on subsequent races. In 
consequence each LBO required a settler. Yet the pressure of 
continuous betting also implied the immediacy of decision taking on 
bookmaking questions. With the growth of betting chains it
became virtually impossible for the bookmaking employer to make all 
the decisions on his liabilities on a particular race. Decisions 
needed to be made quickly and required some expertise and knowledge
of the precise action to take. A mistake could have disastrous
. .  . .  ( 1 )fxnancial consequences.
This delegation of the content of bookmaking activity, was coupled with 
the delegation of control over the labour process itself. The two 
were clearly entwined: decisions on bookmaking were not purely 
technical, but concerned the operation of the LBO itself. Whether or 
not a bet should be taken is not merely a bookmaking question, but one 
of control over the taking of bets.
In practice, the exercising of control over the labour process within 
the betting shop accompanied the delegation of settling and hence the 
managing and settling functions of the LBO were combined in the same 
position: the settler-manager. In the initial expansion, without 
systematic means of control, the bookmaker tended to rely increasingly 
on settler-managers to ensure the adequate, and even honest, running of 1
1. An example may be helpful here: For instance while LBOs operated on 
starting prices, as did the street pitches, they were also at liberty to 
bet at board prices, i.e. to strike bets at the odds offered on the course 
market prior to the race. These odds were transmitted simultaneously to the 
shops by Extel. However, whereas these odds reflected the strength of the 
on-course market, they might not have reflected the bets struck by an 
individual off-course bookmaker. In this situation, the bookmaker might 
'lay-off' some of the money placed on the more popularly-backed horses to 
cover himself against heavy losses. This is known as "hedging" and to do this 
a bookmaker would need to contact a trade bookmaker willing to take such bets 
Alternatively, he might offer longer odds against horses that had not been 
backed, with the similar consequence of spreading his liabilities more widely 
Clearly, to misread the situation could involve heavy losses.
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his LBOs as his chain began to expand.
The importance of considering this development in some detail 
is to understand how collective interests were structured through 
the labour process. And the creation of the settler-manager is 
crucial in understanding both the extent and limits of common 
interests amongst the LBO employees. Insofar as the settler-manager 
controlled the labour process within the LBO, he performed not only 
the function of the collective worker but the global function of 
capital. To this extent the interests of the settler-manager on 
the one hand and the other LBO employees on the other were fundamentally 
different.
In performing the global function of capital the interests of 
the settler-managers were linked to those of the employer. This was 
not merely reflected in the content of their work and their activities 
as agents of control and supervision, but in remuneration. Commission 
payments on LBO profits were not uncommon; and to the extent that LBOs 
wore run independently of each other within the same ownership, the 
settler-managers might be seen as relatively isolated and without 
generalised common interests amongst themselves.
The material basis for common interests between employers and 
settler-managers was reinforced at the political and ideological level.
The notion of occupational community still persisted and was encouraged 
by employers desnarately short of skilled settlers; it also gained 
continuity through the recruitment of labour from within the preceding 
illegal cash betting system and the credit offices. Yet this proved 1
1. It is perhaps important to note at this stage, that the 
bookmaking industry developed very rapidly after 1960, but that this 
development was uneven. Many LBOs remained one-man concerns. And even 
where chains developed locally, the delegation of control may have been 
very limited. This does not detract, however, from the general 
tendencies towards the growth of betting chains and the delegation of control 
and aspects of bookmaking activity to the settler-managers.
(1 )
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inadequate for the employers, even when considering the input of 
those with previous connections with bookmaking and now drawn back 
in through the offer of high wages. ^  The shortage of settling 
expertise could not be overcome immediately and indicates the strong 
market position of the settler-managers at this time. Until a 
new generation of settlers could be trained, employers were particularly 
dependent on the initial stock of settler-managers and the continued 
integration of this group with the employer's interests was paramount.
Not until the late 1960s would the external training schools, such as 
the London School of Turf Accountancy, together with internal training 
programmes of the larger firms increase, in any substantial way, labour 
supply and erode the strong market position of the settlers.
While the position of the settler-manager had been revalued in 
consequence of this early development of the LBO chains, the general 
tendency to devalue labour-power produced a contradictory effect. The 
efforts of the employers to increase the supply of skilled settlers was 
coupled with strategies to devalue the settling component of the position.
The reduction of settling skill to its elementary components combined 
with the application of mathematical knowledge, to simplify the process of 
settling bets. The development of settling schools allowed the widespread 
dissemination of standardised settling systems, more simplified and 
quicker than the varied systems used by the 'older hands'. In particular, 
the 'block' and subsequently the 'crash block' system substantially 
reduced the time necessary to settle many complex bets. Settling was both 
simplified and speeded up, and the position of I he settler (-manager) 
devalued.
While the performance of the settling function, and its gradual
devaluation, implied some basis for common interest amongst all LBO
employees - as the collective worker - the differences were overwhelming.
1. There is no systematic data on wage rates at this time. There is general 
evidence from interviewing various workers in bookmaking that they left other 
jobs because they could earn higher wages in bookmaking at this time, e.g. 
see Interview F.Martin 10.6.75.
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In terras of the labour-process itself, the other LBO employees 
were under the control of the settler-manager, constituting an 
essential point of divergence. Once again, as in the credit offices, 
the division between settler-manager and counter clerk was reinforced 
not merely in terms of skill, but through the sexual division of labour. 
For the counter clerks, common interests did not exist so much within 
one LBO as across different TBOs.
In the initial expansion, these wide differences of skill tended 
to increase. The devaluation of settling was just beginning; that 
of the counter clerk was soon complete. The division of taking and 
settling bets implied the potential use of less skilled labour for 
the former task. And given that most bets were taken during the 
three or four hours of racing in the afternoon, it allowed the use of 
part-time workers. This made the counter clerks job 'women's work' 
with very limited exceptions.
The skills required were initially on a par with those needed 
in the phone-room of a credit office: the ability to take bets quickly 
and under pressure. Once a race has been run, bets cannot be taken.
Vet the initial working systems placed inherent limits on the speed 
of taking bets. In the North of England, bets were placed verbally 
by the backer and the counter clerk would write them down. In the South, 
it was usual for bets to be written out by the backer, who would receive 
a hand-stamped receipt.
With the expansion of the betting medium and the increasing volume 
of betting, the limitations of these systems became apparent, and 
resulted in the rapid introduction of electrically operated cash registers. 
3y the end of the 1960s, some form of electric cash register was common
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in most LBOs^' Such registers were designed to record the 
placing of the bet, the precise time it was taken, the amount staked, 
and to produce a receipt for the backer. This increased productivity 
through shortening the time needed to take a bet, thus enabling more 
bets to be taken in a given time.
The premium placed on continuous betting, emphasising the all- 
important speed in returning money to the backer in the hope it would 
be restaked and lost on the next available opportunity, accentuated 
the importance of taking bets rather than checking their accuracy.
Whereas the counter clerk had previously acted as a filter for wrongly 
written bets, any errors in writing out or in understaking were now 
deemed the fault of the backer. The skill of understanding bets was thus 
minimally demanded; the emphasis was now placed on the ability to 
handle money and operate the cash register.
While the introduction of machinery was at the heart of the 
routinisation of the counter clerks' activities, it simultaneously 
embraced a systematic check on the performance of her work. It provided 
a constant monitoring on the amount of money that should be in the 
till, through 'ringing up' the amount staked on the bet itself, the 
backer's receipt, and on the till roll. While the employers rationale 
might be set out in terms of the elimination of fraud, the cash register, 
like other machinery, represented an attempt to control the work 
patterns of the employee - in this case the counter clerk.
Against this background any basis for common interests between the 
settler-managers and counter clerks was fraught with differences.
While both, to some extent, performed the function of the collective 
worker, this interdependence was continually overlaid with the domination 
of the counter clerk by the settler-manager and the existence of prior 
allegiances._______________________________________________________
1. in 1962 there was an exhibition of Betting Shops Equipment held in London. 
See CCQG (1962) p. 38 for a brief comment on the exhibition.
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For the sake of completeness it is necessary to mention the 
boardman's position, but the relative insignificance of this job 
task within the labour process, as well as the numbers involved, does 
not warrant detailed attention. The function of the boardmen was to 
assist both the backer and the LBO employees in displaying racing 
results and up-to-date betting odds.^ The work was limited to 
racing hours and thus suitable to part-time employment. It was not, 
however, crucial (as was the counter clerk's task) to the taking, 
settling, and paying out of bets; in offering only a qualitative 
improvement to the backer, the boardman's job lent itself to casual, 
and not merely part-time, labour. In this vein boardmen were made 
up of sections of the workforce who did not regard this job as a central 
interest: moonlighters, OAPs, dropouts, and 'unemployed' workers.
At the same time, some boardmen were employed as regular, full-time, 
employees: but these were learning the 'trade' , the LBO managers of 
t.he future, and obviously an entirely different group to the casual 
boardmen. Not until the end of the decade did the trainee manager 
grade come to replace the 'apprenticeship' of the boardinan.
In consequence, it is impossible to generalise about the 
interests of boardmen. Clearly, the function itself remained wholly 
witiiiti the collect ive worker; yet the interests of t lie groups involved 
were either not primarily determined by Llieir position in the labour 
process or conditioned by their visions of becoming a settler-manager.
As such, the Boardmen constitute another strand of the divergent 
rather than common interests among the LBO workers. 1
1. Depending on betting turnover and/or race meetings, it would 
require someone to perform only this function.
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To conclude: the structuring of the labour process in the expansion
of the LBOs inherited divisions from the preceding sections of 
the bookmaking industry. Yet due to the decentralised nature of 
off-course cash betting,the employers soon faced problems of control 
with the expansion of betting chains. This implied a delegation 
of some bookmaking functions and a measure of control over the labour 
process to the settler-manager in each LBO. This served to generate 
a basis of common interest between the employing bookmaker and the 
settler-manager in opposition to any common interests between the LBO 
staff through performing the function of the collective worker. Such 
divisions were reinforced both through the sexual division of labour, 
as it had in the credit offices, and the casual nature of much boardman 
employment.
A
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(ii) Bookmaking as Retailing: the growth of betting chains.
(1) The pattern of expansion in the period of 
betting chains.__________________________
The characteristic form of the individually-owned LBO, or
small-scale betting chain, of the initial expansion gave way in the
late 1960s and early 1970s to the growth of national, large-scale,
betting chains. The continued expansion of bookmaking was
accompanied by a rapid concentration and centralisation of ownership
and control of LBOs, with growing links between bookmaking firms and other
sections of the economy, which can be called 'established capital.'
These changes altered the very nature of the bookmaking industry with
important implications for the LBO employees.
As the period of initial expansion came to a close in the mid-late
1960s, the basis had been established for the dramatic development
of the industry. Between 1967-68 and 1974-75 betting stakes rose
by more than 50%, as table 3.4 shows. A closer examination suggests
that the vast majority of this increase was in the turnover of the
off-course bookmakers. Within this general expansion, however, the
gradual emergence of localised betting chains established the
preconditions for a period of rapid centralisation of ownership and the
development of national LBO concerns.
Prominent in this phase of development were the two major
bookmaking firms who had initially declined to become involved with LBOs:
Ladbroke and William Hill.^1* The traditional areas of credit____ _
1. William Hill was the most notable of the various rags to riches stories 
in bookmaking history:
"One of 11 children,he was born 68 years ago (1903) in 
a Birmingham slum, and left school at 12 to work as a farmer's 
boy". (Sporting Life 16.10.71 p.3).
During the first world war. Hill found himself working as an apprentice 
in the BSA works in Birmingham. And it was here he started making a book.
It was not until 1929 that he came to London;'standing up' at the important 
Southern race meetings and greyhound tracks :
"More than once in those days he knew what it was to be broke" (ibid). 
However, business eventually proved so successful that just before 
the war he was able to move from his credit offices in Jermyn Street to the 
more desirable Park Lane area.
"He was heavily committed financially, so while the biggest 
firms of the day contracted their businesses, he had no
footnote continued
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...... footnote continued ....
alternative but to push ahead with expansion".
(ibid) .
It was this period that laid the foundation for Hill's immense 
business success. In 1954, the firm became a public company, the 
first bookmaking firm to do so. And Hill himself pursued a very 
successful 'second' career in breeding racehorses.
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bookmaking were now in decline. The first major casualty had 
been fixed odds betting on football. This had taken place for 
many years, but in the early 1960s, perhaps with the outlet of 
L30s, fixed odds betting was effectively competing with the pools 
promoters. There was no tax on fixed odd betting, unlike football 
pools, and the government were scarcely indifferent bystanders. In 
1964, a tax was introduced which resulted in the virtual collapse of 
fixed odds betting.
Even more significantly, credit betting on horseracing was under 
pressure. Table 3.5 shows the dramatic decline in the credit 
business of William Hill at this time. While in 1968, credit betting 
had been twice the figure for LBOs, by 1971 it is little more than one 
third. Credit betting had nearly halved, while LBO turnover had 
more than trebled. The e>;planation of this dramatic decline rests 
partly in the non-separation of the cash and credit betting clienteles; 
the anticipation that credit backers would not frequent LBOs had not 
materialised. Secondly, it reflects the diminishing importance of 
'trade' business; the traditional role of the large bookmakers in 
accepting bets from other bookmakers attempting to offset their liabilities 
was less significant with the rise of betting chains able to sustain 1
1. See Table 3.4 in 1964-65, the year in which the tax on fixed odds 
was introduced. Fixed odds coupon betting accounted for 15% of the 
combined fixed odds-football pool betting stakes. By 1969-70, this had 
fallen below 1S%, and by 1974-75 to '4%.
Table 3.5: William Hill Organisation: a comparison of
Credit and Cash bookmaking 1960-71.
YEAR LICENSED
TURNOVER
£000
BETTING OFFICES 
PRE-TAX PROFITS 
£000
CREDIT, COURSE 
TURNOVER 
£000
AND
PRE-
ANTE-POST 
-TAX PROFIT 
EOOO
1968a 18,221 640 38,564 L 245
1969 20,620 827 23,378 L 12
1970 29,020 1,087 26,119 297
1971 58,716 b 22,811 b
Notes: a 15 months
b not discernible.
L loss.
Source : Extel British Company Service.
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large liabilities 1themselves. (1)
1. In the 1950s, the trade department in William Hill was run by 
Sam Burns, one-time boxing manager and subsequently a managing 
director of William Hill:
"Burns built up the Trade Room - a clearing house for 
smaller bookmakers hedging their liabilities - into 
the most efficient in the business. 'There was a lot 
more trade money in those days' recalls Burns. 'Nowadays, 
as well as the big firms like Hill's, Ladbroke's, Coral's, 
and Mecca, there are many other combines with over 100 
betting shops which can afford to hold their liabilities".
Hadert (1975).
Burns' career is of some interest. In the inter-war years, he 
coupled his more famous talents in the Boxing world, with making a book 
at West Ham amd Clapton greyhound stadiums. Born in 1913, into a 
boxing family in London's East End, Burns left school to work in 
Fleet Street, eventually moving to the "Sporting Life" for whom he 
compiled racing form and wrote a Boxing column:
"But for me it was a bit slow. I could see I'd be 
stuck as a wage-earner. I've always been ambitious, 
and was determined to make money". (ibid).
Burns succeeded in both boxing and bookmaking. Having built 
up a small chain of betting shops with Terry Downes, whom he had 
'managed' to a boxing world title. Burns sold out to William Hill.
He eventually became managing director of the William Hill Organisation 
in 1972.
Against this background, the major firms entered the market for 
LBOs. In 1967, Ladbrokes became a public company which provided 
a launching pad for a massive 6-year expansion. Through taking 
over existing betting chains, Ladbrokes aimed at a national network, 
transcending the geographical restrictiveness of the early betting 
chains. ^  William Hill soon followed the example of their
major rival.
These institutional re-arrangements both reflected and determined 
the rapid concentration and centralisation in the industry. Table 3.6 
shows the extent of this transition. Taking turnover (i.e. total stakes) 
as a measure of centralisation, in 1969-70 the four major firms 
(or their forerunners) held just 15% of off-course betting. By 1972-73 
their share had more than doubled to over 37%. Alternatively, taking 
LBO ownership as an indication, the change is even more dramatic.
Between 1970 and 1973 the 'Big Four' trebled their number of LBOs.
Since there had been little change in the total of LBOs in this period, 
this increase is almost entirely a reflection of the processes of
concentration and centralisation. By 1973, the 'Big Four' owned 23% of
( 2 )all LBOs and received 37% of total stakes.
1. Betting chains of various sizes were taken over by Ladbrokes. Some
were very large such as Danny Quastel in London, whose 137 LBOs Ladbrokes 
acquired in 1972. The driving force behind the expansion of Ladbrokes
was Cyril Stein, whose uncle, Max Parker, had bought the firm in 1956. 
Stein, whose grandfather had arrived in Britain, a Jewish immigrant, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, had inherited an immediate bookmaking
pedigree from his father, who had founded the 'Blower'. " .....  a
grammar school boy who had graduated from business college into his uncle's 
betting business" (Kaye (1969) p.156), Stein brought Ladbrokes from their 
aloof position as bookmakers to the aristocracy to that of the leading 
firm of the Bookmaking industry.
2. Which indicates they owned the more lucrative LBOs - a trend which 
continued in 1975 with turnover rising above 40% and LBO holdings 
declining to 21.4%.
Table 3.6 A comparison of the four main bookmaking firms
1970-1975.
(i) Estimated Turnover
FIRM 1969-70
TURNOVER % OF INDUSTRY
1972-73 
TURNOVER % OF IND.
1974-75
TURNOVER % OF INI
£000 EOOO EOOO
Ladbroke
Group 70,000 7.0 161,000 12. 5 195,000 12.)
Mecca 16,100a 1.6 124,000 9.6 175,000 10.Í
William Hill 44,000 4.4 123,300 9.6 161,(00 10.]
J.Coral 20,200b 2.0 75,000 5.8 123,000 7.C
Total 150,300 15.lt, 483,300 37.5 654,600 40.7
Total for Industry:
993,000 100.0 1,288,000 100.0 1,607,000 100.C
(ii) Licensed Betting Office Ownership.
FIRM
NO.
1970
% INDUSTRY
1973 
NO. %
1974
INDUSTRY NO.
1975
% INDUSTRY NO. % INDUS1
Ladbroke
Group 481 3.3 1,140 7.7 1,096 7.4 989 6.9
Mecca 119® 0.8 800 5.4 750 5.1 705 4.9
William
Hill. 220 1.5 850 5.7 830 5.6 790 5.5
J.Coral 260b 1.8 623 4.2 624 4.2 590 4.1
Total 1080 7.4 3,413 22.9 3,300 22.2 3,074 21.4
Total for 
Industry 14,644 100.0 14,873 100.0 14,837 100.0 14,371 100.0
Sources: Various : the above figures are not generally available in
several instances and some are approximations based on confidential 
interviews and reports. Annual Reports provide some information but tend 
not to show figures specifically on LBO turnover - particularly where 
gaming (i.e. casino) interests exist.
a* Taken as Clubman’s Club (Mid ’69).
b. Taken as Mark Lane Group in 1970.
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The outcome was a general dichotomy within the industry between
the large betting chains and individual operators; and it was a gap
which increasingly widened. As the betting chains increased in size
they were now able to hold their own liabilities, unlike the small-scale
bookmakers. This allowed them to increasingly dispense with 'limits'
on the amount that could be won by a backer and enabled them to
compete on increasingly favourable terms with the small-scale bookmaker.^
The basis for this dramatic expansion rests on the general
capitalistic tendency of accumulation of capital, reflected in the
developing concentration and centralisation. Undoubtedly, the potential
rates of return on capital were particularly attractive; yet this is
unlikely to explain the rapidity of concentration and centralisation
since this was based on the development of various preconditions which
(2)underlay the high rates of profit. Firstly, this concerned
the availability of money capital to take advantage of the rates of profit;
secondly, the continued expansion of the industry depended, as ever, on *
1. Limits might apply to different parts of the bet as well as a whole.
While there might be restrictions on the^total payout on any one bet, there 
could be a maximum return on a 'double', for instance. The limit
would be in terms of a ratio to the initial stake (e.g. 200 to 1). If the 
amount 'won' on that double exceeded this limit, the bookmaker would only 
pay at the odds stated in the limit.
* a 'double' is one bet on two different selections in different races; 
if both selections are successful, the bet is calculated accumulatively.
2. Estimates of the return on capital at this time were varied, but all were 
exceedingly remunerative:
"In the Times 4 March 1970 Mr. John Carrington considered that 
it could be 40 per cent to 50 per cent. The opinion was 
expressed by Mr. Raymond Eisenstein in the Investor's Chronicle 
29 May 1970 that it might be between 30 per cent and 45 per
cent ....  On 1 October 1971 Mr. Balshaw of Hill's was quoted
in the Evening Standard as saying that turnround in bookmaking 
was quicker than in most industries. He liked to get the 
purchase money of a betting office back in eighteen months and 
mostly he succeeded". Moody (1972) p. 39
the prior development of the betting medium; and, thirdly, there
is the activity of state agencies who played a crucial role in
assisting the rapid expansion of betting chains and the betting medium.
In the absence of interest from established capital, it was the
bookmaking firms who continued the expansion of the industry. The
finance for the growth of individual firms derived from two sources:
firstly, the availability of money capital accumulated through LBOs,
which was of considerable importance given the rapid cash flow. ^
Secondly, through opening up the channels of indirect funding by
'going public' and issuing share capital.
The extent of the funds available through the activities of LBOs 
w,-,s in part a consequence of the expanded betting medium. As the 
gaps in the racing calendar were filled, the emphasis switched from 
the absolute direct exploitation of labour to relative exploitation.
This meant the expansion of betting opportunities within the period of 
horseracing, rather than its extension. This could be achieved by 
staggering race times at different meetings where two or more race 
meetings were held on one day. Since the normal time between each race 
was half an hour, offsetting the racing times of two concurrent 
meetings would provide a race to bet on every quarter of an hour, instead 
of two races at the same time every half an hour.
The precondition of staggered race times was two meetings per day 
per weekday. And again the bookmakers found the H.B.L.B., under the new
Chairmanship of Lord Wigg, sympathetic to their demands. In 1968, the
H. B.L.B. offered to 'arrange' racing fixtures so that two meetings per day I.
I. For instance, during 1968-69, Ladbrokes doubled their number of LBOs, but 
issued capital remained unchanged: "A cash flow of around £350,000 with
a small overdraft and deferred liabilities amounting to no more than 
E167,000 had financed the expansion programme". Moody (1972) p.39
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on a weekday would take place with staggered race times, thus
enabling commentaries on all races in LBOs. Despite some
opposition from bookmakers concerning the 'price1 - the basis of
the betting levy would now be turnover and not profits - the deal
( 2 )eventually went through. It increased the dominance of bookmaking
interests over horseracing as a spectator sport, reflected in the 
reallocation of race meetings from Saturdays, Bankholidays, and evenings 
to days when there was little public attendance.*^ 123
1. One problem with having races at the same time was the constant 
interruption of race commentaries with betting shows and results. That this 
was the (new) policy of the HBLB is set out in the Guardian 24.7.68. As
one critic of the HBLB commented: "This (policy) was intended to combine 
the interests of the Board and the bookmakers against punters, and to 
enlarge both the levy and bookmakers' profits." CCOG (1968 p.4)
2. The new levy scheme placed a disproportionate burden on the large 
firms. The new policy came in with effect from 1969.
3. CCOG (1968) : "The value to the Board (and to bookmakers) of 
additional afternoon meetings can be deduced from the fact that according 
to reports, the Board paid £2,000 to the Ayr racecourse authorities on 
8th June 1968 when it transferred a meeting from the evening to the 
afternoon. A spokesman for the course said that 1,500 people attended.
In the evening 5,000 to 6,000 people would be expected. The loss at
the turnstiles was £2,000. Evidently, ‘<% of the extra off-course betting 
that took place in betting offices all over Britain greatly exceeded that 
sum".
I
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The introduction of Greyhound Racing as a complementary 
alternative betting medium at this time allowed both absolute and 
relative direct exploitation of labour. The working day was lengthened 
with the introduction of Saturday morning greyhound racing, which 
provided betting opportunities over a period of perhaps six or seven 
hours - usually with an overlap between the morning greyhounds and
afternoon horseracing. Also, Greyhound racing soon became promoted
( 1 )as a systematic afternoon alternative to horseracing.
( 2 )
, with Extel
providing betting shows, results, and commentaries."" With Greyhound
racing offering eight races in two hours (compared with six races in
two and a half hours in horseracing), more betting opportunities were
. . . , . (3)provided in a given time.
This effort to expand the volume of betting through the development
of the betting medium was not only quantitative, but qualitative. Links
with the televising of horseracing were established in the 1960s and since
1969 the larger bookmaking firms have developed a bet (ITV 7) which
(4)explicitly covers the televised races. The televising of horseracing
1. For many years a popular evening event. Greyhound racing became 
popularised as an afternoon betting medium when horsracing was restricted by 
the outbreak of foot and mouth disease and adverse weather conditions (1968-69
2. Initially when less than two horserace meetings took place and, 
subsequently, when less than three.
3. There was also a qualitative difference, since it was a different medium 
and involved a different emphasis on types of betting, viz: forecast betting.
4. The larger companies have attempted to develop different forms of 
complex bets - not necessarily connected with television - which yield 
a higher losing rate (for the punter) than 'single' bets.
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has provided a means of broadening and popularising betting in 
general and a basis for developing specialist bets on these races.^
In addition, television provides opportunities for advertising particular 
firms and not just betting generally. This may be entirely open, 
through race sponsorship for instance, or slightly covert, such as
the strategic placing of an advertising hoarding where the TV cameras
( 2 )cannot avoid it. Bookmaking sponsorship of individual races has
increased, with whole race meetings sponsored on occasions as well as 
the extension of bookmaking interests as owners of racecourses and 
greyhound stadiums.
The development of the betting medium was not merely aimed at the 
expansion of betting or influencing betting methods. The growth 
of the LBO chains depended not merely on the volume of their funds, but 
also their predictability. This implied the 'rogularis.ition' of betting 
returns, minimising the degree of uncertainty. Off-course betting 
depended on the market prices determined on-course; and a major 
contradiction of the LBO expansion was its reliance on an increasingly 
weakened on-course market for returned prices of runners. ^ * A weak 1
1. There is little doubt that the televising of horseracing by ITV owes 
rather more to betting than the sport itself. "The broadcasts emphasise 
the betting, giving as much attention to bookmaking as to horseracing".
(Moody (1972) p.40). This is especially apparent when horseracing is
abandoned, because a 'back-up' service is ready to hand in afternoon 
greyhounds at Harringay so that some opportunities to bet are still provided. 
Televised racing, in its present form, is two-edged for the bookmakers.
The backer may well prefer to place bets before racing and watch the races 
on television at home. Thus while the market is expanded, continuous 
betting suffers. Hence the persistent campaign to introduce television 
into LBOs (at present illegal) which resolves this contradiction.
2. Interviews and 'hot' news in the change of antepost betting on 
forthcoming important races conveniently relayed to the announcer when 
racing is being televised are other methods of 'free' advertising.
3. Starting Price returns are decided by representatives of the two 
sporting papers. (Sporting Life and Sporting Chronicle) based on the 
odds offered by the course bookmakers at the start of the race.
market could mean false prices; an increasing problem for off-course 
bookmakers as their demands for the expansion and redistribution of 
race meetings coincided with falling racecourse attendances. The 
danger that the oncourse market would not reflect the pattern of 
off-course betting implied an uncertainty in the liabilities of the 
bookmakers. Consequently, the larger bookmaking chains could use 
their resources to drastically affect the on-course market, with a 
relatively small sum.
A further source of uncertainty in betting returns concerned 
the totalisator dividends. Unlike betting odds, the state of the 
totalisator pool at any one time was unknown and therefore difficult 
to influence. Gradually, the bookmakers stopped taking bets at 
totalisator dividends, initially at specific racetracks, but eventually 
introducing 'computerised odds' as a general replacement.^
The development of the betting medium was both a consequence of
the expansion of off-course betting and a precondition for its
continuation. State agencies also played an important role in
assisting this process, not merely in generally expanding bookmaking,
but in promoting it in a particular direction. The activities of the
HBLB have already been noted; but also of significance were the fiscal
interests of the government and the state. The potential of the
betting tax did not merely imply a policy of encouraging the expansion
of bookmaking generally, but in promoting the development of large
bookmaking chains. This would enable a more efficient method of tax
, (2)collection and, arguably, reduce the extent of tax evasion.
1. The totalisator odds were particularly important for forecast betting, 
which was also the most unpredictable of the pool dividends. Greyhound 
racing was particularly 'suspicious', and vulnerable, as far as the 
bookmakers were concerned, especially the afternoon meetings. At one 
particular greyhound track, Oxford, a succession of exceptionally high 
dividends prompted a widespread refusal to take bets at totalisator
odds on their meetings.
2. Hood (1972) gives a succinct account of the development and impact of 
betting taxation.
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In 1969, a new form of betting tax was introduced on the
rateable value of LBOs. This was in addition to the turnover tax,
now at 5%, and ostensibly gave a competitive advantage to the on-course
bookmakers whose business had suffered in the 1960s.^ But the
impact on the small-scale LBO owners was dramatic. By 1970, when the
tax was repealed, the number of LBOs had fallen by nearly 1,000,
( 2 )representing 6% of the total number. In just seven months, the
rateable value tax had driven out a large number of marginal businesses, 
both to the advantage of the larger chains (who increased their turnover) 
and the Treasury - as had been intended.^ It no doubt speeded up 
the process of concentration and centralisation through promoting a 
redistribution of both turnover and ownership in favour of the betting 
chains. 1
1. The tax was levied at three times the rateable value of the LBO and 
was expected to yield £7 million; it would also give on-course bookmakers 
(who were exempt since they had no 'premises') an advantage of 1% on 
turnover.
2. It was replaced by a 6% turnover tax on off-course bookmaking.
3. As Hood (1972) in his discussion of the tax suggested: "Very 
probably another motive was to counter local evasion of betting duty by 
driving small shops out of business since they could not evade this type 
of tax", p.194. It was probably only the bizarre side-effect of the tax - 
the near bankruptcy of the Government sponsored Horserace Totalisator Board 
which saved the day of the small bookmaker; although it is important not 
to underestimate the impact of the militant action of many smaller 
bookmakers led by John Pegley, and assisted amongst others by Don Bruce, 
who campaigned against the tax despite the indifference of the Bookmakers' 
trade associations and the hostility of the large bookmakers. As Hood 
(1972) suggests, the large bookmakers were not happy .about the withdrawal 
of the tax: "This clemency no doubt displeased the largest firms, which 
were looking for a ’clean-up"', p.195.
The discussion so far has centred on how the structure of the
industry changed so rapidly; it remains to consider the implications.
In particular, how this quantitative expansion of individual firms 
implied a qualitative change in the nature of bookmaking. Essentially,
a bookmaker relies on long-run probability in order to retain a 
certain percentage of the amount staked; this implies the short-term 
vulnerability of smaller bookmakers to a series of 'poor' results 
for the book. ^
The legalising of LBOs had an important impact in reducing the long­
term period in providing the opportunities of continuous betting, given 
the development of the betting medium. The expansion of betting
chains added a further dimension. As the bookmaker expanded his 
business, increasing his holding of LBOs, the number of backers 
necessarily increased and the total number of bets on any one race rose.
As the expansion continued, the bookmaker took an increasing number of 
bets from an increasing clientele. The implication was that the 
'book' would 'make' itself.
While during the initial expansion, in a small betting chain, a 'bad' 
result might have had a similar impact in all the LBOs, as the betting 
chain grew a 'bad' result for one LBO might be a 'good' result in another.
At a given size of betting chain, the bookmaker becomes virtually 
indifferent to the results of particular races, or of the performance 
of individual LBOs, since he knows that local unevenness will tend to 
cancel itself out over the firm as a whole. The percentage return on 
stakes becomes largely prodictable,_and income can be relied upon with
( 2 )some certainty. This characterises the period of bookmaking as retailing.
1. Actuarial skill may minimise their effects, but can scarcely reverse them.
2. In the words of a representative of William Hill: "It's a retailing 
business. I'm successful because I'm a retailer." (Interview
D. Konrath, 12.9.74).
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Once the predictability of return on money capital had been 
achieved and generalised, the links with established capital became 
t i g h t e r T h e  post 1970 phase of the expansion of the Bookmaking 
industry has been characterised by the increasing interdependence of 
bookmaking and other sectors of economy, ending the relative isolation 
of the industry. The precise complexities of this relationship 
are beyond the scope of this discussion: what is of particular concern 
are the important influences on the relations between and amongst 
employers and employees, as mediated through the labour process.
In this context,the relationship between established capital and 
bookmaking has appeared in two forms: the purchase of bookmaking firms
by conglomerates and the diversification of bookmaking companies into
( 2)other areas.
Looking at the 'Big Four', only Ladbrokes and J.Coral Ltd remain 
in the hands of the bookmakers.^ And both have diversified, with
Ladbrokes the outstanding example. 1
1. As Handel (1976) has argued:
"... Monopoly capital has no reason to bo hostile to the whole 
development of the intensive capitalization and industrialization of all 
sectors of society because it participates itself in this process - at 
least as soon as 'new' capital has successfully performed its historical 
role of opening up new fields for investment and experimenting in new 
products, so that the profitability of these novel realms is guaranteed." 
(p. 389) .
2. Both aspects are, of course, different sides of the same phenomenon: if 
the larger firms do not diversify then they are likely to be swallowed
by the conglomerates. Hence Mandel's exposition appears as schematic if 
considered to reflect the replacement of 'new' capital by established 
capital at the level of institutions. The transition is from one 
institutional form to another, not from one institution to another.
3. Despite the attentions of various conglomerates, e.g. EMI's 
interest in Ladbrokes in 1977.
The Founder of J.Coral Ltd was Joe Coral. Born in Poland in 1904, he came 
to England in 1912:
"He now says that his career was settled by his very first bet, 
on the 1918 Derby: Grand Parade sailed in at 33-1, which 
netted him four times his regular weekly wage and persuaded 
him from then on, wholly logically, to spend more time 
studying form than studying for his job." (Caulkin (1973) p.68)
Footnote 3 continued
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Footnote 3 cont'd .....
In the early 1920s, Coral was placing the bets of his follow 
workers with the local street bookie; noticing the regularity 
with which the bookie won, he started to hold the bets himself,
"backed by fully £5 in the Post Office, which I had been given on 
my Barmitzvah". (ibid p.68).
By 1930, Coral had an office in Stoke Newington. Despite various 
setbacks, using £30,000 capital he managed to open a West End 
credit office, after the war, primarily for trade accounts. The 
venture failed and he was forced to rely on the street pitches to 
build up the business again; which he did very successfully.
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Table 3.7 shows the development of the Ladbroke Group between 
1963 and 1974. As the bookmaking side rapidly expanded at the 
turn of the decade, so Ladbrokes developed outside interests, casinos, 
entertainments, property, holidays, and hotels.
The basis by which Ladbrokes could so dramatically expand was 
that which also attracted firms outside the bookmaking industry: the 
immense success of the betting chains with many of the larger firms 
recording ever increasing and predictable "returns" each year, combined 
with the particular attractiveness of the business as an immediate 
source of cash. Since 1971, the William Hill Organisation has been 
part of the ubiquitous Sears Holdings, while Grand Metropolitan Ltd 
own Mecca Bookmakers.
Such an involvement in the Bookmaking Industry is not limited to 
the largest companies. For instance, in 1970, Leisure and General 
Holdings, who had wide interests in catering and other parts of the 
service sector, bought a chain of 56 betting shops in Liverpool owned 
by W.J.Connor. This new purchase was itself to finance a large-scale 
expansion :
"The liquidity flowing from the cash trading policy and the 
profitability of Connor will greatly assist the development ^  
of the Company in its expansion and for further acquisitions.”
This highlights the relationship between the newly developed
bookmaking sector and established capital: the former was to be used
to finance the expansion of the latter, or at least other areas within
the 'service1 sector. In practice this has meant a reinforcement of the
tendency which emerged with betting chains: the expansion of turnover
and régularisation of returns. This was now not simply demanded by the
internal logic of the bookmaking industry, but also by the requirements
of other sectors of activity.
1« Leisure and General Holdings: 'Advertisement in connection with the
acquisition of Connor: 29.3.71.
T a b l e  3 . 7
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(2) The labour-process in the period of retailing bookmakinq.
Retailing bookmaking implied the predictability of retained 
stakes and the maximising of cash flow. The impact of these changes 
was rapid, with important developments in the way work was organised 
not merely within LBOs, but between them. The increasing inter­
dependence of the LBOs of a betting chain, implied the increasing 
socialization of the labour-process, establishing a new inter­
relationship between LBO employees.
The general impact of those changes can be seen in the changing 
pattern of employment in the industry. Table 3.8 indicates how 
overall employment levels stabalised at the end of the 1960s after 
a decade of expansion. In fact since 1967, overall employment had 
slightly fallen back, the expansion in female employment not sufficient 
to compensate for the decline in that of men. When the fall in 
male employment finally stopped in 1971, the level was below that 
of 1964. ^  This represented the declining demand for settler-
managers, presumably as individual LBOs grew in size and the number of
, , , , , . . (2)! or; declined.
1. It should be noted Table 3.8 is for Great Britain, while Table 3.2 is 
for the United Kingdom: in consequence the decline in male employment 
between 1969 and 1970 is probably understated; it may also mean that 
total employment began to decline slightly earlier. However, given the 
non-correspondence bwteen "LBOs" and "Betting and Gambling", the 
differences are not of sufficient order to draw more than general 
conclusions. The balance of the figures might,for instance, be affected 
by the growth of casinos at this time.
2. Consider Table 3.1 which shows an 8% fall in the number of LEOs 
between the peak of 1966 and 1971.
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Table 3.8: No. of employees in employment in "Betting and
Gambling"1969-73■
Figures in ’000s.
1966a 1969b 1970 1971(a) 1971(b) 1972 1973
Males 25.4 23.5b 21.1 20.9 33.1 33.8 35.4
Females 32.1 35.5b 36.9 36.9 46.5 52.0 56.1
Males & 
Females 57.5 58.0 58.0 57.8 79.6 85.8 91.5
Interpretative Notes ;
a
b
Figures for 1966 (UK only) 
Sec Table 3.2 
Figures for UK only.
are shown for compiritivo purposes.
With the proposed discontinuation of national insurance cards, which 
provided the basis for employment statistics, a new system of deriving 
labour statistics has been introduced, operating on a census method 
in a particular week in June. This is more fully described in the 
Dept, of Employment Gazette, August 1973 pp 739-40. The changeover year 
was chosen as 1971, for which estimates were made on both bases.
1971(a) relates to the insurance card system, 1971(b) to the census 
system. The disparity is probably explained by this passage from the 
August 1973 Gazette, p. 740.
"......  in the Census of Employment, a person who
had two regular jobs with different employers 
in the census week would be counted twice.
Consequently, the Census of Employment might be 
expected to give estimates higher than the Census 
of Population in particular industries and 
services where secondary employment is common".
Source: British Labour Statistics Yearbooks for 1969, 1970 and 1971;
Department of Employment Gazette; October 1973 pp. 1000-1013;
May 1974 p. 403.
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The continuing expansion of female employment since 1963 may 
also suggest that the tendency for the size of individual LBOs 
to increase outweighed the impact of the falling number of LBOs.
There is little suggestion of the substitution of female for male 
labour, since this was probably not significant until the mid-1970s.
But of particular importance was the increasing use made of part-time 
workers. The nature of the industry, with most of the work being 
performed in the afternoon period, offered employers the opportunity 
to eliminate full-time workers as the new betting chains were gradually 
rationalised. Table 3.9 gives some indication of the growth of part-time 
employment, showing an increase of 25% between 1971 and 1973.
The advent of retailing bookmaking had seen a continual fall in the 
number of settler-managers, a stabilising of employment opportunities
for the counterclerks, and the development of part-time work on an
.  ( 2 )increasing scale.
The question facing the employer was how to implement the imperatives 
of retailing bookmaking. ^  Essentially, it involved two related 
strategies: changing the pattern of control over the labour-process
and an increased exploitation of labour.
The changing nature of bookmaking both demanded and permitted new 
patterns of control. While the settler-manager retained discretion 
over working methods and bookmaking functions, each LBO functioned as
1. Of all the periods for which statistics are given, the early 1970s 
are perhaps the least reliable. Did, for instance, the Department of 
Employment census merely 'discover' existing casual work? How much 
seasonal employment is picked up in a June census? What effect did the 
expanding casino industry have at this time? Still it is worth noting 
that the number of LBOs in 1973 was the highest since 1969. See Table 3.1
2. There were more part-time than full-time women workers in the industry. 
By 1973, they comprised more than a third of the total labour force in 
Betting and Gambling.
2. This also includes the pressures to expand in and from areas other 
than bookmaking.
TABLE 3.9: No. of employees in Employment in "Betting and Gambling
1971-1973 (GB): Full-time and Part-time Workers.
Figures in '000s
1971 1972 1973
Full-time employment:
Males 24.1 24.2 24.6
Females 21.6 23.0 25.0
TOTAL 45.7 47.2 49.6
Part-time employment:
Males 9.0 9.6 10.8
Females 24.9 29.0 31.0
TOTAL 33.9 38.6 41.8
Interpretive Note:
Part-time is not more than 30 hours per week. This analysis is 
available through the adoption of the Census method discussed in 
the notes to table 3.8; the national insurance card system did not 
distinguish between full and part-time staff.
Source : Department of Employment Gazette May 1974 p. 403.
a relatively independent unit in opposition to the desired 
interdependence of the betting chain necessary for the predictability 
of returns. At the same time, the lessened significance of the 
performance of the individual LBO implied the settler-manager could 
be relieved of some areas of discretion and control. What did this 
mean in practice? It resulted in increasing control over the activities 
of the LBOs, through the introduction of machinery and uniformly-imposed 
working systems, often under the guise of improving security.
In the period of initial expansion, the extent of mechanisation 
had been limited. The only aspect of the labour process which 
lent itself to immediate and systematic introduction of machinery was the 
taking of bets. In that context, the use of cash registers (a) 
increased the productivity of labour by enabling more bets to be taken in 
a given period of time, (b) directly devalued labour-power through 
deskilling and (c) provided a means of control over the performance 
of specific tasks.
Focussing on the third aspect, the use of cash registers gradually 
came to be accommodated as one aspect of administrative control over 
the labour process. Subsequently it was accompanied by various forms 
of control over betting slips, usually a camera fitted with a time clock 
into which bets were fed as they were taken.
The employers' rationale is that such checks are structured in the
pattern of work to minimise fraud. The use of electric cash registers
and timed cameras reduce the possibilities of 'fiddling'.^  ^1
1. "We think our security is more or less foolproof, and we tell our 
staff so; its a guarantee for them, apart from anything else. But you 
always get someone trying to fiddle. We find we have to sack about 
10O shop managers a year for cheating or betting themselves".
Ron Shaw, head of J.Coral's bookmaking security. Quoted in 
Caulkin (1973) p. 72.
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The security system at J.Coral is perhaps typical of those
operated by the major firms. This sycophantic description shows
what happens to the bet after it has been taken by the counter clerk
and photographed in the LBO:
"Coral's security arrangements are a wonder to behold.
Every single winning bet at every one of the group's 
50O-odd offices comes back to security headquarters at 
Dagenham, where 70 people take constant samples of the 
incoming slips. Every bet paying over £10 is singled 
out, as are bets on the dogs, and any slip which has been 
altered. They are then screened by two vetters, who make 
a further selection, whence they are passed on to 
experienced settlers who recalculate the winnings electronically. 
Finally, the time when the bet was accepted is double- 
checked against the time the race started." (1)
While the introduction of security systems might be seen as
eliminating one source of uncertainty - fraud - security itself was just
one aspect of control, as illustrated in this very revealing comment
of one Personnel Manager:
"As you expand you have to have more control. The employer 
has to become more security-minded in a systematic manner, 
for it is no longer possible to vet on a personal basis.
It demands a control system". (2)
In practice, 'security' was used as a blanket term to cover the 
monitoring of a whole range of working procedures. It was not merely 
confined to machinery, but encompassed the work process as a whole.
It provided a rationale for the constant checking of the cash statements 
of individual LBOs: this did not merely test the honesty of employees, 
but was a means of ensuring particular and uniform accounting systems.
1. Caulkin (1973) p.72. Not all employers responded to 'fiddling' in 
this way, although clearly the scale of the monitoring operation would 
depend on the volume of bets received. Some, such as J.Windsor in Leeds, 
allowed for a certain amount of 'fiddling' in their wage rates ! See 
Chapter 4 for a further discussion of 'fiddling'.
2. Interview C. Bold (Connor and Forbes Ltd), 22.8.1974.
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It provided a basis for developing new working systems, e.g. 
instructions on 'cashing-up' tills, on the banking of money, and on 
the paying out of bets. 'Security' was thus used as a means of 
extending a whole range of standardised, controlling, working practices 
into the labour process of the LBO employees.
While control over the labour-process was structured within the 
new working systems^, an administrative structure between the 
employer and the LBO employees was developed to ensure the day-to-day 
compliance of the LBO staff to established procedures and to take 
decisions no longer required of the settler-managers. To this extent, 
a hierarchical system of management had been established, with specialist 
departments at head office. A typical example is that of the
J.Coral Group, who at this time (1974) owned more than 600 LBOs.
( 2 )Their structure is shown in Figure 3.2 . This shows that three
levels of management had been inserted between the LBO employees and 
the employer. This new line management structure was accompanied by 
an expansion of head office with the growth of an estates department,
1. Apart from cash registers and cameras, machinery as yet had made 
little impact. The use of settling machines has become more widespread 
in recent years, but usually in addition, rather than instead of settling 
expertise. The microelectronic revolution, however, is likely to change 
the operation of LBOs, certainly eliminating the boardmen.
2. This structure came into being after the merger in 1971 between 
J.Coral Ltd and the Mark Lane Group. The latter had employed area 
managers for several years, but J.Coral Ltd was predominantly a London- 
based firm, with LBOs controlled direct from Regent Street Head Office. 
Following the merger the J.Coral settler-managers found themselves 
responsible to this hierarchical structure and not head office. Other 
major firms operated similar systems to that in Figure 3.2, though often 
with different titles.
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Figure 3.2
The Administrative Structure of the 
J.Coral Group.
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security section, and personnel department^. The significance 
of this differentiation of the function of capital is that it was 
based not merely on the delegation of that function by the employer, 
but on the removal of control functions from the settler-manager.
If the demands of a predictable cash flow and percentage 
return on stakes implied new patterns of control, then the desire 
to increase cash flow and the percentage of stakes retained implied 
a greater exploitation of labour. The development of the betting
medium meant longer working hours particularly on Saturdays with
(2)morning greyhound racing; increased work through the staggering of 
race times during the racing period; and an increase in work through 
the general expansion of betting and/or the raising of work load 
levels.^ Pressure on work loads was often drastically increased: 
for instance the loss of a counter clerk might mean an increased 
workload of 50% (where there had been three counter clerks) or 100% 
(where there had been two) for those who remained. 123
1. This development of head office had taken place between 1968 and 1974. 
See Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74
2. Lunch breaks on a Saturday became something of a sick joke amongst 
LBO employees. And still are. With the overlap of Greyhound Racing and 
Horseracing (aimed at keeping the punters in the LBO), there is no 
opportunity for a break.
3. The development in the initial expansion of one race meeting per day 
was often approved by employees (not just the settler-manager) who 
might otherwise have a boring day. The expansion of the betting medium 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not well received since this was 
merely extra pressure.
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This was related to a second aspect of increasing the 
exploitation of labour: the volume of betting could be increased 
with the same workforce if labour was sufficiently mobile. While 
racing was held at the same time throughout the country, and with 
the wide distribution of LBOs, there were inherent limits to the 
mobility of labour. Yet not all LBOs were equally busy on every 
day; even on Saturdays some LBOs would not take many bets. It 
was this potential movement of labour which was attractive to the 
employers. Providing labour was mobile, the same turnover could bo 
achieved with less labour. The potential gains from this mobility 
now became both desirable and worthwhile as the betting chains embraced 
more and more LBOs and an increasing workforce.
The consequences of these various changes in the labour-process 
was the generation of a stronger basis for common interests between 
the LBO employees; the increasing socialisation of the labour-process 
affected social relationships both within and between LBOs. These 
changes can be understood in exploring the position of the settler-managers.
Firstly, retailing bookmaking implied the devaluation of the 
position of the settler-manager, which resulted in a changed basis 
of co-operation within LBOs. The settler-manager no longer retained 
discretion over bookmaking functions; insofar as decisions had to be taken, 
these were made further up the hierarchy -all the settler-manager had 
to do was notify the extent of liabilities. Instead, he had become a 
salesman*1*. This can be seen as a decline in the position of the 
settler-manager both in terms of control and surveillance, and unity
1. As D. Konrath (WHO Personnel Director) commented: "No shop managers 
are able to take bets on a hedging basis. His responsibilities have 
changed in emphasis - selling the service and building up the shop". 
(Interview 12.9.74).
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and co-ordination. At the concrete level they are inseparable, 
and must increase or decrease together. The removal of the bookmaking 
function from the settler-manager is by definition a restriction on his 
control of the system of work.
The settler-manager became rather more a 'settler' than a 'manager' 
notionally a salesman, but in practice an administrator of rules 
and regulations passed down the hierarchy and the provider of 
routine information on the performance of the LBO. The old 'skills' 
were no longer required - indeed, they were a liability. By the 
early 1970s it became clear that the larger firms
"don't have managers nowadays - firms don't even want
them - only boys to carry out orders". (1).
In contrast with the initial expansion, the control of work 
organisation was now increasingly exercised externally to the LBO.
To this extent, the settler-manager increasingly performed the 
function of the collective worker to the exclusion of the global 
function of capital. Or, more precisely, the settler-manager became 
increasingly an integral part of the labour-process within the LBO, 
rather than the external controller of that labour process.
In consequence, the basis of co-operation was altered: settler- 
managers, counter clerks and boardmen were all subject to an increasing 
external control; and in performing the function of the collective 
worker, their common interests were strengthened. 1
1. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74
This loss of discretion also extended to staffing matters; 
settler-managers, in contrast to (some) instances in the initial 
expansion, could not hire and fire; nor did they have much say 
over who else worked in the shop. They were expected to ensure 
the day-to-day 'smoothness' of the operation of the LBO, but 
within fairly stringent guidelines.
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Yet, perhaps more significantly, the demanded interdependence 
of retailing bookmaking established a second basis for common
interests: that between the settler-managers of different LBOs.
Now that the individual performance of an LBO on any given day was
relatively immaterial^, the settler-managers in each LBO were
( 2)brought into a relationship of co-operation, not competition.
Clearly, they remained individually accountable for the performance 
of their LBO, but retailing bookmaking emphasised their interdependence 
with the removal of the bookmaking function from the settler-manager. 
Furthermore, the diminution and elimination of commission payments 
served as indicators that the era of isolated LBO units was passed.
All settler-managers were affected by these changes; the general 
devaluation of their position was accompanied by falling wages, partly
due directly to this devaluation, partly to their increasingly worsening
(4)labour market position. 1234
1. Not to be confused with the longer term profitability of individual 
LBOs. Just as the chain as a whole would be expected to make a predictable 
gain over a relatively short period, so would individual LBOs in the long ter
2. This coincided with the breaking down of the bond of occupational 
solidarity. Retailing bookmaking meant the diminution of employer dependence 
on the 'old-style' settler-manager.
3. The increasing salaries of head office staff and betting duty rates 
had seen a decline in the importance of commission. One City Tote Manager 
had received more than £1,000 p.a. as Commission in the early mid 1960s, 
yet by 1970, in the same LBO with very little difference in the profit of 
that LBO, the Commission was negligible. Ladbrokes and Hills 'bought out' 
commission payments in the 1970s (but not until TUBE had been established), 
while Coral managers had lost their commission following the merger with 
Mark Lane.
4. The decline in commission can be seen as a fall in the revenue 
component as that performance of ttie global function of capital diminished. 
Simultaneously the reduced employer demands of the settler-managers implied 
an element of deskilling, i.e. elimination of bookmaking function; while 
the training schools were now producing settlers in greater numbers.
If the increasing interdependence, and its consequences, 
established a basis for common interests amongst the settler-managers, 
this was further reinforced by the efforts of the employers to exact 
a greater productiveness from their employees. Standards of 
settling workloads were raised; while the more 'efficient1 use of 
labour implied staff shortages: settler-managers might find themselves 
operating the till or doing the board. While settler-managers had 
lost a measure of their control, they were nov; expected to 'manage' 
in a rather different sense.
The dramatic changes in the social organisation of work did not 
merely generate tendencies for common interests; pressures built up 
which divided employees, particularly within the LBOs. Firstly, even 
though the relationship between the settler-manager and other LBO 
employees had altered, he still remained an immediate source of control. 
This was a structured division within the labour process which could 
never be entirely overcome, despite the pressures generating a greater 
degree of common interests amongst all LBO employees. Perhaps the 
settler-manager did not determine the rules and systems of work, but part 
of his job was to enforce them. Secondly, despite all these rapid 
changes in the industry, the sexual division of labour was still rigidly 
adhered to. Few women had become settlers, and fewer still 
settler-managers. The domination of settler-manager - counter clerk 
was still simultaneously one of male-female^
1. It is important to point out that some firms did employ women settler- 
managers, from the outset e.g. John Joyce Ltd in the North East, Roland 
Jones in Blackpool. Yet in the major firms it was extremely unlikely 
to find women settler-managers. (Men might be counter clerks temporarily). 
Not until the mid-1970s did Ladbrokes become the first national company 
to regularly use female settler-managers - in the North-East.
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Aside from these general parameters, the specific changes in 
the labour process had different effects on the different job functions. 
For instance, the demands of mobility of labour were particularly 
disruptive of the routines and social relationships of the counter 
clerks. It could involve a good deal of extra travelling time at 
very short notice. Yet it could benefit the settler-managers in helping 
them to run their LBOs. A second example arises from the removal 
of control from the settler-manager. While this devalued his position 
into an increasingly routine range of tasks, the counter clerks were 
not altogether unhappy that the arbitrary control of the settler-manager 
had been curbed. In this way, the organisation of the labour-process 
promoted both common and divergent interests amongst the LUO employees.
To conclude: The development of retailing bookmaking resulted
in the devaluation of the position of the settler-manager. Control 
over the labour-process was increasingly exercised from outside the LBO, 
through the use of standardised procedures and security systems. The 
effect was partly to emphasise the bases of common interest amongst 
workers in the LBOs; but more significantly the changed position of 
the settler-manager implied an inter dependence across LBOs, and hence 
a basis for common interests amongst that group.
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Note 1: The Principles of Bookmaking.
It is important to draw a distinction between betting in the 
form of sidestakes and the practice of bookmaking. In sidestake 
wagers, those involved have a necessary interest in the result; 
in contrast the art of bookmaking is to achieve a pattern of betting 
which leaves the bookmaker relatively indifferent to the outcome.
A hypothetical example can help here.
If A and B make a wager about a particular event, which to 
simplify matters, has two possible outcomes, X winning or Y winning, 
this is not bookmaking. It is a simple sidestake. Only when A (or B) 
begins to take bets from other people nominating X or Y as the winner 
does bookmaking emerge. Suppose that B makes a wager of £11 on X 
and C makes a wager of £11 on Y, and both wagers are made with A.
Now A will have had to state the odds at which he is prepared to take 
such bets. He might have considered the chances of X and Y to have 
been similar, thus he might offer the same odds about both outcomes.
Given that A, like most bookmakers, is not setting up in business as a 
public charity, he will not offer odds which will ensure a loss. In 
other words he must ensure that, at any one time, B (or C) cannot back 
both X and Y and still win. ^  Thus if he offered even money (odds of
1:1) about X or Y, whatever the result A would neither win nor lose.
A would receive bets totalling £22. If X won, then B would collect 
£22 (£11 winnings plus Ell stake). If Y won, C would collect £22. 1
1. i.e. that added together the inverse ofodds,the chances of outcomes 
should be greater than 1. If A offered 2:1 against X winning and 2:1 
against Y winning, then B could place £11 on X and £11 on Y, thus £22 
in all, but would be assumed of a return of £33 (£22 winnings plus £11 
stake) whatever the outcome.
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The problem here is that A makes no money for his skilfull 
services. What he must do is ensure that he pays out less than 
he receives. And this must be achieved by offering shorter odds; 
he must bet in his own favour. So instead of offering even money 
about X and Y, he shortens both odds. They become 10:11,i.e. in 
order to win £10, B or C must stake £11. This time, whatever the 
result, A pays out only £21 (£10 winnings plus £11 stake). Thus he 
'wins' £1 and is much happier.
This schematic view, however, hides the Art of Bookmaking.
Nobaiy makes a bet without knowing the price offered. ^  Nor does 
he have to bet. The above example in practice only holds true when 
B and C accept the odds offered by A. If C declines to bet, A takes 
only £11 from B and runs the risk of losing if the outcome is a win for X. 
Indeed both B and C may consider X to have a better chance than Y and
will both back X. In this way A may stand to lose £20 if X wins
( 2)( although he will win £22 if X loses).
Thus a bookmaker only attempts to make a book; he cannot ensure 
it. He tries to attract betting on all the outcomes of an event and 
he may alter the odds he is offering in consequence. But he cannot
ensure that B and C will back X or Y such that he will win. Only that
the probabilities are in the Bookmaker's favour.
1. This leaves to one side the question of agreeing to accept the 
ruling market price at the start of a race, i.c. "starting price" betting. 
It does not affect the basic principles involved.
2. That A will win £22 if Y wins owes nothing to bookmaking. He is 
in fact making the equivalent of a bet himself on Y winning.
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Note 2: The Jewish influence on the development of the
Bookmaking Industry: individual achievement and 
occupational community.
The historical links between Jews and the business of money 
are well documented. As effectively guest workers in other people's 
countries, it is not surprising they have concentrated their activities 
in areas as essentially transferable as money and finance. The 
movement of a number of Jewish immigrants into a developing Bookmaking 
industry is another facet of this.
Many of the important firms were built up by - and remain in 
the control of - those and their descendants who entered Britain 
at the turn of the century from Eastern Europe. That first generation 
included, for instance, David Cope and Joe Coral; while some of 
those currently in charge of major firms, Cyril Stein and Bernard Coral, 
for instance, can trace their ancestry directly to the Jewish 
immigrants of some seventy to ninety years ago.
This disproportionate involvement provides rather more information 
about bookmaking than the Jews. As an occupation it did offer opportunities 
of individual achievement, based on some acturial skill, yet essentially 
a skill that was mobile and which demanded little other than human 
resources. Consequently, bookmaking did not merely draw the interest 
of the Jewish immigrants; it also brought in those looking for a way 
out of the dead end position of working-class life, the most famous 
example being William Hill. The Bookmaking industry reflected gambling 
generally: the opportunity to go from 'rags to riches' - and very
often the reverse in even quicker fashion. ^  1
1. Many of the major bookmakers had at one time or another 'gone 
broke'; e.g. William Hill and Joe Coral.
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While the nature of bookmaking promoted a particular brand
of individual achievement within the dominant ideology of individualism
characterising Western capitalism, the Jews also made a significant
contribution to the development of occupational community within the
industry. The impact of the Jews on capitalism has been critically
examined, amongst others, by Weber who challenged previously held
views that Jews possessed a 'capitalistic spirit'. Following Weber,
Antoni summarises his argument:
"..... (The Jews) contribution to the development of
the West rests .... only in their character as a guest
people who follow the petty bourgeois ethic of the 
prophets and psalmists towards the members of their own 
sect, an ethic which reflects the ancient rule of good 
neighbourliness and solidarity, while practising usury 
and speculation in their relations with the stranger."
(Antoni (1970) p.138)
Such a distinction involves a separation which perhaps does not 
resemble reality, highlighting the disadvantages of Weberian 'ideal-type' 
analysis; yet the possibilities of contradictory tendencies can be 
seen. Against the background of an activity whose social form
h.isised individual achievement, the traditional values of the Jews 
provided the basis for a communal dialogue.
Of course, the pressures for occupational community did not merely 
derive from the traditions of Jewish society: antipathy against the 
Jews was reinforced by the social distancing of bookmaking generally. 
"Respectability" for the 'profession' lias been a constant demand from 
bookmakers. Wealth has not bought social respect, even for the lucky 1
1. Kaye (1969) p. 50, in reference to the 1920s, reflects that 
bookmaking was " .... then in many quarters reoarded as an unsavourv 
occupation". In more recent times the orofits of the Bookmakinci firms 
who are nublic comDanies have been aDDlauded bv the stock exchanae Dundits 
and admired bv 'resDectable' business men.
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Bookmakers have alwavs wished to be considered as iust another 
orofession:
" What we feel is that someone should at some time sav 
that bookmakers are ordinary resDectable members of the 
community... Bookmakers are honourable people, meetino a 
demand from the majority of people". (D.Summers quoted in 
RC (1949-51) (b) p. 357.
The general public are somehow given the 'wrong' impression, 
the 'wrong' image:
"Unfortunately, through Tom Webster, and people like that, 
everyone visualises the bookmaker with a watch chain and 
large cigars and diamonds etc. That is merely his stock-in- 
trade; no-one wants to bet with a seedy bookmaker, 
therefore he has got to look well dressed. Bookmaking is 
like every other profession; if you work hard you will get 
a living at it, but I cannot recall, and none of my colleagues 
can recall, any bookmaker dying and leaving a fortune 
comparable with those made much more easily in industry".
(ibid p. 363).
But if social traditions and antipathy had the impact of pushing 
toaether bookmakers and their emolovees, there were also strona reasons 
in the practice of bookmakinq for the existence of trust amongst the 
bookmakinq fraternity. The placinq and hedqinq of bets did not 
necessarily involve an exchanqe of money at that time and might only be a 
verbal commitment. If such agreements were not honoured, then bookmakinq 
at least before LBOs, could scarcely have functioned. An awareness 
of this fact (in addition to the potential consequences of defaulting) 
prompted a degree of trust both between bookmakers and clients and 
amongst the bookmakers themselves.^* 1
1. In addition gambling debts are not recoverable at law. Although 
put forward as something of a publicity exercise D. Summers'(NBPA) 
comment to the RC (1949-51) is interesting:
"(Bookmaking) is a calling in which a man's probity must 
remain above reproach if he is to retain the goodwill so 
essential to his business, and in no other trade or profession 
does money change hands to anything like the same extent 
without the backing of written deed or agreement enforceable 
in the courts." RC (1949-51)(b) p. 357.
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Chapter 4: The context of workers' experience: the strengths
and weaknesses of labour-process explanations.
The analysis of the labour process has so far attempted to
provide an understanding of how collective interests can be specified
amongst and between different groups of workers; it has indicated
the sources of both common and different interests. Yet the
development of unionisation cannot be seen simply as a mechanical
reflection of those objective structures.^1* The problem remains
of how the objective position of wage-labourers within the labour-
process is linked with particular forms of consciousness and action.
This chapter explores if and how labour—process analysis can help there*
The arguments that are put forward can be summarised as follows:
(1) that the labour-process is the crucial influence in 
structuring work experience;
(2) that the labour-process provides an essential starting 
point in understanding articulated grievances and forms of action.
These hypotheses can be elaborated in due course; initially,
however, some conceptual clarification is necessary of 'experience', 
which also serves to highlight the analytical problems that are faced.
It embraces major areas of debate, most recently in relation to 
(2 )historiography.
'Experience' stands as the central concept in the work of 
E.P.Thompson, by which he means "social being's impingement on social 
consciousness";^1* in other words it provides an understanding of the
relationship between the response of individuals and groups to the
!• "People are not the simple product of the forces that work on them.
People are not 'the effect' or 'the cause' but both one and the other at 
the same time...." (Nichols and Beynon (1977) p.77).
2. See Thompson (1978) and Johnson (1978) for contrasting perspectives 
on approaching history. See Anderson (1980) for a critique of Thompson. I 
would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jill Hardman in discussing the 
problems arising from Thompson's work.
Thompson (1978) p.196.Anderson (1980) pp.25-27 discusses the variation in 
meaning of experience in Thompson's work.
circumstances which confront them. The crucial problem, as
he sees it, is how experience is produced. The notion that social
( 2 )being determines social consciousness, Thompson finds "difficult", 
and he argues against mechanistic divisions of being and consciousness.
Experience, he argues,
" ....  arises spontaneously within social being, but
it does not arise without thought." (ibid p.200)
Through their interpretation of their circumstances, people
act and make history; it is their experience which determines rather
than itself being determined:
"....  we cannot conceive of any form of social being
independently of its organising concepts and expectations, 
nor could social being reproduce itself for a day without 
thought. What we mean is that changes take place within 
social being which give rise to changed experience; and 
this experience is determining, in the sense that it exerts 
pressure upon existent social consciousness, proposes new 
questions, and affords much of the material which the more 
elaborated intellectual exercises are about", (ibid p.200).
It is undeniably important to emphasise the significance of
•xperience; that people are not merely passive recipients of changing
(4) . ,structures . Yet Thompson himself tends to decline any opportunities
of moving beyond the level of 'experience' and has dismissed efforts
by other historians - notably those with predispositions towards
Althusser - to do so. His emphasis on the centrality of experience has
exposed him to criticisms concerning the role of theory. In particular
his
"... overriding concern with 'culture' and 'experience' and a 
wholly 'hidden' and ambiguous relation to 'theory'or 
'abstraction'." (Johnson (1078) p.81) 1234
1. experience"comprises the mental and emotional response, whether of an 
individual or social group, to many inter-related events or to many repetitions 
of the same kind of event." Thompson (1978) p.199
2. ibid p.200
3. which is a sideswipe at Thompson's caricature of Althusser.
4. As Johnson has accepted, Thompson's work is?"permanent reminder" of the 
limitations involved in reverting to "mechanical notions of society".
Johnson (1978) p. 96.
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Thompson, in criticising the structuralist perspectives of 
the Althusserians, asserts a preference for "experience" to "theory",
where "experience" is also "authenticity".; ^  and it is not at all
(2)clear that Thompson does not deny "theory" per se. If this were
the case, then Thompson would be open to valid criticisms as empiricist 
as distinct from empirical).
This debate is far from over; yet even from this general discussion 
it can be concluded;
(1) that there is an importance in discussing the role of 
experience, and not merely to 'read-off' social consciousness 
and action from objective structures.
(2) that nevertheless it is necessary to go beyond 'actual' 
experience to gain a theoretical understanding of social 
phenomenon and social forces.
The first point is apparent from Thompson's own arguments; the 
“-"cond is concerned with the context of experience, and whether it is 
dismissed as 'social complexity' or if an attempt can be made to 
analyse how the context of experience is shaped.' To do this is
not to argue a mechanical structural determination of experience, but 
to establish the limits and possibilities of experience which will 
influence consciousness and action.
This leads on to what is attempted in this chapter: to explore, 
somewhat tentatively, the relationship between workers experience and 
changing patterns of the labour process; to understand the links between 1
1. ibid p.97
2. viz the title of his book "The Poverty of Theory"; Thompson's
position is strengthened by the inadequacies of the 'Althusserians' in relating 
theory to particular situations - as Johnson (1978) admits (p.83).
3. Thompson, for instance, seems to gloss over the question of 'existent 
social consciousness'. How is this formed? Presumably through prior 
"experience", which had derived from social being. But what of the 
question of determination? Does anything determine experience?
Anderson (1980), queries the utilisation of experience both generally and 
within Thompson's work, noting it allows a "voluntarist drift" (p.81) in the
Footnote cont'd
historical process. He argues that: "The way to a better materialist 
understanding of historical action is not to be found in a regression 
to evermore intangible sources of motivation, but in progressing 
towards an ever more specific and concrete grasp of the manifold of 
its social determinations". (p.80). This would seem entirely 
in accordance with the view put forward in this Chapter. However, it is 
not clear where Anderson stands on this question of experience. He 
seems to regard it as an "ambiguous void" (p.80); yet its conceptual 
source, 'agency', cannot easily be dispensed with and he sees some virtue 
in retaining it (p.19). How he overcomes this problem of the determination 
of social action is not clear.
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changes in the social organisation of work with consciousness and 
action. Referring back to the points made at the beginning of 
the chapter, the initial argument that the labour-process is the 
crucial influence in structuring experience can be made more precise.
The real concern is to indicate the contextual nature of experience 
in relation to changes in the labour process and to draw out any 
implications for collective action. The immediate point that derives 
from the analysis is the way in which the problem may be posed; - given 
their position as exploited collective labourers it would seem more 
relevant to pose the problem as why not collective action rather than why.
In exploring this relationship three particular points are 
considered. Firstly, the importance of the wage-labour relationship 
in structuring the centrality of work experience. Secondly, how the 
changing pattern of the labour process, with the general tendency to 
develop an increasingly co-operative organisation of work, implies 
changing contexts for work experience. Finally, this allows some 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the implications for different forms 
of action.
While this may (or may not) lead to general conclusions about
the structuring of work experience, actions are the product of wage-labourers
interpretation of contingent social forces. Their expression of
grievances, their actions, are therefore crucial; and insofar as the
analysis of the labour process possesses any utility in understanding
collective action, it must therefore offer some guidance in understanding
grievances and action. In other words, this relationship is a crucial
test of the utility of labour porcess analysis in respect of collective
action at the workplace. It will, in fact, be argued that while the 1
1. This does not affect the problem considered here - how does the 
interdependent, co-operative nature of the labour process shape experience?
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labour process provides an essential starting-point in understanding 
employe« grievances, certain grievances cannot be seen as arising 
from experience in this context, and that it possesses limited 
usefulness in understanding forms of collective action. It would 
indeed be surprising if the complexities of social phenomena could 
be explained in any narrow way.
a The Labour-process and the structuring of work experience
i The wage-labour relationship and the centrality of work.
The wage-labour relationship is fundamentally an exploitive 
one. Irrespective of how ideological forces may suggest otherwise 
and mask the essential contribution of labour, that the worker is 
exploited in her/his work activity is the essential starting point in 
understanding work experience.
In particular, the discussion of employees at the various stages 
:f the development of the bockmaking industry indicates the importance 
f the centrality of work in shaping experience. In simple terms, the 
more significant the role of work, the greater its impact on experience. 
While assessing 'significance' may be a tricky task, an initial 
approximation can be attempted through examining the extent of continuity 
:f employment and the hours worked.
Casual and seasonal employment have always been a feature of the 
Bockmaking Industry. The street pitches relied on casual workers, while 
the credit offices, although offering mere stable employment, also 
tended to reduce staff levels in the winter period. In addition, the 
boardmarkers in LBOs were often casual workers, while students provided 
a highly suitable source of labour in the busy summer period.
These instances indicate the relative importance of other sources 
of experience in comparison to that arising from the workplace. And
while they would not have an unequivocal effect on workplace
experience they must be considered a priori as mitigating against 
workplace collectivities, since they reduce the centrality of work 
as a prime source of experience.
Similar comments might be applied to part-time workers, given 
that working hours are reduced and other activities, such as family 
responsibilities, permeate experience to a greater extent. While 
this is admitted, part-time work also embraces the continuity, the 
timelessness, of waged work; and to designate a distinction between 
’full-time’ and 'part-time' work is always somewhat arbitrary.
The argument, crudely stated, is that the development of collective 
action and organisation is partly dependent on the centrality of 
work experience in determining people's actions; if the influence 
of work on experience diminishes, then it must be anticipated that 
action will be increasingly determined by experience elsewhere.In that 
case it might be supposed that continuity and regularity of employment 
will favour the influence of work on experience and the development of 
collective action and organisation.
Information on workplace action and organisation in relation to 
street pitches and credit offices is not readily available. ^  Yet 
the conditions in LBOs represented a relative diminution of casual and 
seasonal work especially, given the need to have LBOs regularly staffed 
and the expansion of the betting medium in the winter months. LBO
employees we re thus employed on . 1 regular .ind eont.i uuous basis throughout 
( 2)the year. To this extent, the labour process within LBOs would
1. The author has been unable to find any evidence of regular, cohesive 
workgroup activity either within or outside of trade unions, prior to that 
in the LBOs. It should not, however, be taken as conclusive that it did 
not occur.
2. With the exception, in some cases, of seaside towns, 
instance, CIR (1974f).
See for
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tend to have a greater influence on workers' experience than in 
previous phases, and arguably establishing important preconditions 
for collective action.
(ii) The changing labour-process and the context of experience.
The tendency of the changing labour-process, both in general and 
in the Bookmaking industry, was to generate a greater interdependence 
of workers accompanied by an increasing fragmentation of job tasks.
These developments necessarily provided the context of work experience; 
but they were not unequivocal and even contradictory in their impact.
On the one hand, the increasing interdependence of the labour process 
was associated with varying institutional forms; the increasing 
objective co-operation of employees was commensurate with the relative 
isolation both within and between different employee groups. On the 
other hand, the fragmentation of job tasks was uneven in its impact, 
generating both "key" and "marginal" groups on whom the changes in the 
labour process had a contradictory effect. ^
These two aspects can be examined in the context of different 
periods of the Bookmaking industry. Firstly, the way in which the 
interdependence of the labour process affected the context of experience. 
The practice of bookmaking implied the ready availability of betting 
facilities; it therefore tended to result in an industry of relatively 
widespread units, and for employees, social isolation in their work. 1
1. This distinction of "key" and "marginal" groups is used in the context 
of the unevenness of capital accumulation; as such it is expressed in differen 
ways; viz, (i) the distinction between the expanding LBO chains and the 
individually owned LBOs,where workers in the former represent "key" groups 
and in the latter "marginal" groups, (ii) the distinction within the labour 
process between the settlers (key groups) and counterclerks (marginal groups). 
Groups of employees are "key or "marginal" both in relation to employers 
and employees collective action. The LBO chains were fundamental for the 
capitalistic expansion of the industry and whose workers were crucial 
in the development of effective action on the part of employees; the 
settlers (-managers) represented for many years an obstacle to employers 
in breaking down the labour-process, a group on whom they were dependent; 
while it was precisely this crucial role in the labour-process which 
promoted their support as imperative for any employee collective action.
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In the period of street pitches, for instance, "runners" were 
necessarily separated and isolated from each other in their work; 
their objective co-operation for one bookmaker was not subjectively 
experienced as a work group and to this extent the social organisation 
of work might be seen as emphasising responses which did not focus 
on their co-operation within their work-group. This embraces physical 
obstacles as well as their social construction of their position.
It might be thought that experience would be structured towards 
collective action during the phase of the large-scale credit offices.
Here the employees were not dispersed, but brought physically together 
to perform different component parts of the collective labourer. 
Nevertheless, these groups were isolated according to job function: the 
settlers, phone-room operators and clerical workers all worked in 
different locations within the offices in this way, the interdependence 
of job functions was largely experienced within workgroups who only 
performed that function; hence the relative isolation, not of individuals 
as in street pitches, but of workgroups based on particular job functions.
The importance of this discussion is to show that just as the growing 
interdependence of the labour-process creates not only common but 
divergent interests, it also generates contexts within which experience 
is structured promoting both collective and fragmentary responses. This 
might mean that objective collective interests may be reinforced by 
experience; on the other hand it may be divergent interests are reinforced.
The transition of the industry with the expansion of the LBOs 
resulted in a situation where the objective co-operation of the LBO 
workers was combined with a physically shared experience across job 
functions. The settler-managers and counter clerks were physically 
separated from others in the same category, but were brought together within 
the LBOs.(1)
It would be very unusual for an LBO to employ more than three counter cler)
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Insofar as both groups suffered the impersonal control of 
security and head office, this emphasised the commonality of interests 
amongst all the employees in the LBOs, rather than their differences.
To this extent the context of their experience tended to overcome 
potential differences in interests.
The isolation of each LBO was, however, a further problem, since 
the widespread distribution of small workplaces produced physical
obstacles for collective action and organisation amongst the LBO
. (1 ) employees.
Comparing each of the phases discussed above, it is possible to
identify the different ways in which the changing labour-process affected
the context of experience. The street-pitches emphasised the isolation
of the 'runner', the credit offices the individual functional work groups,
the LBOs the inter-relationship between functional work groups.
This underpins the different influence of the labour-process on workers
( 2)experience in different phases of the development of bookmaking ; 
and it carries implications for how workers respond to their position 
at work. The development of TUBE, in this sense, can be understood in 
terms of the conjuncture of common interests amongst LBO employees 
reinforced by their shared experience of changes in the labour process; 12
1. Nichols and Beynon (1977) (pp.109-110) argue the impact of shift 
systems within two different plants on the same (Chemical) site resulted in 
social isolation of workers and "significant" problems for "collective 
organisation".
2. It is important to note this is a fundamental critique of theories of 
unionisation which focus on individuals and not on the collective 
organisation of work. What appears as simply a change in the position
of the settler-manager is in fact a reflection of changes in the labour 
process and changes in the form of co-operation within that process.
Treating the settler-managers as a group outside of the labour process could 
only mean that the first aspect would be picked up ("proletarianisation 
effect"). The development of collective action must include consideration 
of the inter-relationships of the various groups involved in the labour 
process.
-18.’-
the union embraced, not just one section of the workforce, but the 
combination of settler-managers and counter clerks - a reflection of 
the LBO structure.
The precise inter-relationship of different employee groups 
depended ultimately on how the division of labour within bookmaking 
had been effected. On the whole, this had generated distinct functional 
divisions which were, in fact, to place certain groups in a crucial 
position within the labour process, while others were largely peripheral. 
This differentiation will be familiar from the discussions in Chapter 3: 
the general separation between, on the one hand, the settling of bets and, 
on the other, their receipt and payment; a division based both on 
skill and sex. But in addition this potential divergence in the objective 
interests of these employee groups was compounded through their uneven 
experience of employer control of the labour-process. This is most easily 
understood in terms of the settlers as a "key" group.
The growth of the credit office bookmakers into large-scale 
firms occured after 1949; but the discontinuities in employment which 
the war had effected in the industry had allowed the employers to introduce 
tighter labour discipline in the post-war period. The enforcement 
of labour discipline was not, however, uniformly applied to all employees. 
The settlers still received preferential treatment to those working 
in the phone room and performing other clerical duties. This can be 
seen as a reflection of the dependency of employers on settlers at this 
time, while the routine tasks of the other employees made them relatively 
easy to replace.
In consequence, the work experience of these distinct work groups, 
already divided in terms of skills and sex, was very different. While 
it is perhaps easy to overdraw the contrast, on the one hand there were 
the male settlers who were not required to carry out tasks other than 
settling, who were granted certain "flexibilities" in their conduct, e.g.
the length of lunch breaks, who received a fairly good wage, and whom 
employers could still integrate as part of the occupational community 
of bookmakers. On the other side were the female clerical and phone 
room workers, who were required to "fill in" in other areas as necessary, 
who were relatively closely supervised, received substantially lower 
wages than the settlers (even though they might be asked to do settling 
when necessary), and amongst whom employers had no need to promote 
notions of occupational community. The context and actuality of work
experience of the groups was in these terms diverse. And it seems 
to have proved a strong barrier to any common action across these 
groups.
In contrast to the credit offices, employees performing different 
job functions were brought together in LBOs, but in this situation the 
counter clerks were under the control of the settler-manager. In the 
initial expansion, the discretion of the settler-managers was at its 
height and the other LBO employees remained vulnerable to the arbitrary 
decisions of the settler-managers both over what tasks they performed 
and how they performed them. ^  Quite clearly, work experience could 
easily promote opposition between the settler-manager and other LBO employees.
In this context, the advent of retailing bookmaking, which heralded
the diminution of the strategic position of the settler-manager in the
labour process and exposed his work to increasing external control, was
in some senses beneficial to the other LBO staff. The arbitrary control
of the settler-manager had been reduced and established working methods
implied some clarification of the demands made of employees. Furthermore, 1
1. An example here (from personal experience) is the way in which some 
settler-managers would insist on the boardman sweeping the floor and generally 
tidying the LBO after racing had finished. Others might say not to bother - 
it was the cleaner's job.
The expansion of the betting chains could also have a similar beneficial 
effect:
"I worked for a small bookmaker. He was very nice to me... 
but I worked on my own; I did the board, pay out, 
everything. Hills took over and suddenly there were 
three extra girls." (1)
While, in this instance, the employees of a small firm had 
found their working load reducod through the change of ownership, 
the existing employees of the large betting chains were experiencing 
increasing workloads; effectively the total volume of betting was
increasing as racing fixtures expanded and racing times staggered, 
while employers now demanded higher thresholds of the number of bets 
taken or settled before allowing extra staff.
This indicates the contradictory impact of the labour process 
on the experience of workers: that some employees experience some 
changes in the labour process as increased control over their activities, 
others as the reduction in arbitrary control; that some employees 
experience workload levels as a decrease, others as an increase on their 
previous position. Such contradictions are not, however, necessarily 
even. The changes in workload leading to a reduction were often 
momentary, and might soon begin to rise; less arbitrary patterns of 
control may also be rigid and tiresomely imposed. To this extent, 
differences in experience may be offset by more significant shared experience. 
For instance, increasing workloads were commonly and simultaneously 
experienced by all LBO employees; similarly with the impact of control 
over the labour process as it was increasingly imposed from outside the 
LBO. Despite her professed gains in the takeover by Hills, Millie soon 
began to feel the harsher side:
1. Interview Millie 9.3.76.
- 186 -
"I worked in Barker Butts at the time and the manager 
there was interested in the union. We chatted about 
things and we felt we needed a union then. We didn't 
have our own way so much, controlled from Leeds. They 
think different to us, up there. We were ruled by morons - 
sent us memos, you do this and that." (1)
Thus the exercising of control over the labour process by
head office provided a unifying experience for the counter clerks and
the settler-managers. While in one sense the changes in the labour-
process had a differential impact on counter clerks and settler-managers,
in another, they generated a certain solidarity between these groups.
There is a strong contrast here between the positions in the
credit offices and the LBOs. In the credit offices, the strategic
position of the settler remained largely intact with a good measure of
employer dependency on their skills reflected in the extent of occupational
community; in the LBOs, the position of the settler-manager was being
eroded, although they still maintained sane expertise in settling, but
the employers now felt sufficiently confident to break the links of
ideological integration. In the credit offices, objective interests
and differential experience had promoted divisions between work groups
based on job functions; in the LBOs, the expanding work loads and
externally imposed control were commonly experienced by those performing
all job functions, although the impact of such changes could be
contradictory.
It would be deterministic to suggest that certain forms of action 
can be "read off" from certain combinations of objective interests and 
experience. But at least it is now possible to move beyond treating 
"experience" as determined by a multitude of influences; arguably, the 
centrality of work and the shaping of the context of experience through
1. Interview Millie 9.3.76.
-187-
changes in the labour process can be traced in such a way as to 
identify sources of different and common experience which may promote 
certain forms of action. It now remains to examine this relationship 
between experience and forms of action.
(iii) The labour-process, experience, and forms of action.
Discussion of the kind of action workers take usually revolves
around distinctions such as 'individual-collective' or 'unorganised-
organised'. This allows some analysis of different forms of action and
how they may be substitutable in different situations. This kind of
approach is evident in Hyman (1972) who here does not substantially differ
from other writers on industrial conflict.^
"The distinction between organised and unorganised conflict 
is of great analytical importance .. in unorganised conflict 
the worker typically responds to the oppressive situation in 
the only way open to him as an individual .... Organised 
conflict, on the other hand, is far more likely to form part 
of a conscious strategy to change the situation which is 
identified as the source of discontent". (Hyman (1972) p.53 
(Emphasis in original).
There are two strands to this distinction: there is the main 
juxtaposition of collective and individual forms of action, the former 
'organised', the latter 'unorganised'; there is also a distinction 
of 'calculative - non-calculative' strategies. In contrast to collective 
response, an individual reaction "... rarely derives from any calculative 
strategy". (ibid p. 53). This is indeed problematic, with its 
behavioural overtones, but of main concern here is the'individual-collective' 
distinction.
Hyman admits that the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy is
"occasionally difficult to draw in practice" (ibid p.53) 1
1. For instance, Kerr (1964) : "Several (forms of conflict), such as 
sabotage, restriction of output, absenteeism, and turnover, may take place on 
an individual as well as an organised basis and constitute alternatives 
to collective action", (p.171).
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It also has severe analytical limitations. Essentially, it 
misses the point that the labour process approach has illustrated 
most clearly: that workers are already 'organised' by capital. As 
such, the distinction tends to be read in abstraction from capitalist 
social relations, ignoring the significance of wage-labour and the 
collective labourer. This is scarcely surprising: the 'organised-
unorganised' distinction possesses a generic quality such that it can 
be applied to any 'conflict situation'. It cannot hope to cope with 
the specifities of the social relationships of work in capitalist 
society. In this way, the practical differentiation of individual and 
collective responses is not accidental, but a consequence of an 
inadequate analytical distinction. For instance, in some situations a 
form of action may be 'individual' in that an individual worker may 
respond in isolation from other workers. In relation to street pitches 
s/he may 'fiddle' some of the bets, cheating the bookmaker out of some 
money. Yet fiddling this way may be widespread, a known activity and 
response; it may even be a conscious work group strategy. It is hard 
to see how the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy can help in an 
understanding of 'fiddling' as a response by workers: the practice remains 
the same and is carried out by individual workers - who must be seen in 
the context of their workgroup. Whether a response is 'individual' or 
'collective', 'unorganised' or 'organised' is always problematic since 
the focus must rest on the collective labourer in which the 'individual' 
participates on capital's insistence.
These problems of analysing forms of action can be overcome by 
analysing capitalist social relations: in particular wage-labour and 
the labour process. In this way workers responses are seen as arising 
from their position as wage-labourers and as collective workers. More
specifically, it is the conditions and restrictions imposed through
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wage-labour and the labour process which shape, through workers' 
experience, certain forms of action; this provides a potential 
basis for understanding why particular actions are taken in different
contexts.
There are two essential components to wage-labour. Firstly, 
the flexibility of movement or the 'freedom' of wage-labourers to 
become wage-labourers and that within the system as a whole labour can 
move from one area of work to another; secondly, that in return for 
performing work, the labourer receives payment, the wage ■ These 
conditions throw up areas of concern which may result in particular 
responses. For the employer, the inherent contradiction of demanding 
labour flexibility is that labour itself can use that flexibility - 
to become employers themselves or wage-labourers elsewhere. This can be 
termed as job quitting. Regarding the question of remuneration, this 
can be raised in various contexts with varying responses. Within 
Marx's framework, the employer only paid for a potential, the labour-power 
f w îge-labour, leaving the actual contribution of the labourer as 
a v a r i a b l e . T h e  relationship, therefore, between remuneration and
value added is indeterminate and subject to what has been termed the 
( 2)'effort bargain' , where a 'balance' is reached between remuneration 
and the amount of labour performed. The opportunities for either 
employers or employees to improve their position in the 'effort bargain' 
must vary according to a large number of conditions: the product produced, 
labour market 'tightness' or 'slackness', product market conditions and 
so on. In particular,in Bookmaking, one manner of response can be identified 
which arises out of the nature of the work: pilfering or 'fiddling' as it
is more usually referred to in the industry._____________________ _
Indeed, it will be remembered that it is precisely the difference between 
wages and value added by labour-surplus value- which is the basis of profits. 
2. See, for instance, Hyman (1972) pp. 126-7 and Turner (1962) p.18
The existence of varying options of response imply that certain 
forms of action may be preferred to others. It would appear from 
the evidence of the Bookmaking industry that insofar as workers 
sought to resolve their problems at work this was by job quitting 
rather than within the workplace; and that 'fiddling* was not uncommon 
and on occasions became an accepted part of the wage, proving a more 
popular response than making overt demands from employers as a work group. 
There is little mystique about such preferences: as long as the 
options of 'job quitting' and 'fiddling' remained, they were far easier 
responses than acting as a workgroup to remedy grievances.
The potential for job quitting was of three kinds: to become self- 
employed (i.e. petty commodity producer), usually as a bookmaker; to move 
to another bookmaking firm; to leave the industry altogether. At 
different times, these options changed in terms of availability to 
bookmaking employees. The general pattern of development of the 
industry implied a generally diminishing option for the bookmaking employee 
to become a bookmaker. This occurred in two ways: firstly, the growing 
significance of off-course betting accompanied by increasing monopolisation 
of ownership and control. This meant a decline in the on-course market - 
where the opportunities to 'stand up' as a bookmaker were most immediately 
available - and the constriction of viable areas to become an off-course 
bookmaker. Secondly, that the increasing fragmentation of job
tasks and specialisation reduced opportunities for bookmaking employees 
to gain the skills and expertise needed to become bookmakers: the 
tangibility of 'going it alone' diminished.
In consequence, the options of becoming a bookmaker rapidly 
diminished in the period after 1945; in the immediate post-war period
1. See ch.3 for a discussion of the decline of one-man LBOs.
'standing-up' on-course was still entirely possible, but the on-course 
betting boom soon declined in the 1950s. Hie new LBO industry- 
offered these opportunities in a slightly different form, but by 
the end of the 1960s there was little chance for an employee to become 
a bookmaker.
Similarly, movement to another job within bookmaking provided little 
real change as the industry developed. Again, until after 1945, there 
were very few large firms; there was a wide variety of options for 
settlers to 'progress' in smaller firms if they were unhappy where they 
worked. Such possibilities remained for the next twenty years, though 
gradually diminishing. tost spectacularly, the LBOs offered a new 
opportunity for settlers - often to become settler-managers - which 
many credit office workers took. But with the emergence of large-scale 
betting chains, the opportunity to move was increasingly- in terms of 
one large employer to another; and given their increasingly non- 
petitive position, the smaller firms often paid lower wages.
While the options of becoming bookmakers or joining other bookmaking 
firms became increasingly limited, the opportunities of gaining a 
comparable job outside the industry were not improving. The other side 
of the employer's dependency on the skill of the settler, was the 
dependency of the settler on the employer. In other words, skill specifity 
can cut both ways; bookmaking skills were not easily applicable to 
jobs outside of the industry, which would necessarily pre-empt those with 
a long history of employment in bookmaking from finding a job comparable 
in pay and conditions.
This discussion applies rather more abrasively to the 'key' 
settling workers than to the 'peripheral' groups. The former found 
the option of job quitting increasingly less attractive; the latter had 
never any real pretensions of becoming bookmakers, nor did they have the
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changes in the labour process can be traced in such a way as to 
identify sources of different and common experience which may promote 
certain forms of action. It now remains to examine this relationship 
between experience and forms of action.
(iii) The labour-process, experience, and forms of action.
Discussion of the kind of action workers take usually revolves
around distinctions such as 'individual-collective' or 'unorganised-
organised'. This allows some analysis of different forms of action and
how they may be substitutable in different situations. This kind of
approach is evident in Hyman (1972) who here does not substantially differ
from other writers on industrial conflict. ^
"The distinction between organised and unorganised conflict 
is of great analytical importance .. in unorganised conflict 
the worker typically responds to the oppressive situation in 
the only way open to him as an individual .... Organised 
conflict, on the other hand, is far more likely to form part 
of a conscious strategy to change the situation which is 
identified as the source of discontent". (Hyman (1972) p.53 
(Emphasis in original).
There are two strands to this distinction: there is the main 
juxtaposition of collective and individual forms of action, the former 
'organised', the latter 'unorganised'; there is also a distinction 
of 'calculative - non-calculative' strategies. In contrast to collective 
response, an individual reaction "... rarely derives from any calculative 
strategy". (ibid p. 53). This is indeed problematic, with its 
behavioural overtones, but of main concern here is the'individual-collective' 
distinction.
Hyman admits that the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy is
"occasionally difficult to draw in practice" (ibid p.53) 1
1. For instance, Kerr (1964) : "Several (forms of conflict), such as
sabotage, restriction of output, absenteeism, and turnover, may take place on 
an individual as well as an organised basis and constitute alternatives 
to collective action", (p.171).
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It also has severe analytical limitations. Essentially, it 
misses the point that the labour process approach has illustrated 
most clearly: that workers are already 'organised' by capital. As 
such, the distinction tends to be read in abstraction from capitalist 
social relations, ignoring the significance of wage-labour and the 
collective labourer. This is scarcely surprising: the 'organised-
unorganised' distinction possesses a generic quality such that it can 
be applied to any 'conflict situation'. It cannot hope to cope with 
the specifities of the social relationships of work in capitalist 
society. In this way, the practical differentiation of individual and 
collective responses is not accidental, but a consequence of an 
inadequate analytical distinction. For instance, in some situations a 
form of action may be 'individual' in that an individual worker may 
respond in isolation from other workers. In relation to street pitches 
s/he may 'fiddle' some of the bets, cheating the bookmaker out of some 
money. Yet fiddling this way may be widespread, a known activity and 
response; it may even be a conscious work group strategy. It is hard 
to see how the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy can help in an 
understanding of 'fiddling' as a response by workers: the practice remains 
the same and is carried out by individual workers - who must be seen in 
the context of their workgroup. Whether a response is 'individual' or 
'collective', 'unorganised' or 'organised' is always problematic since 
the focus must rest on the collective labourer in which the 'individual' 
participates on capital's insistence.
These problems of analysing forms of action can be overcome by 
analysing capitalist social relations: in particular wage-labour and 
the labour process. In this way workers responses are seen as arising 
from their position as wage-labourers and as collective workers. More 
specifically, it is the conditions and restrictions imposed through
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wage-labour and the labour process which shape, through workers' 
experience, certain forms of action; this provides a potential 
basis for understanding why particular actions are taken in different 
contexts.
There are two essential components to wage-labour. Firstly, 
the flexibility of movement or the 'freedom' of wage-labourers to 
become wage-labourers and that within the system as a whole labour can 
move from one area of work to another; secondly, that in return for 
performing work, the labourer receives payment, the wage. These 
conditions throw up areas of concern which may result in particular 
responses. For the employer, the inherent contradiction of demanding 
labour flexibility is that labour itself can use that flexibility - 
to become employers themselves or wage-labourers elsewhere. This can be 
termed as job quitting. Regarding the question of remuneration, this 
can be raised in various contexts with varying responses. Within 
Marx's framework, the employer only paid for a potential, the labour-power 
of wage-labour, leaving the actual contribution of the labourer as 
a variable.^ The relationship, therefore, between remuneration and
value added is indeterminate and subject to what has been termed the 
(2)'effort bargain' , where a 'balance' is reached between remuneration 
and the amount of labour performed. The opportunities for either 
employers or employees to improve their position in the 'effort bargain' 
must vary according to a large number of conditions: the product produced, 
labour market 'tightness' or 'slackness', product market conditions and 
so on. In particular,in Bookmaking, one manner of response can be identified 
which arises out of the nature of the work: pilfering or 'fiddling' as it
is more usually referred to in the industry.____________________________
1. Indeed, it will be remembered that it is precisely the difference between 
wages and value added by labour-surplus value- which is the basis of profits.
2. See, for instance, Hyman (1972) pp. 126-7 and Turner (1962) p.18
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The existence of varying options of response imply that certain 
forms of action may be preferred to others. It would appear from 
the evidence of the Bookmaking industry that insofar as workers 
sought to resolve their problems at work this was by job quitting 
rather than within the workplace; and that 'fiddling' was not uncommon 
and on occasions became an accepted part of the wage, proving a more 
popular response than making overt demands from employers as a work group. 
There is little mystique about such preferences: as long as the 
options of 'job quitting' and 'fiddling' remained, they were far easier 
responses than acting as a workgroup to remedy grievances.
The potential for job quitting was of three kinds: to become self- 
employed (i.e. petty commodity producer), usually as a bookmaker; to move 
to another bookmaking firm; to leave the industry altogether. At 
different times, these options changed in terms of availability to 
bookmaking employees. The general pattern of development of the 
industry implied a generally diminishing option for the bookmaking employee 
to become a bookmaker. This occurred in two ways: firstly, the growing 
significance of off-course betting accompanied by increasing monopolisation 
of ownership and control. This meant a decline in the on-course market - 
where the opportunities to 'stand up' as a bookmaker were most immediately 
available - and the constriction of viable areas to become an off-course 
bookmaker.'^ Secondly, that the increasing fragmentation of job 
tasks and specialisation reduced opportunities for bookmaking employees 
to gain the skills and expertise needed to become bookmakers: the 
tangibility of 'going it alone' diminished.
In consequence, the options of becoming a bookmaker rapidly 
diminished in the period after 1945; in the immediate post-war period
1. See ch.3 for a discussion of the decline of one-man LBOs.
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'standing-up1 on-course was still entirely possible, but the on-course 
betting boom soon declined in the 1950s. The new LBO industry 
offered these opportunities in a slightly different form, but by 
the end of the 1960s there was little chance for an employee to become 
a bookmaker.
Similarly, movement to another job within bookmaking provided little 
real change as the industry developed. Again, until after 1945, there 
were very few large firms; there was a wide variety of options for 
settlers to 'progress' in smaller firms if they were unhappy where they 
worked. Such possibilities remained for the next twenty years, though 
gradually diminishing. Most spectacularly, the LBOs offered a new 
opportunity for settlers - often to become settler-managers - which 
many credit office workers took. But with the emergence of large-scale 
betting chains, the opportunity to move was increasingly in terms of 
one large employer to another; and given their increasingly non­
competitive position, the smaller firms often paid lower wages.
While the options of becoming bookmakers or joining other bookmaking 
firms became increasingly limited, the opportunities of gaining a 
comparable job outside the industry were not improving. The other side 
of the employer's dependency on the skill of the settler, was the 
dependency of the settler on the employer. In other words, skill specifity 
can cut both ways; bookmaking skills were not easily applicable to 
jobs outside of the industry, which would necessarily pre-empt those with 
a long history of employment in bookmaking from finding a job comparable 
in pay and conditions.
This discussion applies rather more abrasively to the 'key' 
settling workers than to the 'peripheral' groups. The former found 
the option of job quitting increasingly less attractive; the latter had 
never any real pretensions of becoming bookmakers, nor did they have the
-192-
strength or weakness of skill specifity. Yet if they wanted to 
work within bookmaking, their choice was being similarly restricted; 
the option of moving to another firm where conditions might be better 
was diminishing.
In posing the question of remuneration, there is an immediate
difficulty in terms of the lack of information on rates of pay and
earnings. It can be reasonably assumed that formal records were
scarcely ever kept for any period and even if they were, would be
unlikely to show any real relationship to "earnings". The evidence on
'fiddling' is also largely impressionistic, yet it is possible to
understand how the patterns of development within the industry presented
this as an option which has diminished in the 1960s and 1970s.
The tradition of 'fiddling' is no doubt as old as gambling itself.
In the early days of bookmaking, it was often the bookmakers themselves
who were most adept at sharp practice, particularly when becoming backers.
For instance, at the beginning of this century many S.P. bets were made
by telegraph and as long as the telegram was timed before the 'off'
the bets would stand. This provided a real opportunity for risk-free
betting. One sharp-witted 'operator', using the names of various friends,
would take a series of telegrams to a remote country post office:
"All would be time-stamped the moment they were handed in and 
before being transmitted. The first telegram handed in might 
have consisted of a chapter of the Bible, so that by the time 
the telegram actually backing the horse was dispatched the 
race would have been over. As there would have been no money 
on the racecourse for the horse, a very favourable Starting 
Price would result." (Kaye (1969) p. 16).
Kaye continues to tell how, by such methods, Arthur Bendir (of 
Ladbrokes - the Gentleman's Bookmaker) managed to place £700 each way 
on a horse at Gatwick Racecourse which won at 20 to 1.
This indicates a difference between bending the rules and outright 
theft. No doubt examples of the latter did occur - for instance, the 
returning of winning postal bets claiming they were received too late -
but traditionally 'fiddling' was not as blatant as that. Perhaps 
contrary to popular belief, it is not easy for bookmakers to 'fix' 
the odds on a race; but given the way Starting Prices are obtained 
from a weak on-course market, it is possible for major coups to be 
landed. Consider this, perhaps slightly exaggerated, story of a 
'colourful' inter-war bookmaker.
"At one time if the market at the dog tracks wasn't very strong, 
the Sporting Life would take as the starting price that offered 
and laid by one of the bigger bookmakers. There was murder 
one night at one of the London tracks. There was a real good 
thing in one of the races and all along the line they're 
showing it at 2 to 1. Then just as the hare's running, S . . . .  
from whom the 'Life' took the prices sticks up 8 to 1. 
Straightaway he lays it: 'eight tenners, O.K' and then another 
'eight tenners before the dogs are off. So the good thing 
sluices home - returned at 8 to 1. Its there in his book 
that he's taken bets at that price on the off. Of course, 
all the lads have backed it off-course at S.P. and made a 
nice few bob. " (1)
In more recent times, the attractions of such activities have
( 2 )diminished for the large-scale bookmaking firm. " In particular, 
they seem rather more concerned with 'fiddles' conducted against them, 
rather than being involved in perpetrating some themselves.
'Fiddling' on the part of employees may take place in a variety 
of ways. It might involve the open embezzlement of money where an 
employee might steal a large sum of cash and disappear. This would be 
an extreme case, however. More commonly, as the word implies, it would 
be an occasional, perhaps regular, pilfering of cash within the 'normal' 
system of work. For instance, it might be achieved through altering a 
bet and pocketing the difference between what should have been paid out 
and what was actually paid out; it could also occur through under-recording
1. Interview former bookmaking employee, October 1976. The name of the 
bookmaker is omitted for obvious reasons.
2. It would seem that casinos are a more lucrative area for bending the 
rules, given the persistent police opposition to the granting of casino 
licences to some firms with longstanding bookmaking interests and 
traditions.
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the amount received for a bet and taking the difference between the
actual stake and recorded stake. There are many, many ways of
'fiddling' cash in this manner without openly taking the money.
The opportunity to 'fiddle' principally existed where cash betting 
was involved. Street pitches could, and no doubt were, 'worked' 
in this way, providing the fiddle was. not too obvious. The occasional
'winning' bet might be inserted before all the bets were delivered to
„ .  . .  .  ( 1 ) tne booxmaxer.
It might seem that 'fiddling' would have proved a less significant
possibility in the credit offices. To the extent that betting was on a
credit basis, this was true. But not all the business in the credit
office was on this basis. Perhaps the most important source of cash
betting for the credit firms arose through the system of postal betting.
At one time the larger credit firms utilised addresses in Scotland in
the belief that postal bets in Scotland were legal. Having been sent to
Scotland, they were immediately returned to England by rail, where they
were opened and settled accordingly - providing an opportunity for
some employees to supplement their wages:
"When we were opening the bets, old Flo used to sit at her 
place at the end of the table with a waste paper basket next 
to it. Every now and again she'd drop a note into the basket - 
that was hers and she'd collect it all later. One day the 
old man came in; he was a bit short that week, so he goes up 
to the end of the table and picks up the wastepaper basket.
"I'll empty this for yer, 'Flo', he says and rushes off. Of 
course, she couldn't say a thing, but everyone knew what had 
gone on." (2)
1. See Hobbs (1974) pp. 109-126 for a fascinating account of how this 
could be done.
2. Interview Charlie/October •76.The 'old man' was Charlie's father not 
the employer.
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Opportunities for 'fiddling' still prevailed with the expansion of 
1.30s, but the increasing control of employers over the labour 
process provided severe obstacles and checks in the larger firms.
The introduction of security systems, with cameras, timeclocks, and 
regular monitoring was indeed successful. * Some firms demanded
that any shortage of cash in the tills should be made up by employees -
( 2)irrespective of whether any 'fiddling' was involved.
'Fiddling' was thus a 'known' response, although its practice 
is very difficult to estimate; but there is little doubt it had 
prevailed as a form of response throughout the history of the industry.
Its feasibility was, however, increasingly diminished as retailing 
bookmaking developed. It eliminated the practice of occasional 
'fiddles' through to the systematic workgroup fiddles accepted by both 
employers and employees as part of the wage for the job.
The context of action by employees thus changed during the 
: v lopmer.t of the bookmaking industry. Generally it meant diminution 
in both opportunity and attractiveness of particular options. Job 
quitting was no longer a realistic alternative to improved working conditions 
fiddling could no longer compensate within the effort bargain.
And while these options began to close down, others began to open up.
1. although 
See above
this was only the obstensible reason for 
Chapter 3.
the introduction.
e.g. W. J.Connor Ltd in Liverpool.
3. e.g. Jack Windsor, based in Leeds. When William Hill took over this
firm in 1972, the low wage rates allowed for 'fiddling' by employees. 
Mars (1973) has stressed the importance of fiddling as an income 
source for hotel employees, and that this is a known and acceptable 
practice for both employers and employees.
Once the labour process is characterised by the collective 
labourer there is an immediate shift in any discussion on collective 
action. The question now becomes why not collective action rather 
than why. This arises out of the interdependency of wage-labourers 
in the context of their mutual dependency and exploitation.
This throws some light on the earlier discussion of workers' 
responses and how they can be analysed, for in any situation where 
workers perform the function of the collective labourer, any response 
is made in the context of a collective dependency. It is a truism that 
all actions are individual responses; but once the collective labourer 
is in evidence, all actions arc taken within a socially collaborative 
context.^ It is therefore meaningless to talk of 'job quitting' 
and 'fiddling' as 'individual' responses juxtaposed to 'organised' 
'collective' responses.
The question is whether the labour process, through the collective 
labourer, promotes certain forms of action within and between workgroups.
In a general way it does imply collective action on the part of 
employees since it emphasises their interdependence. The more difficult 
question is whether it can inform what kind of action is taken and by whom.
As the options of job quitting and fiddling were affected by the
development of the collective labour-process, certain options diminished,
( 2)and others appeared more preferable or necessary. One such option
of particular interest is the willingness to secure objectives within
1. Which is why the 'individual-collective' distinct ion:; are misplaced.
2. The extent of 'fiddling' is difficult to assess (obviously). Yet 
it is probable that many employees did not 'fiddle' at all and
very few did so on a regular basis. This does not, of course, affect 
its availability as an option. Nationally TUBE took a very hard 
line on the question of 'fiddling', adopting a moral stance against 
it and, in their early days especially, taking a pro-employer view.
the workplace through open workgroup representations to employers.
The next part of the chapter discusses how the labour process may 
assist here in more precise detail. Yet for the moment it can be 
noted how the basis of co-operation within the labour process promoted 
or discouraged such action by and between workgroups.
In the credit offices differences in experience compounded 
different interests amongst functional workgroups, which may help to 
explain any lack of open work group response from the workers as a whole.
But it does not indicate why the settlers or phone room/clcrical workers 
did not take independent initiatives. To begin with the analysis does 
help in suggesting why the settlers may not have been prompted into 
a more overt form of collective action: the double-edged nature of their 
skill specifity had resulted in a mutually reinforcing interdependency 
with their employers, which combined the vulnerability of settlers 
with relatively high wage rates and an ideological integration into 
the relative isolation of the bookmaking community.
The phone-room and clerical workers, who experienced the worst 
conditions of employment and the harshest labour discipline, were 
never in a position to make an open collective response with any 
continuity. Easily replaceable, they could never be in a position to 
impose any effective controls or sanctions, unless they gained the 
support of the 'key' settling group. The way in which the labour 
process was broken down through the division of labour thus promoted/ 
reduced the variety of options which workgroups might utilise in response 
to their exploitation.
In some contrast, the development within the LBOs emphasised 
the diminution of some alternative options; the eradication of a particular 
tradition of bookmaking employees could not be combatted through job 
quitting or informal activities within each LBO. The emergence of 
retailing bookmaking and its implications for employees had placed
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certain forms of action on the agenda, while effectively removing 
others. This is discussed more fully in the second part of the 
chapter.
(b) The Limits and possibilities of the labour process as a source
of workers grievances, demands, and action.
After 1971 unionisation did develop amongst bookmaking employees, 
concurrent with the dramatic changes in the labour process in the 
LBOs. But what is the relationship between these developments?
This can be partly answered through the historical analyst!', oi the 
previous chapter, where the preconditions and context of workers 
resistence have been developed. But it also demands an examination 
of these changes in relation to expressed grievances and demands on the 
part of those involved, and the forms of action with which they respond. 
It is these two relationships that are now considered; this necessarily 
implies some assessment of the utility of the labour process as the 
main focus of explaining the development of unionisation.
Initially the labour process is examined as a source of expressed 
grievances and demands. It is intended to show how using such an 
analysis serves to bring a coherence in understanding the disparate 
experience of workers; yet it will also be seen as important to look 
beyond the labour process in the development of TUBE, examining closely 
the events which led to the formation of the union. Furthermore 
the efforts of the employers to reconstruct patterns of working will 
be shown as an important motive force in the formation of TUBE; 
nevertheless, other potentially significant influences will be identified 
in why and how unionisation took place.
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i The labour process as a basis for understanding employee 
grievances and demands.
If the grievances expressed by workers in the bcokmaking industry
can be characterised in any particular fashion, it is the wide
diversity of these grievances that stand out. There seems little
merit in categorising these varied expressions in some pseudo-scientific
manner, abstracted from their social context. What must be attempted
is to understand the bases of those grievances and identify their
sources. The contention is that changes in the labour process can
be established as the primary source for explaining grievances.
The discussion in chapter 3 indicated that the changes in
the labour process would have a dramatic and deleterious effect on
many employees within the large betting chains; and it seems beyond
question that it was employees in this part of the industry that provided
the main support for unionization. As will be described, the source
of TUBE rested in one particular takeover of a leading London betting
chain. And those who formed the union saw this aspect of the
industry's development as the reason for the emergence of TUBE:
"Prior to the union there was a spate of takeovers. The 
effect on employees was drastic. Wages fell, they were 
given extra duties and there was a security offensive.
Working conditions worsened." (1)
Here the deteriorating conditions suffered by the employees were linked
explicitly to the mergers taking place at the time. Furthermore, these
mergers were seen as providing the main source of recruitment for the
union:
".... at present about 21% of LBOs are in the hands of the
Giants. Within two years the position will be drastically 
altered and at the present rate of takeovers, 75% will be 
owned or operated by the big combines... Your job is your 
living, you must protect yourself now." (2)
Interview Don Bruce 20.2.761.
2. TUBE Broadsheet October 1971.
The message struck home amongst many bookmaking employees. As
the larger companies began to amass LBOs and consolidate their
expansion, TUBE was seen as a possibility to combat worsening
conditions. The following extract from a group of employees in
Newcastle is a typical example in making this connection:
"My colleagues and I work for Ladbrokes, who have over 
lOO betting shops on the Tyneside area. This area is 
shortly to be merged with that of Teeside which will 
result in a group of approx. 200 shops in Northumberland- 
Durham-North Yorkshire.
We feel that while conditions at the moment are far 
from perfect, they shew every sign of becoming worse and 
that uniting the labour force through your union will 
help to combat this and to improve conditions." (1)
"Conditions" here covers a multitude of possible grievances: and,
as mentioned earlier, the ways in which employees articulated their
dissatisfaction were indeed varied. To make this point most emphatically,
it is useful to consider how stewards at the same firm, who could have
been expected to experience broadly similar changes, expressed themselves
in very different ways.
The firm is that of Connor and Forbes, a Liverpool based group which 
followed the typical pattern of development outlined in the previous 
chapter. At the end of 1970, Leisure and General Holdings, originally 
a catering company but with interests in other spheres of the 'service' 
industry, bought a chain of LBOs owned by W.J.Connor; in the Spring of 
1972 they added two further chains - Forbes and Frank & Mawdsley - 
completing a holding of some 120 LBOs. TUBE began to recruit members.
The impact of the takeovers was soon felt, but different aspects
( 2 )were emphasised by different stewards. Significantly, comments were
made on the systems of control; but while George M. referred to the 1
1. Letter P.Arnold to George Sawford 25.5.72
2. i.e. those w h o  s u b s e q u e n t l y  b e c a m e  stewards.
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activities of head office as "organised chaos" (1), George P. was
more explicit about the direct impact of these changes:
"People were moved around; previously you were left alone 
to run your own shops. I didn't like the treatment - 9 
shops in 3 years, moving me around to make me fed up.
Then they sent letters to employees, treated like kids.
'Keep your door locked' and so on." (2)
Other responses, if less articulate, were suitably blunt. "Treated
like cattle" was one of the reasons why Pat joined the union.^
But others found it difficult to describe how things had changed:
"Hard to explain how it changed; just felt generally 
treated differently. Tightened procedures, time sheets 
and a lot of casual workers and a hard core of regulars.
Most people feel working conditions were better before 
the amalgamation". (4)
Thus even in these few examples there is a wide range of dissatisfaction: 
the ineptitude of head office; the lack of discretion of the LBO 
manager; management's treatment of employees - either as "kids" or 
"cattle"; and the disruption of social relationships amongst employees. 
M l  are expressions of discontent, of different importance to different 
employees.
It is not perhaps surprising that workers demands should reflect 
the diversity of experiences. And some of the employees at Connor and 
Forbes, who supported a staff association in opposition to TUBE, gave 
vent to their frustrations of a management who virtually refused to 
negotiate, in outlining a wide range of complaints:
1. Interview, George M. 20.8.74
2. Interview, George P. 19.8.74
3. Interview, Pat 19.8.74
4. Interview, Irene 19.8.74.
-202-
"Here is a list of grievances: Wages; Christmas Bonus;
Christmas Holidays; staff dismissals; attitude of 
management towards staff committee and procedure; methods 
of security staff; lack of communication; insufficient 
staff and equipment; attitude of management to shop 
requirements and problems; insufficient cash in the shops; 
lack of stores; movement of staff and travel expenses; 
poor conditions in shop; insufficient office staff to 
deliver betmasters and cash; lack of information to 
staff committee regarding changes in working conditions 
and changes in policy. No definite job responsibility 
laid out for staff. Information re shortages, overpayments, 
and percentages. Stopping payments of bets." (1)
Taken out of the context of what was happening in Connor and Forbes and
in the Bookmaking industry generally, this is merely a list of grievances.
But what might appear as a lengthy list of individual grievances obtains
coherence when seen from the perspective of the earlier analysis of
changes in the labour process.
The lack of stores, equipment and reduced cash 'floats', indicate 
a tightening of control necessitated by the financial demands of Leisure 
and General's expansion. The issues concerned with inadequate staffing 
and mobility of labour reflect the strategy of management in reorganising 
the labour process within the betting division as a whole; just as 
the complaints on job responsibility, cash shortages, overpayments, staff 
dismissals, and the methods of security staff, reflect the strategy 
of management in reorganising the labour process within the LBO, which 
included the imposition of labour discipline.
Thus the ways in which employers generally throughout the industry 
were trying to secure greater control over the labour process in order 
to increase their share of revenue, manifested thomselves in many forms. 
Different employees not only experienced, but articulated, this assertion 
of control in a variety of ways. Focussing on the labour process helps 
in understanding the source of their grievances.
1. S.A.C. to Leisure and General Directors 1.12.72
There are, however, limitations to the extent that expressed 
grievances can be directly linked to changes in the social organisation 
of work. In particular one area where it might be argued that the 
labour process is less useful is in relation to wages. After all, 
why should the market position of employees bear any particular 
relationship to their activity in production?
The conclusions from the earlier discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 
indicated the importance of not separating the market position from 
the conditions under which the job task was performed. The labour 
process does carry implications for wage levels; the logic of capitalist 
economy is to continuously cheapen the value of labour-power, so 
that a greater surplus is produced.
The exposition in Chapter 3 showed how the position of the settler- 
manager was devalued in relation to the reorganising of work activity 
both in and across LBOs. The consequence was a reduction in the wage 
component through the falling value of labour-power and the reduction 
in the performance of the global function of capital.
In this sense grievances over wages can be seen as essentially 
related to changes in the labour process. It might be anticipated that 
grievances over wages would therefore be linked to those on other issues. 
Consider again the comment of Don Bruce mentioned earlier in the 
chapter :
"Prior to the union there was a spate of takeovers. The 
effect on employees was drastic. Wages fell, they were 
given extra duties and there was a security offensive.
Working conditions worsened." (1)
Here wages are cited as one aspect of the deteriorating conditions of
employees and are attributed to the general changes in the industry.
1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76
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The impact on wages through the changing labour process
can be identified in both the system of payment and the general level.
The tightenina of procedures and the introduction of new systems of
work also involved predictable waae costs. This often involved the
elimination of accepted practices and perks. Such changes frequently
occurred with takeovers. As one Sheffield worker protested:
"I am a betting office manager working for Windsor 
Sporting Investments, and am receiving a weekly wage of 
£28. Until recently, when the firm was taken over by 
William Hills, we were paid £26 a week plus all unpaid 
winning bets. Although we were responsible for all our 
own debts (settling errors), I had a tax free gain of 
£6 plus per week... For the present I am not interested 
in a wage rise, but only in regaining my past standard 
of living." (1)
Here William Hill had eliminated the practice of the settler-manager 
receiving money due on unpaid bets which they (William Hill) considered 
belonged to the firm. Despite a superficial increase in wages, the 
workers involved were now financially worse off - a consequence of 
the introduction of working systems utilised elsewhere by William Hill.
Secondly the pressures to standardise within the labour process 
generally had a direct effect on wages. For some groups of employees 
this meant a fall in wages:
"After the amalgamation, Connor's wages had to bo raised 
to match Frank & Mawdsley's. Their wages were held 
down. Forbes' were even worse off since they used to 
get a bonus several times a year." (2)
The employer* sdemands for an effective cash flow for expansion and
precticable levels of accumulation emphasise the internal aspects
whereby wages and wage demands are explained in the context of changes
in the labour process; this can even be extended to include the
increasing supply of labour, since the training of settlers must bo seen
in terms of how the LBO operations could be organised.
Letter to George Sawford 22.8.72 
Interview Irene 19.8.74
1.
2 .
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Yet there are limits to the internal explanation. The employers 
were also pressurised through increasing overhead costs and taxation 
levels; but furthermore, the state of the labour market generally 
in relation to the transferability of skills and/or the supply of 
labour must influence wage levels; and such conditions are determined 
by far more general forces in the capitalist economy, than the labour 
process in a specific industry. Wage levels will tend to reflect 
the availability of labour able to do the kind of work demanded by 
employers; and that is determined across the economy as a whole, 
although certain rigidities will remain in local labour markets.
So naturally wider questions of market position cannot be ignored. 
But the initial question about wages must be in terms of the labour 
process if the development of unionisation in a particular industry 
is under discussion. It is insufficient to state that wages are low 
because there is an excess of labour. That is merely a description 
of the market mechanism; and not an explanation of why this should be 
the case.
The focus on the labour market suggests a second important 
consideration in identifying the context of workers' experience which 
does not derive from the analysis of industry-specific labour processes: 
the impact of previous experience of work in other areas of employment. 
This was particularly important in the expanding Bookmaking industry 
of the 1960s when employment rose by more than 50^. ^  1
1. Based on information derived from British Labour Statistics yearbooks. 
The details are shown in Table 3.8. This shows total employment in 
the 'Betting' industry as 38,200 in 1960, that in 'Betting and Gambling' 
as 58,000 in 1970. The change in classification seems to account for little, 
since the Figure for 'Betting' (alone) in 1968 was 58,300. By 1973 
the figure was 91,500, but it is unlikely this expansion in the 1970s 
reflected a vast increase in bookmaking, given the number of LBOs 
was in decline in this period.
The influx of result
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'new' labour into an industry may well 
in the promotion of a general dissatisfaction with working conditions^, 
especially where these are worse than previously experienced. There 
is little doubt that while support for TUBE initially came from long- 
serving employees in the industry, the new labour in the industry 
provided substantial support for unionisation.
All positions in the LBOs attracted labour new to the industry.
The changes in the labour process which allowed this potential development 
to become real are detailed in Chapter J: the changing position of the 
settler-manager and counter clerk. Clearly, the overall figures show 
an increase in the numbers of both men and women employed in the industry,
which supports the view that new labour entered all the job functions
( 2)in LBOs. This expansion included the increasing amount of part-time
work in bookmaking, notably in the position of counter clerks, which 
had brought many women workers into the industry.^ They could compare 
t-heir new jobs with what they had done before. Pat, one of the TUBE 
stewards in Connor and Forbes, had worked in both offices and factories 
when single, but once married with a small son, she looked for a more 
suitable job: 1
1. or indeed acceptance of working conditions.
2. Again see Table 3.8. But note how male employment nearly doubled 
between 1960 and 1964, while female employment was static. This is 
presumably due to the emergence of small concerns during the initial 
expansion. Male employment declines between 1966 and 1971, while female 
employment increases consistently after 1964 - again presumably in part
a reflection of the changing structure of the industry.
3. Part-time employment in 'Betting and Gambling' was approx. 42% 
of total employment in 1971. See Table 3.9.
"I didn't fancy factories. They were boring, so I tried 
cleaning - the hours were handy. The same with betting; 
the hours were good and the money poor. People in betting 
are hard done by." (1)
Pat, along with four of the five TUBE stewards at Connor and 
Forbes, had only worked in bookmaking since 1970. Irene had been a 
housewife; George P had previously run his own snackbar at Crosby 
before his business was ruined; and George M had worked on the docks.
This gives some indication of the diversity of the backgrounds of the 
'new* labour force in bookmaking; but more significantly it suggests 
the importance of their work experience prior to their involvement in 
bookmaking as an important influence in their attitudes to unionisation.
A third area where it is necessary to move away from the focus 
on the labour process concerns the relations of production. So far 
the emphasis has been on grievances largely concerned with the immediate 
effects of control at the workplace or remuneration. But looking 
further into the experiences of the bookmaking workers, while they 
protested at the day-to-day conditions and control imposed on them, this 
did not mean they were unaware of the wider context of their exploitation 
as wage-labourers. Again this was particularly clear with the Connor 
and Forbes workers.
Now it might be expected that changes in the labour process
in terms of external control would bring into question the whole
interpersonal relationship between employer and employee. Such a view
is substantiated in this discussion of her employers past and present,
by Edna, who subsequently became the Convenor at Connor and Forbes:
"If we had worked under our old employer (Forbes), we 
would never have had a union. We didn't need one; 
wages were better, treated right; you were an individual.
I' When Connor asked me why I joined the union, I said it was
his reputation, I didn't want to be treated like that; 
that he didn't care about his employees." (2)
Interview Pat 19.0.741.
2. Interview Edna 19.8. 74
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At first sight this might appear that Edna only sees the 
change in terms of management style, of 'good' and 'bad'employers.
Yet it is clear this is not the case, for when Forbes succeeded Connor 
in controlling the bookmaking division in 1973, she found herself 
opposing her old boss:
"I'd never have (fought) him in a million years, he 
was so good to us. But it was big business as far 
as they were concerned." (1)
Forbes had become part of them. The real basis of the employer's 
control over and exploitation of employees, while not explicit, is 
contained in this indictment of the Connor and Forbes management.
The personality of employers was irrelevant: they were now seen merely 
as 'profit-making businessmen'. In this way grievances were wider than 
the immediate content of changes in the labour process. They 
involved a more complete understanding of the social relationship 
between employers and employees, through experiencing the introduction 
of a reorganised system of work.
Again, do wage demands raise questions about the exploitative 
relationship between employer and employees? The earlier examples 
might suggest that for many employees the fact of wacje labour rpmained 
unquestioned. Yet in periods of expansion capitalism appears as 
self-contradictory in holding down wages on one hand, yet financing 
expansion on the other. And this contradiction is most blatant when 
money is utilised to expand into areas where existing employees do not work.
In Connor and Forbes, the employees realised that they wore 
paying for the expansion of head office within the division:
1. Interview Edna 19.8.74
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"Frank and Mawdsley was a small company with about 15 
shops and 2 people in the main office running it. Now 
go to the main office in town. There are six or seven 
directors with staff checking and rechecking work from 
the shops. Look at the money going out." (1)
The LBO employees thus realised that their efforts had provided
sufficient money for an enlarged head office staff. Yet that was
money which could have gone to them for wages. But it was not only
the head office expansion they were financing:
"(Connor and Forbes) made huge profits last year. They 
put it into holiday inns and things like that. Their 
conscience must have got the better of them and they 
gave us £1". (2)
Profits from bookmaking had been channelled into new, expanding 
areas; yet the company were only prepared to give their employees 
an insignificant wage rise. Thus the question of how profits are 
allocated is raised, again emphasising the social relationship between 
the employer and employee as one of exploitation.
To conclude: In general terms the labour process 'approach'
does seem to provide a coherent, even essential, understanding of 
workers' grievances and demands; and it remains the starting point 
even when wider influences are involved. But it is important to avoid 
any tendency to remain merely at the level of the workplace; understanding 
workers' grievances must involve an appreciation of wider social 
pressures, e.g. the impact of inflation on wages or the general 
exploitative relationship between employers and employees. 1
1. Interview George P. 10.0.74
2. Interview Pat 19.8.74
3. Such awareness is usually translated into demands about basic 
working conditions of employment - in this instance a wage demand. 
This, of course, is not always the case and may result in more 
far-reaching objectives, e.g., the much-quoted Lucas Aerospace 
Corporate Plan.
(ii) Tho labour process and forms of workers action: the origins 
Of TUBE
So far in this section the diversity of the experiences of 
employees in the bookmaking industry have been explored in an attempt 
to show that the varied grievances can best be understood in terms 
of changes in the labour process, specifically indicating the links 
with wage demands and wider perspectives on the exploitative 
relationship of wage labour. Yet while the changing labour process 
provides the primary context of work experience, it still remains 
to develop the links between the labour process and trade unionism 
as a form of workers action.
But why should their response take the form of trade unionism?
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, the answer to that question is
essentially historical. While the focus on the labour process has
led to an understandino of collective action, it does not determine
tho form of that collective resDonsc.
Consider initially the historical development of TUBE. Some
twelve months after TUBE had been formed, George Sawford, the General
Secretary, received a letter which perhaps sums up the problem:
"I work for Ladbrokes here in Bromsgrove and there is 
a general feeling that a strong union is called for, 
as at the monent we are going to be put into operation 
without prior consultation with workers, e.g. opening on 
the Friday and Saturday before Christmas with wages 
being well below the national average across the board.
Something needs to be done and the union is the obvious 
answer." (1)
Trade unionism is thus seen as an "obvious" solution to the problems 
faced by wage labourers. But what is it about trade unionism that 
makes it such an "obvious" response? It is interesting that for those 
employees who eventually formed TUBE, a union was not their immediate objectiv«
1. Letter to George Sawford 12.12.72
The motive forces behind the birth of TUBE derived from the
patterns of concentration and centralisation in the ownership of 
LBOs in the London area, with combinations of large-scale betting 
chains taking place for the first time. For instance, in December 
1970, Ladbrokes bought the London-based Joe Solomons and Bud Flanagan 
chain; in March 1971, the William Hill Organisation, making up lost 
ground in the race for profitable sites, took over the Hurst Park 
Syndicate owned by Sam Burns and Terry Downes; on an even bigger 
scale, 1971 had seen the merger of two large London groups, Mark Lane 
and Joe Coral.
But perhaps most importantly for TUBE there had been the merger 
of City Tote Limited and Ron Nagle Limited. The workers of City Tote 
had been particularly affected by the spate of take-overs in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. At the beginning of 1969, the original 
London-based firm of City Tote had been taken over by a firm operating 
in the 'leisure' industry called Clubman's Club. However, early in 1970, 
they sold out to Mecca, the entertainments group. By that time, Mecca 
had acquired other bookmaking interests, particularly the London firm,
Ron Nagle Limited, which was controlled by four members of the Nagle 
family. To begin with the different groups were run independently, 
but gradually they were merged into one unit. In the boardroom the 
Nagle faction gained the upper hand against the City Tote representatives 
and by 1971 they had effective control of Mecca's LBO interests, who 
were by now themselves owned by Grand Metropolitan Hotels, following 
the takeover of 1970-71.
This rapid centralisation was not merely brought about by integrating 
firms owning a hundred or more LBOs. There was also a readiness to 
buy up smaller concerns; and it was the takeover of one of these 
small-scale local firms which provided a major spark for TUBE:
"There was a local bookmaking firm, Ledgers, who had 
10 shops. A good firm. They were taken over by 
City Tote. The staff were assured by their ex-employer 
they were secure. First thing, the area manager was 
made redundant on the first day of the takeover. In 
three months, every employee had left. There was some 
harrassment, no doubt, but its hard to prove. Their 
terms and conditions were above the going rate therefore 
it paid the company to get rid of them. So at that point 
I said the industry needs a union.”
Those employees most affected by these changes were, as we have seen,
the settler-managers. The option which those stall at Lodgers hud
taken - to leave - rather than to adhere to the dictates of their
new employer had now become a rapidly diminishing one. Declining
wages and their devalued position could not be offset by moving to
another firm. Those small firms who owned 'quality' LBOs were under
continuous pressure from the market leaders to sell up,' those that did
not could scarcely offer high wages. The option to move now presented
itself as the option to take a similar job in a different firm or, of
course, to leave the industry altogether.
Against this background, in March 1971, a group of bookmaking 
workers approached Don Bruce, a well-known and respected Bookmaker 
in the West London area. Their ambitions were clear - to improve the 
general position of bookmaking employees - but they were not clear how 
they might achieve this.
Don Bruce received their representations favourably. Bruce, 
a prominent figure in the bookmaking world, had for many years been 
involved in a number of employers organisations most notably as a 
Director of the National Sporting League. In 1969 he had taken a particularly 
active role in the various campaigns to influence government policy over 1
1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76, "Local" means local to Ruislip, 
Middlesex area.
the rateable value tax on LBOs. His prominance and experience
were, however, coupled with extremely articulate and powerful liberal 
(2)views , and perhaps it was the combination of these qualities that
made him attractive to the employees who approached him in March 1971.
A group of employees concerned with events in the industry
was formed as a result of discussions with Bruce. It was fairly fluid,
but the most prominent figures were Bruce himself and George Sawford,
who did much of the canvassing for support. He was a LBO manager
with City Tote and came from West London. He had been connected with
bookmaking for many years. Following his brother's footsteps he
became a bookies runner and eventually made his own 'book' before
"going broke" when Airbone won the Derby in 1946. He "drifted into the
credit business" and moved into LBOs in the 1960s, working for small
firms until City Tote took over the firm he was with in the late 1960s.^
The steering committee, as the group called itself, was faced
with the immediate problem: what action should they take? In
Bruce they found an advocate, of visionary proportions, of forming a
union for bookmaking employees:
"I saw this as a unique opportunity for this industry 
to have had a completely independent union, untrammelled 
by past experience - the struggles of the 1930 period - 
part of which still governs the attitude of unions today.
We could, and should, have had an independent body 
functioning in the true meaning of a union ... I felt 
we were better to go it alone. A new independent union
had not been formed for 40 years. It suited what I
wanted to do." (4) 1
★
1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76. See above, Chapter 3, for the context
2. He was an active Liberal Party member.
3. Interview George Sawford 12.9.74. At one time he was also a casino
worker.
4. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.
of the rateable value tax.
Bruce, at this time, was an important influence on the path 
which eventually led to TUBE. Yet TUBE did not derive from the 
visions of one man. It could only arise and develop if the conditions 
amongst those employed in the industry were such they would give it 
support.
So what conclusions can be drawn? Firstly, that TUBE emerged 
during a period when a range of alternative forms of action wore 
diminishing as a consequence of the changing patterns of ownership 
and control in the bookmaking industry. The options to leave were 
deteriorating for many LBO staff; the tightening of security 
procedures was limiting anv opportunities for fiddling; while other 
informal practices came under closer scrutiny, such as the length of 
luncbreaks and leaving early from work. Secondly, there was also a 
worsening of working conditions, particularly for the settler-managers, 
who were inspirational in the formation of TUBE; this reflected changes 
in the social organisation of work which was becoming increasingly 
generalised at this time.
These influences are related to how the labour process was 
reorganised in this period and which arguably provided the groundswell 
of support for the union. This is reflected for instance in the 
decision to form an industrial union for all bookmaking workers and not 
merely attempt limited representation in the workplaces involved.
In forming a union, workers are developing their own formal 
organisation on the basis of their position as the collective worker.
It is distinct, yet essentially interrelated, with how they are organised 
by capital at the workplace. Workplace grievances are the source 
of union demands; hierarchies in the labour process are likely to 
be reflected in the union; while the patterns of union organisation may
tend to reflect the structure of the industry. These relationships 
are complex and demand detailed study; in part they are taken up in 
Chapter 5 where the history of TUBE necessarily involves discussion 
of who dominated the union and what policies were pursued; in part, 
and most directly, the link between the labour process and the course 
of unionisation is taken up in Chapter 6 where the expansion and 
contraction of TUBE is examined in detail in relation to the changing 
industrial structure and organisation of the labour process.
The emphasis on the labour process has arguably been instructive 
in understanding how TUBE was formed, both in terms of the specific 
extents which led to the union and the wider support which it gained. 
Furthermore, this approach may have some potential in explaining 
the speed of unionisation over the next three years as well as assisting 
the understanding of the internal structure and operation of TUBE.
Yet it would be nonsensical to try to explain unionisation 
entirely in terms of the internal processes of the organisation of work 
activity and ignore wider social forces. Not even the Bookmaking 
industry was that isolated.
In the first instance, whatever the changes in the labour process, 
the diminishing forms of action, there remains the question why form 
a union? There are two aspects to this; on one hand, why form a 
union in preference to other activities; on the other, why form a 
new union when there seem plenty in existence already. The workers 
who eventually formed TUBE did not originally set out with this intention 
in any positive way; but they soon decided on this option and in part 
it was a decision made for them - not so much by Don Bruce, but the 
whole history of working class activity in Britain which has presented 
trade unionism as the foremost option for any group of workers in the 
position of the bookmaking employees in 1971. The existence of a widespread
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trade union movement gives testimony to this and supposedly provides 
an existing organisational umbrella for those who want to join. In 
practice, although the bookmakinq workers decided to follow the well- 
trodden path of trade unionism, they did so against the indifference 
and even hostility of some sections of the trade union movement.
The decision to form TUBE in 1971 and the support it commanded 
cannot therefore be removed from the context of contingent social 
forces at the time: it must be seen in terms of working class activity 
both historically and concurrently and the relationships with employers 
and the state; it must be examined in the context and willingness 
of trade unions (including TUBE itself) to organise and reflect the 
demands of actual and potential members.
It is not only the contextual and organisational activities of 
the working class that must be considered; those of the capitalist class 
and their supporters must also be examined. In this particular period 
the offensive on the part of the employers was being explicitly 
carried through by the new Conservative government. In this way the 
state had an important and immediate impact on the activities of the 
bookmaking employees in their promotion of the IRA 1971. There is 
little doubt that the legal support given to certain kinds of trade 
unions was a significant influence on the decision to form TUBE at this 
time; it is a relationship which must be examined in detail, but must 
initially be seen as promoting the decision to go it alone on the part 
of the bookmaking workers.
The general influences of the state and employers reflect the 
balance of class forces at that particular time and demand analysis.
For the bookmaking workers, their action was in response and in relation 
to employers with particular traditions and under certain kinds of 
pressures flowing from the demands of accumulation, who could either
support or oppose the union. Arguably their policies towards 
TUBE were informed by the same developments which prompted their 
efforts to reorganise the labour process. The success or failure 
of TUBE could be significantly influenced by how the employers responded 
to this initiative from their workforce; thev could inhibit certain 
kinds of action and oromote others; and therefore demand explicit 
attention.
The internal pressures towards unionisation must therefore be 
seen in the context of a ranqe of conjunctural forces which might 
determine the specific development of the actions of bookmaking 
employees. Their work experience was complemented by the legacy 
of a working class emeshed in the traditions of trade unionism; by 
a trade union movement who did not offer real assistance in their 
struggles; and by the sponsorship of certain forms of trade unionism 
by the state. Their efforts to develop and sustain their own union 
received the continual motivation derived from their continuing work 
experience, but were subject to the indifference and/or hostility of 
the trade unions and employers and the ambivalence of state sponsorship.
If these forces represent the limits of labour process explanations, 
it can also be seen that they can be integrated into the approach. 
Furthermore, they should not detract from the determinancy of workers 
experience itself. The task is now to explore the relationship between 
the labour process and the course of unionisation and then to explore 
the relationship between changes in the labour process and other social 
forces. While it is clear that the labour process is not a 'full' 
explanation of the development of unionisation, the analysis has thrown 
up a way of understanding the role of employers, the state, and trade unions 
in terms of workplace position and experience.
Concluding Remarks on the discussion of workers experience.
This chapter began with a discussion of the supposed debate 
between Thompson and the 'structuralists', e.g. Johnson; in terms 
of the positions adopted in those debates and in the rest of this 
chapter, the two points concluded in relation to the theoretical debate 
have been confirmed. To have remained at the level of workers 
experience would not have provided such a clear understanding of the 
processes of the unionisation in terms of the development of the 
conditions of the labour process; neither would it have provided any 
meaningful understanding of the source of workers experience and demands.
Yet at the same time, the problems of structural determination are 
evident. It would have been easy, but incorrect, to read off from 
the changing objective position of the workers involved their decision to 
form a union; but the events which actually took place demand a more 
sensitive understanding of the varied social forces involved and 
illustrate that a conscious decision was necessary on the part of those 
involved. On the one hand their experience was determined by a variety 
of historical and conjunctural forces; but their experience also 
determined the course of events, and in forming TUBE brought into play a 
range of social forces in new and different ways. While men and women 
are a product of their social environment they also make history.
Hopefully this chapter has indicated that it is possible to link structural 
forces and workers experience albeit in the partial explanation of the 
labour process.
Chapter 5: A Short History of The Union of Bookmakers Employees.
The Union of Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) lasted just three years.
It was formed in September 1971 and amalgamated with the TGWU in 
September 1974. It might seem a very small part of trade union 
history, yet its significance was something greater. It was a new 
union in an area of employment previously unorganised. Most employee 
groups join established trade unions. Most newly-formed unions - 
breakaways for instance - last only a short time.''" TUBE, however, 
reflected the wishes of many bookmaking employees in going it alone and 
was successful in doing so for three years.
The history of TUBE can be divided into various temporal phases, 
sometimes blurred at the edges, but nevertheless reflecting the fortunes 
of the union. The first concerns the formation of TUBE which followed 
a mass meeting of London bookmaking employees in September, 1971.
Next there is the period of expansion when in fifteen months TUBE changed 
from a London-based nucleus to a national organisation. This expansion 
was largely complete by the end of 1972. With the influx of members 
and the growing strength of the union, the first months of 1973 were 
a phase of optimism, of new and more militant policies, when the union 
sought to utilise collective strength. However, defeats in industrial 
disputes set TUBE into its fourth phase, that of decline, with the 
collapse of branches and membership during 1973. Finally, under various 
pressures, the union leadership sought amalgamation.
In this chapter the history of TUBE is considered in the context 
of each of these phases. 1
1. For a discussion of breakaway unions see Lerner (1961); also
Lane & Roberts (1971).
(a) Formation: Birth of a New Union.
TUBE was formed on 7th September 1971. It was the outcome of
six months preparation by the steering committee, who had set up the
necessary technical arrangements in anticipation of formal ratification,
and had given widespread publicity to the inaugural meeting.
The decision to form TUBE was not taken lightly. It was no doubt
inspired by the views of Don Bruce and the general feelings amonst those
involved of the idiosyncratic nature of the industry. Yet there was also
a sense in which there was little choice due to the indifference and/or
ineffectiveness of existing unions.
Initially, the steering committee had approached the TUC for
assistance. They received the following advice:
".... the best course would be to enter an established TUC 
union which would be able to provide the necessary benefits, 
professional advice and methods of representation." (1)
Taking this at face value, the steering committee now approached
( 2 )"several of the established trade unions for advice and assistance", 
but were unimpressed with the apparent indifference of those unions.
But it was not only the lack of interest which concerned them. There 
was also the record of failure of the major unions in the bookmaking 
industry:
".... isolated and unsuccessful attempts to organise within the 
industry have been made by well-established trade unions in 
the recent past." (3)
Once the decision to form TUBE had been taken,the steering committee 
had to consider the financial and legal requirements of forming the union. 
On the question of money, Don Bruce was able to use his contacts: 1
1. Letter, Vic Feather to George Sawford 22.3.73 in which he refers to the 
earlier, similar, advice.
2. CIR (1973) p.7.
3. ibid p.7. In research, two areas have come to light: Wales and Glasgow 
Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76). George Sawford suggested they "Failed
dismally"; Letter G.Sawford to V. Feather 26.3.73.
"Finance was fixed up with a chap I play golf with, manager 
of a local bank." (1)
Meanwhile, in June 1971, a firm of London solicitors were contacted
to advise in the formation of the union. They were to prepare:
".... draft minutes containing resolutions to be passed at 
the inaugural meeting of the proposed members." (2)
and
”.... draft objects as a guide and advising generally as 
to steps which would have to be taken if it was decided to 
apply for registration". (3).
The request to consider the technical processes of registration 
was significant. It indicated the intentions of the steering committee 
to utilise the protections and potential benefits of the IRA 1971 in 
developing TUBE. The attractiveness of a legal protection against unfair 
dismissal and a legal right for recognition were particularly important.
So much so, in fact, that the steering committee decided to wait for the 
Industrial Relations Bill to receive Royal Assent before holding the
(4)inaugural meeting at the Horseshoe Hotel, Tottenham Court Road, London.
With 350 people present, The Union of Bookmaking Employees was 
formed by a unanimous vote ^  . The meeting was addressed by Don Bruce, 
as chairman, with Tom Chapman a "great fellow" and "good friend"of Bruce 
as the guest speaker.^ 1
1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76. He also commented "He was bloody good 
really. We had a £7000 overdraft at one time - the costs of the legal process
2. Accounts June 1971-June 1972, Parlett, Kent, and Co. to TUBE 27.6.72.
3. ibid. Registration refers to registration under the IRA 1971.
4. The Bill was given Royal Assent on 5.8.71, with the inaugural meeting 
held just one month later. The meeting was publicised by much hard work on the 
part of the steering committee: "Most helpers spent their nights shoving 
notices through letter boxes". Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.
5. Minutes of inaugural meeting 7.9.71. See Appendix 1.
6. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76
Chapman, who was apparently well-received at the meeting^, held the
( 2)position of Industrial Advisor to the Church Council . Both Bruce 
and Chapman were to figure prominently in TUBE'S early history.
The purpose of the meeting was to find out the extent of support 
amongst the bookmaking employees, and to ratify the proposals of the 
steering committee. In both instances, these objectives were fulfilled. 
The support was apparent from the turnout and all the necessary decisions 
were taken to launch the union as an organisational force. This included 
the election of union officials and committee.
The successful nominee for Union President was David Kruger, who 
had participated in the steering committee. He came from one of the 
surburban areas of Essex bordering East London and for many years had 
worked in the credit office of City Tote Ltd prior to the legalisation 
of LBOs. He subsequently became a LBO manager. He was well-known 
and respected by the City Tote employees. Later he commented on his 
election as President:
"Frankly, I didn't really want the job of union president, but 
when I saw for myself how the workers are treated by bookmakers 
in Scotland, the North and Wales - so dreadful you wouldn't 
believe it - I jumped at the job." (3)
Kruger was to strike up a strong partnership with fellow steering 
committee member and the now newly-elected General Secretary, George 
Sawford. More than anyone, Sawford was to dominate the future of TUBE.
He combined powerful oratory with an immense capacity for hard work and 
he was to retain his position as General Secretary throughout the 
existence of TUBE, while several of the original group who started the 
union were to disappear from the scene.
Following his speech he took his seat "amid loud cheering & clapping" - 
Minutes 7.9.71. Perhaps for the way he had dealt with hecklers trying to 
disrupt the meeting.
2. More fully: to the Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod 
of the Church of England.
Sporting Life 16.2.72. Kruger was only too well aware of the hazards 
of bookmaking having himself been the victim of a savage attack in a LBO.
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The other post, that of Treasurer, was filled by Sidney Salkild, 
a settler working for Don Bruce. Again, a man who had worked in 
the industry for some years, Salkild had at one time been a tic-tac, 
but like many others in various parts of the industry, he had moved 
into LBOs. ^
With the consequent election of the executive committee, the main 
objectives of the steering committee were fulfilled. In effect, the 
meeting had served this purpose well and provides some indication as to 
how the union had emerged - not so much through mass action by grass 
roots support, but through a small group, who having knowledge and personal 
experience of what was happening in the industry, felt that something 
needed to be done, and set out purposively to do it. In consequence, 
the trend of policy decisions and the general affairs of the union were 
embodied in the very origin of the union, with the establishment of 
a highly centralised system of control and administration. While the 
plan for union government was basically simple - a number of local, 
geographically-based branches being directly responsible to, and 
represented by, an Executive Council - the union had no branches. The 
inaugural meeting elected national officials and Executive; in an 
organisational sense these were the union.
Focussing on the composition of the Executive Committee, gives some
guidance as to the specific sources of support for TUBE, since the
membership of the committee in part reflected this. Following the
( 2 )election of the three officials, an Executive Committee was now formed
1. Sporting Life 16.2.72; a tic-tac is someone who relays prices from one 
bookmaker to another at a racetrack, often involving the use of well-known 
sign language for each odds selected.
2. Throughout TUBE'S history, especially until December 1972, there is a 
confusion about the use of "Executive Committee" and "Executive Council". 
Strictly speaking, in the rulebook, the "Executive Council" was the biannually 
elected executive body of the union, while the Committee comprised a small 
group of the Council in charge of day-to-day policy matters. In practice thi 
formal distinction was not strictly adhered to and the terms used, at times, 
interchangeably in union records and minutes.
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by electing a further ten nominees . This gave an Executive 
Committee of thirteen members. Three important characteristics of 
the newly-elected Executive stood out. Firstly, the extent of male 
representation; secondly, the disproportionate number of settler- 
managers, and others in managerial positions; and thirdly, the strength 
of employees elected from the larger companies.
The earlier discussion of the sexual division of labour in
bookmaking showed how job positions tended to be predominantly male or
female with a rigid separation in terms of occupational structure.
It is not surprising that the general subjugation of women in society
is reflected within the institutions of the labour movement. Neither
can it be seen as surprising that the male domination within the
bookmaking industry would be reflected in the significant power-holding
institutions of TUBE. Despite the undoubted numerical dominance of
<2 )women in bookmaking, only two women sat on the Executive.
The essential link between male dominance and job positions also 
implied the disproportionate representation of settler-manager and 
managerial staffs to the detriment of predominantly female job positions, 
i.e.counter clerks, and the relatively peripheral boardmen.
Most of the Executive were settler-managers, though as an occupational 
group, they comprised little more than 301 of LBO staff. 1
1. Ton nominees were unanimously elected; the only other nominee was 
Laurie Franklin who, although a member of the steering committee, was not 
elected. He worked as a training officer for the J.Coral Group, a position 
which apparently made his nomination unacceptable to various J.Coral employees 
at the meeting. See Inaugural minutes of TUBE, 7.9.71.
2. The use of women as sex objects in bookmaking is extensive. In the earl 
days of LBOs, especially,employers would deliberately advertise for women 
whose physical appeal would bring in customers, regardless of expertise. Thes 
values are now extolled in a more sophisticated fashion to encourage existing 
staff, e.g. beauty competitions. Gambling is traditionally strictly a man's 
activity - where women are used as 'sellers'.
3. It is difficult to be precise here,due to the lack of information 
(some members of the E.C. are never again mentioned), but only one counter 
clerk (at the most two) sat on the E.C. at this time. It is not, perhaps, 
coincidental that most of the few female activists in TUBE who achieved 
official positions were settler-managers.
They had rather more in common than being merely settler- 
managers. Again, most of the Executive worked for major London (or 
National) bookmakers. There were three staff from J.Coral Ltd, two 
from the William Hill Organisation, and one from Ladbrokes. But in 
particular evidence were the workers of the City Tote - Ron Nagle combine, 
now owned by Grand Metropolitan Hotels. They had five representatives, 
including the President and the Secretary*^'. While it was to be 
expected that these major firms would all be represented, the strength 
of their representation was such that only two members of the Executive 
were employed by smaller concerns.
Looking beyond the predominant characteristics of the Exedutive - 
male settler-managers in the major combines - what were the backgrounds 
of those who came to the forefront of TUBE'S activity? The significant 
election of the three officials indicates a greater commonality than 
expressed above: all three were middle-aged men with their background 
firmly rooted in the bookmaking industry. Their experiences were not 
confined to LBOs for they had been involved in the industry before the 
days of legal cash betting. They represented those elements in 
bookmaking who sought to uphold pre-existing social and economic 
relationships within the industry. They reacted generally to the changing 
pattern of the industry and specifically to the elimination of their 
position within the labour-process.
Such perspectives were not merely limited to those who had 
experienced the pre-1960 days of illegal cash betting. On the Executive, 
others with backgrounds in bookmaking, who had only really been involved 
since LBOs,were apparent: for instance, Dot Calzetti,a long-serving and 
resilient counter clerk from the East End, who worked for City Tote; and
1. only one of the five came from the Nagle side of the firm.
Dave Dyster, who had been employed by the J.Coral Group for twelve 
years and now at the age of 30 had worked in all the departments 
of the firm from "the board to trade room".^
While variations in perspective might arise , the point remains 
that TUBE emerged from the reaction of those who had a history of 
employment in bookmaking; who had experienced the changes in the 
labour-process outlined in Chapter 3; who now demanded that something 
be done to halt their deteriorating position both within the labour 
process and the labour market; who found that collective action was now 
their main hope of making their feelings felt and their position 
improved.
Clearly the interests of TUBE members, or those active in beginning 
TUBE, were not monolithic. But the dominant influence at the time of 
TUBE'S formation were the settler-managers, in particular the long 
serving employees, who were most severely affected by the changes in the 
labour-process. The devaluing of their position prompted a specific 
reaction from that group which focussed on the right of settler-managers 
to manage, a fundamentally reactionary response, harking back to past 
times and embracing the historical mythology of bookmaking. How this 
affected the nature of TUBE can be understood in the context of two 
aspects: the tendency to develop independently of the labour movement, 
i.e. the actual formation of TUBE; and, secondly, the non-oppositional 
character of TUBE'S policies.
Chapter 3, showed how, historically, the development of the bookmaking 
industry and its relationship to the rest of the economy, and society, 
had generated tendencies to a solidarity amongst employers and employees. 
Those in the front of TUBE at this stage inherited this perspective of 
what the bookmaking industry should be like, emphasising the idiosyncracy 
of bookmaking and the relationships between employers and employees:
1. EC Election Notes, 1972. See Appendix 2.
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"being a specialised industry it appeared that the 
existing unions were inappropriate: the bargaining 
between employer and employee would be of such a 
special nature that it appeared to the workers 
concerned that only a new union could meet the 
situation. (Chapman (1971)).
Thus, this 'special relationship1 cannot merely be 
attributed to the undoubted managerial perspectives of TUBE'S new 
leaders, although this can play a part in the notion of 'inappropriateness' 
as applied to trade unions in general; its source also lay in the 
historical isolation of the bookmaking industry, and the corresponding 
ignorance of outsiders in understanding the problems involved:
".......  we feel that such a union must spring
from within the betting game itself. Because 
our jobs are highly specialised only we really 
understand the difficulties." (1)
Hence TUBE emerged as a means of coping with the 'special' 
problems of the settler-managers, to combat the changes in the 
1ookmaking industry, to provide an organisation articulating fundamentally 
conservative notions concerning employerTemployee relationships.
Given this, it is not perhaps surprising that TUBE'S policies 
were in general terms non-oppositional in character. The objectives 
of the union, as set out in the inaugural meeting, were essentially 
parochial and modest, limited to the processes of collective bargaining 
in the bookmaking industry. This sectional perspective was further 
reflected in the non-political position of the union.
TUBE was:
1. D. Kruger quoted in Sporting Life 16.2.72
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The Objectives of The Union of Bookmakers Employers as set out in the 
Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting, 7.9.71.
"(a) The protection, care and welfare of employees
engaged in the bookmaking industry.
(b) To regulate the relations between employees 
and employers in the said industry and to improve working standards 
and conditions and to alter same where they are improper, unjust
or oppressive and to provide legal advice and representation for 
all members of the Union.
(c) To negotiate the settlement of disputes 
between members and employers.
(d) To give advice and to provide benefits to 
members as in the case of accident, strikes, lockouts, hardship 
of victimization subject to the Executive Councils authorisation 
and the availability of funds at the time."
1. Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of TUBE, 7.9.71. See Appendix 1.
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not to affiliate with any Political Party 
without the approval of the membership at a meeting 
called for that purpose". (1)
Thus any connection with the Labour Party, and the political
levy, was effectively ruled out.
Besides embracing limited objectives and an explicitly
non-political position, TUBE took on another trapping of the
'ideal-type' 'white-collar' union: high subscription rates:
the joining fee was set at 25p and thereafter 75p a month, the same
( 2 )rates to apply for women as for men.
But underlying these indicators of the character of TUBE at 
this time there was the question of interests; a question which 
prompted a particularly strong bond between TUBE'S new officials 
and the moderating advice of Don Bruce and Tom Chapman. In the 
first instance, whatever the bookmaking experience of the Executive, 
union expertise was indeed lacking. The meeting at the Horseshoe 
Hotel was a mass meeting of 350 bookmaking employees. Many who went 
along were enthusiastic at first, like Fred Martin, who later became 
secretary for the London Eastern branch of TUBE:
"I went to the meeting to join and pay my subscriptions. 
I thought there would be people there to do something 
for us. But soon I learnt there was no-one there to 
do anything. George Sawford was just a betting shop 
manager. He didn't know anything more about the union 
than me." (3). 1
1 • Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 7.9.71
A motion to allow reduced rates for women was heavily defeated, 
see ibid. Other comparable unions at that time charged lower 
subscription rates than TUBE. TUBE subscriptions were E6 per 
annum (= 50p per month), while the ASTMS maximum was 65p a month. 
Fred Martin Interview, 10.6.75
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Lacking in union experience, the Executive were forced to rely
on their own intuition and judgement - and on the advice of two
outsiders, Don Bruce and Tom Chapman.
Bruce had played a significant part in organising the formation
of TUBE, assisting with financial backing, legal advice, and in
developing the initial strategy. Tom Chapman's help was also well
received, as Kruger pointed out at the time:
"We know that, as a union, we're only amateurs .... But 
we are getting some wonderful help from no less a person  ^
than the industrial advisor to the Archbishop of Canterbury."
With the formation of the union, the positions of Bruce and Chapman
as advisers were officially confirmed. At the first Executive meeting,
just eight days after the inaugural meeting, they were both made honorary
( 2)vice-presidents of the union by a unanimous vote.
At the same time, the close relationship with Bruce indicates 
the extent to which the TUBE leadership primarily challenged the large 
betting chains, but retained a dialogue with the smaller employers.
This was a fair reflection of the pressures that had generated the basis 
for collective action. And the dominating tendency in TUBE, the long- 
established settler-managers, embraced the paternalistic small-scale 
employer as the contemporary inheritor of what bookmaking was really 
about, and what should really be. They at least talked the same language, 
even if it proved to be the language of a dying breed.
(b) Expansion:September 1971-December 1972: the development of a 
national organisation.
The period of fifteen months which saw the transition from the 
inaugural meeting in London to a national organisation started 
disastrously for TUBE. Within eight days of the formation of TUBE,
George Sawford had been dismissed by his employers. City Tote Ltd, as a 
settler-manager. The eventual consequences for TUBE were not necessarily
1.
2 .
D. Kruger, Sporting Life. 16.2.72. 
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By MICHAEL ROLFE
OFFICIALLY formed only last week, Ihe Union 
of Bookmakers’ Employees is already shaping up 
for its first big battle.
7; Georse Sawford. the first secretary of T.U.B.E.. has been 
sacked by iii.s employers. City Tote Ltd.
Sawford's dismissal 
competes with the more 
regular racing features 
in the Sporting Life 16.9.
l.V Mr. Sawford was told 
’ employment had been tor­
i' mlnatcd and the news was 
I quickly followed by a state- 
'■ anent from a union -pokes- 
: man who said: " We have no 
. intention of taking it lying 
down."
' The Union Executive met last 
evening to determine their 
course of action.
; / VICTIMISATION'
Mr. Sawford himself cx- 
pres?-cd amazement that his 
employers had dismu-sed him 
and described it as "obvious 
victimisation."
He added that he had never 
allowed his work tor the union 
to interfere with his job. and. 
in fact, the takings of the shop 
he managed nad gone up since 
he took it over.
In addition, he pointed out 
that when he cave City Tote 
notice to leave some ten weeks 
ago over a disputed overtime 
payment, he was asked to stay 
on, which was. he said: "proof 
•that my work was not un­
satisfactory."
But a spokesman for City 
Tote said that his dismissal 
was on the recommendation of 
the area manager for a breach 
of security regulations.
’ COINCIDENTAL'
Mr. Sawford's character was 
: not in question and his 
activities for the union were 
v purely coincidental." City 
' Tote have no Abjection to their 
, .employee! joining the union.
The spokesman tor the firm 
added that Mr. Sawford vuth- 
' drew his own notice to leave 
and was not asked to do so.
George Sawford. who is 47. 
has been with City Tote for two 
years, having been taken into 
their employ when they 
acquired a betting shop pre­
viously owned by Eddie Spark 
f Alexanders».
At the time of his dismissal j 
he was manager of the Field : 
End P.oacr betting shop, at 
Eastcote. Middlesex.
/esterday morning th at his
By OUR PARIS 
CORRESPONDENT 
LESTER PIG GOTT had a 
double a t  Chan ti l ly  yes­
terday. and was desper­
ately unlucky to he beaten 
into third  p lace on his 
only other  m o u n t ,  who 
made most of th e  running.
His double w as sparked 
ofT in the Prix do Polymclus. 
worth about E 1 .800. over a 
mile and a half, in  which he 
rode Minio, from Jack Clay­
ton's Newmarket stable.
M:n:o. wno h is won both h:s * 
races in England this year, led 
from start to finish.
It was only m th<* last furlong 
that he was seriously challenged 
oy Beau Charmcur ridden ov 
Freddie Head, who was beaten 
a «hors neck. w*tlt Manro 
Capac the same distance away.
Pari-Mutuel dividends were:
?.f»* lor a win and 1.70. 2.30 and 
3.10 tor the places
The British champion com- 
p’efed his double on P.ibonrince
Continued on page three
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H B a lla n lin e  (7 ).
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harmful: partly as a result, the union soon had a full-time General 
Secretary. Yet it was obviously a personal misfortune for Sawford, 
and insofar as it preoccupied the attention of the Executive Committee 
in subsequent months, the issue deflected concern from the main 
objectives of the union.
The new union immediately faced a dilemma. The Executive was
unprepared to call out the membership over this "obvious victimisation". ^
Equally, the new IRA 1971 provided no legal support - the provisions
on unfair dismissal had yet to be implemented. The actions, or rather
inactions, of the Executive are of some interest. While the refusal to
organise industrial action might have reflected the lack of confidence
in the members - either in terms of their willingness to take action or
their effectiveness - it does seem that the TUBE Executive had a clear
preference for using institutional channels in an effort to effect a
degree of conciliation. For four months, they utilised the Department
of Employment, lobbying selected MPs, and even involving the Industrial
Society. All to no avail and Sawford remained dismissed.
The actions of the Executive in preferring a conciliated settlement
in part reflect the basis of their trade unionism: that the way
forward for the union was not by struggle, but by discussing with the
employers in a 'reasonable manner'. They were keen to eliminate
'unreasonable elements' from the union and in fact made this a major
plank of the recruitment campaign:
"The Elected Committee will be responsible for all major decisions 
concerning your future - it is up to you to see that level headed 
responsible men and women look after your interests." (2)
!• George Sawford quoted in Sporting Life, 16.9.71 p.l.
2* Handbill: "TUBE comes to Liverpool" 10.4.72. Similar handbills were 
used elsewhere throughout the year.
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TUBE had arisen, as they saw it, to rectify an 'unfair' 
situation in a society that was basically 'fair'. The union slogan 
was 'Justice our Cause ' :
"Our aim is to be just to employers and members alike and 
we will not hesitate from backing an employer so that we 
may do our best to keep harmony in the industry". (1)
Leaving aside the undoubted rhetoric, there remains an impression
that 'justice' can be obtained; that it is the 'normal' situation;
and that it only needs the employers to see the situation properly for
justice to be achieved. Social justice in a wider sense is not
problematic: 'just' employers already exist - it only remains to
persuade the bad ones of the error of their ways:
"This union exists only to secure justice for its members, 
therefore no just employer need fear us". (2)
Such perspectives imply that existing social institutions can, 
more or less, deliver the goods. The failure of the various important 
bodies to assist on the Sawford issue at least partially brought the 
reality of the situation home to them: morality is not all powerful.^ 123
1. Letter George Sawford to Dept Employment, Manchester 9.10.72.
2. Letter George Sawford to Sporting Life, undated (but probably 1972).
3. The reactions of groups of employees who become discontented with
their position may well involve moralistic viewpoints. In their study of the 
Pilkington Strike of 1970, Lane and Roberts noted: "The strike had brought 
to prominence a number of men not wise in the ways of the world. More able 
perhaps than many of their fellows but probably not notably different in thei; 
outlook. Men who looked at issues in uncomplicated terms of justice, fair 
play and democracy; innocent men in the sense they had not learned the 
ultimate cynicism: ' politics is the art of the possible'. 'Politics' 
for them was not a question of practicability in a world of conflicting 
entrenched interests. 'Politics' was a question of what was right and what was 
wrong. Issues were judged in terms of morality rather than in terms of 
expediency. The strike did not change this outlook, but it did change their 
perceptions of the world. The world, they discovered, was not a very 
pleasant place".
Lane and Roberts (1971) p.202-3.
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The issue of Sawford's dismissal eventually gave way to more important 
issues; and Sawford himself became the only full-time employee of 
TUBE in early 1972, as General Secretary.
Sawford was now able to devote his full attention to organising 
new branches for the union. During 1972 membership increased
sevenfold: in January there were 479 members^1', but by October, Sawford
( 2 )claimed the figure was now "in excess of 3,500" . And by the
end of the year, there were thirteen branches throughout England, Scotland
and Wales.
The expansion of TUBE in this period was characterised by two 
particular aspects: firstly that there were distinct temporal phases 
of branch formation; secondly, that branches were geographically 
widespread. The initial phase of branch formation comprised the 
efforts, mainly in London, following on from the inaugural meeting.
But the main thrust did not come until March-April 1972, when five 
branches were added to the only branch to develop in the initial phase, 
London Eastern. The third and final phase of branch formation did not 
take place until July-August 1972. This gave TUBE a wide geographical 
coverage with the Midlands area the only conspicuous absentee.
TUBE existed as an Executive elected by a mass meeting of 
Bookmaking employees. This was the sole, tenuous, relationship between 
the union as an organisation and the potential membership. The question 
of providing organisational continuity was immediately raised and the 
TUBE Executive confronted the problem of developing a branch organisation, 
and chose where to utilise the scarce resources of the union. Although 
some efforts were made elsewhere, the main focus rested on London, which 
had provided the impetus for TUBE. In October 1971, the Executive :
EC Minutes 27.1.72
Letter George Sawford to Dept, of Employment, Manchester, 9.10.72.
■ H i
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agreed that the Secretary book three or four venues 
for meetings in various parts of London with a view to ^
increasing membership and forming branches where possible."
Meetings were arranged for late October in Harlesden, Tottenham,
and Stratford. Even allowing for the lack of money available and
the difficulties of publicity, the results were still slightly
disappointing. Only the Stratford meeting resulted in a union
branch, that of London Eastern.
This remained the only branch formed in 1971. Despite enquiries 
from Anglesey, Cardiff, Glasgow, and Manchester, the Executive were 
reluctant to sanction further union branches. There is little doubt 
this was largely due to the fears of victimisation of union activists 
at the hands of the employers:
" Some of (the betting shop workers) have been fired for joining 
a union, some have been discharged for even discussing a 
union; several have been sacked for merely saying that they 
were thinking of attending a union meeting." (2)
Tactically, the Executive now delayed further branch formation
until the legal protection of unfair dismissal, enshrined in the IRA
1971,became operative at the end of February 1972. In consequence
the second phase of branch expansion was rapid as TUBE made up for lost
time. In the last week of February and the first week of March,
four branches wore officially established: Cardiff, Manchester,
Glasgow and West Middlesex. In addition, Sawford had developed
membership in Bangor at this time and although never officially made
a branch, it was eventually considered as such.
The sources of membership were contrasting. The Cardiff branch
drew support from local, small-scale, Welsh firms, while the Manchester
and Glasgow members were primarily William Hill employees. The
West Middlesex branch had something of a balance of employees from local
EC Minutes 14.10.71
2. D.Kruger quoted in Sporting Life 16.2.72.
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firms - especially Don Bruce's own firm - and the national 
companies. Membership in the branches soon grew, and within a couple 
of months had reached the 100 mark in Glasgow and West Middlesex 
and even higher in Manchester. In contrast, London Eastern and 
the Welsh branches gained rather less support.
There was little rest for Sawford. Having formed four branches 
in two weeks, he now responded to interest shown in Liverpool and 
Swansea. In Liverpool, local firms provided most support for the 
union. In particular, the 10O plus betting chain of Connor and Forbes 
provided several members and representatives on the local committee, when 
the branch was formed in April 1972. Similarly, though on a smaller 
scale, the Swansea branch, also formed in April, drew support 
primarily from employees in local firms.
With six branches formed in seven weeks, a framework for 
national expansion had been set. While many members were serviced 
through head office, where branches had been formed it was up to the 
representatives in those areas to look after their membership and provide 
a focus for expansion. By May 1972, TUBE membership had risen to 1500.
Between the middle of April and mid-June, no further branches were 
formed. In part this reflected the importance of not merely expanding 
the union, but to actually achieve something through it and on behalf 
of the members. Recognition by employers not only did not come easily _ 
it seldom came at all. The efforts of TUBE to collectively represent 
the membership were largely a history of successive defeats. Yet again 
the union leadership looked to the law and hoped that registration under 
the IRA 1971 would give them the right to recognition through the 
legal procedures. But until registration was achieved, they had no 
recourse to these legal channels. And against a background of 
rebuffs, voluntary recognition by employers was seldom a live possibility. 
It is not perhaps surprising that the TUBE Executive shelved any further
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plans for branch formation until they could do something more 
effective for the potential membership involved. It is not perhaps 
coincidence that TUBE became registered under the IRA 1971 on 2nd 
June 1972 and that between mid-June and the end of August, a further 
five branches were formed. Two of these branches were London-based.
Both were formed in June and catered for members on either side of 
the Thames: hence they were known as London North and London South.
Both drew support from large London chains; Hector MacDonald in the 
North where there were at least 100 members, and in James Lane Ltd 
in London South who was one of the few employers to have some sympathy 
for TUBE.
Further branches were subsequently formed at the other end of the 
country: in July, the Stockton branch held its inaugural meeting, largely 
comprised of employees from the local betting chain of John Joyce; 
while in August, 1972, the Ladbroke members in Newcastle were 
instrumental in forming a branch which soon had 200 members. Efforts, 
however, to start a branch in Sunderland came to nothing.
This left the main gaps in branch organisation as Yorkshire and 
the Midlands. One of those was largely filled when the Leeds branch 
was started at the beginning of August. With William Hill taking over 
the main Leeds firm of Jack Windsor, interest in the union was strong. 
Claims that meetings held by the branch were attended by upwards of 
150 to 200 people were made at the end of 1972, and without doubt, the 
Leeds branch proved one of the strongest areas of support for TUBE.
This completed the third, and final, phase of branch expansion 
in 1972. During the first twleve months of its existence, TUBE 
had become a national organisation, establishing a succession of active 
branches largely as a response to local demands. Yet, paradoxically,
1972 in other ways proved a particularly unsuccessful year: notably
in gaining acceptance from employers. Apart from two small successes
in Wales, and Don Bruce, TUBE did not gain recognition in any 
bookmaking firm. In some cases, such as with the national companies, 
this was the beginning of long campaigns. In others, the union 
suffered real and disastrous defeats, such as in James Lane, where 
at one time success had seemed a formality. Defeats by individual 
employers in some cases resulted in the collapse of branches, noticeably 
in Wales where there was a foretaste of future fortunes.
Yet the failure of the union to press homo its demands to 
collectively represent its membership cannot merely be related to 
the hostility of the employers. With the rapid organisational 
expansion over such a wide area, internal difficulties soon arose.
Problems of communication between head office and branches were a common 
complaint from local activists, often linked to the apparent inactivity 
of the union. On the other side, Sawford was the only full-time 
employee of the union, and it could scarcely be expected that he should 
service all the thirteen branches effectively, build membership, and 
negotiate with employers. And, again, at the local level, the problems 
of collecting subscriptions, of sustaining paid-up membership, where 
members worked in relatively isolated units, posed real problems in almost 
every branch.
But underlying the organisational difficulties of TUBE, there was 
the crucial question of union democracy. The caretaker Exedutive, 
elected at the very first mass meeting, was scarcely representative of 
the newly expanded membership. Furthermore, during 1972, they had 
struggled to maintain an effective complement. Within three weeks of 
formation, seven of the thirteen-strong Executive had effectively 
dropped out. This left a small hard core, including the three 
officials - Sawford, Kruger and Salkild - who continually sought to 
replenish the ranks through intermittent co-option and the introduction 
of delegates from newly-formed London branches. During 1971-72, 24
. v
different lay representatives, sat on the Executive at various times.
The union rules demanded that elections for the Executive should 
be held in 1972, and the closing date for nominations from the branches 
was set for 31st August 1 9 7 2 . The Council was now to comprise 
16 members plus the three officials: Secretary, Treasurer and Chairman.* 
It was hoped that the holding of elections would enable a more 
effective representation of the provincial branches and thus strengthen 
union organisation. Yet from the start, this could be only partial.
The newly-formed branches in the North East and Leeds were too late to 
make nominations, nor were any forthcoming from W a l e s . T h e  other 
provincial branches did make nominations, however: four from Liverpool, 
two from Scotland, and one from Manchester. Still, the bulk of the 
candidates came from the London branches, who provided sixteen 
nominations.
The elections were held in October 1972 and the results published 
in D e c e m b e r . T h e y  provided an interesting mixture: six of
the seven provincial candidates were elected; Laurie Gilmurray from 
Scotland had topped the poll by a clear margin. At the same time, most 
of the established Executive were re-elected, only Bill Morgan of those 
who had offered themselves for re-election being defeated.
With a new Executive, a national branch structure, and 3,500 
members, TUBE entered a new phase in 1973 where the union could push 
to the forefront the problem of making real gains for the membership.
1. Elections were to be held every four years.
2. At some point in 1971-72, the position of President was replaced by
Chairman.
2. Each branch could make four nominations.
4. Each TUBE member had 16 votes - the same number as seats on the 
Executive. Voting was by postal ballot under the auspices of the 
Electoral Reform Society. See Appendix 2.
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(c) New Policies January 1973 - March 1973: A New Militancy.
There were similar comparisons to be made between the new 
Executive and the one elected the previous year. Firstly, there 
were only two women, Shirley Warren from London North and Carole 
Richardson from London South, just as there had been in September 1971,^  
but now the lack of female representation was greater in proportion than 
it had been twelve months previously. Secondly, with neither of the 
two women employed as counter clerks, the new Executive Council drew 
exclusively on employees from managerial positions. The male- 
managerial dominance on the Executive remained.
Yet the predominance of the major firms diminished. In 1971, 
the four main chains, Ladbrokes, Hills, Corals and City Tote had provided 
eleven of the thirteen strong Executive. Now they only provided 
ten from eighteen. Partly this reflected the influence of the 
provincial branches, particularly Liverpool whose three representatives 
all came from local firms. Yet it can also be seen in the London 
representatives, with candidates working for local London firms.
It was perhaps a reflection of the unions presence in these smaller 
groups.
There were also changes in official positions. Kruger, the
President, resigned on health grounds having suffered a heart attack
in 1972. His deputy in the interim period, Tony Pawle, a LBO
manager with City Tote, also resigned to take up a position in that
( 2 )company's newly created personnel department. They were replaced
by Barney Saville, a prominent member of London Eastern, as the new 
chairman; and by Laurie Gilmurray as vice-chairman. Shirley Warren 
took over the difficult task of treasurer.
Interestingly, both secured high places in the polling list, Warren in 
fact finishing runner up to Gilmurray.
2. Kruger was given a promotion to administer the new pension scheme.
-2 44  ■
The new Executive determined that results should be achieved - 
and quickly. At the first meeting in January, "Union Policy" was 
added to the proposed agenda and involved a far-reaching discussion 
of both the internal and external problems of TUBE. In consequence, 
three key areas were identified: the consolidation of membership; 
union organisation; and strategy towards employers and attempts at 
recognition.
The first two of these objectives implied a consolidation of the 
progress of the previous year: a continuation of branch formation 
on the one hand and maintaining existing membership on the other. Here 
union organisation was weak. Sawford, the only full-time official, 
was largely responsible for servicing all the branches - an impossible 
task - and undertaking the administration of the union. Continued 
branch formation and maintenance also implied an expanded administrative 
structure.
In the early months of 1973, the gaps of the previous year of expansion 
were largely filled. In December 1972 there was a dispute in Hull 
between William Hill and local employees and Sawford was called in by 
the employees to back them up. The dispute concerned the non-payment 
of a traditional Christmas bonus, and following a stoppage on Boxing Day 
the Hill's employees were successful. In early January, a local 
branch was formed - the final stage in the TUBE expansion into the 
North-East and Yorkshire.
In 1972, the Midlands had proved a particularly unsuccessful area 
for TUBE. As far back as October 1971, TUBE had tried to form a 
branch in Birmingham and while during 1972 support had developed amongst 
the J.Coral staff, even in October 1972 efforts to establish a branch 
in Wolverhampton failed. Only in December 1972 was a Birmingham branch 
formed. And in February 1973 it was closely followed by a new branch 
for the Coventry area.
For the remaining branch expansion, it was now a question 
of mopping up lesser areas. Requests for branches, for membership, 
had come in from smaller areas e.g. Cornwall, Devon, East Anglia, 
and Oxford. In these areas membership potential was small and 
Sawford was unwilling to give any substantial time to these groups 
at the expense of larger urban areas. But where membership did 
rise above a few isolated employees, Sawford was to be prepared to 
form branches. In January 1973, three new ones were added, Portsmouth, 
Bristol and Blackpool.
The question of administration was now posed more strongly.
Sawford demanded more assistance from his new Executive. And they 
responded by establishing three positions of area officials to assist 
in servicing the membership and the branches; and by giving priority 
to new union offices and secretarial support for Sawford.
Between them, the three area officials were to cover England,
Scotland, and Wales. Dividing the country into three areas, the
Executive invited the branches to nominate candidates by mid-February.^
The Executive would appoint from these nominations. While there were
eight candidates, five had applied for the Area 2 position - from Carlisle
to Birmingham. The one who proved eventually successful was Sawford's
( 2)protege, Andrew Long,the Leeds Branch Secretary. In Area 1,
the northern region, the Executive appointed the only applicant, Walter 
Lavery who had been active in the NUM for twelve years before entering 
the betting industry. Unfortunately, the Executive could not 
immediately fill the Southern position, although shortly afterwards,
John Hobbs, a new member of the Executive, took on the job. 1
1. The precise areas to be covered were: "(1) Newcastle, Stockton and 
all areas north of Carlisle including the whole of Scotland, (2) South of 
Carlisle including Liverpool and up to and including Birmingham. (3)
South of Birmingham including the London area, Bristol, and South Wales." 
EC Minutes 21.1.73.
2. It will be remembered Leeds were not represented on the Executive.
This provided Sawford with support around the country. The 
central administration stillremained, and in January the Executive 
voted Sawford a 'girl Friday'. Yet this necessarily hung fire
until union offices were found. Sawford still worked from his
home, while using Don Bruce's offices as a formal address. Various 
efforts to secure offices had come to nothing and while the new Executive 
made union offices a top priority it proved a long time before anything 
was finally achieved. In April 1973, the Executive even went as far 
as appointing an office manager - Barney Saville - to take effect when 
offices became available.
This three months saw a conscious change in TUBE policy towards 
employers. The new Executive were ambitious: they had shown this
in their approach to strengthening the organisation of TUBE. But 
they desperately wanted to achieve success with employers: and to 
this end were prepared to support a more militant line than their 
predecessors.
The central focus at this time were the two major firms, William 
Hill and Ladbrokes. In December 1972, William Hill employees at Hull 
had successfully staged a one-day stoppage. On 3rd February 1973, 
William Hill employees stopped work in Manchester, Coventry, and 
Yorkshire in an effort to secure better conditions. The Executive 
were willing to support this line, culminating in proposed national 
stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes at the end of March.
However, only one stoppage actually took place, that in Ladbrokes. 
Here the support was patchy: while the North-East solidly supported
the withdrawal of labour, the response in London was immensely 
disappointing with most Ladbroke employees working normally. In 
between, in the Midlands, there were partial successes: some sixteen
LBOs remained open in Birmingham indicating that while the majority of 
employees had joined the stoppage, a substantial minority had worked
normally. On the whole, the Ladbroke stoppage had failed.
Far from demonstrating a general solidarity, the uneven response 
of the membership highlighted their divisions.
It was scarcely a good omen for the planned stoppage in 
William Hill the following Saturday. Already, the reality of a 
C.I.R. investigation had undermined TUBE policy towards industrial 
action*^; now the Ladbrokes stoppage had proved disappointing, 
posing another query over this course of action. Finally, Sawford 
received the results of the ballot of William Hill members, which did 
not give encouraging support for industrial action. Three days before 
the proposed stoppage,Sawford, on his own initiative, entered negotiations 
with the managing director of William Hill, Sam Burns, with the assistance 
of the Department of Employment. The Company were prepared to concede 
a five day week plus extra payment for bank holiday working if the 
stoppage was called off. Sawford agreed.
The failure of the national stoppages was a major disappointment 
after the optimism of the Executive earlier in the year. But why did 
it fail? Within TUBE, two distinct positions adopted differing 
perspectives: the first put the main blame on the poor organisation 
of the stoppages; the second suggested the apathy of the rank and file 
was the major reason.
Prominent amongst the advocates of the first explanation were 
the Newcastle branch, who had proved the strongest supporters of the 
Ladbroke stoppage, despite only coming out on the instructions of the 
Executive, and not because of any local grievances. David Patterson,
1. See Ch. for a detailed discussion of this question.
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the Branch Secretary, sent, strongly worded letters to the Executive 
immediately after the stoppage indicating that the Ladbroke 
members were " .... disgusted at the fact that they had been misled", 
and criticising the lack of information they had received prior to 
the stoppage. ^  Patterson then circulated the Branch Secretaries 
of the union canvassing support for the Newcastle members who believed
the "poor response" to the stoppage was due to the "lack of
( 2 )communication between London and the branches".
What the Newcastle members felt was subsequently echoed by 
others, including Don Bruce who was closely involved in the early stages 
of this campaign:
"I laid down the plan of action. Four days before, I found 
things were not at all as had been presented. It was 
a tragedy because the means was there". (3)
These explanations of the union's defeat clearly placed the blame 
on those organising the stoppages, not on those participating in them. 
Sawford, as General Secretary, was naturally the prime target. The 
responsibility for co-ordinating the stoppages was his and at the 
April meeting of the Executive he was heavily criticised for the 
mishandling of the Ladbroke stoppage and his initiative in calling off 
the Hills stoppage -contrary to the instructions of the Executive.
Sawford, however, was unwilling to accept the blame for the poor 
response to the stoppages. Contradicting Bruce and the Newcastle 
members, Sawford sought to explain the defeat in terms of the apathy 
of the members. On 18th April, 1973, he wrote to Patterson, commenting 
on the attitude of the Newcastle members:
1. Letter D.Patterson to George Sawford 29.3.73.
2. D.Patterson to R.Cowern 1.4.73. Significantly Sawford also received 
complaints about the organisation of the Ladbroke stoppage from London. 
See Letter C.Cousins to George Sawford 28.3.73.
2. Interview D.Bruce 20.2.76.
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"The EC can understand the feelings of your members who 
took part in the one day strike and are amazed at the 
apathy shown by Ladbroke employees." (1)
This particular response was part of a more general view held
by Sawford, for instance, in the general comment "people in this
( 2 )industry associate unions with strikes." It is a view of the
membership which questions their commitment to trade unionism, 
indicating the general source of failure for TUBE'S policies 
within the rank and file.
As such it directly contrasts with the explanation of defeat in 
terms of 'poor organisation', which conversely implies the willingness 
of the rank and file to take industrial action in certain situations.
Either explanation of the failure of TUBE'S early campaigns in 
1973 can only be partial. In particular the causes of defeat were 
not entirely internal . For the moment, however, the significance 
of the defeats and their divisive impact within the union must be 
noted. They stand out as the beginning of TUBE'S decline.
(d) Decline ;March 1973-September 1973: the collapse of the branch structure 
In a period of six months, TUBE suffered substantial loss in 
membership and a collapse of the branch structure, so optimistically 
and enthusiastically developed in the previous one and half years.
The most striking feature of the decline of branch organisation 
was its generality. All branches were affected, and many collapsed 
entirely. Some, such as those in Wales, were relatively small branches, 
but others included major areas of support and were among the earliest 
TUBE branches.
1. Letter George Sawford to David Patterson 18.4.73.
2. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74.
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By Juno 1973, therefore, not only had support in Cardiff,
Blackpool and Coventry dwindled, but the strongholds of Birmingham 
Newcastle, Manchester, and Scotland had become major casualties.
By September 1973, Swansea and Stockton could be added to the list, 
while the London branches were also suffering. In fact, by this 
time it would not be unfair to describe TUBE as comprising relatively 
isolated firm-based branches with little scope for the general solidarity 
which had developed early in the year.
The decline of branch organisation can be understood in terms of 
membership composition: on the one side, the branch drawing almost 
exclusively on members from national companies; on the other, where 
membership was entirely based on local firms; and, finally, the hybrid 
model, where membership was sustained in both local and national firms.
As examples of each type, the branches in Scotland, Manchester, and 
Wales are considered. Most typical of the first was Scotland, where 
William Hill employees dominated. While William Hill employees were 
also prominent in Manchester, support within the branch simultaneously 
derived from local firms, and provides a good example of the hybrid 
branch. Finally, the Welsh branches again illustrate most clearly 
the problems of local dependency.
The membership in Scotland had spent most of 1972 waiting for 
something to happen. For branches based on national firms could make 
little inroads locally - success depended on a co-ordinated national 
effort, including in this case, William Hill branches in other parts 
of Britain. Following the elections of 1972, Scotland now had two 
representatives on the Executive : Laurie Gilmurray and Stuart 
Montgomery, both influential in the new emphasis in TUBE policy.
The potential for action now seemed to be there and it become a reality 
with the February stoppage in Leeds, Manchester, and the Midlands and 
the proposed Grand National Day stoppage that March.
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llowever the events of that second stoppage found little favour 
in Scotland. While the precipitate action of Sawford in calling 
off the strike was criticised on the Executive, the terms of this 
agreement with Burns was sufficient to induce criticism from the 
Scottish membership. Sawford, they believed, had endorsed 
differential rates of pay between London, the Provinces, and Scotland; 
with Scotland having the lowest rate. ^
Twelve months of waiting had produced little for the Glasgow 
Branch; and the disappointment appears to have rubbed off on the 
activists too. Neither Gilmurray nor Montgomery attended the Executive 
meeting in April to discuss the aftermath of the stoppages. In fact, 
Montgomery, who like Gilmurray had attended the Executive meetings in 
January and February, now withdrew from the Executive. While locally 
Gilmurray tried to maintain support in the union, dues were not 
forthcoming. And when Gilmurray was dismissed by William Hill
at the end of May, he had already made plans to open his own LBO, thus 
resolving his own individual problem. By then, the branch in Glasgow 
had disintegrated.
While the story at Manchester was somewhat similar, it was rather 
more complex. Here the membership had been actively involved in the 
February stoppage in William Hill. Hero also, TUBE had been close to 
success in gaining recognition from local companies. And, at the end 
of 1972, Manchester had seemed one of the most promising branches.
Yet within four months everything had gone sour. While in 
December 1972 and January 1973, 90 new members had been recruited 
in the Manchester area, by April 1973 Sawford was concerned that few had 
continued to pay subscriptions. While in February, the William Hill
Letter Anon to George Sawford 30.3.73.
2. On 1.4.73 the Glasgow Branch account was the only overdrawn branch 
account in TUBE - a reflection of the lack of subs paid. It will also be 
remembered that members of the branch had complained about paying dues in 
1972.
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THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES
40 High Street, Ruislip H A4 7AN 
Téléphoné: 01-841 0916
Minimum Wage Scale fo r  Bookmakers Employees w orking in the London Area -  July 1973
MANAGERS
Shop Taking: Number iaf Slips: 5 day 37% hours: 6 day 45 hours: Hourly Rate
Up to:— €1,500 Up to :— 2,000 £31.87 £41.44 £0.85
1,500- £2,000 2,000 - 2,500 £33.76 £43.88 £0.90
2.000 - £2,500 2,500 - 3,250 £37.50 £48.75 £1.00
2,500 - £3,000 3,250 - 3,750 £39.37 £51.19 £1.05
3.000- £3,500 3,750 - 4,500 £41.25 £53.63 £1.10
3.500 - £4,000 4,500 - 5,000 £43.12 £56.06 £1.15
4.000- £4,500 5,000 - 5,750 £45.00 £58.50 £1.20
4.500 - £5,000 5 ,7 5 0 - 6,250 £46.87 £60.94 £1.25
5,000- £5,500 6,250 - 6,750 £48.75 £63.38 £1.30
5.500 - £6,000 6,750 - 7,500 £50.62 £65.81 £1.35
6.000 - £6,500 7,500 - 8,000 £52.50 £68.25 £1.40
6.500 - £7,000 8,000 - 8,750 £54.38 £70.69 £1.45
Over £7,000 Over 8,750 £56.25 £73.13 £1.50
To compute Cash or Slip ceiling:—  Take the best 13 consecutive weekly period during the Flat season. 
Grades may be achieved by either Shop takings or the number of Slips taken during a Six day week.
SETTLERS
Trainee
Up to Age 20 £24.37 £31.69 £0.65
20 up to 23 £26.25 £34.13 £0.70
23 up to 26 £28.12 £36.56 £0.75
Qualified settlers S.P. £31.87 £41.44 £0.85
'  'alified settlers Credit £33.76
COUNTERHANDS
£43.88 £0.90
Trainee £18.75 £24.38 £0.50
Qualified up to 2 years service £24.38 £31.69 £0.65
2 -  3 years continual service ... £26.25 £34.12 £0.70
3 - 5  years continual service ... £28.13
BOARDMEN -  BOARDWOMEN
£36.56 £0.75
Trainee £18.75 £24.38 £0.50
Qualified up to 2 years service 
2 - 3  years continual service
£22.50 £29.25 £0.60
£24.38 £31.69 £0.65
3 - 5  years continual service £26.25 £34.12 £0.70
employees to receive Three weeks Annual Holiday (2 Summer &  1 Winter)
3 years continual service Four Weeks Annual Holiday (2 Summer & 2 Winter)
^  1 overtime to be paid at Time & One Half
Employees working over 21 hours weekly are entitled to  Holidays as above.
CAMERA TECHNICIANS, SECURITY STAFF AND COURIERS
As ,he duties vary so much in each company rates of pay and specific duties w ill be published according to the various
companies operating.
RACING TELEPHONISTS (Not settling) Rates as per Counterhands.
PR0VINCIAL RATES ARE AW AITIN G  R ATIF IC ATIO N  BY PR O VIN C IAL BRANCHES.
employees had closed 50 LBOs by June, the leading activists, Ken
Wheeler and Dave Wagstaffe had dropped out, with branch subscriptions
totalling only £20. And while at the beginning of 1973, recognition
had seemed possible in the local firms of Fred Booth Ltd and Foy Bros
Ltd, within a few months these hopes had been dashed - in the latter
despite a successful Agency Shop ballot. ^  As Jack Rashman, the
Branch Chairman, later recalled:
"The Manchester members slowly became disenchanted.
Andrew Long did nothing. Dave Wagstaff chucked it in.
All did, felt they were getting nowhere. The branch 
folded. I remained a member, but the branch ceased to 
function. (2).
At least Manchester knew that full-time organisers existed: 
in Wales the isolation was even more pronounced. In the expansion 
of TUBE Wales had provided the extremes of success and failure for the 
union, largely attributable to the dependence of the branches on local 
firms. Two branches, out of the four, survived into 1973. Of these, 
Cardiff appeared the strongest.
At the beginning of 1973, Cardiff seemed likely to enjoy further 
success. Recruiting substantially in Derek Pugh Ltd, which employed 
approximately 40 staff, Sawford approached the Management in early 
February, demanding an Agency Shop Agreement thus building on the 
representational rights secured previously . Agreement was reached 
that the employees should be ballotted. In the meantime, the Cardiff 
branch suffered two setbacks. In March, Brian Stephens, the Branch 
Secretary, left the industry to become a meter reader, thus resigning 
his union position. And later that month, some TUBE members in
1.
2 .
See below, Ch.6.
Interview,j.Rashman. 5.8.76.
Derek Pugh notified Sawford that they were leaving the union.^
By the time the ballot preparations had been made and ballot run 
it was June. In those four months, membership had declined by 50% 
and TUBE failed to gain the required number of votes. And the Cardiff 
branch merely faded away.
In Swansea, it was a little different. Mere, activity was 
negligible and only the predominantly female employees at Val Jones 
Ltd maintained TUBE'S presence. Isolated from the main body of the
union, they were unaware, until September 1973, that they were "covered" 
by an area organiser. And this they only discovered when Pauline 
Player, their leading activist, informed Sawford that membership had 
dwindled and that she herself was leaving to start a family. Even
Sawford was forced to admit that TUBE had neglected the branch "rather 
( 2 )badly".
These three examples show the generality of decline, both across
large branches, such as Manchester, and small ones, such as Swansea;
across those drawing membership largely from national firms, such as
Glasgow, and those dependent on local employers, as in Cardiff.
By the time Pauline Player wrote announcing the final collapse of the
Swansea branch, TUBE had been reduced to little more than a basic shell.
Some support remained in Leeds and Hull among the William Hill
Organisation employees; but elsewhere branches depended on "success"
in local firms, such as Connor and Forbes in Liverpool, Hector MacDonald
in London North, and Ken Munden in London South.
This period of decline was accompanied by an increasing reliance
on the legal provisions for gaining recognition. The period of near
total dependence was yet to come, but at this stage, two cases, that of 1
1. Though not because they did not think the industry needed a union. 
Their reasoning was entirely based on their view of their employer: "This 
boss is one in a million, but if I ever left this firm I would like to 
rejoin TUBE". Letter B.Halter to George Sawford 27.3.73.
2 . Letter George Sawford to Pauline Player, 9.9.73.
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Connor and Forbes in Liverpool and the national reference in 
William Hill were being investigated by the CIR. ^  * Although
the legal process was proving a long haul, by the summer of 1973, 
success in Connor and Forbes seemed highly probable. This was 
in contrast to the apparent defeat of more militant tactics in 
Ladbrokes and William Hill.
In consequence, by the Autumn of 1973, TUBE had embarked on a 
new policy direction from that developed by the fresh enthusiasm of 
the newly elected Executive. The decline of branch organisation 
underlied the new focus on firms, reinforced by the attentions of 
the CIR.; the failure of the stoppages had meant the defeat of 
militant policies and with the favourable response of the CIR, the 
legal road to recognition now seemed unquestioned.
The decline in this phase necessarily generated conflicts 
within the union - conflicts which had appeared incoherently throughout 
1972, but were now fought out with vehemence and bitterness on the 
Executive itself. The changes in policy were not achieved without 
internal struggles within the union.
The challenges to the Executive in 1972 and the expression of 
oppositional tendencies on the Executive in 1973 had not merely embodied 
policies, such as the more militant approach to recognition; they 
simultaneously involved questions of union democracy. And with the 
failure of the stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes, questions of 
union democracy now came to the forefront. Initially, the focus had 
been the handling of both disputes by Sawford: his unconstitutional 
negotiations with William Hill and his mishandling of the Ladbrokes 
stoppages were both sources of discontent amongst many members of the 
Executive. 1
1- The precise course of the legal recognition process is set out in Ch. 8 
where the whole relationship between the law on recognition and trade 
union organisation is discussed. Basically, the CIR performed an invest­
igating function on behalf of the NIRC, who had the legal jurisdiction 
of making decisions on recognition cases.
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Such criticisms had been raised at the April Executive
meeting. And, at the same meeting,questions were also raised
about the positions and attendance of the two vice-presidents, Don Bruce
and Tom Chapman. Both, it will be remembered, had been appointed
to those offices by the caretaker Executive in 1971. Some of the
newer members were unimpressed. Shirley Warren, a main focus of
oppositional support, on Don Bruce:
"I was deeply opposed to having a bookmaker on our EC - 
he may have helped start the union, but no way could I 
see how he could sit on the EC. Under no circumstances 
would I accept this. You can't be on both sides". (1)
Her criticism of Bruce concerned his position as an employer;
that of Chapman centred on his personal qualities, echoed elsewhere
on the Executive. Fred Martin, co-opted at the April meeting:
"Most of the time Tom Chapman seemed drunk, fie talked 
nonsense and his mind wandered". (2)
At the time, there was only a partial victory for Warren and 
Martin. While the Executive decided unanimously that they themselves 
had the sole right to invite guests, a proposal to invite both 
Chapman and Bruce to the next meeting was carried.
The continued presence of Bruce in the affairs of TUBE was not 
decided by the activities of his opponents on the Executive; his fate 
was sealed by the CIR. Investigating the Connor and Forbes 
reference, they suggested that the presence of Bruce, as an employer, 
on the Executive raised doubts about the independance of the union.
These misgivings were expressed in the draft report' on Connor and Forbes 
in mid-June. At the Executive meeting on 1st July 1971, Bruce's 
resignation from TUBE was announced and accepted.
Interview S. Warren 24.8.76.
2 . Interview F.Martin, 10.6.75
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By this time, the decline of the union brought many issues 
sharply into focus: two immediate concerns were the loss of many 
activists, including Executive members, and the rapidly deteriorating 
financial position of the union. By the July meeting, only eight 
of the original eighteen members of the Executive remained and again 
co-option was continually used to bring numbers up to strength - 
increasingly so, as branches collapsed and many activists became 
disillusioned. With the disintegration of the branches, membership 
also fell away, and thus financial problems rapidly emerged. While 
at the end of 1972, TUBE was holding its own,by August 1973 the 
union was more than £4,000 in debt, with current expenditure exceeding 
current income.
Such influences tended to bring support to Sawford's position: 
the declining branch organisation weakened the position of several 
EC members, while the worsening financial position emphasised the 
need for strong, centralised leadership. And, just as the use of 
the legal machinery had served to reinforce tendencies towards the collapse 
of branch organisation, so it now exerted a centralising influence on 
the distribution of power within the union, through reinforcing the 
control of recognition policy in the hands of the central leadership 
in general and the General Secretary and administration in particular.
So that when, in July, Sawford was criticised within the 
Executive on a wide variety of issues, the forces within the union were 
running in his favour. The criticisms were wideranging: Shirley
Warren claimed the minutes of the April meeting had misrepresented her 
position and that of her branch over the question of the attendance of 
Bruce and Chapman; John Hobbs raised the question of Sawford's 
inactivity in the representation of members in his branch who had been 
dismissed by their employers; Mick Levy proposed a motion of censure 
for Sawford's action in defending a non-TUBE member at an industrial
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tribunal. Furthermore, Sawford had to argue his case for
recommending the dismissal of Walter Lavery, the full-time organiser for
the North-East and Scotland, which the Executive were reluctant to
( 1)accept.
Sawford managed to parry the criticisms, and then launched a 
counter attack by threatening to resign. It produced a dilemma for 
his critics: Shirley Warren:
"George was always telling you how nice the employers are.
You lose faith in a man who seems to believe what Guv'nors 
tell you, but there was no feasible alternative to
George Sawford". (2)
The uncertainty as to whether Sawford would remain lasted until 
the next Executive meeting in August - to be held in the new union 
offices in Don Bruce's premises at Ruislip. Here Tom Chapman made 
his comeback; addressing the meeting he announced his refusal to 
accept Sawford's resignation. Sawford's grievances concerned the 
lack of support he received from the London members of the Executive, 
and the financial drain on his personal resources. The Executive had 
little option but to give support in this direction. In a vote of 
confidence in Sawford, only Shirley Warren voted against. With Sawford 
agreeing to continue, Chapman demanded Shirley Warrens' resignation 
as treasurer.
It is important to see how these shifts in power at the national 
level of the union reflected the changes in the overall pattern of 
union organisation. The declining strength of oppositional elements 
within the Executive reflected the deteriorating branch organisation. 
Furthermore, the focus of attention had now swung firmly on to the legal 
possibilities, for the recommendation by the CIR that Connor and Forbes 1
1. Lavery had been particularly unfortunate. Having successfully 
organised an almost total stoppage in the North-East in Ladbrokes that 
March, he now found himself with a disillusioned and increasingly apathetic 
membership.
2. Interview s.Warren 24 . 8 . 76 .
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should recognise TUBE was made public on 2nd August. It is 
significant that Sawford's account at the Executive meeting on 12th 
August of the current state of play in recognition attempts was 
almost entirely within the framework of the use, actual or potential, 
of the legal provisions.
This direction of policy was made explicit in a newsletter, 
prepared at the beginning of September 1973 for distribution to the 
branches. Here the achievements of TUBE'S two year history wore 
set out:
"The satisfactory completion of many wrongful dismissal 
cases, the CIR inquiries, the recognition issues and 
Agency Shop Agreements arc just a small part of what TUBE 
is doing on your behalf". (1)
A small part? Surely not. It was indeed significant that
only these specific activities are mentioned. Future policy was 
clearly spelt out:
"It has been decided that in the coming months your Executive 
will concentrate all their endeavours to obtaining recognition 
and Agency Shop Agreements on a selective basis rather than 
throughout the country at one and the same time." (2)
While not expressed specifically in terms of the IRA 1971, the
emphasis was clear. Achieving recogni l ion on a selective basis
meant through the legislative procedures. Past success and future
policy were seen respectively in terms of legislative activity and
possibilities.
The voices of opposition on the EC had never represented a majority 
position nor had they presented themselves as an organised alternative 
to the position of Sawford and his supporters. With their basis of
support being continually undermined, Shirley Warren's resignation as
_ (3)Treasurer, was only a matter of time.
TUBE Newsletter September 1973.
2. ibid.
3. She still remained a member of the Executive Council.
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All the key positions on the EC were now held by Sawford's 
supporters and it left the one remaining office holder with 
dissenting views, John Hobbs, in an increasingly exposed position.
Sawford regarded the August meeting as a turning point.
Shortly afterwards he wrote to Dave Dyster, who had just resigned 
his position on the EC having secured employment outside of the 
bookmaking industry:
"After Sunday's meeting, I am still Secretary and for the 
very first time, the EC got down to some serious business 
and planning for the future instead of the petty arguments 
that have arisen in the past". (1)
And Sawford, increasingly unimpressed with the performance of 
John Hobbs as an area organiser, decided to remove this particular 
obstacle to "planning for the future". Hobbs was dismissed by 
Sawford on 12th September.
But this dismissal would bring the TUBE Executive Into its most 
serious crisis. And it would involve a new issue which focussed on 
TUBE'S survival as an independent union. That issue was the question 
of amalgamation.
(e) The Road to Amalgamation: September 1973 - September 1974.
The most significant feature of the phase of TUBE'S history 
leading to amalgamation concerned the non-reversability of the decline 
of branch organisation and membership, experienced in the middle 
months of 1973. If anything, the situation became worse. By the 
beginning of 1974 only three sound branches remained: London South,
effectively organising the Ken Munden employees; Liverpool, where the 
Connor and Forbes workers still battled for recognition; and Hull, 
where Ron Grantham maintained solid membership <-mong his William Hill member
1. Letter George Sawford to D. Dyster 19.8.73.
Elsewhere, the position had deteriorated. West Middlesex
and London North suffered both from setbacks with local employers 
and the divisions nationally within the union; Birmingham, although 
reformed in November 1973, soon became little more than a shell; 
in the North, the Manchester Branch survived only in terms of the 
membership in Seymour and Story; while the once strong Leeds 
branch, at one time having 400 members, fell as low as eighteen 
members in 1974.^ In the North-East, local defeats in Newcastle 
virtually finished off the remnants of membership there, although 
Stockton eventually emerged victorious in their struggle with John 
Joyce. And while employees in Scotland and Wales expressed an 
interest in TUBE, the branches in these areas no longer functioned.
In consequence, TUBE was plunged into a severe organisational 
and financial crisis. That the union could effectively represent 
and pursue the interests of its members was now called into question. 
Only two full-time officers remained: Sawford in London and
Andrew Long in Leeds. The task of reconstructing union branches 
and maintaining them demanded a more substantial back-up structure 
than this. Organisationally TUBE had immense problems.
Any plans to expand the number of full-time organisers, and 
at the end of 1973 and beginning of 1974, the TUBE Executive were 
considering just this possibility, immediately floundered on the 
problems of finance. Again, for TUBE, the Catch-22 position: to
increase membership full-time organisers are needed; yet in order 
to employ full-time organisers money is needed to pay salaries - and 
money has to come from subscriptions. 1
1. Interview A. Long 19.5.75.
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Aware of the weak financial position of the union, the 
Executive had appointed a finance sub-committee in August 1973 
in an effort to put TUBE on a viable financial basis. Yet the 
financial position became even worse. At that time TUBE'S 
deficit stood at £4,000. Within twelve months that figure had 
reached £10,000. Expenditure was always in excess of income: 
many membership dues were not collected while those that were 
remained insufficient to sustain the union.
These interrelated features, the collapse of membership and 
branch organisation and financial insolvency, were the immediate 
pressures which pushed TUBE towards amalgamation. But, in addition, 
these problems were exacerbated by the failure of union policies and 
the internal divisions which developed.
Towards the end of 1973, a major conflict occurred on the 
Executive concerning Sawford's dismissal of John Hobbs, the area 
organiser for Southern England. This decision arose, in part, from 
Sawford's decision to rely on the processes of the legal recognition 
procedure, placing his hopes in the CIR. Hobbs was scarcely paying 
his way as an organiser and Sawford felt this was not adequate.
However, Sawford took this decision irrespective of the Executive, 
not even consulting them before the dismissal. In consequence, 
there was an immediate polarisation on the Executive, with most of the 
dwindling number of members siding with Hobbs. This dispute was 
the flashpoint for long standing differences to surface. Barney
Savillo, now TUBE Chairman and long-time Sawford supporter, emerged 
as the principal advocate of Hobbs' position and generalised the 
issue into an overall attack on Sawford's performance as TUBE General 
Secretary. Hobbs himself had taken a militant position on the way 
forward for TUBE, arguing industrial action rather than legal
procedures: he thus received support from the remaining oppositional
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The dispute within the TUBE leadership over the John Hobbs dismissal: the 
Chairman orders the Secretary to ensure the union offices are available for use

elements on the Executive as well as those from the London Branches in
which he had been most involved: London North and West Middlesex.
Sawford, at this time, was relatively isolated. Yet the strength 
of support for Hobbs soon began to crumble. Barney Saville decided 
to leave the union in the midst of the dispute in October 1973, while 
Hobbs made injudicious statements to members of his own branch and 
the Executive. ^  Eventually, in November 1973, the Executive 
reprimanded Sawford for the way he had handled the affair, but 
nevertheless confirmed that his judgement was correct in dismissing 
Hobbs.
This whole affair had lasted two months; and if in fact, the 
appeal by Hobbs is also considered, it was March 1974 before the issue 
was finally resolved. Valuable time had been spent on internal disputes 
while the union struggled to survive. More directly, the dismissal of 
John Hobbs substantially contributed to the decline of the West Middlesex 
and London North branches from where he had received strong support.
Meanwhile, the policy of recasting branch structures in terms of 
firm based units, to make the most effective use of CIR investigations, 
was under test. Between mid-September and mid-October, the NIRC 
referred six recognition cases involving TUBE to the CIR. Some were 
successful, such as the John Joyce and Ken Munden references, providing 
a boost for the membership in Stockton and London South respectively. 
Others gave TUBE little encouragement and unfavourable reports from the 
CIR tended to be associated with the collapse of local support, as in 
Roland Jones Ltd in Blackpool and Ken Hailes Ltd in Newcastle. And 
since these branches were now primarily firm-based, it also meant the 
collapse of local branch organisation.
While the results of CIR investigations were equivocal for TUBE 
at a local level, nationally Sawford and the Executive became
Statements in which he placed his own interests before those of the 
union.
increasingly dependent on the CIR. On one hand, the deterioration 
of branch structure and worsening financial position, made the 
alternatives that much harder, while, on the other, the CIR could 
dangle the very lucrative carrot of a favourable report on William 
Hill. Yet the CIR were reluctant to back TUBE on such a major 
reference as William Hill without guarantees that TUBE could be a 
viable organisation to represent the 3,000 William Hill employees.
The demands the CIR made were ones TUBE would struggle to meet, 
including, as they did, a 3-month period of financial stability and 
the successful reformation of three key branches.
In fact, the CIR were consciously, through delicately, pushing 
TUBE towards an amalgamation with the TGWU. This, in turn, matched 
an internal pressure within TUBE itself, expressed officially for 
the first time in June 1973 that they should seek to amalgamate with 
another union. At that time, London Eastern had passed a motion 
recommending a merger with ASTMS. The representatives from this 
branch, Fred Martin and Barney Saville, continued to advocate this 
position within the Executive where they gained further support from 
Shirley Warren and John Hobbs.
Sawford was strongly opposed. During the John Hobbs dispute, 
he tried to isolate Saville, Hobbs and Warren as a "splinter group ... 
active in trying to get TUBE swallowed by one of the big unions".^ 
But as TUBE'S fortunes failed to improve, even Sawford, now personally 
deeply in debt through the lack of money to pay his wages, began to 
accept the necessity of amalgamation. Alan Schooler, the CIR
Commissioner in charge of the bookmaking references, set up a contact
( 2)for Sawford in the TGWU,
1. Letter George Sawford to EC members 26.9.73.
2. See below, ch.% for a full discussion of the influential role of 
the CIR in promoting this amalgamation.
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T H E UNION OF BOOKM AKERS EM P LO Y EES
4 8  PINNER R O AD , H A R R O W , M ID D L E S E X
General Socretary : G. S AW F O R D
10 l.T-HH IT MAI CONCERN.
I hereby certify that I vas the Scrutineer at 40,High Street, Ruislip on 
Tuesday 2nd July, 1974 when the count of the Postal Ballot concerning the 
resolution n That T.U.3.E. transfer it's engagements to T & G.W.U. in accordance 
■<dth the terns set out in the Instrument" vas conducted.
The result was as follows
Total Voting Papers received 482
'■ favour of the Resolution 474
''-■"St the Resolution 8
spoiled Papers jiil
Total 482
¿he Resolution vas carried vith a majority of 4Ó6 votes.
Signed . J . A . F r a t t .......................
of Nunn & Nunn,
Chartered Accountants, 
10,College Road, 
Harrow, Middlesex.
Registered Trade Union under the Industrial Trade Act 0516T
Events now moved along fairly quickly. On 3rd February 1974, 
an emergency meeting of the Executive took place. In the morning 
they were addressed by Moss Evans, then National Organiser of the 
TGWU, who outlined the benefits of amalgamation. In the afternoon 
they heard the gloomy financial position: debts in excess of £7,000
with Sawford now unpaid since October 1973. The Executive unanimously 
decided to pursue the possibilities of amalgamation. At the 
beginning of March, a draft agreement on amalgamation, drawn up by the 
TGWU, was circulated to the Executive. A final meeting was arranged 
for March 31st at Transport House where the members of the Executive 
would take a firm decision on amalgamation.
However, the position that month soon became more complicated.
TUBE was now also courted by APEX, who in a very short space of time 
also drew up a draft agreement on amalgamation including various 
guarantees for TUBE'S continued independence within the APEX structure. 
It was not an option seriously considered by the TUBE Executive, however 
On 31st March 1973, the decision to join the TGWU was overwhelmingly 
supported by 15 votes to 1. ^
This decision still had to be confirmed by the membership. A 
postal ballot was held in June 1974 of existing members and gives 
some indication of how the union had declined, with less than 500 
members voting. The result was nearly unanimous with the Executive 
decision confirmed by 474 votes to 8. On August 14th, 1974, TUBE 
formally became part of the TGWU.
1. The only dissenter was F. Martin who voted to amalgamate with ASTMS
INSTRUM EN T
This instrument of transfer of engagements of the Union of Bookmakers Employees 
hereinafter called T .U .B .E . to the Transport and General Workers Union herein­
after called T. & G .W .U . shall i f  duly approved by a resolution o f the members 
of T.U.B.E. take effect on the date of registration o f this instrument. Upon the 
coming into operation of the instrument the members of T«U . B .£ • wi II become 
members of the T .& .G .W .U . and be subject to that Union's rules, copies of which 
can be inspected on application to Branch Secretaries or the Head O ffice of T .U .B .E .
T.U.B.E. shall become a section of the T. & G .W .U . as part o f the A .C .T .S . 
group of that Union and shall be known as the T.U.B.E. section. The Branches of 
T .U.B.E. shall continue to operate as Branches of the T. & .G .W .U . and w ill be 
entitled to the assistance of the full time officials of T. & G .W .U . as necessary.
Members of T .U .B .E . shall contribute to Scale 1 of the T. & G .W .U . Member­
ship of T.U .B.E . and the T. & G .V /.U . shall be regarded as continuous and 
members in compliance for benefit with T.U .B .E . shall immediately be in compliance 
for benefits in Scale 1 of the T. & G .W .U . The contributions and benefits payable 
under Scale 1 are scheduled to this instrument. Arrears of contributions due to 
T.U.B.E. at the date o f transfer shall be carried forward and become due to the
T. & G .W .U .
A ll property and assets of T.U .B.E . shall vest in the Trustees of T. & G .W .U . as 
at the date that this instrument comes into effect, and the T. & G .W .U . shall 
assume responsibility for the liabilities of T .U.B.E.
The present full time officers of T.U.B.E. shall become officers of T. & G .W .U . 
on terms no less favourable than those applying immediately before the transfer takes 
effect.
Members of T.U .B.E . may obtain exemption from payment to the po litica l fund of 
the T. & G .W .U . by completion o f an exemption notice which, i f  completed 
within one month of their receiving copies of the T. & G .W .U . rules following 
registration of this instrument, w ill operate with immediate effect.
Signed on behalf of the Transport & General Signed on behalf of
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INS 7 RUM t  NT
This instrument of transfer of engagements o f the Union of Bookmakers Employees 
hereinafter called T.U.B.E. to the Transport and General Workers Union herein­
after called T. & G .W .U . shall i f  duly approved by a resolution of the members 
of T.U.B.E. take effect on the date o f registration o f this instrument. Upon the 
coming into operation of the instrument the members of T«U . B .-£ • wi II become 
members of the T .& .G .W .U . and be subject to that Union's rules, copies of which 
can be inspected on application to Branch Secretaries or the Head Office of T .U.B.E.
T.U.B.E. shall become a section o f the T. & G .W .U . as part of the A .C .T .S . 
group of that Union end shall be known as the T.U.B.E. section. The Branches of 
T.U.B.E. shall continue to operate as Branches of the T. & .G .W .U . and w ill be 
entitled to the assistance of the full time officials of T. & G .W .U . as necessary.
Members of T.U.B.E. shall contribute to Scale 1 of the T. & G .W .U . Member­
ship of T .U.B.E. and the T. & G .W .U . shall be regarded as continuous and 
members in compliance for benefit w ith T .U .B .E . shall immediately be in compliance 
for benefits in Scale 1 of the T. & G .W .U . The contributions and benefits payable 
under Scale 1 are scheduled to this instrument. Arrears of contributions due to 
T.U.B.E. at the date of transfer shall be carried forward and become due to the 
T. & G .W .U .
A ll property and assets of T.U.B.E. shall vest in the Trustees of T. & G .W .U . as 
at the date that this instrument comes into effect, and the T. & G .W .U . shall 
assume responsibility for the liabilities of T.U.B.E.
The present full time officers of T .U .B .E . shall become officers of T. 5« G .W .U . 
on terms no less favourable than those applying immediately before the transfer takes 
effect.
Members of T.U.B.E. may obtain exemption from payment to the po litical fund of 
the T. & G .W .U . by completion o f an exemption notice which, i f  completed 
within one month of their receiving copies of the T. & G .W .U . rules following 
registration of this instrument, w ill operate with immediate effect.
Signed on behalf of the Transport & General Signed on behalf of
APPENDIX 5.1
Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of The Union of Bookmakers Employees
7th September, 1971.
n,-,„ In,u n r .1 Meeting of the Union oT Hookm-ukerc Employees (T.U.3.E) 
"'cli.! t the " lorooshoe flotcl" Tottenham Court liond on the 7th 
Sgr.tenber 1 C;71. The meeting opened at 6.10 p.n. and there were none
55C) reorle present.
nhe Chairman for the meeting was Hr. Don Truce.
guest Ci enker -..'as Hr. Ton Chupnan, Industrial Adviser to the
Church Council.
/ *
The meeting was called to order by the Chairman who 
explained how he came to be involved with the Union an he was an 
employer - Hr. Truce was approached cone si:: months a ;o by workers 
in the Booknaking Industry who wore keen to form a union and asked 
for his advice, thus a working committee was formed and the result 
was tonijilts meeting.
The first business of the evening was to ask for the
approval of +-h'* * genda. Iroposed by J. Carter and Seconded by J.
Hcrony this was carried unanimously. The Chairman outlined the 
objects of the Union and the kind of things that the Executive 
C car. it see would have to look into such things as Bank holiday rates 
of .ay, 4-0iv. h day week, Lunch hours, Overtime r a t e s , Saturday 
morning dope, 5 weeks annual holiday, linas ’week and other blank day 
workin :s, extended programmes, evening racing, Transfer of staff 
■ itheut notice, Loss of seniority particularly with take over bidr., 
Hedurdancy, mechanisation, Employees risk attached to security, On 
course minimum wage rates and travelling expenses, Equal pay for 
women, Superannuation.
The Chairman the introduced Mr. Ton Chni -.’in who
• •-•••w'-a.i the meeting on the need to • et a Union formed, and net t© 
one or two neoplo who were trying- to disrupt the meeting 
■wjcc:• • it was essential that this meeting form a strong Union
bora :kt and he complimented the peonle present on their deter; ¡in.‘cion 
to i' -rove working conditions in chair industry, amid loud cheering 
and cl. ping Hr. Chapman took his seat.
I reposed by Mr. Towel and Seconded by Hr. hiygens 
the objects of the Union be:
(a) The protection, care and welfare of employees engaged in 
the book;--,king industry.
(b) To regul te the relations between employees and employers 
in the said industry end to improve working stand"rds and 
conditions and to alter sane where they are improper, 
unjust o r  oppressive and to provide legal advice and 
representation for all members of the Union.
v-c) -° negotiate the settlement of disputes between members 
and employers.
(d) io give advice and to 
the ease of accident, 
victimization subject 
authorisation and the
rrovido bone fits to members ar. in 
strikes, lockouts, hardship or 
to the Executive Councils 
availability of funds at the time.
This was put to the vote and carried with two
against.
It was proposed by Mr. './acker and Seconded by Mr. 
Humphries that this mooting resolves that a Union of bookmakers 
?:.;?ioyees be formed and that registration be applied for. Voted 
Unanimously.
It was proposed by Mr. Bream and Seconded by Ur.
Edgeworth that the Union be named the Union of Bookmakers Employees. 
Voted Unanimously.
It was proposed by  ; rs Ca]zetti and Seconded by Miss« 
D'nrcy that the subscription be 75p per month, Mr. Buckingham 
roved an amendment Seconded by Mr. Short that the subscription be 
'i.00 male and 70p female per month and explained th~t ho thought 
that male employees earned more than their female counterparts,
Mrs. C-alsetti stated that one of the aims of the Union was to get 
equal pay for ’./omen and that they wanted to pay equal rates, thc-e 
v:ere quite a large number of ladies present who sun; or tad this, the 
ravnement was then read again to the Meeting and received three votes, 
the original motion was then put to the meeting and carried with 
hires against.
It vf.es proposed by Mr. v/ackor and seconded by Mr.
'./worth and carried Unanimously that the entrance fee bo 2yp.
Proposed b y  Mr. './acker and "econded by  Mr. vIgeuor,th 
t¡"t Messrs. larlott, Mont u  Company be appointed Solicitors to 
the Union. Voted Unanimously.
Iro'osed by  Mr. Holland and Seconded by  Mr. Miemon that 
v;i" Executive Council open a Bank account in the name cf the Union 
;yu t.r t Signatories be approved and Trustees appointed. Voted 
Unanimously.
M ( Iroposcd by Mr. './acker and seconded by Mr. '..'indsor
g^V.L this Union does not affiliate to any loliticnl party ’without 
.V1/ -’o v ’l or the membership at a meeting c  lied for t)vit purpose. 
•o„od Unanimously.
M  , Iroeosed by Mr. ilenon and Seconded by Mr. Hunrhries
the M.c. appoint a rules committee and that when completed a 
J nor;1 meeting bo called to approve the rules. Voted Unanimously,
rv . Election of Officers to serve on the Executive
Conan tee.
11. Kruger 1 reposed by Mr. Martin and Seconded by Mr. 
Bmplirios.
A. Carter I-ropoced by Mr. Mhort rovi .Beco.id od by Mr.
1 lease.
Both nominees ;.’ci'o invited to address the meeting 
nj aftcr both men had made short speeches a vote was taken and 
rr. ;). ¡:ru;;er duly elected.
Secretary.
elected.
Treasurer.
Cerri tt ce.
G. Sawford Proposed by J. Sullivan and Seconded by 
Hr. Batshaw.
There beinp no other nomination Hr. Sawford was duly
S. Salkild Proposed by Hr. Sawford and Seconded by  TIr. 
Greene.
There bein^ no other nomination Mr. Salkild was duly 
elected.
L. Franklin Proposed by Hr. Atkinson and Seconded by 
llr. Jones.
There was an objection b y  members of J. Coral and Hr. 
Iknnklin v.rn invited to address the meeting which he declined, his 
nonination wan then rut to the vote and Hr. Franklin was not elected.
The following nominees were duly proposed and Seconded 
and were elected unanimously.
H r . Samuels. S. Na>yle Ltd.
Hr. Dyster. J. Coral ltd.
Hr. Hutchinson. Ci ty Tote Ltd.
Hr. ;!ir" :cns. '.liH i  am H ill Ltd.
Mrs. Cal r.ctti. City Tote Ltd.
H r . ’.-.'acker. J. Coral Ltd.
Hiss D'arcy. La dbok.es L t d .
Hr. Lockley. R. J. Murphy Ltd.
Hr. Bolton. ViiIlian \ill Ltd..
Hr. loarce. J. Coral Ltd.
Thei>e bcinm no further bus iness t ‘io nootin
vote of thanks to the C h a i r m n  and Hr. Ton Chapman at
APPENDIX 5.2
Elections to the Executive Council of TUBE, 1973.
Resume of Candidates (in original format).
THE UNION OF 3C0KMAKERS EMPLOYEE'S 
FLECTION OF OFFICERS TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 1973
RESUME OF CANDIDATES
SIDNEY
CURRIE
Lives in Liverpool -»nd has been in the industry for 11 years, 
he is married with 2 children and is employed by 3. Taylor Ltd 
->s a Manager, his hobbies are all kinds of sport, 'ge 44.
DAVID
DYSTER
Lives in Essex and has been in the industry for 13 years, he is 
single, and employed by J. Coral Ltd in the Head Office trade 
room, he is a founder member of the Union and is at present 
serving on the Executive Council, his hobbies ore dricket and 
Fridge. .ge 31 .
LAURIE
GILK’JRRAY
Lives in Clydebank and has been in the industry tor 9 years, 
he is married with 4 children and is employed by ’ . Hill Ltd 
as a Manager, he is a founder member of the Union and was 
responsible for the formation of the Glasgow branch of which 
he is Secretary', his hobbies are Soccer and Golf. Age 34.
PADDY
HEENAN
Lives in South London and has been in the Industry tor -0 years, 
lie is marri< i end is employed by K. Munden Ltd is a Manager, he 
is at. present serving on the Fxi ou* ivo . nin. il 'til It ¡u..t been 
appointed Press and Publicity Officer for the Union, past 
Secretary for Penge C.C. his hobbies are Fowls end Darts. Age 55.
Lives in London nd has been in the industry tor o years, ho is 
single, end employed by City Tot'. Ltd ns e Manager, he is a 
founder member of the Union and is :L present serving on the 
test Middlesex Committee, his hobbies re Table Tennis -nd Chess, 
/ge 27.
de::i3
HODGSON
Lives in Liverpool and has been in the industry tor 11 years, he 
is married viith ? children and is emrloyed as ■' Manager for the 
Leisure and General Group, be is Minute Secretary for the 
Liverpool branch and his hobbies ’re Music and Sport. /ge <9.
HUTCHINSON
Lives in Essex =nd lias been in the industry for B years, he is 
married with 2 children and is employed by City Tote Ltd aS i 
Manager. He is a Founder member of the Union ind is at present 
serving on the Exccutiv, Council, his hobby is orort. .ge 3_.
JAMES
JENKINS
Lives just outside Liverpool md has be n in the industry 4 years, 
he is married with 2 children and is employe.1 is i Manager by the 
Leisure and General Group, his hobby is sport. Age 5-*.
HARRY
•^tRSHAV
Lives in Liverpool and has been in the industry for 5 years, ho 
is married with 2 children and is employed as a Manager by the 
Leisure and General Group, he is at present Secretary of the^  
Liversool branch and his hobbies ire Sport .end his family, /.ge 41
DAVID
KRUGER
Lives in Essex and has been in the industry f ;r <0 years, ho 
is married with ?. children and is mployed by City Tote Ltd 
is * Manager, a founder member of the Union, ho is the President 
of the Union and prior to his illness - travelled nil over the 
country for the Union during his holidays, his hobbies ere Music 
and Sport. Age 54.
KICK
LEVY
Lives just outside London 'nd has been in the industry for 26 
years, he is nr.rried with 1 child •: nd is employed by J. Corel Ltd 
es a Manager. He is a founder member of the Union and is at 
present serving on the Executive Council, past Noble Master of 
a. Friendly Society, his hobbies .--re Bridge nrd Gardening.
FRED
PARTIN
Lives in East London *nd has bc.n .in the industry for 15 years, 
he is married with 3 children and is employed by Prinkworth Bros, 
as a Manager, he is the present Secretary of London South branch 
and his nobby is Football. Age 45.
M/.TTHEF
MONTGOMERY
Lives in Renfrewshire ur.d h-s bacn in : rv industry for 4 years, 
he is married with 2 childre'. and ir. employed by . Hill Ltd as 
- Manager, ho is at present Ch*lim h oi the G1 irgow hr '.nch and 
his hobbies arc T'-ble Tennis, Snooke-r. kart.' 'nd Chess. Age 11.
BILL
MORGAN
Lives in East London nd h's bc.n ir the industry for 15 years, 
he is married with 4 children and ir employed by J. Edwards Ltd_ 
as a Manager .and is at present a r. — ter of tk • Executive Council, 
he is on the Committee of London Easter., brancr. :,nd his hobby is 
Eoxing.
Lives in Couth London ard her be n An '.he .ui tv\ ror 0 years. 
h< 1.; single and is employ i by Lone Ltd .as i Men. tor, he to 
on the Committee o\ fcb.e London Eouth branch and his hobbies ore 
Sports end Debating .\ge 24.
TONY 
RA' LE
Lives in North London "nd has bc.n .n - ¿r.-.ustry for s> years, 
he is married with 1 child and is employed by City Tote Ltd as
a. Manager. Is .at prese.it on t....x cut uncil ind .is- Vice-
Civ?, irm-’n of the Union, past Treasurer if nod ir en ( a-oporo.tivc 
Party -and past E.C. member ot Middlesex Youth Committee, his 
hobbies are Dancing, Organisation and International Affairs.
Age 28.
JACK
RA3HHAN
Lives in Prestwick ('.lunch'':;ter) end h-s Ivt.n in the industry 
for 10 y^ -rs, he is macri'd '.-'it *. c. ildron '.nd is era loy-_ . 
by Seymour and Story or ' Manager. As 'L present Chairman of 
the Manchester branch n.'.d his hol-bi».-.; arc tconc..iics 'nd Deb too. 
Age 56.
NISS
CAROL
Richar dso n
Lives in South London -r.d bes bean in .he industry for li years, 
she is single and is employed by J. L no Ltd as a Manageress.
Is ap present Secretary, of London South b’- nch rid :a -Iso 
Acting Treasurer until -a new nppointn nt is made, sh* is ct 
present serving on the Executive Council and hci hobbies ate 
Electronics nd Current Affairs.
Lives in Surrey ar.d has been in the industry for 5 years, 
he is single -nd is employed by A. '-'illiams h< Son Ltd as a 
Manager, h.is hobby is Music.
Lives in E:st London jnd has bean in the industry for 27 y e T S ,  
he is married with 2 children and is employed by City Tote Ltd 
as an Office Manager. He is at present Treasurer of the London 
Eastern branch ^nd his hobbies ^rc Physical Sports :>nd Trade- 
Union Representation.
Lives in North London m d  hns been in the industry for 12 years, 
he is married with A children and is employed by Hector 
MacDonald Ltd as a Manager. He is at present on the Committee 
of the London Northern branch and is -a member of the Lxecutive 
Council, his hobby is Football.
Lives in Vest Middlesex n^d has been in the industry for 7 years, 
he is single end is employed by Harris ■'nd Philp Ltd as ■»
Manager, lie is Treasurer of a local Football Club -and his 
hobbies are Footb'll r.nd sports in general, /.go 30.
Lives in North London and has been in the industry for 11 years, 
she is married -and is employed by A. V.’illi-ams & Son Ltd a.s a 
Manageress. She is past Treasurer of a local Tenants . ssociation 
and was a founder member of the Union, her hobbies ••'re Current 
Affairs and Organisation.

THE UiilOIT or BOOKTIAICERS EMPLOYEES
4 8  PETiIER ROAD, 
HARKOV/, IUDDLCSI^:
BALAHCE SHEET as at ■Slot DECEMBER 1972
Assets:
Office Furniture and Equipment 34
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 4 30
Stock of Stationery 522
Stock of Badges 80
Cash at Ban!: and In Band 225
657
Deficiency in Central Fund as shown in Account 145
802
Inabilities:
Sundry Creditors and Accruals 002
AUDITORS' RETORT
V/e report that the Auditors' Reports for the twelve branches 
stated that the records for the period under review were not 
adequate to verify subscription income in full. Subject to this 
qualification we report that the Accounts for the Union give a 
true and fair view of the matters to which they relate for the 
period from 9th September 1971 to 31st December 1972.
iruinr & uuiin
Tim union or boqkiiakers thployess
¿10 pnnira ro a d, 
HARROW. h i p p l c s c:
ADimTISTRATIOiT EXPEUSES A1TD OTIPCR OUTGOUTGS 
TOR TEC PERIOD FR0I1 FORIIATIOIT TO 51 at DIED33m 197?
Salary of Officer 
Auditors Tees
licenses of Conferences - Hire of Hooting Rooms
Travel and Hotel Szponscs
Purche.se of Badges
Printing, Post and Stationery
Advertising
Legal Expenses
Telephone
Bank Charges
Hire of Office Equipment 
Sundry Sr . se3
Depreciation of Office Equipment
Branch Expenses;
Travel and Hotel Expenses 127
Printing Post and Stationery 516
Advertising °4
Hire of Hootin' ems 109
Banl: Charges 10
Sundry Expenses 22
Depreciation of Office Equipment 2
Charged to Central I\uid_
1750
220
455
1559
328
1266
464
716
120
91
55
25
2
950 7747
7747
THE U1TI0IT OF DOOKHAKPRS EHPLOYUFi
ad ppimr, r o a d,
HARROW, IHDBLE3I1X
cfhtrai. m m  account
FOR TUB P'TPJOD FROII PATE OF FORMATION TO 3 1 s t  DEC El HER 1972
Central Fund - Income
Subscriptions and Contributions 7656
Donations 250
Other Receipts 4
7910
Central Fund - F:rocndituro
Victimisation Pay 300
Administration Expenses (see Account) 7747
Deficiency in Central Fund at end ox Period
(per Dalance Sheet)
8055
(145)
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Chapter 6 : The development of TUBE: the importance of the
labour process approach and the limits and possibilities 
of union autonomy.
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold: firstly, to 
examine the importance of the labour process 'approach' in understanding 
the patterns of expansion and decline of TUBE; secondly, to draw out 
the limitations of this kind of explanation through delineating the 
extent of union autonomy. Both points need some elaboration.
How might the labour process exert an influence on the development 
of TUBE? It is useful to return to one of the hypotheses made at 
the end of Chapter 2:
" .. it will be argued that changes in the labour process 
can provide a basis for understanding the course of union 
development."
In Chapter 3 it was shown how changes in the labour process were 
informed by developments in the Bookmaking industry, arising from 
competitive pressures - ultimately a consequence of capital accumulation - 
and movements between different sectors of the economy. Changes in 
the labour process are thus derived from other changes; the significance 
of the former is in comprising the point of experience for wage-labourers. 
That changes in the labour process are derived is significant in 
posing a relationship between movements of capital and trade union 
growth and organisation. How definite and determinant are those links?
Hopefully this focus on the labour process, as a way of understanding 
the development of unionization in the Bookmaking industry, will 
establish a range of constraints and preconditions within which that 
development took place. This forms part of a structural explanation 
of unionization. Yet such an explanation is only partial, for it must 
not be seen as crudely determinist, but in relation to those workers 
in the industry who were trying to improve their conditions of employment. 
The relationship between workers and the structural constraints which
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they face is dialectical: while structural influences may provide 
a framework within which decisions and actions are taken, those 
decisions and actions will help to shape society. Yet workers 
face a variety of structural influences, some of which are very difficult 
to counter through workplace and/or industrial unionism; in particular 
the competitive pressures of the market, which may imply changes 
in the labour process and/or redundancy, raise very difficult problems 
in developing alternative policies and strategies at the workplace 
level. But there is an area, a constantly shifting one, where structural 
imperatives are not overriding, where they may be ambiguous or in 
conflict with other pressures. This can be referred to as the extent 
and limits of autonomy. The question then becomes the extent of autonomy 
which this implies.
Both aspects - the structural determination of the labour process 
and the potential of union autonomy - can be explored in looking at 
tube's history. But exactly how can this be done? What conceptual 
categories are most useful? This is a necessary task before re-engaging 
the history of the union.
One fundamental dilemma of trade unionism is the necessity to 
take an organisational form within capitalism, despite being an expression 
of the antagonistic social relations on which capitalism is based. This 
exists as a functional imperative if the continuity of demands and 
collective strength is to be sustained. The characterisation of the 
precise nature of that form - the role of trade unions - is a crucial 
question and the subject of fierce debate. ^  Here it is instructive 
to consider the contribution of Allan Flanders, who as the major
!• See McCarthy (1972) Part One, for four distinct contributions.
theoretician of the Oxford school can be considered as the most
significant formative academic influence in British industrial
relations thought and policy in the post-war period.
Flanders never published a detailed theory of union growth;
it has to be gleaned from various indications in his writings. However,
his definition of the problem can be seen as dependent on his view of
trade unions as primarily concerned with collective bargaining and
"job regulation". For Flanders, participation in these areas is the
object of trade unions; or, more precisely, the means by which trade
unions can best represent the interests of their members. This poses
an immediate problem: if trade unions are to participate in collective
bargaining and job regulation they must have an organisational form.
How that organisational form develops, and its precise nature, becomes
an essential problem for Flanders to tackle. He does this by using
the twin interrelated concepts of 'movement' and 'organisation'.
"Trade Unions are a mixture of movement and organisation 
and the relationship between the two is the key to an 
understanding of the dynamics of their growth." (Flanders 
(1975) p.43).
What does Flanders mean by these concepts of 'movement' and 'organisation' 
'Movement' is really the upsurge of collective strength; 'Organisation' 
on the other hand implies the harnessing of this collective strength 
into a less volatile and more rationalistic continuity overcoming the 
fragility of collectivism. 'Movement' thus implies common ends and 
community of purpose amongst a group - virtually a normative consensus.
For Flanders, this must eventually give way to 'organisation' if trade 
unions are to survive:
"One problem which has always confronted trade unions 
is how to convert temporary movement into permanent 
organisation". (Flanders (1975) p.43)
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In terms of union growth, therefore, it is 'organisation' which is 
the main driving force. 'Organisation' depends for its continuation 
on the rewards and sanctions that it can utilise through the processes 
of collective bargaining (i.e. job regulation) and the effect of 
internal discipline which it implies on the membership. It is this 
expansion of job regulation - for which 'organisation' is a necessary 
precondition - which generates the growth of trade union membership.
Various criticisms can be made of Flanders concerning the 
explanatory power of his model: the internal logic of moving from 
individuals to a collectivity is in some sense false, given the 
socialisation of the labour process with the organising of the collective 
worker by capital;^ there is also a circularity in the inter­
relationships of 'job regulation', 'organisation', and 'union growth',
(2)where it is not always clear what is determining what.
But in focussing on the foundations of Flanders' dualism,
'movement' and 'organisation', two major problems are revealed of
particular interest in the context of this chapter. These arise not so
much from the internal inconsistency of the concepts, but the methodology
(3)of utilising this dual process of transition. One underlying
assumption of Flanders' model is that the survival of any agency of 
articulation depends on the transition from 'movement' to 'organisation'.
In other words, the argument constitutes a general theory of organisational 
development. In consequence, Flanders fails to consider the specific 1
1. See Chapter 4 for a critique of individual-collective approaches.
2. see Pickard (1978) for an expansion of this criticism.
3. For a discussion of these concepts, especially the role of movement 
in Flanders' theory, see Pickard (1978).
nature of trade unions; and this derives from his basic failure 
to consider trade unions within an historical and social context - 
the underlying social formations of capitalist society.^
The second problem concerns the way the 'movement' - 'organisation' 
dichotomy serves not merely to redefine the essential contradiction 
of trade unionism, but to eliminate it. Far from viewing the growth 
of trade union organisation as the dialectical interrelationship 
of the developing opposition to capitalist social relations and the 
accommodation of objectives within capitalism, Flanders expounds a 
process of union maturity, with the channelling of continuous upsurges 
of opposition (i.e. 'movement') into the rationalistic patterns of 
'organisation'. This reflects Flanders' notion of the objectives 
of trade unions as participation in collective bargaining and job 
regulation. But this is a definition of union objectives in 
institutional terms; once removed from this context, union objectives 
can be seen as problematic and dependent on the balance of power 
relationships within the union, necessarily calling into question 
Flanders' exposition.
The first deficiency - the neglect of capitalism as generating 
specific social processes and institutional forms - is precisely the 
criticism set out in Chapter 1 concerning orthodox approaches to trade 
unionism. Again the answer is the same: to understand unionisation 
it is necessary to consider the changing labour process in the context 
of capital accumulation. 1
1. This is entirely in keeping with Flanders' emphasis on Industrial 
Relations ' systems', which necessarily excludes the importance of external 
social and economic processes. See the critique of Bain in Chapter 1, 
who is a disciple of Flanders in this (and other) respects.
-280-
The processes of concentration and centralisation will be familiar 
from the description of the historical development of the Bookmaking 
Industry. That account is clearly in keeping with Marx's assertion 
concerning centralisation:
"The attraction of capitals no longer means the simple 
concentration of the means of production and the command 
over labour, which is identical with accumulation.
It is concentration of capitals already formed, destruction 
of their individual independence, expropriation of 
capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into 
few large capitals". (Marx (1976) p. 777).
The expanding size of firms is not accidental: it is part
of the inherent logic of capital accumulation, whereby concentration
(growth of firms through their 'own' resources) leads to centralisation
(takeovers and amalgamations) which in turn feeds further growth.
In Western capitalism, this has resulted in:
".... a radical reduction in the number of 'different
capitals' competing with one another, until entire 
branches of industry were dominated by a handful of trusts, 
companies, and monopolies...." (Mandel (1976) p.3ll)
It is important not to equate the remorselessness of capital
accumulation with evenness. While the tendency to 'monopoly
capitalism' continues, it does not so much supercede the establishing
of small capitals as continuing to exist with them:
"Primitive accumulation of capital and capital accumulation 
through the production of surplus-value are, in other 
words, nor merely successive phases of economic history but 
also concurrent economic processes". (Mandel (1976) p.46 
Emphasis in original).
This is clearly true of different industries, where the processes 
of concentration and centralisation in one industry 'set free' capital 
and labour for the small-scale development of a new industry*1 ;^ but it 
can also apply to existing industries, in that a polarisation can occur 1
1. Marx (1976) pp. 1035-1036.
between large and small-scale firms.
While the unevenness of capital accumulation thus allows a 
spectrum of firm size (whatever the criterion) at a given moment 
in time, there are other dimensions that can be considered. Firstly, 
the geographical spread of concentration and centralisation: while
some areas may have large firms, others may have smaller ones. Secondly, 
there is a time dimension, whereby accumulation is at a faster rate 
in some firms than others. Combining the two aspects, capital 
concentration and centralisation proceeds at a faster rate in some areas 
than in others. The result can be, especially in an industry such 
as bookmaking where the 'service' is immediately 'consumed', an 
immensely uneven structure.
The labour process approach would seem to anticipate a relationship
between the development of support for TUBE (and thus branch formation)
and patterns of capital accumulation. This can be examined in terms
of the three dimensions of uneven accumulation outlined above.
The second deficiency in Flanders' approach concerned the problematic
nature of union objectives. What objectives are pursued by the members
(2)and officials of trade unions? This is ultimately a question of
power relations within unions, both within and between members and officials. 
The relationship between union policy and union democracy therefore demands 
some examination; and perhaps the most useful attempt, in terms of 
understanding union growth, is that of Hording (1972) 12
1. Friedman (1977) considers the relationships within both firms and 
industries in terms of the 'centre-periphery' distinction. See especially 
pp. 105-119.
2. Clearly 'trade unions' cannot have 'objectives' - that is reification.
It can only be the people that comprise the union that have objectives.
2. One of the most useful analyses of power in trade unions is that of 
Anderson (1967) in his discussion of 'power for' and 'power over' 
subsequently taken up by Hyman (1975).
(1)
In his examination of job control and union structure, Herding 
is particularly concerned to emphasise the important role of organising 
policies in contributing to union growth. Following Bernstein (1961) 
he divides all previous arguments about why trade unions grow into 
one of two camps: they are either "structural" or "historical". The 
former, it seems, look particularly towards institutional factors 
or labour force characteristics in 'structuring' the propensity of 
groups to unionise; 'historical' explanations, however, emphasise 
the importance of economic influences, such as the upswing of the 
business cycle. But whichever argument is considered important in 
explaining union growth, Herding argues they both have one particular 
underlying common assumption:
"The historical argument as well as the structural assumes 
a fundamental tendency of organised labour to expand and 
look at the unorganised for obstacles." (Herding (1972) p.56)
In other words, the development and growth of trade union membership
is not problematic for most theorists; they are concerned with why
trade unions grow and look for reasons why they do not grow in terms
of the unorganised sectors. Herding, however, queries these assumptions
".... the reality in unionism may sometimes better be 
explained by the restrictive tendency of the 'happy few' :
The organised may be a more serious obstacle to expansion 
than the unorganised." (Herding (1972) p.56).
Therefore the expansion of membership is not an unproblematic objective
within trade unions. Indeed, unions may seek to restrict recruitment
or eliminate existing membership. Drawing on his empirical analysis
of organising amongst the U.S. steelworkers, mineworkers and teamsters,
Herding concludes:
"By their own dynamics, unchecked by political consciousness, 
unions seem rather likely to forget about 'organising the 
unorganised'- or may just translate the situation of the 
unorganised into that of a secondary-status group within 
the organisation. Bargaining interests in themselves are 
ambiguous." (Herding (1972) p.64).
In this way the organising of various groups may well be dependent on
patterns of membership and democracy within the existing union
organisation. It suggests the union may adopt a selective policy
in organising occupational or stratified groups within industries;
some will be organised and others not. Herding relates the growth of
union membership to particular organising policies, not merely in
terms of number counting, but also in relation to the nature of potential
membership. And organising policies are in turn related to the processes
of internal union democracy:
"Organising policy was found less a matter of 'automatic' 
expansion drives, or of the target workers' inclination 
to yield to unionisation, but in practice, one more 
instrument for the union leadership to manipulate consent 
for cooperative deals, to divert from internal rifts, or 
to recruit auxiliaries for the core constituency's 
bargaining position." (Herding (1972) p. 65).
Thus in unions where internal democracy is itself limited, organising
policy rests in the hands of the leadership; and can thus be developed
in a more conscious and deliberate fashion.
The importance of Herding's analysis is in his integration of
the expansion of collective organisation and the processes of internal
democracy within the union. Trade unions are not seen in the monolithic
dualism of Flanders, but in the constantly shifting distribution of
power relationships within the union. Hence, organising policies,
through the consideration of the interests and abilities of union members
to expand the union, can provide a basis for examining the extent and
limits of union autonomy in the growth of trade union membership and
organisation.
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However, there is a slight problem in utilising Herding's approach 
since his analysis is developed in the context of the USA, where 
he suggests the norm is for employee groups to be organised from 
external forces, i.e. existing trade unions, rather than organising 
themselves from within. This may not, however, be the case in Britain 
or in 'white-collar'groups generally. Indeed, in the case of TUBE, 
the employee group did in fact organise from within. Does this 
pose any particular limitations on the conceptual use of organising 
policies?
Firstly, organising from within may well be related to conscious 
decisions on the part of existing unions not to organise particular 
groups; this seems indisputably the case with TUBE, which arose at 
least in part due to the indifference of the established trade unions. 
But, more generally, Bain has investigated the role of organising 
policies in examining the recruitment tactics of 'white-collar' unions.
He notes:
"Whatever the nature of union recruitment strategies, they
have generally not been pursued with much tactical aggressiveness.
The recruitment process tends to be more passive than active 
in the sense that potential members generally have to 
contact a union before there is much attempt to recruit them".
Bain (1970) p.92
Although Bain does not confront the nature of organising policies in
any systematic way, his investigations provide some insights. He
cites trade union officials as stating their priorities in organising
large groups of workers in preference to small, disparate groups.
"I will drop everything to get them in. If they weren't 
from a combine I might not do this unless it was an extremely 
large group or I wasn't very busy." ASSET official in Bain 
(1970) p.92.
Bain, however, argues that even when there is a large group of 
potential members the recruitment process is essentially passive. This 
enables him to discount the importance of organising policies in
explaining either the aggregate or overall pattern of union growth. 
However, in the light of Herding's analysis two queries emerge 
about Bain's conclusions. Firstly, that for Bain, once recruitment 
has taken place membership is somehow sustained unproblematically; 
on the contrary, Herding's analysis has shown that members may well 
be organised out of the union, or quite possibly relegated to an 
inferior status within the union. Passivity in organising policies, 
therefore, is not merely related to potential members, but also to 
existing members; Bain, however, does not consider organising 
policies in any sense other than recruitment policies. Secondly, the 
passivity of organising policies may themselves bo related to internal 
democracy within the unions and the interests of existing membership. 
This is of particular importance in connection with 'white-collar' 
unions when considering the expansion of established manual unions 
into areas of 'white-collar' sections. Passivity, therefore, does not 
signify the absence of organising policies and hence cannot be used 
in order to discount their importance in explaining union growth.
It would therefore seem valid to approach the limits of union 
autonomy in terms of organising policies; this is attempted in 
the second part of the chapter.
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(a) The labour process and the course of unionisation.
The development of TUBE from the point of its foundation, through 
the periods of expansion and decline, to amalgamation can be linked 
quite clearly with the uneven patterns of capital accumulation.
This, it will be argued, is beyond doubt. In showing this relationship, 
a distinction is made between the phases of expansion and rationalisation 
within the industry; the former is largely concerned with the period 
up to 1972, while the latter becomes generalised in 1973-74.
(i) The unevenness of capital accumulation and the expansion
The course of TUBE'S expansion in 1971-72 can be compared with 
the three dimensions of unevenness in capital accumulation. To do this 
it is useful to distinguish analytically between the development 
of industrial structure on one hand and its geographical and temporal
relationships to be drawn more precisely.
In the first instance it seems beyond doubt that the development
of union support and organisation was closely related to centralising
capital. Several of the union branches established in the initial
expansion of TUBE were based primarily on the expansion of national
firms or those aspiring to that level. Employees of the eventual
'Big Four' provided substantial membership in London, as shown in TUBE'S
beginnings. Elsewhere, support could be found in Manchester from William
Hill employees, who provided four of the six steering committee members;
in Glasgow, where the Branch Secretary was a William Hill employee;
in Leeds, where William Hill bought 118 LBOs from Jack Windsor, and the
branch developed primarily as a William Hill branch; and in Newcastle,
where Ladbrokes employees provided most of the local membership. 1
1. As a proxy for firm size tin; most appropriate indicator in this 
period is the number of LBOs; in subsequent years it becomes less useful 
, ; i i K : e  the major firms increased Iheir share of betting turnover while 
reducing the numbers of LBOs.
Of TUBE.
phasing on the other. ( 1 ) This, hopefully, will enable the
Usually, in these branches where membership was dominated 
by employees from the larger companies, support was also evident 
from employees in local firms. In some instances, this latter 
membership was in a majority, most noticeably in Liverpool and 
Stockton. Here, the consequences of expanding local firms provided 
the conditions for union organisation, while the national companies had 
made less significant inroads into these areas. In Liverpool, for 
instance, the newly formed Connor and Forbes chain, an amalgamation 
of existing firms, comprised more than 100 LBOs, the largest in the city.
While the process of expansion might be expected to produce 
conditions for unionisation, the implication of the labour-process 
approach suggests those sections within the industry where expansion 
did not take place would provide little membership potential for TUBE.
In general terms this was true. The individually-owned bookmaking 
firms with only a handful of employees did not appear as significant 
areas of recruitment. Only in Wales was there any serious organisation 
in the firms at the bottom end of the market. With the rapid expansion 
and consequent increasing economic advantage of the larger firms, 
the smaller firms competed on increasingly less favourable conditions: 
thus the pressures on those employees were greater since they had 
to compensate for the lower profit margins. But only where these 
'bottom market' concerns had managed to expand above a handful of 
betting shops did the physical basis for collective organisation 
develop. This happened in Wales. The uneven expansion of bookmaking 
had meant that LBOs in Wales tended to operate on lower levels of cost 
and turnover than they did in England. The national companies had 
shown little interest in expanding in this area; it was left to the local 
bookmakers to develop small-scale betting chains lacking viability for
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large-scale accumulation. It generated poor conditions for employees;
and with the expansion of betting opportunities these conditions
worsened as the working day was extended and intensified.
The uneven structure of the industry thus generated two prime
bases of trade union organisation: those responding to the impact
of retailing bookmaking, and those working in the bottom market-concerns,
suffering increasingly worsening conditions as these firms struggled
to compete with the large conglomerate:;.
It is perhaps not surprising and indeed reinforces the general
argument, that employee groups in these different sections of the
industry, emphasised different grievances. It is interesting to
contrast the responses of the workers caught up in retailing bookmaking
(which are discussed in Chapter 4) with the somewhat more basic
demands of the Anglesey employees.
It was not the possibility of takeovers that concerned them,
working at the bottom end of the market in Wales. Their conditions
were not so much worsening as a direct consequence of the expansion
of the firms in which they worked, but through the generalised increasing
economic domination of the industry by the larger firms and their
efforts to expand the betting medium. The increasing exploitation
of the employees resulting from the expanded betting medium affected
those workers just as much:
"We feel that the present time would be ideal for a 
'recruitment' campaign, as feelings are running high 
due to the fact that some employees are having to forego 
their Saturday lunch-hour, and similar problems caused by 
the early commencement of racing". (1)
1« Letter Owen Williams to George Sawford 13.11.71.
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At the forefront of the demands from the Anglesey members 
were higher wages. This was scarcely unimportant to other 
bookmaking workers. But whereas in the expanding sectors of the 
industry, wage levels reflected the devaluation of labour-power, 
and a consequent weakened market position, at the 'bottom market' 
level of the industry low wage levels reflected the weak competitive 
position and low profit margins of those firms. Efforts to increase 
wages by the Welsh employees were made against the background of 
potential redundancy.
This contradiction was reflected in the demands which the Anglesey 
workers considered putting forward to their employer. In January 
1972, they agreed the following resolution for minimum rates of pay: 
managers, E30 per 6 day week; settlers, £20 per 6 day week; trainee 
settlers, E12 per 6 day week; and the same for full-time counter-clerks, 
part time counter clerks, £8 per week.^ In comparison with other 
areas, who were in part responding to the request of the Executive to 
produce minimum wage rates, these proposals were exceedingly low.
For instance, the minimum rate for trainee settlers and counter clerks 
set by Anglesey was less than half of that suggested by London Eastern 
in April 1972 - £4.20 per day. ^
To conclude: the expansion of TUBE was primarily associated with
national and local centralising capital, in which, as shown in Chapter 3,
there were dramatic changes in the labour process. Yet the impact
of the processes of accumulation implied a relative worsening position
for the smaller firms and consequently deteriorating conditions for
employees in those firms. While this prompted, where the physical
basis existed, some form of collective organisation, this was essentially
unstable given that it operated in the dilemma of insecure employment.
Letter 0. Williams to G. Sawford, undated, referring to a staff 
meeting of 17.1.72.
2. Minutes of London Eastern Branch meeting 18.4.72.
-290-
Turning to the temporal and geographical dimensions of capital 
accumulation it seems that this unevenness provided necessary 
preconditions for branch expansion. In London, the centralisation 
of ownership and its consequences in 1970-71 had precipitated the 
formation of TUBE. Given the existence of TUBE, other areas where 
firms had already expanded, particularly on a national basis, provided 
immediate support: Manchester and Glasgow both approached the newly 
formed union in 1971, and in both cities, William Hill (who provided 
most of the membership) already had extensive interests - in the 
latter since the late 1960s.
Patterns of local centralisation also occurred before branch 
formation. In Liverpool, three separate chains were brought together 
under Leisure and General Holdings, a catering firm, expanding its 
interests between 1971 and 1972 - the third chain being added in 
April 1972, the month the Liverpool branch was formed.
On the other side of the Pennines, the response came a little 
later. It was May 1972 before employees in John Joyce, later to 
form the Stockton branch, and the Ladbrokes workers in Newcastle 
approached Sawford. In Leeds too, it was in the summer of 1972 that 
William Hill purchased the Windsor LBOs, which immediately resulted 
in the Leeds Branch of TUBE. Now William Hill also turned to other 
parts of Yorkshire and bought the Hull chain of John Hudson, comprising 
thirty shops, giving Hill's a virtual monopoly in the area. In 
December 1972 a bonus dispute arose in part from the introduction by 
William Hill of their own systems of working and payment - which did not 
include a traditional Christmas bonus. Soon, the ex-Hudson employees 
discovered that wage-rate differentials existed across different areas 
and they were unimpressed.^ Sawford was more than happy to enrol
more William Hill employees and formed the branch in early January, 1973.
1. Interview Ron Grantham 14.5.75.
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With solid support developing in William Hill, Sawford was 
alive to any potential recruitment. As the William Hill Organisation 
had expanded and introduced their own working and payment systems, 
i.e. as the labour process and wages had altered, conditions had 
developed enabling TUBE to recruit members. In the Coventry-Tamworth 
area, Hill's were now poised to take over a small local betting chain 
of eleven shops. Sawford, compaigning on the likely consequences 
for the employees, successfully recruited most of these workers, 
forming the Coventry branch on 1st February 1973.
While the William Hill Organisation had made inroads into Coventry 
and Tamworth, their main rivals, Ladbrokes, had bought one of the main 
Birmingham chains, Cutler Prescott. TUBE had been trying to build a 
Birmingham branch since 1971, but without success. Some members had 
been recruited in J.Coral Ltd, but it was late 1972 before the 
involvement of the major firms became generalised. City Tote were 
buying shops in the Wolverhampton area and Sawford received complaints 
from employees in September 1972 concerning the conditions of 
employment imposed by the new management.
The major impetus came when Ladbrokes proposed takeover of Cutler 
Prescott came to light. Now the employees were no longer surprised 
by the impact of centralisation. The fear of redundancies and lower 
wages was sufficient for widespread interest in TUBE from the 150 
workers in these 52 LBOs. The branch in Birmingham, formed in 
December 1972 was dominated by Cutler Prescott staff. ^
From the perspective of branch formation, the example of the 
Midlands illustrates the importance of the preconditions necessary 
for collective organisation to develop. Ihe workers here, of course,
1. They provided 50% of the Branch membership.
had already seen the consequences in other parts of the country 
as the large firms moved in - they knew what to expect and did not 
want to experience it themselves. But TUBE had been unsuccessful 
in recruiting members in any meaningful quantity until the workforce 
had come face-to-face with the probable consequences of being immersed 
in the national companies. The only difference being that while 
the founders of TUBE had experienced the consequences of centralisation 
and concentration, with the generalisation of these processes, workers 
could now anticipate them and act collectively on the basis of these 
fears.
Obviously, there is no simple relationship to be made between 
the uneven development of the industry and the growth of trade union 
organisation. Yet this does not mean general parallels cannot be 
drawn. The course of uneven development in terms of economic 
domination, geographical and temporal dimensions generated necessary, 
yet insufficient preconditions for the phased development of TUBE.
All the evidence of branch formation in TUBE'S eighteen months of 
expansion points to the importance of these preconditions.
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(ii) Industrial rationalisation, uneven patterns of accumulation, 
and the implications for TUBE.
The processes of concentration and centralisation are inherent 
inin capitalist economy, and/that sense continue unceasingly. Yet 
at different times the conflict between the process of capital 
accumulation and the institutional form - the firm - becomes apparent. 
Despite the assistance of finance capital and the system of company 
shares, this requires the expansion to be less than even: periods
of expansion are followed by restructuring and consolidation.
TUBE had developed in conjunction with the growth of large-scale 
betting chains; branch expansion and formation largely reflected 
patterns of concentration and centralisation within the industry.
But the phase of 1973-74 brought a new problem for TUBE. So far,
TUBE had sought to represent members within a rapidly developing 
bookmaking industry,where major firms had bought up many small and 
not-so-small betting chains in an almost mad scramble to expand.
1973-74 was the period when this process slowed down, and a major 
rationalisation took place within the industry. Firstly, there was an 
overall decline in the number of LBO’s which had increased since 1971. 
Secondly, the total number of LBOs owned by the four major firms fell, 
for the first time, by more than 3%.
The total number of LBOs, after reaching a peak early in the 1960s, 
had declined until 1971, when, in relation to the overall expansion 
of the industry, there had been a small, but steady, increase. The 
turning point of this brief expansion came in 1974, when the number of 
LBOs fell slightly below the 1973 figure; and in 1975 this decline 
became more exaggerated with a net fall of 466 LBOs on the position in
1. A decline which still continues. See Table 3.1
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This decline was proportionately more severe in the larger 
firms. Between 1973 and 1974, the number of LBOs owned by 
Ladbrokes, William Hill, and Mecca all decreased, by 44,50 and 20 
respectively; while the J.Coral Group had a net addition of one 
LBO. This compared with the total industry figure of a net fall 
of 36. And by 1975, the holdings of these four major firms had
fallen by nearly 10% on 1974, with the number of LBOs owned by each 
of the groups falling substantially. ^
In other words, as the end of 1973 approached, TUBE was no 
longer organising in an industry where the number of LBOs were 
expanding or where the Big Four were intent on buying betting chains 
on sight. For the first time since its formation, TUBE faced a 
position of decline in the number of LBOs, and decline in the ownership 
of the major firms, as the smaller, non-profitable LBOs were closed or 
sold off.
This inevitably made an adverse impression on the already diminishing 
strength of the TUBE membership. And perhaps the most dramatic 
example was the severe pruning of their Leeds holdings by the William 
Hill Organisation. Here, many of the ex-Windsor shops were closed and 
the number of William Hill LBOs in this area quickly fell from 118 to 66. 
This meant that nearly half of the Leeds membership in Hills disappeared 
irrespective of TUBE policies. The collapse of the Leeds Branch in this 
period can scarcely be separated from the savage rationalisation carried
out by the William Hill management and the consequent weakening of the
(2)collective strength of the branch.
1. The precise figures are set out in Table 3.6
2. In one phase of this rationalisation, William Hill closed 12 LBOs in 
January 1974 in the Leeds area. See Allwood, Bradley, Pemberton v.W.Hill 
unfair dismissal tribunal hearing 26.3.74.
The unevenness of capital accumulation, however, implies that 
within an industry different sections are expanding or rationalising 
at different times. While the expansion of the major firms in terms 
of LBOs was coming to a close, the continuation of concentration 
and centralisation in other sections of the industry remained a 
common feature. And in the context of smaller firms, the whole 
section at any point in time is necessarily portrayed as simultaneously 
expanding and rationalising, as individual firms develop and new firms 
begin. Thus in bookmaking in 1973, TUBE adopting a deliberate new 
policy focus in favour of small firms after the disillusioning experiences 
in Ladbrokes and William Hill, found themselves tackling firms of 
varying sizes, often in the course of expansion.
Why did TUBE subsequently suffer so many defeats in local firms?; 
Internal organisation was part of the answer, for instance, the poor 
servicing, especially in Wales. Yet, given the policy intention of 
focussing on small firms, this can scarcely be a credible explanation 
for wide ranging defeats, particularly in the relatively strong and 
important branches.
In part the continuing centralisation underlay the various defeats 
TUBE suffered in local firms. These were not limited to any particular 
geographical area, and indeed were spread throughout the country.
And, at the end of this phase, despite immense promise in several 
firms, TUBE'S efforts had generally failed to secure recognition.
Some examples are relevant here, particularly ones where success 
always seemed imminent. Firstly, Manchester: In 1972, Sawford
had approached a small local firm, Foy Bros Ltd, employing approximately 
44 staff, for recognition. Following meetings under the chairmanship 
of a Department of Employment official,the company agreed to a ballot 
of their employees to determine whether they wished TUBE to represent
them and also if they wanted an Agency Shop Agreement. The ballot 
was held in December 1972 and the results made public in January, 1973. 
They immediately highlighted the problems of such a system - only 24 
voted, but an overwhelming majority, though a minority of the employees, 
voted for TUBE to represent them (20 votes to 4) and with an Agency 
Shop Agreement (18 votes to 6). Technically, TUBE had won the 
ballot, yet immediately different interpretations arose. Sawford 
claimed victory, while the company refused to grant recognition 
when it was not supported by a majority of the staff. The Agency Shop 
Agreement, despite TUBE'S technical victory, was out of the question. 
Discussions took place, but with no avail. Irrespective of the 
ballot, Foy Bros were demanding TUBE should produce evidence of more 
than 50% membership in the company before granting recognition. In 
March 1973, Sawford took a hard line - if there was no offer forthcoming, 
he was going to the Courts. Time passed. In April, Jack Rashman 
contacted Sawford, utterly confused at the lack of appointment of 
shop stewards in Foy Bros and the absence of the collection of 
subscriptions through check-off. Sawford could only reply that Foy Bros 
had sold their business which had become part of a larger group. 
Recognition was no longer on the agenda.
A similar example can be found in the experiences of London South, 
the strongest London Branch. In late 1972 and early 1973, the branch 
had suffered from the collapse of support in James Lane Ltd, a sizeable 
local firm. A few months later they experienced a different kind of 
frustration in Ken Munden Ltd. Towards the end of 1972 Paddy Heenan, 
a prominent member of the TUBE Executive, began to recruit, members amongst 
his fellow workers in Ken Munden Ltd, a South London firm with nearly 
60 LBOs and nearly 200 employees. In April 1973 TUBE held a meeting 
for Ken Munden staff in Central London, which proved successful.
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By June 1973, Sawford could claim a majority of regular employees were 
members of TUBE and with membership still growing the company had 
little grounds to refuse recognition.
Yet just as it seemed certain, success was taken from TUBE'S grasp.
The company managed to prevaricate until July when it promptly announced 
that TUBE'S claims were incorrect - the bargaining unit was now far 
wider than before. The secret lies in the history of the company.
Ken Munden had sold his betting chain to the llemdale Group in May 1972, 
who themselves had been taken over by Equity Enterprises - a holding 
company with interests in entertainment, property, finance, and investment - 
in January 1973. As part of their own expansion in July 1973,
Equity Enterprises bought a company called Nalim Limited which happened 
to control the South Wales bookmaking firm of Shermans. Although 
Shermans was run independently of Ken Munden, it provided a suitable 
means of widening the bargaining unit and thus denying TUBE recognition.
Finally, Newcastle. Towards the end of 1972, Sawford had approached 
a small local firm - owning 15 LBOs - called Harry Kirtley, for 
recognition. There was substantial support from the workers for TUBE 
and a bitter dispute over the non-payment of a Christmas bonus provided 
further support. This TUBE retained, despite the apparent efforts of 
the company to intimidate employees into leaving either the union or the 
firm. The failure of the company to respond to the grievances of the 
employees set off a strike by the Kirtley employees over Easter 1973.
They were joined by the employees of Ken Hailes Ltd which was owned by 
the same local businessman who owned Kirtley's,W.S.Martin. The strike 
was successful: out of a total of 30 LBOs between the two groups,
24 were closed.
The problem was how to follow this up. Walter Lavery had met 
Martin, who had offered minor concessions in substantive terms without 
granting TUBE bargaining rights. After the strike, nothing more seemed
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on offer. The employees became apprehensive about taking further 
strike action and failed to attend meetings. The three-day stoppage 
had not secured an improved offer from Martin. What could TUBE do now?
In all these examples, TUBE had secured substantial support, and 
recognition had appeared a live possibility. The events in Ken Munden 
and Foy Bros illustrate particularlv how the buoyancy of the process 
of centralisation undermined TUBE'S efforts. The two firms show 
the other side of the same coin - Ken Munden taking over another 
firm and expanding the bargaining unit, while Foy Bros had become 
part of a new distinct unit altogether. ^
The third example shows the relative impotence of TUBE in pressing 
home the undoubted support amongst local employees against a small-scale 
employer who was prepared to sell his holdings to a large betting chain, 
at a time when there would be buyers.
The patterns of development within the industry now weighed against 
TUBE'S success in both the large national companies and the small-scale 
employers. Given this, it might have been expected that TUBE'S most 
lasting success would be in the medium-sized firms, which were expanding 
within a given locality and who wished to remain independent of the 1
1. And such developments could cut across the union branch structure: 
the events in Ken Munden implied that the union now had to organise 
members in Wales as well as London South, posing problems of internal 
organisation. At this moment in time, the collapse of TUBE organisation 
in Wales indicates how the general decline of branch organisation affected 
the fortunes of the remaining branches.
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Big Four, and could,in fact, compete with them. It is probably 
not unfair to say TUBE was most successful in such firms - Ken Munden 
in London South (where the membership did not diminish and the efforts 
of the employers thwarted), Connor and Forbes in Liverpool, and 
Hector McDonald in London North were centres of TUBE membership for 
much of the union's history.
In conclusion it is important to draw out the contradictory nature 
of the uneven development of the Bookmaking industry, the continually 
opening and closing of different possibilities for TUBE'S development.
The rationalisation of the major firms seriously weakened several of 
the union branches as membership and finances were drained away. But 
the uneven accumulation of capital meant that conditions favourable to 
the expansion of membership and union organisation were constantly 
generated; only to be withdrawn where the process of centralisation 
implied the swallowing of pockets of membership into larger employee 
groupings.
Yet even this process had a contradictory impact on TUBE. The 
membership was not necessarily lost and indeed might play an important 
future role. This, in fact, was the case with the membership of Foy Bros 
in Manchester. In May 1974, Sawford received a request from an 
employee of Alan Carlisle, the firm who had taken over Foy Bros, for 
membership forms. By July, most of the Alan Carlisle employees had 
joined TUBE and Sawford was negotiating to secure recognition on behalf 
of the 65 workers. This illustrated the more positive side of losing
membership through a firm being taken over - eventually the union might reap 
larger rewards. ^  1
1. Jack Rashman had used just this argument in the discussions on the TUBE 
Executive: that the way to secure recognition in the major companies 
was through building support amongst employees in the smaller ones, anticipatin 
their firms would be taken over. See Interview, J. Rashman 5.8.76.
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In other instances, enquiries came from groups of workers 
who had not been members of TUBE before, although with the union 
now lacking the organisational structure to service them properly, 
little membership was sustained. Examples here included Wales, 
where all of the branches had collapsed, yet there were enquiries from 
the employees of Shermans (after their takeover by Equity Enterprises) 
and in Scotland, where the Ladbroke employees showed an interest for 
the first time.
(b) Extent and Limits of Union Autonomy: the Role of Organising
Policies in Union Growth.
Having outlined the various structural influences which affected 
the development of TUBE, it now remains to identify the extent and 
limits of autonomy on the part of the union. What choices could 
be made? How and why were these policies chosen and not others?
Can other crucial influences be identified which do not arise from the 
labour process? This part of the chapter will attempt to answer these 
questions in the context of the historical development of TUBE.
It does, in fact, go a little beyond that. While, initially, 
attention is focussed on TUBE as an independent union during 1971-74, 
it is interesting to draw a contrast with a similar time period following 
the amalgamation with the TGWU. The first section, therefore, looks 
at TUBE; the second, at the TGWU.
(i) TUBE: Union Growth and Organisation; the influence of Organising
Policies.
Two important points must be stressed in any discussion of TUBE 
in this context. Firstly, TUBE was a new union which had developed in 
a non-unionised section of the work force; secondly, it arose primarily 
as an industrial union and remained so throughout its history.
The emergence of a new union immediately poses problems of survival - the 
necessity of adequate finances and resources; the restriction that the 
union should only represent employees within a given industry, serves 
to intensify that pressure.
TUBE developed as a union from the top downwards. From its date of 
formation, the leadership of the union was firmly established while the 
membership were conspicuously absent. Consequently , those in command 
could consciously develop organising policy, in particular directions:
!• With one small qualification, the attempt to recruit casino staff 
in 1973-74.
which groups to recruit or what areas to concentrate on. But such 
policies could only be developed within the more general problems 
of the survival of the union and the ambitions for an industrial union.
This implied an overall policy of general membership expansion within 
the industry; and the rapid and widespread growth of TUBE in 1971-72 
would definitely seem to suggest this was indeed the case - there is 
certainly no record of membership applications being turned down. 
Nevertheless this 'open door' recruitment policy did not preclude 
priorities:in practice, organising policies were selective towards certain 
employee groups and favoured certain areas. This process can be understood 
in terms of four dimensions: job tasks; sex differentiation;
geographical areas; type of firm involved.
(1) Job Tasks.
On the whole, TUBE restricted its activity to the Bookmaking 
industry. Only in one instance did any diversification take place: 
the recruitment of casino workers in the autumn of 1973. This seems 
to have been largely a personal whim on the part of George Sawford, 
although the members were a potential source of much needed finance.
Sawford eventually received a good deal of criticism over the time he
(2)spent on the casino workers.
In a way, it was the exception that proved the rule: TUBE was
The Union of Bookmakers Employees. Yet did the leadership of the union 
attempt to recruit all bookmaking employees? There is some evidence 
to suggest that while Sawford and his fellow Executive members genuinely 
launched a recruitment campaign towards all employee groups, some of the 
groups remained higher on the priority list than others.
1.
2 .
Sawford was at one time a casino worker.
See, for instance, Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75.
TUBE membership figures scarcely exist in any detail, thus 
evidence on recruitment policy is largely impressionistic. Fortunately, 
however, the C.I.R. inquiry into the William Hill Organisation, does 
provide an overall picture of the distribution of membership between 
employee groups, and on a significant scale. Table 6.1 gives the 
results in detail. This shows, not altogether surprisingly since they 
constitute some 60% of the workforce, that LBO managers, cashiers, 
and counter clerks provided the main source of membership for TUBE; 
but of these groups, the managers were disproportionately likely to be 
TUBE members. Indeed more than 28% LBO managers were TUBE members, 
compared with an average figure of 18% for all LBO employees. ^
There is no obvious reason why this should reflect organising 
policies: workers are not, of course, passive recipients of union 
efforts or propaganda. Yet, comparing the levels of actual membership 
with professed support for TUBE, then some explanations must 
bo put forward for the massive discrepancies. The potential support for 
TUBE, as discerned by the CIR, is also set out in Table 6.1. Here the 
proportionate level of support for the four main occupational groups 
in the LBOs is remarkably similar, ranging from 61.5% to 66%. The wide 
discrepancies across occupational groups in terms of actual membership 
have disappeared.
Various explanations may be put forward regarding the differences 
between actual membership and potential support. Jn this particular 
case, employer hostility towards TUBE was probably an important influence. 
This, however, is scarcely likely to explain wide disparities across 1
1. It should be noted that some groups, notably cleaning staff in 
LBOs, were scarcely ever recruited into the union. Significantly, TUBE 
did not seek to represent them in any of their applications to the NIRC.
TABLE 6.1: TUBE Membership and support in William Hill Organisation
Licensed bettinq offices Total TUBE members Support for TUBE ^
Respondents No. Per cent No._______Per cent
Area Supervisors 37 7 18.9 7 18.9
Senior Managers 41 3 7.3 16 39.0
Managers 851 241 28.3 533 62.6
Settlers 141 17 12.1 93 66.0
Counter Clerks/Cashiers 1,036 156 15.1 637 61.5
Boardmarkers 333 27 8.1 209 62.8
Others 18 0 0.0 4 22.2
TOTAL 2,457 451 18.4 1,499 61.0
Administrative and Head Offices
Supervisors 26 4 15.4 11 42.3
■t tiers 88 6 6.8 59 67.1
Genie Operators 19 1 5.3 4 21.1
Racing telephonists 50 6 12.0 31 62.0
Clerical and Admin. Staff 223 11 4.9 88 39.5
Others 73 2 2.7 25 34.2
TOTAL 479 30 6.3 218 45.5
General Total: 2,936 481 16.4 1,717 58.5
(a) i.e. "Staff who wished TUBE to represent them in negotiations with the
Company about pay and conditions.
S°H£ce: ciR (1974b) pp. 14-15.
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occupational categories. The suggestion therefore remains that 
these differences may at least partially reflect the nature of 
TUBE and the objectives pursued by the union and the priority areas 
for recruitment; though the evidence is scarcely conclusive. ^
There is some more impressionistic evidence: representation and
policies at the level of the Executive suggest that TUBE was primarily
(2)a union of LBO settler-managers. It was from this job category
that the majority of TUBE representatives arose, both at local and 
national level; furthermore the reluctance of the leadership to take 
up the issue of the mobility of labour - a strongly expressed grievance 
of the counter clerks - is particularly important since most LBO 
managers were ambivalent on this matter. Finally there was an enquiry 
from Newcastle regarding TUBE, where the sender assumed the union was 
mainly for settler-managers and indeed wondered whether counter clerks 
and similar groups would be admitted.^ 1
1. It might have been the case, for instance, that LBO managers who did not 
wish to join TUBE could effectively prevent other LBO staff from doing so.
The manager was in the crucial position, e.g. opening mail, controlling access 
to telephone etc. besides his general authoritative position. But where 
a LBO manager supported TUBE, he did not possess a symmetrical power to 
persuade other LBO staff to join. Even so, it still begs the question why 
the manager might join, but not the other LBO employees.
2. See above Chapter 5 for a discussion of the composition of the Executive.
3. They asked for advice on a "few points", one of which concerned:
"The position regarding the female counter and board staff, 
most of whom are part-time and working purely for 'pin money"'.
Letter P. Arnold to George Sawford 25.5.72.
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The evidence is clearly circumstantial and somewhat limited: 
yet organising policies are not necessarily blatant, nor without 
contradictions. While TUBE may have been dominated by settler-managers, 
both in terms of representatives and membership, official union policy 
was to embrace all bookmaking employees; and only through expanding 
membership could a sound financial and organisational position be 
achieved and maintained.
(2) Sex Differentiation
The evidence here is even more inconclusive than in terms of job 
categorisation. The sexual division of labour parallels the division 
between settler-managers and counter clerks. Thus, insofar as the 
TUBE leadership and branch activists tried to recruit settler-managers 
rather than counter clerks, this necessarily implied recruiting men 
rather than women. It is possible to speculate that some mutual 
reinforcement did occur - again the letter from Newcastle, where 
women are portrayed as working for pin-money, comes to mind. Nevertheless 
some predominantly female firms did receive support from the TUBE 
Executive: in John Joyce Ltd and Roland Jones Ltd the virtually all­
female workforce received no less backing than other groups in similar 
positions.
Insofar as involvement in a union is related to organising policies 
and insofar as that degree of involvement is reflected in representation 
in the union, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the 
pattern of representation at branch level. Table 6.2 indicates the 
distribution of local branch officers by sex. Of 65 identifiable branch 
officials across the TUBE branch structure, only 12 were women. There is 
no record of any female Chairperson, while the positions of Secretary 
and Treasurer were equally under-represented with only six women
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Table 6.2: TUBE Local Branch Officials by Sex.
(a)
Position Male Female Total
No. % No. % No. %
Chairperson 22 100 - - 22 loo
Secretary 16 73 6 27 22 100
Treasurer 15 71 6 29 21 100
TOTAL: 53 82 12 18 65 100
Source : TUBE Archives
Note (a) These records are as complete as the archive records
allow.
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in each.
The male domination amongst local branch officers, at 82% of 
all positions, thus reinforces the impression gained in the examination 
of the National Executive: TUBE was a male-dominated union in an 
industry using predominantly female labour. The weight of the evidence 
points to TUBE as a male/managerial dominated union; and insofar as 
organising policies reflect the interests and objectives of dominant 
groups within the union, female/counter clerks were of a lower priority.
3. Geographical Distribution.
More definite conclusions can be drawn in terms of geographical 
differentiation. One identifiable aspect is the granting or 
withholding of official sanction by the TUBE leadership in the formation 
of branches; another concerns the provision of organisational support 
to the branches, and where it was absent. The first aspect involves a 
brief examination of branch formation from the perspective of organising 
policies in 1971-72; the second an analysis of how the full-time 
organisers operated in 1973. 1
1. The results are particularly interesting in that they support the 
results of a larger scale analogous study in NALGO: Chairperson 
(or equivalent) was again the most underrepresented position at 5%, 
while Treasurer embraced 10.5% and Secretary 16%. This survey 
included a far wider range of positions, but the overall figure 
for female representation as branch officers was 15.5" - 
remarkably close to the TUBE figure. See NALGO (1975) p.30
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As an Executive without a membership, the TUBE leadership in 
1971 were necessarily anxious to build support and recruit members; 
nevertheless choices had to be made as to where to actively campaign 
for such support. Branch formation may in this way be seen as an 
institutional consequence of organising policy. On the other hand, 
the membership could still organise from within and request official 
approval from the union to be received as a branch. As such, the 
organising policy of the leadership can be seen as essentially passive, 
and, insofar as such requests are granted, indiscriminate in terms of 
recruitment. As regards TUBE, most branch formation was a combination 
of these two processes, an outcome of their dialectical interrelationship. 
Yet at different phases of expansion, such processes were not necessarily 
in balance.
In assessing the three phases of TUBE'S expansion, only in the 
initial phase did the union actively campaign to build membership and 
branches prior to local demands. The efforts to form branches in three 
areas of London and in Birmingham, shortly after the inaugural meeting, 
were not successful. Only one branch resulted, that of London Eastern; 
employees in London and Birmingham did not immediately respond to TUBE'S 
campaigning. On the whole, the Executive had tried to build membership 
in the immediate locality: it is worth remembering the domination on 
the Executive in this early period of the employees of the London-based 
City Tote/Ron Nagle combine.
While the TUBE Executive were ambitious to expand the union, the 
subsequent impetus for local branches came less from the national 
leadership than the local employees. The remaining twelve months of 
expansion was largely the story of Sawford offering TUBE s meagre 
resources to assist local efforts to organise. While certainly not 
passive in the matter, the TUBE leadership, after the initial months, was
cast in a largely responsive mould. Organising policy was thus 
primarily concerned with what areas not to take up.
Generally, the TUBE leadership responded favourably to most 
requests; nevertheless some areas were not supported. While branches 
were formed in the major conurbations requests from the less central, 
rural areas were not followed up. This was true notably in Kent,
South Devon, and East Anglia.
Between the priority areas of the industrial conurbations which 
formed the basis of the TUBE Branch structure, there was little evidence 
of selective organising on a geographical criteria in the period of 
expansion. Although the Executive members spent most of their efforts 
on the organisation inLondon, this did not prevent Sawford, as the only 
full-time official, providing support throughout the country.
Far more pronounced was the selectivity over the phasing of organising 
support and branch formation. This reflected the centralisation of 
power in the union, and the relative autonomy of the Executive in 
determining when resources should be utilised to build which branches.
To this extent, the phasing of branch formation was largely a strategic 
choice on the part of the TUBE Executive: to await the legal backing 
of the unfair dismissal sections in the I.R.A. 1971 before starting 
the second phase of branch formation; and to await formal registration 
under the Act prior to the third phase. Such strategies reflect the 
objectives and interests of those dominant within the union and who 
structured organising policy at least partially in terms of general 
union policy to utilise the IRA 1971.
The elements of conscious choice not to organise certain areas appear 
more clearly with the appointment of the geographically-based full-time 
organisers in 1973. But to the extent that these organisers were 
autonomous, organising policies became more sharply contradictory. Between
them/three full-time organisers covered all TUBE branches and membership. 
The divisions were drawn on geographical lines, with one organiser 
responsible for an area from Birmingham southwards; a second, running 
from Birmingham towards the North-West Scottish border; and a third 
incorporating the North-East of England and Scotland. Clearly the 
coverage of some parts of these areas would only be nominal.
Just as certain areas had not been actively canvassed, despite 
local requests, in 1972, so in 1973 certain areas were not serviced 
either by Sawford or the organisers. The most dramatic example was 
the virtual abandonment of the Welsh branches, even though pockets 
of membership remained some months afterwards. Decisions were made by 
the Executive to put TUBE resources into developing membership elsewhere 
and while branches were being formed in the Midlands and North-West, 
the Welsh branches were receiving little attention.
The elimination of such areas did in part reflect the difficult 
choices faced by the union: how were resources to be allocated where
they were simply insufficient? The Welsh branches were relatively 
difficult to service, given the way the structure of the union had 
developed, and provided only a limited membership potential. This had 
to be weighed against demands and potential elsewhere.
The impact of the area organisers, however, interposed an 
organisational tier between the Executive and local branches. This 
generated a degree of dislocation between the policies of the Executive 
and the practices of the full-time officials. The principles of the 
latter group were indeed rather different. Faced with such wide
1. The interesting question of who does the "weighing and what criteria 
are used is discussed in the conclusions of this chapter.
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geographical areas to service, all of the organisers placed a 
premium on existing loyalties and connections with their 'home' 
branches. But outside of these branches all three were subject to 
criticism over their inactivity. It meant that branches suffered 
which were crucial to the Executive's general strategy, e.g. Manchester 
and Birmingham; while others, e.g. Liverpool, survived in spite 
of the full-time organiser, rather than because of him.
The contradiction between the instrumentality of the full-time 
organisers and the policies of the Executive implied that out-lying areas 
of peripheral significance to the main objectives of the TUBE leadership 
would not be serviced: they were both physically difficult to maintain 
and low on the membership priority list. Yet, where the physical 
problems of servicing and membership priority moved in different directions,
i.e. difficult to service/high priority, easy to servico/Jow priority, 
the outcome of organising policies was less predictable: but largely it 
was resolved in favour of the organisers inactivity. Such contradictions 
did not merely operate in terms of geographical policies, but also 
concerned strategies towards firms - the fourth dimension of organising 
policy.
4• Firm-based differentiation
The general contradiction in the organising policies of the TUBE 
leadership is reflected once again in the dimension of firm-based 
differentiation. This time that contradiction, i.e. the general imperative 
to expand membership in order to survive which nevertheless implied that 
certain priorities would be sought in terms of organising, was resolved in 
favour of the larger firms.
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Throughout TUBE'S history-with the exception of a fairly short 
period in the spring of 1973 - the priority of establishing membership 
in the major companies was never seriously challenged.
TUBE had arisen in the context of changes in a large London-based 
combine; and initially the new Executive had tried to build membership 
in that firm. Subsequently as support developed elsewhere, it became 
clear that membership was expanding rapidly in William Hill and Ladbrokes - 
scarcely surprising given the dramatic expansion of the 'Big Four' 
in this period. The TUBE national officials decided to give priority 
to these groups in their efforts to secure recognition, to the inevitable 
detriment of other groups of actual and potential members. For 
instance, with the impending stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes 
in the Spring of 1973, Sawford was actively campaigning for members 
in these firms and played a leading role in forming the Birmingham and 
Coventry branches; yet, simultaneously, elsewhere in the country, e.g. 
in Wales, where the firms involved were primarily local employers, little 
support was given.
That TUBE showed more interest in recruiting members in the large 
firms did not mean that recruitment and retention of members was any 
easier than in the small ones; the size of LBOs was virtually the same.
Only insofar as the LBOs of the larger firms were closer together and 
in the large towns was there any economy of effort involved. It was 
rather a reflection of the dominant policy amongst the TUBE leadership 
from the outset that the success of the union depended on gaining 
recognition in one of the major companies whereupon all the other firms 
would, sooner or later, fall into line - the domino theory of union success. 
While this perspective was seriously challenged for a brief period in 1973 - 
in the aftermath of the stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes - the 
importance of the efforts to gain recognition in William Hill soon 
came to override all other policy objectives. The attempted resurrection
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of the TUBE branch organisation in late 1973 and early 1974 reflected 
this choice; efforts were concentrated on reforming those branches 
where there was potential or past William Hill membership.
The policy of the national Executive in these matters was not, 
however, always reflected in similar policies at local branch level.
The Executive had developed a pattern of geographically based branches; 
and this necessarily cut across the patterns of firm-based membership.
Hence while some branches were dominated by membership from the large, 
national companies other branches were primarily based on local firms.
The evidence of local branch activities suggests that where branches 
were dominated by particular firms, members from other firms were 
excluded, or opted out, from participation in branch affairs; and given 
there was no other forum for union activities,this also meant the union 
itself. In some cases this meant that membership in the national 
companies declined in branches where membership in local firms were 
dominant, e.g. Liverpool or where membership in one of the major companies 
was dominant, e.g. in Coventry.
(ii) The TGWU: organising policy in the Bookmaking industry, and the
impact on union growth.
While TUBE developed as an industrial union for the bookmaking 
industry, the TGWU was Britain's largest union, with some two million 
members, and recruited in a wide range of industries and occupational 
groups. Therefore the starting point in examining organising policies 
is immediately different. With TUBE the important question was 
given the intention was to develop an industrial union, did organising 
policy focus on particular groups within the industry? What was the 
basis, if any, for selectivity in organising amongst the bookmaking employees? 
The TGWU, on the other hand, as a large general union with a wide
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variety of membership, was involved in an issue which TUBE had 
pre-empted by its very existence: should the union recruit members 
in the bookmaking industry at all? The bookmaking membership was, 
after all, only a small proportion of the TGWU membership.
It is important to see the organising policies of the TGWU 
towards the bookmaking employees as part of the wider interests of 
the total membership of the union. This is developed in the first 
part of the section: what policies were adopted within the TGWU 
towards the building of membership within the Bookmaking Industry?
Once this general question of whether the TGWU was prepared to devote 
resources to organise bookmaking employees has been considered, it then 
becomes possible to analyse which groups of bookmaking employees the 
union particularly sought to recruit. Finally, there is an examination 
of the kind of organisation that was implied by the involvement of 
the TGWU and the impact of the TGWU structure in the development of 
membership amongst bookmaking employees. This will also consider 
and contrast notions of how trade unionism actually develops.
But firstly, how did TUBE fit into the TGWU structure? This is 
an essential precondition for understanding how the TGWU organising 
policies developed in the way which they did; and how the TGWU took 
on the responsibility for organising the bookmaking employees in practice.
The TGWU has a twin structure of geographical and occupational 
organisation and representation. Any member is attached both to a 
trade group, depending on his/her occupation, and to a geographical 
region (there are eleven regions for the whole country). The trade 
groups are represented at district, regional, and national level with 
trade group committees, and can also elect a member to the General 
Executive Council, the policy making body of the union (with the exception 
of the Biennial Delegate Conference which is the supreme policy making body) 1
1 • TGWU (1975) p. 6.
The trade group structure is parallelled by an administrative 
structure at District, Regional and National level, with committees 
at both District and Regional level. The full-time officials are 
attached to the union through this administrative structure. The 
administrative and trade group structures are integrated at the national 
level in the General Executive Committee: while the national trade
groups elect delegates, so do the regions through a membership ballot 
in the region. TUBE comprised one small part of one trade group - 
the white-collar section ACTSS - and the bookmaking membership was 
scattered throughout the eleven regions of the TGWU. Hence the 
membership in bookmaking would, notionally, be organised in local branches 
of bookmaking employees attached to the relevant regions. Where there 
was insufficient membership they would comprise part of a "holding" 
branch until such times as their numbers were sufficiently large to 
warrant a branch of their own. National contact could be achieved through 
the national trade group, i.e. the ACTSS group.
Where there were branches, they would be serviced by a full-time 
official, located at district or regional level. In some instances 
usually at regional level, there would be an ACTS3 official who would 
concentrate his efforts on this particular trade group. At district 
level, however, it was a question of the local official adding this 
membership into his already varied mixture.
It is important to appreciate the position of ACTSS within the 
TGWU. The TGWU developed as a manual union and its membership 
remained predominantly in the so-called manual groups. The ’white-collar' 
membership remained a growing, but less than significant, numerical 
grouping within the union. As such, it does not have a particualarly 
strong position within the union. Hence TUBE became a relatively 
insignificant part of the ACTSS trade group, which itself was a lightweight 
in terms of the power relations within the TGWU. The prominent groups
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within the union could be found in the car industry and general 
engineering. ^  These groups provided most of the TGWU full-time
officials that were interviewed. To that extent AC'l’SS was a poor 
relation within the TGWU and TUBE a poor relation within ACTSS. This 
provides the context for examining the organising policies of the 
TGWU in relation to bookmaking employees.
1. Where to build membership?
The decision of the TGWU to develop membership in bookmaking 
was taken in the context of the interests of the union membership 
as a whole. The decision to amalgamate was taken within that 
context; and the perspectives and activities of full-time officials 
and elected members continually developed from this basis - that was 
the objective position in which they were involved.
To an extent there was little choice: the TGWU did not start 
from scratch. When amalgamation was effected they inherited the TUBE 
membership; admittedly this was rather patchy to say the least, and 
as some officials found to their cost, very much a paper membership.
But nevertheless they did start with substantial membership and 
potentialities in William Hill and with certain strong local groupings 
of membership, e.g. in Liverpool. That membership could either be built 
upon or let go.
Within the TGWU the obvious financial pressures and lack of 
resources which had hampered TUBE were no longer a problem - or so it 
appeared. The largest trade union in Britain could surely muster 
sufficient money and resources to organise the bookmaking employees
1* See TGWU (1975) pp6-7. Note the way in which the trade groups are
set out in a scmi-circle, with the'vehicle building and automotive'
group in the most prominent position; ACTSS is on the extreme right hand edg
if they wanted to. Consequently the options to build membership 
were reasonably open; resources could be put into areas of 'untapped' 
membership if it was so desired.
Looking at the commitment of the TGWU to organise bookmaking 
employees, two specific questions can be asked: Firstly, did the 
TGWU after the amalgamation provide special arrangements for the 
building of this membership over and above the normal structures of 
recruitment into the union? Secondly, what was the impact of 
the normal patterns of recruitment, i.e. the existing structure of 
local full-time officials within the TGWU, in organising the bookmaking 
employees?
The priorities given by the TGWU to organising membership in the
bookmaking industry manifested themselves in two particular ways. The
first concerns the position of the National Organiser, at this time
Moss Evans who was destined to become the General Secretary shortly
J . „ ( 1 )afterwards and whose job it was "to enthuse officers into organising 
One of the areas which Moss Evans took up with some enthusiasm 
concerned organising the workers within the horseracing industry, 
of which the TUBE membership was a part. Secondly, there was the 
question of organising at the local level; and here the inherited 
full-time officials from TUBE, who had now become full-time officials 
in the TGWU, Andrew Long and George Sawford, were given special 
dispensation within their jobs in order to organise bookmaking employees.
A closer examination of the position of Moss Evans as National 
Organiser, suggests this was primarily a troubleshooter function, 
involving areas that were difficult to handle through the normal TGWU 
structure; to that extent the taking over of membership in bookmaking 
without recognition in the major companies clearly could fall into that 
category of warranting special attention. The newly acquired bookmaking
1. Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76.
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membership complemented the efforts of Moss Evans in co-ordinating
the building of union organisation in the horseracing industry
and in expanding the influence of the TGWU into the institutions of
that industry. The TGWU already had membership in the Totalisator
employees (indeed this had been a selling point in persuading
the TUBE Executive to amalgamate) as well as amongst the stable lads.
The TUBE membership thus gave the TGWU a monopoly within the 
industry. Yet none of the sections were that strongly organised, 
hence the involvement of the National Organiser.
Even within his own terms of reference, Moss Evans gave priority 
to the TUBE membership:
"I have spent a lot of time (on TUBE). I've spent more 
time attempting to develop organisation in the industry 
perhaps (than in other industries)". (1)
While Moss Evans performed his troubleshooting role at national level
was his enthusing effective locally? How did the special dispensation
given to Sawford and Long work out in practice? For a time both
were given some freedom to develop bookmaking membership. Sawford,
for instance, was given special responsibility in 1975 for building
membership in the home counties and for reforming branches in London.
His efforts, however, were not successful. By September 1976 his work on
TUBE had diminished:
"I'm doing very little on TUBE now. I'm doing Sainsbury's.
Road Transport, JICs and so on. Therefore TUBE doesn't get 
half the attention it should." (2)
Whatever the policy of the TGWU nationally, at local level the
priority given to Andrew Long and George Sawford to organise in
bookmaking had been substantially eroded within two years of amalgamation.
In the case of Andrew Long, as early as 1975 he was under pressure
fi‘om senior officials in the TGWU to broaden his horizons as an organiser:
!• Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
2- Interview George Sawford 27.9.76.
"It is hard to orient to the TGWU. As an Officer you 
have to service other industries. I try to give as much 
time as possible to TUBE, about three days a week.
It involves a lot of footwork. I use buses (I haven’t 
a car) and I've got about three hours to get around as 
many shops as I can." (1)
The reduction in the special dispensation given to Sawford and Long
soon made its mark on the lay activists amongst the bookmaking
employees. Fred Martin, for instance, who was still trying to
organise membership in East London, commented:
"When the TGWU first took over, Andrew Long's first job 
meant he was sent to a plastics factory to settle a 
strike. He didn't know anything about it. We needed 
all we had - as if they couldn't have found somebody else!
Once they got us they seemed to ignore us." (2)
Thus the reality of events at the local level appears in some contrast
to the national policy expressed by the National Organiser. Soon
after the amalgamation this contradictory position within the TGWU
towards the bookmaking employees was brought into very sharp relief
for Fred Martin in his efforts to organise an East London branch:
"Moss Evans said although you need 50 members to form a 
branch they'd accept 25. When I got 27, I phoned George 
Sawford. He was out, so I phoned Bert Fryer (TGWU official 
in London) - I had more chance of talking to George. I 
got on to some assistant who said it was out of the question.
They said we're cutting down on branches in London. I had 
to ask if we were talking about the same thing. There are no 
branches in London, I said, which is why all those cards are 
going into the head office." (3)
This illustrates the tensions between the activities of the National 
Organiser and the local branch bureaucracies. The troubleshooting 
role of Moss Evans necessarily meant the rules might be bent on occasions 
in this case it was arguably better for TUBE branches to exist with
Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75 
Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75 
Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75
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below the required membership as a platform for expansion. But 
the local administrative controls could effectively cut across 
these kinds of initiatives.
There was, however, a further limitation on the activities
of Andrew Long and George Sawford and this concerns the areas they
were allowed to cover. In the days of an independent TUBE, Sawford
and Long between them had serviced all the TUBE branches throughout
the country. Not so under the TGWU. The 'special dispensation'
only applied to the region in which they wore employed: hence
George Sawford was restricted to the London area, and Andrew Long to
Leeds. This was a cause of great frustration to the cx-TUBE officials;
"I can't service Liverpool - its out of my area. Its 
frustrating to know that branches need servicing. In 
Liverpool it isn't good, the officers service other 
industries." (1)
This raises the important question of the position of local officials 
in developing organising policies. During the course of the 
research, a number of TGWU full-time officials were interviewed.
In all cases they were officials in areas where TUBE membership 
existed prior to amalgamation or where membership had developed 
under the TGWU. To that extent they represented the full-time 
officials who were perhaps more interested in bookmaking emp]oyees 
than most. Some were regionally based ACT.^ S officers while others 
were local officers handling a variety of membership.
Three key questions can be raised concerning the role of the full-time 
officials in relation to the expansion of union growth and organisation 
amongst bookmaking employees. Firstly, how did they organise groups
Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75
of employees; what were the methods of recruitment? Secondly, 
what autonomy did they possess in making decisions on organising 
policies? Thirdly, did the officials have any particular awareness 
of the problems of organising the bookmaking employees within the 
structure of the TGWU?
Firstly the methods of recruitment. With little , if any,
exception, all of the officials interviewed supported Bain's
characterisation of the full-time official as primarily a passive
recipient of new members. This applied generally to all groups of
employees as well as specifically to the bookmaking employees. As
one full-time official commented:
"I spend very little time on TUBE. I suppose if I had 
nothing else to do I could do a job on bookmakers in 
Liverpool. I could go round the shops. But we don't 
operate that way." (1)
Hie point is clearly made: full-time officials in the TGWU were
not to be found campaigning around widely distributed LBOs in order 
to recruit membership. If the members came along, all well and good.
The full-time officials might not only gain such membership through 
approaches from local employee groups. In at least one case, a full-time 
official had been asked by his Regional Secretary to take on members 
in bookmaking.
Passivity in recruitment was sometimes matched by passivity in 
terms of sustaining and developing the membership. Even where full­
time officers had bookmaking membership on their books this did not 
necessarily imply a change in attitude. Some declared they had no 
time to service the members and would merely wait for the numbers to 
increase without providing support. But, in contrast, some full-time
1 . Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76. My emphasis.
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officials showed a live interest in developing their bookmaking 
membership. Terry Austin in Birmingham, for instance, was supportive 
after the amalgamation :
"We circulated a rc.cruijnent letter throughout the region, 
he got twelve replies. The management - they always get 
copies somehow of everything we send out - said it was a 
big improvement on hat had been sent out before." (1)
Such differences in attitude proved increasingly important the
more autonomy local officials possessed over organizing policy.
The role of the national organiser is interesting in this respect;
his job was to "enthuse" organisers into organising - which
immediately suggests that he possessed little more than powers of
persuasion and indicates an absence of centralised control within the
union. To a large degree this proved a fair reflection on how the 
TGWU operated in relation to the everyday tasks of recruitment and 
organising the membership, indicating the autonomy, within broad 
guidelines, of the full-time officials in the regions.
The extent of this autonomy can be seen in terms of the impact 
of the amalgamation on TUBE membership. Within a matter of months 
areas of strong TUBE membership were in decay. One particular 
example was that of Manchester, where the TGWU had ironically assisted 
in the revitalisation of the branch in the Summer of 1974, prior to the
official amalgamation date. But where, nevertheless, by 1975, the
branch had collapsed. As Jack Rashman later commented:
"The organiser of the TGWU didn't know if he was coming or 
going. He just had an extra task on his plate." (2)
Interview Terry Austin 23.6.75. 
Interview Jack Rashman 5.8.76.
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At the same time interest in other areas prompted an expansion of
membership in bookmaking employees. This was notably true in
Scotland where the Glasgow branch had begun to thrive under the
influence of a new Branch Secretary, Roy Brown, and assisted by an
enthusiastic full-time official. They built up a strong membership
in Brown's own firm, J.Coral Ltd, and which provided a solid branch
structure for the campaign amongst the Ladbroke workers.
In cases such as Scotland, and also Newcastle, the amalgamation
with the TGWU in providing keen full-time officials had proved
beneficial in expanding union membership. The reputation of TUBE
in these areas was in fact poor - a legacy of the 1973 stoppages.
The TGWU presented a fresh image which won the support of many members
who would not have rejoined TUBE.
On the whole the local officials were free to decide on their
priorities. They had many and varied areas to cover. Consider the
responsibilities of one ACTSS Officer:
"I am the only ACTCS officer for 7,500 members in the whole 
of this region. That includes bookmaking employees and other 
ACTSS groups." (1)
He had a relatively high number of bookmaking employees in membership 
at this time, approximately 300; but even that was only a small 
proportion of the total membership which he had to service. Choices 
had to be made on which members had to be serviced and which members 
suffered.
Those officials who did make serious efforts to expand 
the bookmaking membership soon realised there were inherent limits to 
their local efforts; they had to move beyond the regional boundaries
i- Interview Bernard McCardJe 31.8.76
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of the TGWU structure. For instance, Terry Austin in 1976 called 
a national meeting of union representatives amongst the J.Coral Group, 
plus Andrew Long and George Sawford, to discuss the possibility of 
a national campaign amongst the J.Coral employees. The limitations 
of local success were indeed appreciated by Bernard McCardle in 
Newcastle in the context of building up the Ladbroke membership at a 
time when a national campaign in Ladbrokes was supposed to be taking 
place:
"Our achievements have been on a local basis. We tried to 
extend nationally, I approached Moss Evans, but the information 
was very sketchy. This concerned our members. Why is it no 
good elsewhere? The national campaign seems to have done 
more harm than good. I feel we'll never get anywhere if 
there is nothing in Birmingham or London and so on." (1)
The problem for local full-time officials concerned the expansion
of membership in national companies on a local basis. The large
bookmaking companies were not prepared to concede local recognition;
and even where membership was substantial, as in Newcastle at this
time, the union lacked the muscle to enforce it.
To conclude: the TGWU possessed an overall commit ment to developing
membership in the bookmaking industry as part of an overall policy 
of expanding membership in the horseracing industry - which in turn 
was part of a wider policy of expanding into new areas of untapped 
membership. Yet while this appeared as the official national policy 
of the union, it is evident that local officials could and did have 
a large say in whether they recruited in certain areas; and that their 
recruitment methods were usually passive, responding to approaches from 
employee groups rather than campaigning actively to expand or even to 
sustain existing membership.
!• Interview Bernard McCardle 31.8.76.
2. What membership was organised?
Since the major question on organising policy was whether or not 
to recruit any members in the bookmaking industry, it is scarcely 
surprising that there was rather less emphasis on precisely which 
employee groups within bookmaking to recruit than in the days of TUBE. 
Furthermore, the TGWU already effectively discriminated against 
certain sorts of employees with their widespread use of a passive 
organising policy; for instance, this implied that potential members 
would be largely self-supportive in their local organisation - which 
might exclude groups lacking the time or confidence to effectively 
organise without the help of a full-time official.
But in terms of the dimensions considered in the discussion of TUBE,*1* 
the TGWU did not face the same problems as TUBE in relation to financial
and organisational resources. The evidence from the interviews of the 
full-time officials and observation of the development of union 
membership and organisation under the TGWU does not suggest any conscious 
discrimination against certain job tasks or sex specific to bookmaking 
employees; nevertheless, the general principles of organising adopted 
by the full-time officials could effectively eliminate certain groups of 
actual or potential membership. There appeared a general reluctance 
to spend a disproportionate amount of time on groups where the 'rewards' 
were 'small', manifested in a lack of practical emthusiasm for part-time 
or women workers, which constituted a large part of the potential 
bookmaking membership. But this does not appear to have been a conscious 
decision in relation to bookmaking employees.
Again, in part, this reflected the role of full-time officers as 
passive recipients of membership who effectively left the details
1. Tlie four sources of differentiation were specified in terms of 
sex; job tasks; geographical areas; and firms.
of organisation to the local lay officials; hence any real 
differentiation would take place before the full-time official 
was involved. This suggests that the full-time officials might 
be more influential in decisions affecting recruitment in the other 
dimensions of geographical and firm-based differentiation. This 
would seem to be justified: already it has been shown how the 
development of membership on a geographical basis was largely 
discretionary depending on the defined priorities of the local 
officials; now the policy towards which firms to organise must be 
examined, a policy which was uniform throughout national and local 
levels of the union in emphasising the building of membership in the 
larger firms, notably the national companies.
In the three year period after amalgamation the TGWU developed 
campaigns in throe of the major companies. The first, in 107-1 — 75, 
built on the TUBE membership in William Hill with Moss Evans playing 
an active co-ordinating role across the various regions. Despite 
effective localised industrial action in Leeds and Hull the union were 
unable to secure recognition from the company. The second campaign 
was in Ladbrokes, which flowed from the refusal of the Ladbroke 
workers in the West of Scotland to accept the level of wage increases 
offered to them by the company in summer 1975. They immediately 
joined the union and the dispute became one of union recognition with 
some 300 Ladbroke workers in this area on an indefinite strike, 
eventually resulting in the closure of virtually all the Ladbroke LBOs 
in the West of Scotland for nearly six months. The TGWU, who had 
quickly made the strike official, soon tried to extend the dispute 
into areas south of the border. The response was patchy as was the
enthusiasm of some of the local officials; and the dispute was not
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effectively widened. Eventually the strikers were to receive 
paltry financial compensation for their efforts at the Industrial 
Tribunal. Following the defeat of the Ladbrokes dispute, attention 
soon turned to the J.Coral Group. This derived primarily from the 
efforts of J.Coral employees in Essex and East London who built 
up a substantial membership on their own initiative. Again the 
union tried to widen the dispute and a national conference was 
called in Birmingham by Terry Austin, the ACTSS officer in that 
region. Yet again support was uneven across the country.
While the building of national campaigns in the national companies 
may have put some pressure on local officials to recruit members in 
bookmaking, as regards local firms the full-time officers possessed 
a large element of discretion. On the whole the TGWU were not really 
interested in recruiting in either small firms or small units; 
and some expressed incredulity at the activities of the former TUBE 
officials:
"I've got Andrew Long working with me. Its a different world.
He's chasing round like a blue-arsed fly. One member here 
and two there, he doesn't understand the world we operate in.
He's picked up a bit, but he's still out of his depth." (1)
Clearly Andrew Long had not learnt the 'real' world of the trade union
official: small units and small firms were not worth the bother.
Those officers, such as Andrew Long, who were prepared to put in the
effort found the problems exactly as they had been under TUBE in
organising the bookmaking employees, despite the resources of the TGWU:
"My main problem is organising - to get' people to a meeting.
The shops arc spread over an area and its hard to get them 
all together. The collection of subscriptions is the worst.
Its impossible to visit each office weekly. Arrears become 
a problem and people have to be reapproached and its hard to 
get them back once they've resigned. We go in for check-off 
as soon as we can and they (the management) know this is our 
problem and they make trouble for the people who collect for us. (2)
Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76.
^• Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75.
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Membership in local firms is impossible to estimate*1'. it is 
difficult enough even to find whether any agreements have been 
secured with local companies. But it is still reasonably clear 
the membership in local firms in the regions investigated had usually 
collapsed since amalgamation. In Manchester, London, and Newcastle 
for instance membership in previously organised firms under TUBE had 
disappeared without trace. Even in areas of real strength, the 
membership and organisation had dwindled and deteriorated under the 
TGWU, such as in Liverpool. The general policy of the TGWU thus 
emphasised the large, national companies to the exclusion of the local 
firms. If the full-time officials were going to spend time on 
bookmaking employees it was likely to be in the context of the 
national firms rather than local ones; but again the autonomy and 
priorities of local officials proved significant in determining precise 
policies towards recruitment in this area.
3. Power relationships within the TGWU: Organising policies and the
implications for union growth.
There is an immediate contrast to be drawn between the TGWU and 
TUBE which had profound implications for organising policy. TUBE, 
while embracing contradictions between local and national level, had 
developed with a strong leadership co-ordinating a central and indeed 
national policy towards the expansion of membership and organisation.
The TGWU, while emphasising the role of national co-ordination, 
encompassed a large degree of local autonomy. The amalgamation thrust 
the organising of the bookmaking employees into a union with a different 
balance of power relationships within its structure which had particular 
implications for the development of membership amongst the bookmaking 
employees._____ ____________________ _________ ______________________
1. The TGWU do not keep centralised records of bookmaking members.
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Firstly there was the movement from centralised control to 
that of co-ordination which necessitates a more detailed examination 
of the role of National Organiser within the TGWU. In September 
1974, George Sawford remained highly optimistic about the outcome 
of the amalgamation ;the industry would be "sewn up” under the TGWU 
in a couple of years.^ Moss Evans had clearly made a strong 
impression:
"Moss has a lot on his plate. That man has so much work on 
his plate." (2)
Yet within twelve months the full realisation of what amalgamation
meant had begun to impress itself on the old TUBE activists; and a
major complaint was the lack of direction at the national level:
"They'll never get anywhere in this industry until they get 
a national officer; and I can't see that happening because 
the TGWU are trying to save money, not spend it." (3)
This was a continuous criticism reflecting the relative powerlessness
of the National Organiser in achieving concrete results:
"It all comes back to having a National Officer. We'll never 
succeed until we get one. Someone who will get the Regional 
Secretaries to get their finger out." (4)
In other words the power of the Regional Secretaries was certainly
sufficient, that if they did not wish to spend their time organising
bookmaking employees, there was little that could be done to force them
to do so. This, of course, undermined the efforts in other areas.
Since most of the membership was in the major, national companies,
Regional Secretaries who were not prepared to organise bookmaking
employees necessarily undermined the efforts of those who did try, given
the significance of national membership in these companies. Within
the existing structure of the TGWU there seemed little that could bo done
to overcome this problem._____________________ ________________________
Interview George Sawford 23.7.74.
2• Interview George Sawford 12.9.74.
Interview George Sawford 6.10.75.
Interview George Sawford 16.2.76.
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Sawford found himself particularly stymied at times in his efforts
to expand membership. For instance during the Ladbroke dispute
with 300 Ladbroke workers on strike in Glasgow and the union at
the national level trying to widen the dispute into England, Sawford
outlined the action taken in London concerning the dispute:
"Sod all. I need authority to call a meeting and spend money.
To call a meeting you need adverts, hall bookings and so on.
I can't get assistance from the regions. Like other firms, 
costs are going up and the powers that be obviously feel that 
the money could be better spent elsewhere." (1)
The ability of the Regional Secretaries to restrict activities in
their regions necessary undermined the efforts of national co-ordination.
Sometimes criticism was made, perhaps unfairly, at the full-time
officers who did take national initiatives rather than those who did
nothing. The following comment was made in relation to the organising
of a national campaign meeting in the J.Coral Group:
"Far be it for me to criticise a fellow officer, but I thought 
there was a complete lack of organisation. He should have 
ensured the attendance of other officers. Why wasn't there
anyone from Manchester or Liverpool? There was no-one from 
Wales and most important of all from Bristol - the biggest 
concentration of Coral's shops in the country. Why wasn't 
there anyone from there? Southampton too. Also there is 
not enough lay membership involved.” (2)
The immediate impact of this discrepancy between notional policy and
actual practice implied that internal problems within the TGWU had to be
overcome before any meaningful expansion could take place. Quite
clearly, in some areas, the expansion of membership at all was
problematic; but within the TGWU structure the lack of an effective
national co-ordinating policy at precisely the time when the major
companies were consolidating their positions as national companies, militated
against any coherent and prolonged expansion of membership in any
Particular area. This was a problem which TUBE had faced and had
1.2. Interview George Sawford 6.10.75Interview (Name withheld) The comment was made some eight days after 
the national campaign meeting on J.Coral Ltd in February 1976.
failed to resolve, apparently because of their lack of resources;
but now Britain's largest trade union could not solve it either -
this, however, was an expression of the priorities of the full-time
officials and the interests of dominant membership groups in
influencing the utilisation of resources within the union. The
availability of resources within the TGWU was in many respects only
notional for the majority of bookmaking employees.
A further dimension to the question of regional autonomy and
national co-ordination concerned the inter-communication between
regions and branches - or rather the lack of it. Under the TUBE
structure communication had proved a problem: it had been a major
complaint from various branches that they were in ignorance of what
was happening. But within the TGWU it was now commonplace that what
happened in one region was not known in another - certainly amongst
local activists. Any communication which took place was largely
informal. This even applied to Sawford himself:
"There's no organisation. I don't know what's going on.
You probably know more than me. The regions won't spend 
any money. The only way I learn about anything is through 
the 'Sporting life'. (1)
The structure of any union reflects the power relationships within 
that union; and the extent to which the TGWU were prepared to organise 
(or not to organise) bookmaking employees reflects the dominance of 
certain groups within the union and the consequent priorities in union 
policies - even if these were not explicitly articulated. It meant 
the TGWU structure could encompass employee groups of a particular kind: 
primarily factory-based units in limited localities. This, however, 
implied more than just an organisational mismatch which could be corrected
1. Interview George Sawford 6.10.75.
if only the 'right' administrative structures were introduced; 
it also implied a particular view of trade unionism and how it 
develops. Some groups of workers could be readily defined as trade 
unionists; others, however, even if they wanted to organise 
collectively could not be considered in the same way at all. 
Furthermore, there was a correct way in which trade unionism 
developed; other methods were distinctly inferior and not the real 
thing at all.
The background of nearly all of the TGWU officials interviewed 
was that of the motor car industry. Their experiences were based 
in the workplace model of union organisation, which emphasised the 
importance of self-activity in generating union organisation and 
the corresponding passivity of the full-time official. But organising 
bookmaking employees in a wide number of geographically distributed 
units was a very different problem than organising car workers that 
worked within a limited geographical area and who were in daily 
and regular contact with each other. Some of the full-time officials 
asserted the superiority of the workplace model as THE way in which 
trade unionism can and must develop. One described his six years 
as an ACTSS officer:
"I had a different union background. I was in the car
industry. Areas these days are not trade unionism. You
can't use traditional methods at all. It's like running
on the spot dealing with these people. They've no inkling
of trade unionism. Some do have previous experience, but
mostly they're dreadful. I can't go along with some white-collar
officials; they say join us and we'll do it all for you. I
say if you can't stick up for yourselves I can't do anything
for you." (1)
Such views also embrace a scepticism about the naivety of the members 
when they do join the union:
1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76.
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"We offer umbrella assistance. We address meetings. We’re 
asked what is the union going to do for us? I joined 
tonight, can I have a rise tomorrow"? (1)
And as if to reinforce this view, very often the union members
don't 'stick up' for themselves. As one full-time official commented
on the collapse of a recently formed branch during the Ladbroke
dispute :
"I am afraid matters have fallen very flat with Ladbrokes.
Our membership have not shown the 'stool' which is necessary 
with such a company and our organisation hardly exists 
anywhere in the country." (2)
And amongst some full-time officials the reality that the struggle
in bookmaking was in fact a national one had not been fully grasped,
expressing a degree of naivety about how the affairs of their
bookmaking membership might be handled with parallelled the 'workplace'
model of unionism; that all that was needed was to build the
membership and go in and negotiate with the employer:
"When the membership comes we go in and say 'you're lagging 
behind, what about this and that'?" (3)
Such a view indicates how a background in the car industry - or any
other similar workplace - colours the attitude of the official to
trade unionism as a whole; one which is consistent with local
negotiation in the setting of a factory organisation, but generally
inappropriate to bookmaking employers whose local LBOs might provide only
a small minority of their business and who take the view (for some years
(4)
past) that local negotiations were out of the question.
The other side of the 'workplace' model which the full-time 
officials espoused was the effect it had on the lay activists and
membership. The paradox of the self activity model is that far from
Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76
2. Letter D.Buckle to author 27.10.75 
^• Interview Fred Palmer 13.8.76
It is true that many negotiations are carried out at the national level, 
including the car industry itself. But this does not deny the traditions 
of local bargaining which strongly influenced this generation of union
officials.
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encouraging the self activity amongst the membership, this line
of approach from the full-time officials may merely serve to
disenchant lay activists in their efforts to build local union
organisation. This was evident in the experiences of Fred Martin
who was trying to rebuild the London Eastern branch. *** Shirley
Warren, a former member of the TUBE Executive and still active
locally in the TGWU at this time, had similar views:
"The TGWU? Freddie Martin said all they wanted was the 
name and numbers. They haven't done anything - wouldn't 
even put an advert in for members .....
"The TGWU? they haven't got a very good name. Freddie 
Martin was the only one who really opposed it (amalgamation).
He knew from the docks. He wanted Clive Jenkins. I know 
why he did now. He said they wouldn't do anything and they 
haven't." (2)
Freddie Martin himself echoed these sentiments:
"Since (the amalgamation) most London delegates have boon 
disappointed with the TGWU. I believe in the provinces 
they seem to get a lot of help. Here we were promised the 
TGWU would get two ex or retired officers with the sole job 
of talking to employers." (3)
'Hie impression amongst many of the TUBE activists that after amalgamation
TUBE would retain something of an independent identity was not borne
out in their experience. For instance:
"George Sawford said there would be a newspaper every eight 
weeks . Its been promised since we started. TUBE 
had a press officer but that's fizzled. The TGWU said 
'everything at your disposal'. We can get everything 
printed". (4)
But the only newspaper the bookmaking employees ever received was the 
same as all the other TGWU members: the Record.
Fred Martin's comment that perhaps the activists in the provinces 
were receiving more support than the London based ones had some 
justification; Scotland, Newcastle, and Leeds had been revitalised.
see earlier discussion in this section.
Interview Shirley Warren 24.8.76
Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75. The officials never materialised. 
Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75
On the other hand, the solid Liverpool membership had undergone
some near disasters before finally the local activists and their
full-time official had sorted out their respective difficulties.
But pernaps the most continually successful partnership was struck
in Hull, where the TUBE Branch Secretary, Ron Grantham, operated
closely with his full-time officer, Terry Dunn. Yet even here tnis
was no measure of a general enthusiasm with the activities of the 'l'GWU:
"Membership has fallen off in the last two months due to the 
TGWU's lack of action. I wrote to Moss Evans and had a 
reply - I always go to the top, I don't mess around with 
little people - I wrote to Moss Evans and said I was totally 
dissatisfied (every time I threaten to resign something's 
been done) witn action taken in London and if I hadn't 
received written notification of forming branches in London,
I'd resign. Moss Evans replied that it may seem bureaucratic 
but I should go through the Area Manager and go through the 
chain. It wasn't very satisfactory. I said I must be able 
to contact Moss Evans - I'm an individual in that respect 
and I've got the right to use my own tongue. The effects 
were not very resounding. I doubt if the Area Manager voiced 
my words." (1)
To conclude: the patterns of power relationships within the union,the
consequent structure and defined objectives, embracing a particular 
view of the nature of trade unionism, all militated against the 
expansion of membership in the bookmaking industry. Yet the relative 
autonomy of local officials in relation to organising policies could 
and did have beneficial effects in promoting the growth of membership 
and organisation; but when it is realised that the basis of that 
local autonomy did not derive from any inherently democratic processes, 
but was more correctly a reflection of the relative power of different 
membership groups within the union - dominated by the factory based, 
localised, membership - then it is apparent local autonomy in organising 
policies held no particular advantage for bookmaking employees. This, 1
1' Interview Ron Grantham 14.5.75. An interesting slippage in his 
uso the term 'Area Manager' instead of 'Regional Official' which 
r<,flects Ron Grantham's view that the union was controlled from the top.
coupled with the notion of self-activity as a basis for union 
development and the passivity of the full-time official, meant 
that potential organisation amongst bookmaking employees was 
effectively discouraged in various parts of the country.
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(c) Concluding Discussion.
The objective of this chapter has been two-fold: to show 
the labour process as an important focus in understanding the 
course of unionisation; while nevertheless indicating that union 
policies did possess a certain autonomy, that choices were possible. 
The first point seems substantiated by the discussion in section 1 
on the expansion and contraction of TUBE; the second by the 
analysis of organising policies both within TUBE and the TGWU, in 
section 2. But, to conclude, it is instructive to draw the threads 
together a little tighter.
That both aspects have been given a measure of empirical 
validation is not surprising; both can be seen as deriving from the 
essential contradiction of trade unionism outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter - that trade unions must take an organisational form 
within capitalism. The outcome implies trade unions arc primarily 
responsive organisations on terms not of their own choosing, while 
they comprise workers who can take action and influence their own 
futures.
Since capital owns and controls the means of production (including 
economic activity in non-productive sectors), ultimately it is 
employers who determine how work is organised, how labour processes 
are performed. In consequence, it is employers, as agents of capital, 
who are instrumental in developing the conditions for unionisation.
The existence and continuity of trade unionism must therefore depend 
on the vagaries of capitalist development.
Section 1, on the fortunes of TUBE, reveals this quite clearly.
It locates patterns of membership recruitment and branch formation in 
terms of the unevenness of capital accumulation, mediated through the 
labour process; and analyses the decline of the union in terms of
rationalisation. ' Here this influence can be expanded to
include the determination of the organisational problems faced by 
the union. Quite simply, many of the material obstacles to 
TUBE’S activity arose primarily from the structure of the industry - 
the way in which work was organised.
The widely distributed, small work units of the LBO structure 
implied serious organisational problems. How were branches of the 
union to be set up? On the basis of firms - which might cover a 
massive area - or geographically - which would raise problems of 
the interrelationship of employees from different firms within the 
branch? TUBE opted for geographical branches - each still covering 
a large area because of the widespread distribution of LBOs and posed 
travel problems for members wishing to attend. The use of wom-n 
workers in the industry - increasingly as part-timers - meant many 
members had special problems of attendance at branch meetings due to 
domestic commitments.
The structure of the industry did not merely militate against 
branch activity; it made collecting subscriptions difficult and time-
( 2)consuming, threatening the financial viability of the union as a whole.
It also undermined membership, since once an employee had fallen behind 
in subscriptions, there was usually some reluctance to pay arrears.
Such problems were compounded by the high rates of employee turnover, 
a feature of the industry.
These influences necessarily constrained the choices of the union 
members at both national and local level. The national leadership were
This would seem to comprise a severe criticism of the restrictiveness 
°f the industrial relations system as a focus for analysis, a point made 
earlier in this chapter in the discussion of Flanders.
* 90% of the subscriptions were transferred from the branch funds to
the central account.
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confronted by these severe organisational problems - recruitment/ 
retention of membership, lack of finance, erratic branch activity - 
in developing union policy and strategy. The local activists, 
faced with the failure of the union at the national level to cope 
with the problems, had to take them up themselves: encourage 
participation in the union, or use the branch committee as a proxy 
for the branch itself.
Quite clearly, union activists at both national and local levels 
were not passive recipients of these processes - they themselves could 
influence the seriousness of the problems - but the prior context 
was not their choice; it derived from the way the structure of the 
industry had developed and the organisation of work in small units.
The influence of capital accumulation, through the labour process, 
is not merely one of constraint. It did, after all, provide the 
basis for unionisation! The impact of capital accumulation must be seen 
as contradictory: although it generates the conditions for unionisation
through the labour process, it provides constraining influences on 
the consequent development of employee organisations. One interesting 
aspect of this general contradiction brought out in section 1, was 
the way the process of centralisation of capital might eliminate a union 
presence in a firm, only for unionisation to resurface at a later stage 
in the enlarged company.
It is also important to realise that such contradictions in 
capital accumulation did not merely affect developing branch and membership 
organisation, but also laid preconditions for the potential of union 
action generally: the development of national firms, for instance, 
provided the potential for national action by TUBE. Although setting 
increasingly higher membership targets and greater problems of union 
organisation, the establishing of national firms both allowed and 
occasioned national union action which could potentially bring the
- ' 12-
geographically based branches into a more cohesive relationship;(1> 
despite increasing material obstacles, national action was on the 
agenda, a potentially unifying force as much as a sectionally divisive
one.
Given the way in which the development of TUBE'S organisation and 
action can be linked, through the labour process, to patterns of 
capital accumulation, is there much left for union autonomy? Just 
how 'free' were bookmaking employees to make their own history?
There are two questions here: what choices were available and how 
were they made?
In the discussion of TUBE in both sections 1 and 2, tin 
contingency of organising policy on the preconditions of labour process 
changes was evident. Attempting to organise membership where 
retailing bookmaking had yet to make an impression was not usually 
successful. Perhaps the main area of choice was in the timing of 
branch formation, over which the Executive asserted some control; 
but they scarcely had any measure of real choice to deny significant 
areas of membership the opportunity to form a branch - the priority of 
survival being paramount.
This, perhaps, raises the fundamental question of autonomy: to 
what extent can structural pressures be overcome? Vftiile workers 
can determine their existence, their position in the labour process, 
the utility of employee organisations, will affect their ability to do so 
The history of struggles within bookmaking has shown the ability of 
employers to withstand pressure from employees. The most dramatic 
example - the Ladbrokes dispute in Glasgow and the West of Scotland - 
indicates the relative comfort of the employer involved in a dispute
national "action" is not just industrial action (e.g. strikes) , 
hut the wider co-ordination of employee involvement (e.g. firm-based 
structures within the union).
with more than 300 LBO workers. But what of employee organisations?
Could they challenge the pressures of retailing bookmaking?
The contrast between TUBE and the TGWU is interesting here for 
it illustrates the difference in resources which the unions commanded 
and the potential this implied. For TUBE, the limited organisational 
and financial resources were crippling. The material obstacles were 
immense, even for a relatively enthusiastic membership. They 
placed inherent limits on organising policies irrespective of political 
will. In contrast, for the TGWU to provide an effective structure, 
it was largely a question of political will. TUBE could never have 
managed to pay the Ladbroke workers strike pay for one day, let 
alone the six months which the TGWU financed. TUBE struggled to 
sustain any full-time officers, but the TGWU employed them as a matter 
of course. The extent of autonomy is dependent on resources.
A further point: if a challenge to the various implications of 
retailing bookmaking could be developed how could it be carried through? ^ 
Men and women may make history, but some more so than others. The 
opposition to retailing bookmaking at the workplace might tiave achieved 
certain concessions over pay and conditions, even labour mobility 
to an extent, but it could scarcely have halted it per se. That kind 
of challenge demands a political response and political power. Again 
look at the contrast between TUBE and TGWU in terms of resources and 
political muscle. Autonomy must be related to the levels at which 
structural influences operate and can be opposed.
This, perhaps, delineates the parameters of choice, but does not 
indicate how they are made. The latter question must be understood 
in relation to the problem of union survival and the different implications
1. The relationship between employer and union objectives is taken 
up in Chapter 7.
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of different policies that unions may pursue. Ultimately, 
decisions on which employees are organised are made on economic 
grounds: without finance, the union ceases to exist. This was 
the perpetual problem for TUBE, and their all-embracing organising 
policies must be seen in this context. Nevertheless, once unions 
develop, the way they are structured may serve to deter certain groups 
of potential members. In TUBE, for instance, the branch structure, 
without a commensurate firm-based structure, inhibited the 
involvement of many bookmaking workers whose particular problems were 
not catered for at either local or national level. Furthermore, the 
intervention of full-time officials implied another authoritative voice 
in where resources should be placed, to the inclusion of some workers 
and the exclusion of others.
The issue of full-time officers illustrates the most significant 
dilemma: the wages of the officers are paid from members subscriptions; 
financial solvency thus demands full-time officers pay for themselves 
in relation to the membership they service. In its extreme form, 
it implies a systematic accounting method on their activities. Less 
starkly, it raises the question over how long a time period should 
officers pay their way? Is it short or long-term cost efficiency that 
unions must pursue?
The significance of this discussion is when this economic 
constraint is counterposed with the political commitment of unions to 
organise. This, perhaps, is the basis for llording's ambiguity in 
bargaining interests. The involvement of the TGWU in bookmaking outlines 
the issue quite clearly and points to the potential problems and 
consequences of different policy options. The question of whether 
the organising of bookmaking employees was economically worthwhile was
They had to decide whether to
A d *
one the TGWU faced from the outset.
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take on board a union which, superficially, had grown out of the
disparaged IRA 1971, had little organisation and was in financial
trouble. Scarcely an encouraging economic proposition at first
sight. The TGWU were unsure:
"TUBE were in debt up to £10,OCX). George Sawford and his 
assistant were unpaid. Eventually, they came to us and 
I talked to the (TUBE) Executive. We were in difficulties 
as a union; never been involved in this industry before 
and rather reluctant. But we have ideological view:; 
and the people in the industry needed organising. But 
whether we could organise them within our structure 
remained to be seen." (1)
The reluctance to organise reflected priorities within the union: 
whether the resources of the union might be better utilised elsewhere. 
But better for whom? Not for the bookmaking employees, presumably. 
Decisions on the allocation of resources are necessarily concerned 
with favouring one group of members at the expense of another (actual 
or potential) group.
The principle that full-time officers must pay their way thus 
involves a profoundly conservative dimension, since it focuses on 
maintaining and securing existing areas of membership. It must 
inherently oppose expanding membership in any new area unless the 
'rewards' are virtually guaranteed. Putting resources into a new area 
is necessarily something of a gamble, for the results, especially in 
the early stages, may not justify the expenditure of time, energy, 
and money. In Liverpool, for instance, Eddie Roberts was becoming 
concerned at the amount of effort that was being put in without any 
money coming in from subscriptions. Subsequent to the amalgamation, 
he was waiting on the local Branch Secretary in Connor and Forbes to
Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
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deliver all the forms from the membership to allow check-off
facilities to be finalised with the company:
"He's been an unhealthy long time about it. He's only been 
around half the shops. He's got to get the rest so that we 
as a union can at least get some money out of the membership.
We haven't had a penny for years." (1)
Other full-time officers proved less willing to give the TUBE
membership any real opportunity:
"The Manchester officer is a bloody businessman, lie sees 
unions in terms of debits and credits. There's been no 
activity in Manchester at all. J.Nixon,then ACTSS officer, 
said he was steering well clear. There's no activity in 
Manchester at all and you can apply that to a lot of industries."
( 2 )
Despite obvious resentment on the part of Sawford and Long to the
limitations placed on their efforts to recruit and develop organisation
amongst bookmaking employees, any direct challenge to the idea that
full-time officials should pay their way would certainly have been
ironical in view of TUBE'S history and the dismissal of Hobbs and Lavery.
Indeed Sawford accepted that individual officers should pay their way:
"You have to look after the membership you’ve got.
Wages have to be paid - all officers have to have a 
certain membership." (3)
Yet this did not mean a general acceptance of the principle concerning 
the amount of work full-time officers might be expected to do or the 
amount of money that could be expended on organising bookmaking employees. 
This could be extended to involve a general criticism of the approach 
°f the TGWU to the employment of full-time officials:
Interview Eddie Roberts 6.2.76 
^• Interview (name withheld)
Interview George Sawford 29.9.76
See Sawford's comments on the importance of having a national officer 
and the efforts of the TGWU to cut back on expenditure.
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"They're not replacing full-tirae officers. They get 
promoted then the TGWU advertise. The applicants aren't 
good enough, so then they wait another three months and 
readvertise." (1)
Clearly unions do have finite resources and choices do have to 
be made in terms of priorities; but the question then becomes 
how do unions effectively recruit new areas of membership? And 
it poses a particular dilemma for general, supposedly open house unions, 
such as the TGWU who are geared to recruiting certain kinds of 
membership groups where notions of self-activity predominate as the 
accepted method of trade union development-. If the union is faced 
with the problem of recruiting membership groups which do not conform 
to the accepted pattern, there are two choices: either there is
a retreat into established, traditional areas of recruitment or a 
transition in general organising policy. The dilemma for the union 
is all the more severe given the decline of the traditional areas 
of membership; yet there is little evidence from the experience of 
TUBE that there is sufficient flexibility in the organising policies 
of the union to cope with this changing pattern of actual and potential 
membership.
It would, however, be a mistake to leave the discussion in terms
( 2)of inappropriate structures. If "structure is a function of purpose" , 
then it must be purposeful for someone or some groups of members.
Herding, after all, was careful to link organising policy to patterns of 
union democracy. The interpretation of how the union survives is also 
a political one.
Interview George Sawford 16.2.76
George Woodcock quoted in TUC Annual Report 1962 p.298
.i
There are two aspects to this: the role and activities of
full-time officers and the relative strengths of different membership 
groups. The discussion of the TGWU full-time officials in section 2 
concentrated on their passivity as a hallmark of workplace unionism 
within the specific context of their experience. This was a little 
one-sided and it is important to redress the balance - not so much 
to give a more precise picture of their activities, but to indicate 
the constraints of their work. Politically, the numbers and 
activities of full-time officials will depend on the role they perform 
in the union. This is not meant in sane functionalist sense, but 
in terms of the pressures of local membership, national committees, etc., 
the built-in control systems of the union, and the full-time official 
himself.^ This is not merely organising membership, but
negotiating with local and national employers, general administration, 
taking up members (or, more probably, stewards and convenors) problems. 
Full-time officials therefore perform a range of tasks: most could
have an endless job if they wanted. The question is which tasks get 
priority.
Now the full-time officials in the TGWU clearly do have some control 
over choosing those priorities; but in some instances it is greater 
than others, for some membership groups necessarily carry more weight 
than others. The other side of full-time officers paying their way, is 
that the members who do the paying may demand he gives them attention 
rather than spending time on people who are not even in the union.
The involvement of TUBE with the TGWU did, in fact, give rise to 
that kind of animosity from some of the existing membership. Its 
generality is perhaps indicated in that Moss Evans as national organiser,
1. Few full-time officers are women.
saw it as a problem:
"......  Some say we’re not a horse and cart union,
that we'll be taking on prostitutes and casino workers 
next. We have a job to tell some of our men that working 
in a betting shop is the same as working in a car factory.
Its hard to break down the distrust surroundina those 
involved in the bettinq industrv. Thev're not all knaves...
Some manaqers in bettinq shoos are articulate and have as 
much skill and expertise; so I bring the lads together so 
they can see what sort of people they are." (1)
The impact of such divisions between members and potential members
could prove severe on the organising policy of officials both at
national and local level. At least one local official explicitly stated
that he had received comments from car workers in his district
suggesting that he should not waste his time organising bookmaking
( 2 )employees. Hence Herding's analysis of the organised workers
being a central problem in the organising of now employee groups seems to 
receive some support. ^
The relationship, then, between existing unions and new areas of 
membership is exceedingly complex. The naivety of some of the TUBE 
activists that the TGWU was the answer to their prayers was shown for 
what it was. Even for Britain's largest union, the utilisation of 
resources was a political question: the needs of the bookmaking 
membership were scarcely going to override those in the car industry.
!• Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76 
2. Interview D.Buckle 30.6.75
2. It would be easy to jump to conclusions and suggest this arises 
from differences between productive and unproductive workers. 
Clearly (perhaps most clearly of all) workers see how bookmakers 
cream off their wages, but does this necessarily imply hostility 
to those who are employed and are also exploited?
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But it would be unfair on the TGWU to suggest they did nothing.
The financial support for the Ladbroke strikers in Scotland is 
evidence of the willingness to utilise resources; and after all, 
they did resolve TUBE'S financial position.
Whatever the measure of the TGWUs opportunity in overcoming 
many of the obstacles TUBE faced, in no sense are they free agents, 
able to secure whatever they wished. Both national and local
officials of the TGWU put a lot of effort and money into the Ladbrokes 
dispute, but without securing recognition. The employers, in this 
instance, had other ideas; and they played a very significant part 
in TUBE'S lack of success. This is considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: Employers policies and the implications of the labour
process approach: the Bookmaking employers and TUBE.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how far the labour 
process approach provides an understanding of employer policies 
towards unions and unionisation. That employers are an important 
influence on how unions may develop and act is accepted. As noted 
in chapter 1, Bain has made this point ouite forciblv. Yet the problem 
remains as to why employers develop certain policies when they do 
and towards which employees. Bain's failure to link employers policies 
and strategies to the overall logic of capitalist production constitutes 
a major weakness in his approach.
By focussing on the labour process these deficiencies can, to 
some extent, be overcome: for employers, the labour process represents
the concrete expression of their attempts to produce, or secure a 
share of, surplus value. As in the previous chapter, this allows some 
consideration of the various pressures of capital accumulation which 
structure employers' policies. At the same time, the labour process 
represents a source of workers' interests and the context of experience. 
In this sense, it can provide a mediating link between the structural 
imperatives of capital accumulation, reflected in employers policies, 
and the patterns of workers' organisations.
The implication is that employers' policies towards employees 
and their unions are not to be seen in some neatly contained industrial 
relations 'system'. Clearly, employers do shape and adopt policies 
as a consequence of the actions of unions or employees, just as unions 
and employees respond to those of employers. But outside of that limited 
framework, such circularity can scarcely aid understanding and misses
the impact of wider social and economic processes.
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Just as the development and activities of TUBE were subject 
to the varying impacts of capital accumulation, so must employer 
policies be located within this context. In this way, the labour 
process approach can break the functional circularity of the industrial 
relations system. This chapter attempts to do just that, albeit in a 
tentative and partial manner; but in analysing relations between 
employers, unions,and workers within periodisations based on the 
development of the bookmaking industry, it is hoped to establish the 
labour process as an essential focus in understanding employers' policies.
How can employer-union relationships be characterised? One way 
is to concentrate on the willingness of employers to receive 
representations from their workers as a collectivity. In the 
institutional approaches to industrial relations this has been given a 
particular name: recognition. The willingness, or otherwise, of 
employers to grant unions recognition is seen as an important influence 
on union growth.
There are differences of opinion concerning how recognition 
should be understood. Flanders, for instance, adopts a fairly narrow
view, suggesting recognition can be seen as
"... a readiness on the part of employers to conclude 
collective agreements with a representative trade union 
or unions." (Flanders (1975) p. 178)
Fellow institutionalists have criticised such 'once and for all
definitions. McCarthy (1973) argues that ".... recognition is an
open-ended affair" (p.147). It is better to view the content of
recognition as infinitely variable:
".... a claim for recognition means very different things 
in different circumstances; ranging from the position 
where the employer simply agrees to meet with union 
representatives, but will not enter into collective 
agreements on their behalf, throuqh to the situation where 
a union is already accepted as having a right to bargain 
over a broad range of subjects but management is still
refusing to recognise it for certain additional purposes." (1)__________
!• McCarthy (1973) p. 147. Bain (1970) p.123 (F/N) puts forward a similar 
definition:'" "The assumption is often made that a union either possesses 
recognition o r  it does not. But, in reality, union recognition l s ^ m a t t e r  of
But if the content of recognition differs in both approaches,
its form certainly does not: recognition in this sense is part
of the institutional relationships of industrial relations, tied
into the processes of collective bargaining. For the employer it
is the acceptance that unions can represent and negotiate over certain
conditions of employment; conversely for the union it is the procedural
opening to represent their members.
The significance of this discussion of recognition concerns the
different implications for employer policies which the varying perspectives
suggest. Consider Bain's contribution on 'white-collar' unionism.
Here he argues that recognition generates union growth. While admitting
there is a problem of cause and effect between recognition and unionisation
he nevertheless dispatches the determinant influence to the employer's
decision. Now, if employers do not want unions to grow, it would
therefore be logical to withold recognition. ^
This leaves a problem. If employers do not recognise unions,
membership will not grow; there will be no collective bargaining between
employers and unions, which is precisely what Bain and his fellow
pluralists are trying to establish. In consequence, recognition must
be promoted as a positive gain for employers, perhaps in terms of
efficiency. Employers who do not recognise unions ....
".....never achieve the maximum of productive efficiency.
All they can ask for is slave labour; and, in nearly all 
cases, that is all they get." (Webb (1917) p.35)
!• This in Bain's model would not be difficult since he has discounted 
the efforts of the workers and suggests government policies have had 
most impact on the employers' decision to grant recognition.
"....most 'white-collar' union recognition in private industry has
come about, directly or indirectly, as a result of government policies 
and the favourable climaye they created for trade unionism". Bain (1970) p. 181
The prescribed practice in post-war Britain, therefore, is
for employers to recognise unions and share (within collective
bargaining) control over " ... pay structures and the organisation
of work...." (Flanders (1975) p. 197). Management have lost
( 1 )
control " --- because of their refusal to share it". Employers
have to be educated directly, but also through the state sponsorship
( 2 )of collective bargaining as 'good' industrial relations. Finally,
for those employers still not convinced that trade unions are really 
to their advantage, there is the prospect of worsening the position 
by refusing recognition:
"Whatever time may be taken up by the trade union 
official, by the grievances that he brings forward 
or by the interviews that he demands, there will be, 
sooner or later, still greater difficulties, if the 
management takes up the old-fashioned attitude of 
declaring that it will 'deal only with its own employees'."
(Webb (1917) p. 36) .
Far from restricting union growth, the refusal to concede recognition 
may give employees the spur to join.
In consequence, the policy of employers towards unions is not 
unambiguously determined. While employers may immediately respond 
by opposing the actual or potential influence that a unionised workforce 
may possess over the conditions and organisation of work, it may, on 
occasions and in certain situations, suit employers to grant recognition 
rather than withhold it - and not just because the workforce are pressing 
for it. Even the most significant weapons of workers can be turned 
against them. (3)
f• ibid p.197. For an interesting account of how one company attempted 
to develop and channel unionisation in order to introduce a new productivity 
scheme, see Nichols and Beynon (1977) Ch.7
This notion presumably underpins Bain's attempt to give such a positive 
role to state initiatives. Bain (1970) drew inspiration from his earlier 
Research Paper for the Donovan Commission. See Bain (1967)
3- Consider for instance, employer sponsorship of the closed shop. See 
“art (1979), who suggests employers' favour closed shops since it facilitates 
the handling of labour relations.
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The widespread hostility towards TUBE from the bookmaking 
employers cannot be treated unproblematically. Why were their
policies so hostile? Why develop anti-union policies and 
strategies rather than ones of incorporation? What strategies did 
they use, when, and why? This chapter attempts to provide some 
answers to these questions by exploring employer policies and 
strategies in relation to the labour process and underlying features 
of capital accumulation, and the historical development of TUBE. 1
1. It should be added that there are accepted limits to the following 
discussion. It concentrates, for instance, on the larger 
companies and in particular on the 'Big Four'; quite clearly, 
not all the firms in the industry followed the same pattern of 
development or at the same time. Nevertheless, the major 
companies have always provided the core of union members and such
bias is not unwarranted.
(a) Concentration and Centralisation: the Growth of the major
companies and the period of TUBE expansion.
The period between 1970 and 1973 was one of dramatic expansion 
for many firms in the Bookmaking industry. The process of 
centralisation resulted in a distinct group of market leaders - 
the 'Big Four* — measured in terms of LBO ownership and, subsequently, 
in terms of turnover. It was this rapid transition which provided, 
through the labour process, the preconditions for unionisation amongst 
the bookmaking employees. ^
This section looks at how the major firms responded to the formation
(2 )and development of TUBE in this period. Initially there is an
examination of their general policy in relation to the recognition 
of TUBE. The conclusion, that the employers displayed an almost 
universal anti-unionism, demands some explanation and leads onto a 
discussion of the bases of anti-unionism. Finally, there is a concluding 
discussion on the relationship between policy and strategy at this time.
(i) The Employers and TUBE:____The Refusal of Recognition.
The policy of employers towards unionisation does not have to take 
on a concrete form until employees begin to join, or consider joining, 
a union. ^  in that sense, any discussion of recognition(however defined)
This expansion is discussed in Chapter 3 and the precise figures 
shown in Table 3.6
2- 'Major firms' is not used synomously with the 'Big Four'; the 
former includes the 'second tier' of centralising capital, the 
(usually) localised, but expanding betting chains.
2- Although some employers may develop certain policies in order to
forestall unionisation even when it is not an immediate possibility 
e.g. paternalistic management. This does not affect the general 
drift of the discussion, which is the importance of seeing employer 
policies on recognition as dependent on the actual or potential 
demands of employees.
must begin with the union rather than the employers. Who were
TUBE aiming at and with what intentions?
The policy of TUBE on recognition paralleled that of organising
policy.(1> The general tendency to recruit wherever anyone would
join was reflected in widespread demands for recognition; while
the emphasis on major firms was the first stage of a deliberate plan
aimed at unionising the whole industry.
In 1972, Sawford developed two general programmes for union
recognition. The first coincided with plans laid in 1972 for the formation
of branches in conjunction with the operative date for the unfair
dismissal provisions of the IRA 1971. On 20th February 1972,
Sawford circulated a host of employers asking for voluntary recognition.
The second programme followed the long-awaited registration of TUBE
under the IRA 1971 at the beginning of June 1972. This time Sawford
sent out letters at various dates in June and July, indicating the legal
rights of the union and asking for recognition. In selected cases,
follow-up letters were sent warning of the intentions of the TUBE
Executive to use the new legal opportunities.
While TUBE demanded a response from a wide range of employers,
the Executive were most interested in the response from the 'Big Four'
companies. This, in part, reflected the dominance of the employees
( 2)from these companies in the union membership; it also indicated
the policy of the Executive in pursuing the 'domino' theory of union 
recognition. The 'domino' theory, strongly advocated by Don Bruce,
See Chapter 6
2- In particular, TUBE drew strong support from City Tote (now Mecca) 
employees in 1971-72; the J.Coral Group membership was most 
significant during 1971 - late 1972; while the William Hill 
Membership continued to expand throughout 1972. Ladbrokes developed 
slightly later, early 1973 being the peak.
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amongst others, implied that success must be initially achieved 
in one of the larger companies (i.e. one of the 'Big Four'), after 
which the rest would fall into line; securing recognition in the 
smaller firms would resemble something of a mopping up operation at 
a later stage.
TUBE, therefore, demanded a response from a range of employers, 
but in particular the 'Big Four'. Such demands were, of course, 
meaningless without membership. On balance, 15% seems a reasonable
estimate of TUBE'S presence in the 'Big Four' ; ( 1 ) but the employers
did not necessarily know that - only that TUBE had been formed and that 
some employees were members. ^
The specific demand which TUBE sought was the procedural one 
of formal recognition. Given the opportunity, TUBE did take up 
conditions of employment: for instance, union branches were asked to 
prepare minimum wages rates in 1972 and the union produced minimum 
pay scales in 1973; while another industry-wide issue was the 
Christmas working period, with TUBE attempting to secure a longer period
at Christmas without horseracing. But in terms of individual employers,
TUBE pushed for recognition as a prior objective to substantive issues. 12(3)
1. Consider Table 6.1 which indicates William Hill membership in 1973 
at 16.4%. During 1972, membership in J.Coral Group was claimed 
at one time as in excess of 400 (out of approx. 3,000). It is 
probable the membership in the pre-Mecca group was higher, perhaps 
20-30% in 1971 - early 1972.
2. TUBE received numerous requests from employers asking for the 
details of membership - which TUBE refused to provide.
In the few instances where recognition was achieved, TUBE tried to 
conclude agreements on improved conditions of employment.
In one, this resulted in improved holiday entitlements and extra 
payment for working on bank holidays.
The response of employers, large or small, was almost universally 
hostile. Recognition was hardly conceded anywhere; many employers 
did not reply to TUBE'S requests for recognition while some only replied 
abusively; union members and officials were sometimes sacked,often 
pressurised. Some indication of the vehement anti-unionism of 
the employers can be seen in the decision of the TUBE Executive to 
delay branch formation until legal protections for unfair dismissal 
were introduced. Why were the employers so resistent to TUBE'S 
approaches? Why did they not see any benefits in recognition?
(ii) The bases of anti-unionism.
The impact of retailing bookmaking has been extensively 
discussed in Chapter 3. It implied a reconsideration of bookmaking 
activity itself, with serious consequences for workers in the industry. 
The details of the changes are not repeated here; but two main themes 
can be developed which indicate the importance of these changes for 
the relationships between employers, unions, and employees. One 
concerns the restructuring of LBO operations; the other, the development 
of management structures.
The crucial impact of retailing bookmaking was the elimination 
of the need for a whole section of the labour force: the long-serving, 
experienced, settler-managers. They had swiftly changed from an asset 
to a liability as far as the employers were concerned; and those who 
opposed the new working systems were often dealt with ruthlessly by at 
least one of the 'Big Four'.*1^
But those employees who were now 'unwanted' provided the source 
and inspiration of TUBE. In consequence the anti-union policy was 
merely an extension of the general campaign to eliminate certain employee
This was the embryonic Mecca Bookmakers; there is little reason to
suppose the treatment was that different elsewhere.
groups, or at least make them conform to the revised demands 
and systems of control within the labour process. Since TUBE drew, 
initially, from employees whose professed objectives were to combat 
and restrict the effects of the growth of large-scale betting chains, 
the union represented a collective obstacle to the ambitions of the 
major employers; just as those employees were also individual 
obstacles, irrespective of union membership.
The implications of retailing bookmaking in relation to the labour 
process did generate an anti-union response from employers, especially 
given the union was predicated on the kind of principles which directly 
confronted the changes employers wished to introduce. But why so 
vehement a response? In part, this must surely be connected with the 
very real difficulties employers faced in asserting the new patterns 
of control, not merely over LBO workers, but over levels of management 
as well.
A picture of a totally purposeful and united management systematically 
eliminating 'unwanted' employee groups and pressurising upsurges of 
union activity, bears little resemblance to the management of bookmaking 
firms between 1970-1973. The rapid centralisation of the early 1970s 
soon challenged the existing management structure, developed to cope 
with a far smaller-scale enterprise; in addition, severe divisions 
arose within management as a consequence both of continuing mergers of 
bookmaking firms and the imperatives of centralised control.
A major contradiction in capitalism is that the anarchy of the 
market contrasts with the order and planning within the social organisation 
of work. Thus the firm operates within the competitive strictures 
°f the market, yet internally its activities are extensively structured 
through the hierarchy of authority. Yet there is a constant tension 
between the internal organisation of the firm and its involvement in 
the market; and this is highlighted when mergers take place. The
-36]-
centralisation of capital is in one sense unifying, bringing together 
in larger, co-operative units the mass of wage labour and the tools 
and materials which they use. But in contradiction, the internal 
organisation of the firm becomes chaotic as different working systems 
have to be accommodated. The continuity of social relationships 
between employer and employed is broken and there is potential conflict 
between different management groupings.
There is little doubt this was a common occurrence in bookmaking 
in 1970-71, and several examples of mergers and their impact have 
been given in previous chapters. An interesting illustration is 
provided by the merger introduced in Chapter 4, which provided the 
immediate spark for the formation of TUBE: that of City Tote Ltd.
It will be remembered that following the merger with Ron Nagle Ltd, 
there were boardroom battles concerning the control of the enlarged 
grouping. This competition between the two different factions 
also existed at different levels of management. Significantly, one 
particular area of dispute was in the personnel office, where Jim Popkin, 
the Nagle group personnel manager, and Syd Oliver, his opposite number 
at City Tote, clashed:
"There was discord in the office between myself and Syd Oliver 
and it became obvious one of us had to go. This spread out 
to the shops." (1)
If battle lines were drawn up within management on the basis of 
previous loyalties (often, of course, reflecting different management 
practice), differences also occurred between those performing certain 
management functions While the efforts at centralising control could be 
seen as unifying the operations of the firm, the consequence was to create 
divisions between central management on one hand and regional management
1. Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75
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on the other, as the latter lost autonomy over various activities.
This second dispute took place in all the major firms, to a lesser 
or greater degree, but was not finally resolved for some years.
The rapidity of centralisation had given employers little 
opportunity to develop suitable managerial structures, while simultaneously 
generating inter-management conflicts. The consequences for employees 
and the union were severe. The divisions within management resulted 
in an arbitrary imposition of control over the employees, reflected in, 
for instance, the lack of information, unco-ordinated staffing policy, 
and an unevenness in labour discipline. This was the way changes in 
the LBO labour process were introduced.
The implication for the union was not merely employer opposition, 
but the wholesale denial of unionisation. Given the internal problems 
of reorganisation within the imperatives of retailing bookmaking,issues 
of control were simply non-negotiable for employers. Furthermore, 
the imposition of new systems of control had largely broken down co­
operation between employer and employees on anything other than an economic 
basis. Broadly speaking, the employers could do little else than adopt 
a policy of "forcible opposition";^* there was no possibility of 
resolving the arbitrary treatment of employees or the anomolies of pay 
and conditions; the political and ideological integration of the workforce 
would take some time to rebuild; and the last thing that seemed to have
potential was a union derived- from the 'old-style1 settler-managers
( 2 )
and advocating policies in opposition to retailing bookmaking.
The term used by Bain (1970). See discussion in Chapter 1.
2- The employers may, on the last point, have been short-sighted, given 
the eventual involvement of the TGWU.
(iii) Policy and Strategy
The internal divisions within management not only influenced
the anti-union policy of the employers, but also their strategy.
Most of the large chains were in no position to compete with TUBE
until the consequences of centralisation had been resolved. They
could scarcely offer anything positive to their employees in terms of
employment and working conditions until this was achieved.
The principle was therefore to gain time: but how could this
be achieved? Two strategies were adopted, often concurrently, but
with a different emphasis at different times. The first was direct
coercion through the use of victimisation; the second, more subtly,
was the continuous stalling of negotiations.
Victimisation had dated from the formation of TUBE with the dismissal
of Sawford and other activists trying to establish the union. Throughout
TUBE’S history, there is a continuing tale of victimisaion, by firms
of all sizes, of union activists; but the concern of the TUBE Executive
over the unfair dismissal provisions of the IRA 1971,suggests this
early period may have been worse than most.^ The forms of victimisation
did not simply imply dismissal; some were continually moved from one
LBO to another, or given long distances to travel; they might be
subject to frequent spotchecks by the security department; or made
to work consistently short of staff. A wide range of tactics were used
by employers - not merely to irritate and upset union activities, but to
( 2)force employees to either accept the conditions or leave.
!• For a discussion of the impact of the unfair dismissal provisions in 
providing protection for TUBE members, see Chapter 8.
later tactics have included the introduction of computerised 
telephone systems (where the user can only (supposedly) secure the 
numbers on the supplied cards), which prevents workers in different 
LBOs communicating with each other. In a similar vein, direct 
line systems have been introduced in some firms where contact 
can only be made between a LBO and head office.
In some instances these strategies worked - for a time.
Dennis Smith, the main union organiser in Hector MacDonald was sacked 
in 1972 and the membership fell away; but by 1973, it had been 
re-established. Still, no doubt such strategies appeared attractive 
in providing employers a breathing space. Nevertheless, heavy handed 
treatment can be two-edged and assist the union (would TUBE have 
gained a full-time General Secretary if City Tote Ltd had not dismissed 
Sawford?) It may also generate resentment amongst employees in 
exposing the employer as anti-union.
Many employers began to realise there were alternatives.
Both large and small firms began to utilise a very effective neutralising 
tactic: to delay TUBE'S approaches, give themselves time to sort out 
the internal problems caused by the rapid changes in the industry, and 
wait for support to fade away.^ The replies received by Sawford
during 1972 from employers throughout the country are full of requests 
for information about the union, about union membership in the firm, 
of rearranged dates for meetings, and so forth. Some exchanges 
of this kind continued for several months and were clearly efforts by 
employers to stall TUBE'S advances for as long as possible.
To conclude: the immediate policies of the employers towards TUBE
were fundamentally hostile. While they were obviously afraid of how 
effective TUBE might become, the policies and strategies towards the 
efforts of their employees to organise derived fundamentally from the 
changing structure of the industry and the implications this carried for 
the reorganisation of the labour process and managerial structures. The
twin strategies of direct coercion and stalling TUBE'S advances gave the
There does seem some evidence to suggest that TUBE'S registration 
under the IRA 1971 may have prompted the widespread use of this tactic, since 
employers were initially wary of the legal consequences of the recognition 
procedure, and did not want to appear anti-union in front of the NIRC - or 
indeed at any stage of the legal process.
emergent betting chains time to come to terms with their internal 
problems and to develop more positive strategies to compete with 
the union.
I
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(b) Rationalisation within the major firms: Employers 
policies and TUBE in the period from 1973. *
Following the dramatic expansion of the industry in the
early 1970s, the period after 1973 was essentially one of
consolidation for the major firms. Within the 'Big Four',LBO
ownership began to decline at a faster rate than the industry as
a whole, as they closed or sold some of the less viable LBOs
purchased during the rapid expansion. Even so, the 'Big Four' continued
to secure an increasing share of turnover, indicating the development
of the larger, more profitable, LBOs in the most remunerative areas.
One crucial aspect of this process was the reconstruction
of employer-employee relationships - both as a consequence of the
implications of rationalisation and the threat (actual or potential)
of TUBE. This section considers the policies and strategies of
employers in this period within that context. As in the previous
section, following an examination of the general policy towards TUBE,
the bases of anti-unionism are considered in some detail, including
how the policy was put into practice. Finally, there is some
consideration of the strategic use of the policies.
(i) Employers and TUBE: the continued refusal of recognition.
The failure of TUBE to gain recognition in the period of
expansion of the major firms was reinforced once rationalisation
became a priority of the employers. The union had responded in
various ways to the continued hostility and refusal of recognition
from the employers. The threatened use of the legal process became
fact from the autumn of 1972, sending both union and employers into
unknown territory; while the newly-elected TUBE Executive decided to
adopt more militant policies from the beginning of 19/3. The outcome
was a dual policy - use of the legal procedure in some cases, with
industrial action where possible. ^ ________________
Chapter 5 gives an outline history of the 'new militancy', while 
Capter 8 looks at recognition policy and the IRA 1971 in some detail.
-367-
In relation to the 'Big Four', efforts in taking City Tote 
Ltd and the J. Coral Group through the legal process were abandoned 
in 1973, with support declining. In contrast, the growing strength
of membership in both William Hill and Ladbrokes encouraged the 
union to seek recognition in both companies, the former through the 
legal process, the latter by industrial action.
The failure in Ladbrokes was much quicker than that in 
William Hill. The disappointing stoppage of work in March 1973 
meant the immediate decline of membership in Ladbrokes. The legal 
route of the William Hill issue continued for most of TUBE’S history, 
before the collapse of membership in 1975-76.
Thr refusal of the 'Big Four’ to concede recognition prompted 
a reappraisal of policies within the TUBE Executive during 1973: 
a renewed emphasis on smaller firms and the placing of responsibility 
for industrial action on the local branches. This made little 
difference, although recognition was eventually achieved in Connor and 
Forbes Ltd, and John Joyce Ltd. The general picture was, once again, 
hostility from the employers towards the union.
The situation, however, was slightly more complex than that.
Certainly, the majority of employers remained decidedly anti-union -
less than a handful conceded recognition to TUBE for collective
negotiation - but in some instances this was tempered by an accommodation
of union demands; in particular the concession that TUBE could represent
individual members involved in grievances and disciplinary cases. This
was certainly agreed between TUBE and Mecca Bookmakers during 1973,
while there is some evidence this occurred in some regions of the
William Hill Organisation where union membership was substantial.
Such policies reflected the contradictions in the anti-unionism of the
employers, in the reconstruction of employer-employee relations.
There are also indications this may have been the ca®e *n sorae 
local firms, but no direct evidence that can be cited.
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(ii) The bases of anti-unionism
Just as the initial anti-unionism of employers had 
derived from the problems of centralisation, so the continued 
anti-union policy in the subsequent phase derived from the implications 
of rationalisation. The imperative of retailing bookmaking was 
the centralising of control over the activities of the LBOs; the 
emphasis had changed from LBOs as individual units to an integrated 
whole. The implication was, simultaneously, the central control 
over the labour process and labour as a resource throughout LBOs and 
the administrative/ managerial structures.
The consequence, in all the 'Big Four' firms, was the 
development of Personnel Departments who could act as a means of asserting 
control over both LBO employees and local and regional management.
The Personnel function mediates the imperatives of capital accumulation 
and the impact which this has for employees within the institutional 
structure of the firm. As a staffing section, it acts as a mere 
lubricant for the employment and allocation of labour. In a more 
developed form, it constitutes a systematic approach to the recruitment, 
retention, and training of employees while simultenaeously developing 
procedures and methods of defusing conflict between employers and 
employees. It is important to note this wider aspect of the Personnel 
function; for in the development of personnel departments, the 
demands were nothing less than a reconstitution of the social relations 
upon which bookmaking was now based.
In 1973, the Personnel departments of the major firms became 
rather more than staffing sections. This is reflected in the growth 
°f centralised control within these firms. The rapid expansion of 
1970-72 had meant the assimilation by the major firms of various chains 
°f different sizes and thus creating differing practices in different
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areas within the same firm: for the employees this had meant pay
anomolies, widely fluctuating conditions of service, and exposure
to apparently arbitrary decision-making. This was further reinforced
by the extent of regional autonomy in deciding such matters. In
the J. Coral Group, for instance,
"Until the beginning of 1973, the Regional Manager 
determined the salary scales for his area, and thus 
the variations in rates." (1)
The extent of autoncmy also held true for Ladbrokes and William 
Hill. The expansion had been built on giving the regions a relatively 
free rein, but the imperatives of bookmaking and labour relations now 
pointed to centralised control and company wide policies.
In three of the major firms, personnel specialists wore 
employed from outside of bookmaking to control the Personnel Departments, 
something of a surprise in an otherwise incestuous industry. In the 
J.Coral Group, Brian Kavanagh had joined the firm in 1968 and remained 
in charge of a growing Personnel department, until a further outsider 
was appointed as Group Personnel Manager in 1975. Ladbrokes chose 
the opposite method and appointed John Wilson, an ex-Unilever man, in 1971 
to a senior position as Personnel Controller. Syd Oliver joined the 
firm later that year from Mecca to take over day-to-day personnel matters. 
Finally, in 1973, the William Hill Organisation appointed an ex RAF 
and TV Rental manager, David Konrath, to take control of personnel, 
although it was early 1974 before he formally became Personnel 
Director. Thus of the 'Big Four' only Mecca appointed internally, 
expanding the Personnel section at the beginning of 1973 with the appointment 
°f assistants to Jim Popkin - at least one an ex-union activist:
Tony Rawle.
1. Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74.
Power-holders in Personnel: The four main firms in the 1970s.
Ladbrokes: Personnel Director, John Wilson
Graduated from University in 1963. Joined Unilever and worked in 
two of their companies in Personnel and Line Management. Joined 
Ladbroke Racing in 1971 as Personnel Controller and then moved across 
to Group Personnel Controller. Subsequently returned to the Bookmaking 
Division as Personnel Director.
William Hill: Personnel Director, David Konrath.
Spent six years in the RAF (early commission), then joined a TV Rental 
company and within 7 years became General Manager in North East.
Then moved into credit drapery, slot TV before joining Ladbrokes as an 
area manager in the late 1960s. In 1973, he joined William Hill as 
Personal Assistant to Sam Burns and took charge of Personnel at the 
beginning of 1974.
Mecca: Group Personnel Manager, J.S.Popkin.
Joined Ron Nagle Ltd as a wages clerk in 1967 and has successfully 
progressed as the 'Nagle group' within Mecca Bookmakers have secured 
control of the enlarged firm. A working-class lad who has made it.
J.Coral Ltd: Personnel Manager, B. Kavanagh.
Worked in manufacturing industry until joining Mark Lane in 1968.
Following the merger with J.Coral, he took charge of Personnel. Something 
of a lower level position than in the other companies; and in 1975 
J.Coral Ltd appointed:
Group Personnel Manager: Michael Milne.
Formerly with Coventry Radiators.
The development of centralised Personnel control made it
simultaneously unnecessary and undesirable for the union to be
recognised. The employers now possessed their own machinery
to gain the support of their employees and eliminate the 'teething
troubles' of the early 1970s; why bother to recognise a union
if such policies proved successful?
The introduction of Personnel Departments in this fashion can
be seen as both a consequence of the imperatives of retailing bookmaking
and the attentions of TUBE; certainly, the policies and strategies
to oppose the union were developed from within this section of the
In contrast to the negative policiesmanagement structures
provided the opportunity for the employers to systematically compete
with TUBE for the first time. Indeed, the implications for reconstructing
employer-employee relations necessarily made this the case
How, then, did the employers, through the Personnel Department,
achieve this reconstitution of relationships with their employees
and simultaneously compete with TUBE? This can be analysed in 
three ways. Firstly, through the improvement of substantive conditions 
of employment, including their standardisation on a company basis; 
secondly, in the development of structures for the processing of 
grievances; and, thirdly, in the re-establishing of the political and
Any attempt to incorporate the union would have been unlikely t< 
assist in controlling local/regional management unless the personnel 
departments had already asserted control.
2. Within the broad policy guidelines, no doubt, of top management
Improvements in the substantive conditions of
employment
for employers to recruit new employees to the industry; to do
implied some improvement in employment conditions
"There was an awareness of what went on outside (and I 
don't mean other bookmakers). I mean other industries 
We had to offer the benefits to get the staff we wanted
Simultaneously, TUBE were pressurising on terms and conditions
of employment. When the union minimum rates were produced in 1973
only the J.Coral Group of the 'Big Four' could claim to be paying
above these scales. Within William Hill, industrial action had
been taken in protest over pay and conditions in early 1973; indeed
this was the basis of the projected stoppage in March 1973
but the anomolies that were a
source of concern to both employers and TUBE (including their members)
The employers wanted systematic pay scales and conditions of employment
primarily to establish central control over the labour process and
for the union, it meant some members
were simply not getting the rate for the job
The consequence of the combined pressures of retailing bookmaking
and the union presence, prompted the improvement and standardisation 
of conditions of employment from 1973 onwards. At the beginning of the 
1970s the conditions of employment in bookmaking were scarcely attractive
Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75
Naturally, the employers were not keen to 
TUBE in such matters. "Improvements m
recruitment problems and 10% to the union
Interview. J.Popkin 20.10.75
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standardised wage scales did not exist in the major companies;
Saturday and bank holiday working was regarded as part and parcel 
of the job, not warranting extra remuneration; there was a normal 
working week of 6 days (or an 11-day fortnight); and finally, 
holiday entitlements were usually two, at best, three weeks. But 
during the 1970s, beginning largely in 1973, all the major firms made 
improvements in these conditions. By January 1974 all had introduced 
standardised pay scales; by 1975 there was at least a nominal five-day 
week; recognition of bank holiday working meant extra payment or time 
off in lieu; and by 1976 four weeks holiday was becoming more common, 
through not a standard feature.
The importance of this period in 1973 was that it marked the beginning 
of the widespread systematic restructuring of employment conditions.
And it posed problems for TUBE. The union was increasingly unable
to exploit widespread anomalies; and, given the existence of incomes 
policy, was restricted in wage demands. ^  The practice of the
major employers, in promoting the operations of the personnel department 
and improvinq employment conditions, indicated that improvements could 
be achieved without TUBE beinq recoqnised and to some extent proved 
effective competition for the union:
1. The impact of government incomes policy had a significant effect 
on the relationships between employers, unions, and employees in the industry. 
Between June 1970 and November 1972, the Heath Government adopted the 
'N-l' policy of trying to successively reduce pay increases. But by 1972, 
this had failed, and a three-stage incomes policy was introduced, the 
extent of restraint being eased at each stage. Between November 1972 
and March 1973, there was a statutory pay freeze; a slight loosening 
between March 1973-November 1973; and a further loosening after 
November 1973. This allowed the Bookmaking employers the necessary 
flexibility to develop their pay structures during 1973-74 within the 
context of statutory limits. For TUBE to pursue, or campaign for, 
r larger increases could therefore be seen as challenging the law of the
land. The pay policy, in some respects, removed TUBE'S potential in 
developing campaigns around wage issues.
V
» 
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"Management started making concessions and the members 
thought they'd made it and the membership dropped off". (1)
And while TUBE was being challenged in terms of substantive
conditions, the major employers attempted to show the union was
unnecessary in its representative function
The problem of control for employers is not merely restricted
to the way work is performed; it extends to ensuring the various
protests from workers are made in such a way that they are predictable
and controllable. The prime method for achieving this is the use of
The non-neutrality of such procedures has been shown by Beynon (1973)
"The pervasiveness of management's assumed right to manage 
is captured by the Ford disciplinary procedure and others 
like it. It is based upon the premise that management have 
the right to run their establishment as they think fit...."
This is achieved by reducing issues to questions of fact rather
than rights; it is only a question of whether an employee has
disobeyed a company rule or an order - any question that s/he has a
right to do so is irrelevant. Such a perspective can be extended to
grievance procedures - does the worker have genuine cause for complaint?
Is s/he being treated differently to any other employees Again
grievances can now be reduced to questions of fact rather than rights
facts on management's terms
1. Interview S. Warren 24.8.76 on the decline of London North towards 
the end of 1973.
2. For instance, the William Hill Organisation outlined grievances in the 
following way:
"Grievances usually arise when there is a breakdown in communications 
and misunderstanding occurs. The object of the formal grievance procedure 
in your contract is quickly and effectively to restore the communications 
and clear up the misunderstanding."
.William Hill Organisation "Your Company" May 1973 pp.6-7.
■¿aS
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The utility of procedures for management or unions will 
depend on the contingent social and economic context. What appears 
at one point as a useful mechanism through which management can channel 
grievances, so that they can be 'lost' until the issue has faded away, 
may on other occasions appear as an impediment in asserting managerial 
authority. Nevertheless, whatever the benefits to the bookmaking 
employees that each of the 'Big Four' companies introduced written 
grievance procedures in the 1970s, it brought the Personnel departments 
into competition with TUBE in providing the means for workers to express 
grievances.
The development of the procedures was another aspect of centralised 
control, not merely in terms of channelling employee grievances, but 
in eliminating the arbitrariness of local management. The legal 
obligations of the IRA 1971 to produce written procedures also played an 
influential role; but the decision to assert central control determined 
how the procedures would operate. This is an important point, since there 
were alternatives in how the proceduralisation of grievances could be 
developed.
One option was to sponsor or support a staff association in 
opposition to TUBE, and some employers did attempt to do this. ^
But only one of the 'Big Four', the William Hill Organisation - took this 
option, and only did so in 1974-75 in a somewhat tentative fashion. In 
view of the potential of staff associations and their history in similar 
ureas of employment (e.g. banking and insurance), this may seem surprising; 
it is in the nature of deciding to form a staff association that its
Connor and Forbes Ltd, Hector MacDonald Ltd, and Seymour and Story 
were three significant firms in TUBE'S history where the employers gave 
quite open support for staff associations against TUBE. Indeed, in some 
instances, they were instrumental in establishing them. See, for instance, 
CIR (1974c)
4 A
supporters will tend to adopt managerial definitions of problems and 
be more amenable to incorporation. But the Personnel Managers of 
three of the 'Big Four' were unimpressed. Their attitudes to staff 
associations developed from the position that they would be ineffective 
in resolving the problem of handling grievances.
"What can a staff association do? Negotiate?
Over what?". ^
The general view implied there was little gain from staff 
associations - more a potential loss. Firstly, employers might be seen 
as anti-union:
"No, I don't think a staff association would be a 
good idea now. It would appear an attempt to thwart 
TUBE”. (2)
And, secondly, it might encourage the union directly:
"You've just set up the organisation for the union 
to take it over". (3)
There was indeed some support for these views in the experiences 
of Connor and Forbes, where a management-inspired attempt at developing 
a staff association resulted in many employees turning to TUBE instead.
The contradiction in employers supporting staff associations is in 
legitimising the collectivity of grievances and the means of representation. 
In this way it was certainly seen as a second-best alternative (if that) 
by the Personnel Managers of the 'Big Four'; more generally, staff 
associations only seem to have gained any management support in bookmaking 
when TUBE had established substantial membership, and were pushing for
recognition.
Interview J.Wilson 19.2.76 
Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74 
Interview J. Wilson 19.2.76.
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Handling grievances on an individual basis posed no such 
problems: grievances could be defined in individual terms and could 
be handled in an individual fashion. ^  ^ This constituted the most 
attractive option for the employers, for it denied the collective 
nature of employee grievances, yet simultaneously offered opportunities 
to channel those grievances on an individual basis in a controlled 
framework. Furthermore, it provided part of the material practice on 
which the employers tried to reconstruct their relationships with 
employees on an individual basis.
But this policy was not without contradictions. Clearly TUBE 
were being denied the opportunity to represent union members on a 
collective basis, but what of individual representation? If the employers 
were establishing a 'fair' procedure, surely individuals could be 
represented by someone if they wished? In this guise, TUBE gained 
de facto and sometimes de jure representation rights for individual 
members. In seme instances, as noted above, Sawford or one of the full-time 
officers were permitted to represent members in grievances or disciplinary 
cases. But the usually present clause in these procedures, permitting 
employees to be represented by a fellow employee if they chose, allowed 
the lay union representative in the company to take up the cases of union 
members; though, of course, the company could still claim to be withholding 
'recognition' in the formal sense.
But the processing of grievances cannot be seen in abstract from 
other employer policies: while improvements in employment conditions, 
freely granted', were undermining TUBE'S raison d'etre, so too did the 
creation of 'proper' channels of raising grievances. Such policies
The theme of the individualising impact of procedures is taken up in 
Chapter 8 in the context of the unfair dismissal provisions.
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provided a challenge to TUBE both in material terms in delivering 
the 'goods' and in suggesting the union was unnecessary. But it was 
also accompanied by a positive attempt at re-establishing employer- 
employee relationships at the political and ideological level.
(3) The reconstruction of the relationships between employer
and employees at the political and ideological level.
The mediating role of the Personnel function would only be 
partial if it concentrated on the processing of grievances and the 
structuring of employment conditions. Such material conditions are 
important yet insufficient to integrate employees into voluntary 
co-operation in the labour-process. It demands also that this integration 
takes place at the political and ideological levels.
Despite the subordinate role of labour in the social relations 
of capitalist production, unwilling compliance on the part of the worker 
to the demands of his employer is not seen as a stable basis for continued 
production. The existence of wide ranging academic specialisms across 
psychology and soiology which are concerned with the 'motivation' of 
employees performing an everyday drudgery masquerading as work, are 
sufficient evidence to suggest that co-operation on the part of the workforce 
is an essential component of the continuation of capitalist activity. Schemes 
to achieve such co-operation range through payment systems and job 
content, to managerial style.
The major contradiction in these approaches is that all are 
concerned with remedying the consequences of wage—labour, yet remain 
unprepared to do anything about the root cause. This illustrates the value 
to the employer of retaining an ideological and political integration 
°f the workforce - something the bookmaking employers were indeed aware of.
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Until the 1970s, the employers had needed their experienced 
settler-managers, but the dramatic changes in the industry now made 
that group simultaneously unnecessary and undesirable: the resulting 
reorganisation of the social labour process and the devaluation of the 
position of settler-manager implied he was less an agent for the global 
function of capital, than part of the collective labourer.
In general terms, the historical devaluation of the position
of the settler-manager had been largely completed in the betting chains
by mid-1973. But the necessary concomitant was the undermining of the
prevailing basis of occupational solidarity within the industry. ^
The ideology inherited from the credit office days now wore thin with
the routinisation of the job; and at the same time, politically, the
employers no longer wished or needed to retain the staff versed in those
experiences. The compromise, at the ideological level, was to redefine
individual achievement in more conventional style. And the task to
exact this compromise fell to the developing personnel departments. The
William Hill Organisation produced a booklet for employees which indicated
the fusion of the new and the old:
"The policy of the Company, whenever possible, is to promote
from within and many of the Senior Executives of the
Company rose from very junior positions. William Hill
never forgot his humble start and determined that in his jj)
Company anyone who had the merit and drive could rise to the top .
William Hill, however, had not reached the 'top' through the
hierarchy of the career ladder now advocated by the Senior Management who
had replaced him. This kind of redefinition is not peculiar to bookmaking;
as Wright argues, it can be seen as the ideological transition between the
old and the new petty bourgeoisie: 1
1- See note 2 to Chapter 3 for a brief discussion of the sources of 
occupational solidarity.
2- William Hill Organisation "Your Company" May 1973.
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"While it is true that individualism characterises the 
ideology of both the new and old petty bourgeoisie, 
the individualism of the two categories is extremely 
different. The individualism of the old petty bourgeoisie 
stresses individual autonomy, be your own boss, control 
your own destiny, etc. The individualism of the new 
petty bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is a careerist 
individualism, an individualism geared towards organisational 
mobility." (Wright (1976) p. 24)
Perhaps the line between these two strands cannot be drawn quite 
so starkly. In bookmaking, the opportunities did remain for some
employees to become small-scale bookmakers; while for most, wage-labour
was the inevitable future. The growth of the retailing chains now
meant a severe reduction in the chances of employees to become self-employed,
while necessarily demanding a measure of co-operation of employees with
the new organisational forms of the industry. The reconstruction of
the labour process demanded new patterns of ideological integration.
If the changing employer-employee relationships implied by
retailing bookmaking implied this kind of reconstruction, the individualist
card could also be used against the union:
"The very nature of the business is against the growth 
of a union. The people in this industry are somewhat 
individualistic and reckon they can take care of themselves." (1)
The very success of the efforts of the Personnel Departments to
develop employer-employee relationships on the chosen basis depended
on discrediting the union. The practice on employment conditions and
processing grievances attempted to show the union as unnecessary,
emphasising that issues could be handled individually. The above statement,
from one of the most experienced Personnel managers in the industry, indicates
not only that a union was unnecessary, but also inappropriate; and it was
this aspect which constituted a major strand of the ideological offensive
against TURK.__________________ _______ __________________________________
Interview S.Oliver (Ladbrokes) 3.10.74. "The very nature of the business" 
is a return to the past era of bookmaking, where fortunes were won and or 
iost in a day (according to folklore - with some justification). This, perhaps 
characterised the 'old' petty bourgeoisie ideology of the industry. Here it 
is used in a statement which collapses the bookmaking industry as it once was, 
into a prescriptive statement for employees in the contemporary - and rather
different - industry.
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| The arguments about inappropriateness developed, on the one
hand, from a perspective that the industry itself was 'unsuitable'
for unionisation; and, on the other, that particular unions were
not the 'best' ones or did not behave 'correctly*. The first aspect
was developed not merely from the past "nature" of the industry, but
the structuring of the overall labour process within bookmaking:
"As I see it, union structure is based on a structure 
appropriate to the shop floor. In Bookmaking, there 
are a large number of very small widespread units.
Attempting to graft a shop floor pattern on this is 
costly and ineffective. The union cannot service its 
members." (1)
And where the union necessarily falls short, management can provide 
satisfactory solutions:
"(The union) know nothing about our staff. When they 
raised the question of Christmas working last year, we 
went round all our staff and in three weeks had heard 
their views. We know our staff's views better than 
the union". (2)
It is a short step to justifying a policy against a particular
union:
"Until they have an adequate organisation with sufficient 
resources .... in no way would we recognise them". (3)
And, perhaps, to develop the criticisms of the union's lack of
resources into querying the ability of the officials:
"I've little time for TUBE. It is not strong enough, 
lacks expertise and I have no confidence in the people 
involved. They seem to have a chip on their shoulder." (4)
As well as their conduct:
"TUBE are irresponsible. Sawford was engaged in a 
strike in Leeds, but he had no facts. He had to call off 
the strike. He hadn't followed the proper procedure...
People telling lies and behaving in an inappropriate manner - 
we don't want to do business with them." (5)
I- 1- Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74. Claims for the 'special status' of the
industry were also made by Cyril Stein of Ladbrokes "He (Stein) said he 
didn't think the industry was appropriate for trade unions. He expected and 
| was prepared to have his hotels and so forth organised, but not his betting
shops." Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76 
2- Interview j.Popkin 20.10.75
Interview S. Oliver 3.10.74 on TUBE
4- Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74 5. Interview D.Konrath 12.9.74
Clearly, TUBE did provide an opportunity for these kind of
criticisms to make an impression on employees. Some ex-TUBE members
already had decided views on the union The widespread distribution
of the membership,the lack of experienced leadership and the consequent
errors of judgement and disappointment, did generate divisions within
the union that could be exploited. Nevertheless, the inappropriateness
arguments did possess contradictions - and dangerous ones for employers
Less than twelve months after suggesting to the CIR that
"(TUBE) is not a union with which in the group's opinion 
it would be appropriate to conduct collective bargaining. 
The group would however regard more favourably an 
established union with appropriate resources and experience
The William Hill Organisation found they were now dealing with
the TGWU. Under pressure to concede recognition, the William Hill
management were backtracking
"Joining the TGWU? We don't quite know what this 
will mean. If the TGWU control TUBE effectively, that 
might make us happier regarding the possible behaviour 
of the union. However, if they don't (and affiliated 
unions tend to go their own way) then we will still 
question TUBE'S responsibility." (3)
Clearly the merger of TUBE with the TGWU undermined many of the
inappropriateness arguments - resources, experience, and thus management's
credibility. A further redefinition was necessary
I want to talk 
(4)
"I'm not happy with the TGWU link-up. 
to people concerned with the industry
For instance in Newcastle after March 1973
CIR (1974b) p.4
D. Konrath 12.9.74Interview
J. Popkin 20.10.75: a wondrous comment given that TUBE were 
amalgamate with the TGWU because they had been unable to 
the hostility of the employers.
Interview
forced to 
cope with
The ideology of inappropriateness derived frcm a number of
an occupational community
which the labour process changes were concurrently undermining; but
those changes themselves, in the context of the widespread LBO structure
provided an argument for inappropriateness palpably untenable in the
context of the credit offices. The continuing aspect, however, was the
juxtaposition of 'individual' against 'collective' solutions, the
inappropriateness arguments serving to reinforce the former while
The significance of ideological integration should not be
underestimated, for the political integration of employees was rather
more difficult. The socialisation of the labour process continually
undermines the basis for individualist ideology. Given that the settler
managers were not only objectively co-operating under retailing bookmaking
in a qualitatively different way, but that this also involved a devaluation
in their position in performing the global function of capital, their
political integration posed problems. They had lost areas of control
over the work of the LBO, and had been left with a general supervisory
responsibility. While attempts might be made to provide an alternative
means of integration, e.g. importance of salesmanship, those were
distinctly lightweight compared with the patterns of control which higher
management and Personnel sought to impose
This threw importance onto the credibility of management as being 
lust and fair in relation to TUBE; something indicated in the
development of coherent arguments as to why recognition would be refused 
until certain conditions were met. Once again the employers were able
to utilise the very resourceful doctrine of the freedom of the individual 
though the pressure to develop coherent arguments, in whatever guise,
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were not simply prompted by the need to appear 'just* employers to
u • , ( 1)their employees.
One contradiction of advocating the ideology of individual 
freedom is the danger of people making the 'wrong' choices. The overall 
policy of the employers, carried through by the Personnel Departments, 
was to re-establish a pattern of employer-employee relationships on an 
individual basis; to effect sane continuity between the past: practice 
of bookmaking and occupational community with a newly-defined individualism 
predicated on the implications of retailing bookmaking. But for such 
a policy to succeed, other options could not be blatantly foreclosed: 
the freedom of individual choice must be seen to include the opportunity 
of unionisation given the existence of TUBE.
The outcome was a general proclamation, virtually throughout the 
industry, that the employers would grant recognition if a majority of 
employees want it:
"We're neither for nor against TUBE. We are interested 
in our staff. We're against TUBE gaining representation 
by default. If 55% of the staff want it we'll have to 
give it. But when the number is around 12%, its a bit of 
a joke, like the tail wagging the dog." (2)
Within the 'Big Four' this went hand-in-hand with a similar
condition:
One particular external pressure was the demands of the legal 
recognition process, where employers had to put forward and establish a 
case for the refusal of recognition. In consequence, the positions of 
employers towards the union gained a 'rehearsed' quality and a broad 
similarity, as each employer was brought before the NIRC.
2 . Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74.
( 1)"We are a national company with national policies".
Both positions appear eminently 'fair'. It is only 'common 
sense' that the employers should not give in to the wishes of a minority 
and that recognition can only be conceded on a company-wide basis.
But:
"Common sense alights on the obvious, delights in the cliche -
and deplores explorations that tunnel under the surface of
things." (Lane (1974) p. 103)
There is plenty below the surface here: for the conditions for 
recognition simultaneously appear as 'reasonable' while setting 
impossibly high targets for the union to achieve. This the employers 
were able to do by presenting themselves as neutral ("neither for nor 
against TUBE") and their employees as free agents. In no sense does 
this bear any relation to the Bookmaking industry which appears in this 
and other chapters. Employers do exert influence over patterns of 
unionisation: as agents of capital they create the conditions for it. 
Employees who were 'free' to join the union sometimes found themselves 
'free' from the obligations of working.
But the magic of 50% prevails for it is as strong as the dominance 
of individualism (which has managed to survive not despite the differences 
in power relations, but because of them). In terms of individual freedom 
and rights, the 'fairness' of 50% is unassailable; it requires challenging 
in terms of collective rights.
Similar comments might be made about national recognition. Like 
the 50% argument, its practical strength was in denying recognition per se 
since the LBO structure virtually ensured the union could never muster 50% 
membership in all the LBOs of one of the 'Big Four' at any one time; yet 
it seemed eminently 'rational' that the larger firms should continue to decide
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1. Interview J.Wilson 19.2.76.
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terms and conditions centrally and not in a piecemeal fashion. ^
There are other aspects to the relationship of this professed 
policy on recognition and actual practice. What is it 50% of? All
LBO employees (including cleaners)? If TUBE did approach the majority
( 2)figure, it was not unknown for the absolute figure to alter. How
were the "wants" of employees assessed? By actual membership of the
union or preferences to be represented by it? (3) But one point in
particular is made here: the way in which these arguments could be put
forward in support of an individualist approach of employer-employees
and as a practical denial of union recognition.
"I would like to see 51% membership before giving recognition.
And then I'd fight to stop the will of the other 49% 
being trodden on. I'm bitterly opposed to a closed shop 
and I'd fight tooth and nail to stop that happening.
Why? It comes back to individuals. Anything that takes 
away the freedom of choice is out as far as I'm concerned.” (4)
The traditions of individualism have a long-established dominance
in Western capitalism. But the use and internal consistency of those
arguments in bookmaking in the early 1970s must be seen in the context
of how retailing bookmaking had rapidly developed and changed the labour
process within the industry at that time.
Local recognition was totally out of court while the Personnel
Departments were trying to establish control over the regions.
2. Traceable to patterns of centralisation. See the discussion of 
bargaining units in Chapter 8.
2. The William Hill Organisation reference indicates this problem dramatically 
See Table 6.1; and also the discussion of the William Hill reference in
Chapter 8.
4. Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75.
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(iii) The strategic use of policy.
The practice of the Personnel Departments in developing the 
wide-ranging policies to reconstruct employer-employee relationships 
was not merely to compete with and undermine the union in a general 
fashion, but to take certain initiatives at crucial moments.
Perhaps the most clear and interesting example is how John Wilson, 
as Personnel Controller at Ladbrokes, used the stoppage of March 1973 
to compete with TUBE through the introduction of a new wage structure 
and how competition with TUBE was not a substitute for coercive 
policies but a complement.
One of the weaknesses of the national stoppages was the long delay 
between the calling of the stoppage and it actually taking place: 
specific procedures were laid down in the union rulebook, procedures 
vetted and agreed by the Registrar under the IRA 1 9 7 1 . The gap 
was approximately five weeks and allowed the employers involved 
sufficient time to develop a counter strategy.
In the Ladbrokes dispute, this strategy took on distinct, discernible 
phases. Initially there seems to have been something of a softening-up 
process: rumours circulated through the management structures and 
around the LBOs that strikers would be dismissed, with visits from local
management to the betting shops "threatening" and "cajolling",
(2)particularly in the weaker areas.
Ladbrokes were not merely relying on pressurising their employees 
in this way. They also intended to compete with TUBE and show the union 
to be unnecessary. Just eleven days before the stoppage, on March 13t.h, 
the Personnel Department circulated the results of the job evaluation scheme
TUBE rules had been agreed prior to full registration. While one of the 
'carrots' of the IRA 1971 had been the benefits a registered union could 
obtain, the 'stick' was most certainly the pressure that could enforce changes 
in union rulebooks to bring unions into line with what the Conservative 
Government thought they ought to be.
2• Letter George Sawford to Sporting Life 14.3.73. Documentary evidence 
in the TUBE files seems to support Sawford's assertions (as indeed did future 
Policy by Ladbrokes in 1975).
begun in June 1972, detailing salary grades and salary increases.
Ladbrokes were now going to have a "nation wide salary structure".(1>
Clearly the timing of such an announcement was strategic, 
ihe offer of tangible increases in wages had been made; and geographical 
anomolies and irregularities were to be removed. Hence management were
employing the twin strategies of "forcible opposition" and "peaceful
( 2 )competition", as Bain has called them , wielding the stick and dangling 
the carrot at the same time.
Part of the reasons for the defeat of TUBE lies in the inability 
of the union to cope with this strategy. Even as the strike occurred,
Ladbrokes had outmanoeuvred the union. Capitalising on the uneven 
response to the stoppage call, Ladbrokes transported blackleg labour 
from London and the South into the Midlands with some success. And 
with the TUBE ranks in disarray selected one of the weaker, isolated 
areas, Nottingham, to carry out the rumoured threats of the previous week.
Nine men were dismissed "for taking part in the strike". ^
The timing of these strategies clearly related to the immediate 
possibility of the stoppage. But the form and the content are rooted more 
fundamentally in the context of bookmaking at that time. The effectiveness 
of the pressurising tactics - which may vary in content, e.g. 
threatened dismissals, hints at transfers and harassment by security staff - 
tested on the structure of the industry, widely distributed, relatively 
isolated working units, and the weakness of trade union organisation.
Ladbrokes, as a national company, could ensure by such tactics that the 
smaller groups of their diffusely scattered employees might remain outside 
the union umbrella, for their vulnerability as a group was plain to see.
Letter Ladbroke Personnel Dept, to employees 13.3.73. Given the pay freeze 
salaries were to be raised by "the maximum approved by law".
2- Bain (1970) p.131
Letter George Sawford to D. Patterson 18.4.73.
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The strategic introduction of new pay scales was echoed in 
two other major firms. The J.Coral Group had brought in standardised 
pay scales at the beginning of 1973, which coincided with their 
withdrawal from negotiations with TUBE over recognition. And when 
William Hill finally instituted similar changes in January 1974, this 
coincided with the CIR investigation , just a few months before the 
CIR were to issue a favourable report for TUBE on the William Hill reference.
(c) Conclusions.
The discussion of employers' policies in this chapter has, 
admittedly, been a partial one. Concentrating mainly on the 'Big Four' 
companies, the intention has been to draw out from their policies, towards 
both employees and the unions involved, an understanding in terms of the 
labour process approach.
The initial conclusion that can be drawn concerns the source of 
employers' policies. In utilising the labour process as an initial 
focus, an understanding of employers' policies towards their employees 
and TUBE was achieved in relation to patterns of capital accumulation.
The expansion of retailing bookmaking and then the rationalisation of 
the betting chains provided certain imperatives and constraints in the 
kinds of policies that could be adopted by the employers: the specific
sources of antiunionism and potential choices of coercive and co-operative 
policies in terms of economic improvements as well as ideological and 
political integration. Furthermore, the social organisation of work with 
the widely distributed LBO structure provides the basis on which the policies 
were introduced.
Insofar as this provides an understanding of employer policies, 
it does indicate the contingency of employer-union relationships on 
external pressures: for employers, their policy towards employees is 
necessarily affected by their efforts to create (or, in this instance, gain
a share of) surplus value. Taken together with the discussions of 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, concerning the dependency of unionisation 
on the changing basis of co-operation in the labour process, and uneven 
patterns of accumulation, the result is significant: the conditions 
which generate unionisation amongst employees derive from the same 
source as the primary influence on employer's policies towards trade 
unions. Considering employer and union policies only in relation to each 
other, obscures the degree of commonality of the source of those policies.
It is one thing to conclude the importance of the labour process 
in examining both employer policies and the pattern of unionisation; 
it is another to argue that source is determinate of employer-union 
relationships. Indeed, the complexity of the relationships involved 
can be seen once it is realised employer-union relationships are also 
determinate: the policy of the employers was influenced by TUBE;
while the lack of concessions from the employers affected the activities 
of the union; Furthermore, the impact on the membership of the union 
(and thus the union on the employers) was not merely affected by the 
lack of success, but by the objectives pursued by TUBE.
To begin with, it is clear from various discussions in this 
chapter, that the actual or potential presence of TUBE did have an 
effect on employers' policies. While it would be impossible - and 
undesirable - to draw any monocausal line between TUBE and employers 
policies, this does not deny the existence of a link. The Big Four 
would probably have developed Personnel Departments as a means of centralising 
control irrespective of TUBE- yet the union did have an impact on 
when these developments took place, how personnel policy operated, and what 
objectives were pursued. The attentions of TUBE generated an added
imperative to the need for employers to reconstitute employee relations 
and prompted for instance changes in substantive conditions of employment 
at an earlier, rather than later, date, e.g. the improvements for Ladbroke
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eraployees in 1973. The implementation of personnel policy was 
frequently strategic, being used to oppose the efforts of TUBE; while 
the actual policies used against TUBE, e.g. the use of blackleg labour, 
would scarcely have been introduced without the demands for unionisation. 
The influence of TUBE on employers' policies can therefore be seen in 
both the timing and nature of employer response.
But, at the same time, the lack of concessions from the employers 
also affected union policies and objectives. The general anti-unionism 
and victimisation pushed the TUBE leadership into an increasing use 
and reliance on the legal protections of unfair dismissal and recognition; 
the continuing refusal of the major companies to recognise TUBE raised 
serious questions within the union about their general policy towards 
employers and how this could be implemented; furthermore it resulted 
in the promotion of recognition as the crucial objective of the union.
In short, employers' policies had a wideranging effect on how TUBE 
developed, functioned, and succeeded or failed.
This, however, does not diminish the importance of the labour 
process approach, but enhances it. Consider the impact of employer 
policy on union branch organisation.
While in Chapter 6 links were established between concentration 
and centralisation and patterns of branch formation, employers, as do 
unions, mediate this relationship: responding to the pressures
of accumulation, they can adopt policies which can affect the success 
or failure of branch organisation. Against the background of TUBE'S 
development of geographically-based branches, employer policies might 
result in the collapse of membership not merely in that firm, but also 
the branch as well; while national companies presented particular 
problems for local union activity.
The best example of the first occurrence can be seen in the
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experience of the Welsh branches. In Anglesey, Bob Jones Ltd, by 
agreeing to the demands of the staff association, pre-empted TUBE'S 
attempts at recognition; in Bridgend, a blatant threat of 
redundancy from Jack Brown Ltd, had thwarted the union. These different
forms of anti-unionism had the same effect: the collapse of local 
branches reliant on the membership of these firms.
Where branches were dependent on more than one firm, the impact 
of individual employers was more limited; but where they involved 
membership of the national companies, the problem was slightly different.
The general employer policy of national recognition implied union success 
depended on the simultaneous growth of membership in different areas.
This scarcely happened, and membership only came together in this way 
for a very short period. For the most part, local union members in 
the National companies found themselves dealing with a local bureaucracy; 
opportunities for success were therefore limited.
But the impact of employer policies (and the conditions for 
their adoption) was dependent on the general patterns of capital 
accumulation: its uneven development between different geographical 
areas and in terms of industrial structure. This necessarily promoted 
limits on potential autonomy within employers policies, just as it did 
with those of TUBE.
The precise relationship between the bookmaking employers and 
TUBE cannot be understood without a more direct reference to the 
objectives of the union. The response of employers is in part dependent 
on what the union seeks to achieve, but does in turn influence those 
objectives. The reaction of the 'Big Four' employers was in part due 
to the nature of the early TUBE membership and the anti-retailing bookmaking 
Perspectives; while their refusal to concede recognition prompted the 
onion into pushing this forward as a major demand. These highlight two 
important influences on the objectives of TUBE: the demands and grievances
of the membership and the willingness of employers to make concessions
The discontinuities of these two pressures had severe implications
for employer-union relationships
In the first place, TUBE had originally opposed the expansion of
betting chains. In the formative period of early 1971, this had been
aimed against a potential development; by 1973, the union had to come
to terms with the existence of the large-scale LBO chains. By
implication union objectives on questions of control over the labour
process became problematic. Notions that there could be some return
to the idyllic world of the small-scale bookmaker, where individual
settler-managers could make decisions on betting and bookmaking on
their own initiative
industry. Consequently
wages, holiday entitlement, extra payment for holidays, etc
With this shift, the demands of TUBE became increasingly non
oppositional to employers policies, who were seeking to rationalise
and standardise conditions of employment. This served to undermine
the union in some instances, since it showed the union as unnecessary
membership declined as, in consequence, did the impact of TUBE on
The predominant union objective was not, however, improving
conditions — either in terms of control or remuneration — but the securing
of recognition. This was a logical consequence of the refusal of employers 
to accept TUBE as representing their employees; but it generated particular 
problems for the union. The struggle for recognition per se is to fight for an
insubstantial objective, a means to an end. But part of the fetishism
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which accompanies the institutional/pluralist emphasis on procedurisation, 
establishes 'recognition' as an end in itself. The corollary in union 
practice is to separate the demand for recognition from those for 
conditions of employment. ^
Once such a separation occurs within the objectives of the 
union, problems are likely to arise. While on the one hand, the TUBE 
campaign in William Hill (which despite all its shortcomings, was 
remarkably successful in sustaining membership and pressure on the
( 2 )company) continually linked recognition with employment conditions, 
this was not achieved in Ladbrokes. In the context of the Ladbroke 
stoppage in March 1973, one local activist tackled Sawford on this issue:
"Are we going on strike just for recognition of the union?
If Ladbrokes still do not recognise the union where do
people stand who go on strike?”. (3)
The membership in this area, Blackpool, soon disappeared; as did 
the Ladbroke membership generally. The reasons were complex, but owed 
something to the inability of the TUBE leadership to make real connections 
between the demands for recognition and those for substantive improvements.
The consequent decline in membership took any immediate pressure off Ladbrokes 
for more than two years.
!• The existence of legal channels for securing recognition may also 
serve to do this; indeed the NIRC made distinctions between 
recognition disputes and other disputes. See Chapter 8.
2. Consider the problems over the March 1973 stoppage in relation to the 
NIRC referral on recognition. See Chapter 8.
^tter Harry Richmond to George Sawford 7.3.73.
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The one conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion 
is the complexity of social forces which underpin employer-union 
relationships. Employer policies affect and respond to union objectives 
and organisation, yet both find a partially common source in the 
desired and actual patterning of the labour process. It is important 
to understand these various relationships rather than evade them; or, 
as Bain attempts to do, reduce the social complexity to a series of 
determinant 'factors'. ^  The labour process approach allows a
far greater understanding of employer policies towards unions, since 
it essentially locates employer-union relationships within the immediate 
context of employer-employee relationships and the contingent pressures 
of capital accumulation. In consequence, the approach necessarily 
denies the usefulness of unequivocal statements of how employers affect 
unionisation outside of those contexts. 1
1. For instance, in his attempts to separate the strength of union 
membership from the employers attitude towards recognition. In 
relating the latter to the exogenous 'variable' of government policy, he 
denies the significance of the inter-relationship between the two 
'factors'.
à
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Chapter 8: The impact of state intervention on union organisation
_______________ and activity. ____________________
Given the continuing historical preoccupation of successive 
governments with the 'problem' of labour relations, it is scarcely 
contentious to argue that the state could have an important influence 
on union organisation and activity; of more potential disagreement 
is the nature of that impact. The current tendency for governments 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of union representation while pursuing 
anti-union policies, indicates some of the difficulties in analysing 
this question. Does the state act to support or undermine unions?
The answer is both.
The formation of TUBE occurred in a period when this contradiction 
in state policy was quite open. The Conservative Government had been 
elected at least partly on the platform of anti union policies and 
against the background of the "anti-union hysteria" of t>>e late 1960s.*1' 
Superficially, this gave little encouragement to the formation of a 
new union; yet the cornerstone of the Government's labour relations 
policy, the Industrial Relations Act, was a clear source of inspiration 
to the Bookmaking workers in forming TUBE. This paradox is explained 
in the kind of unionism that the Industrial Relations Act (I.R.A. 1971) 
offered - 'responsible* unionism - where collective representation 
could be achieved without the normal struggles associated with it and 
where employers would willingly receive the 'reasonable' views of such 
unions.
It might seem that the limits of the labour process approach 
had been reached when considering state intervention. How, for instance, 
could the changing labour process in the Bookmaking industry in any 
way provide an understanding of the basis of state intervention in
1. Hyman (1973) p. 113
employer-employee relations within that industry? Quite clearly 
the policy of the state* on industrial relations must be understood 
in the context of the national (and international) economy; and the 
range of state institutions are scarcely developed with just one 
specific sector in mind. It is transparently implausible that an 
understanding of state intervention can be achieved through analysing 
the changes in the labour process in bookmaking.(1)
Nevertheless, the labour process 'approach' is arguably of 
use when analysing the impact of state intervention. If the way the 
state tries to influence industrial relations is abstracted from the 
social and economic context in which it takes place, there can be little 
understanding of how union organisation and activity are affected. Thus 
the labour process can be seen as providing the general context and 
source of unionisation, with the IRA 1971 constituting an important 
conjunctural influence on the development of TUBE: while the founders 
of TUBE had decided on a particular response, the formation of the 
union was delayed until the IRA 1971 had received Royal Assent; Branch 
formation was consciously restricted until the unfair dismissal provisions 
were operative; recognition attempts were initially phased according 
to the status of TUBE'S registration under the IRA 1971 and access to the 
various entitlements that went with it. Such examples show how the 
IRA 1971 influenced the timing of these developments, but can scarcely 
be seen as an underlying reason for the developments per se.
Yet the IRA 1971 did have an impact on union organisation and 
activity through its procedures and institutions; one that was 
essentially contradictory in the way it impinged on pre-existing conditions 
for union growth and organisation, both promoting and discouraging
1- This can be qualified to the extent that bookmaking did have a 
specific relationship to the fiscal policies of the state which could imply 
certain predispositions as regards state intervention in this industry.
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unionisation. In order to explore this effect and understand why 
this should be the case, it is first necessary to gain a perspective 
on the position of the state in capitalist society and develop 
the general position of bookmaking and legal enactment in that context.
Therefore the chapter begins with a discussion of various 
approaches to the capitalist state emphasising the contradictory role 
of the state; this is followed by an examination of the context of 
state intervention in relation to the bookmaking industry and the 
general characterisation of the state in the development and operation 
of labour legislation. Finally, the bulk of the chapter is concerned 
with the impact of the IRA 1971 and the Employment Protection Act 
(EpA) 1975 on the development of TUBE, particularly in relation to the 
procedures on unfair dismissal and recognition.
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The State in Capitalist Society: a discussion of views of 
the State
Within the mainstream of industrial relations literature, the
state appears as primarily neutral in relation to employers and
employees. The chief proponents of the industrial relations
'system' - Flanders and Bain - present the state as an external
influence on the everyday conduct of labour relations.(1) The state
therefore appears as a potentially progressive force in assisting
employers and employees to overcome their industrial relations ’problems':
".... there is a crucial role for government, not least 
in providing support for a network of public agencies 
designed to encourage and assist the parties in their own 
initiatives." (McCarthy (1973) p.6).
This view of the state suggests neutrality is achieved as long as such 
institutions retain an independence from government policy - and will
/ o )
thus be free to pursue the objectives of 'good' industrial relations.
The extensiveness of the involvement of the state as a neutral mediator
and referee is reflected in the variety of institutions set up under
the aegis of the state and embracing the notions of tripartism. But
as Hyman argues, such neutrality is only superficial:
"The ostensibly neutral functions of mediation and 
conciliation - most recently embodied in the 'independent'
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service - in fact 
serve the essential purpose, for both employers and the 
state, of stabilising the existing mode of production."
(Hyman (1975) p. 137).
If the state is not neutral, however, what is the basis of this non­
neutrality? It is important to realise that neutrality and non­
intervention are not identical. Hyman argues that the state did not 
systematically intervene in British industrial relations until the post-war
period, because employers did not require such assistance from the state.____
Bain (1970) p.186 is explicit: "... government action is also largely 
an exogenous variable from the point of view of the industrial relations 
system.” Flanders is not so forthright, but consider his discussion of 
the role of the state in relation to voluntarism: Flanders (1975) pp. 288-294
2- McCarthy (1973) p. 6
3- Hyman (1973) p. 112
The tradition of voluntarism thus derived from an essentially 
practical basis - that capital did not need state intervention -
and therefore non-intervention was historically abstention in favour of
. (1 ) capital.
Such a position relates the extent of intervention by the state 
to the requirements of a predominantly capitalist economy. It is 
only a short step to functionalist views of the state, which understand 
state activity in terms of the 'logic' of capital. It is a view readily 
associated with expositions of vulgar Marxism which attempt to explain
the activities of the state in terms of the requirements of capital,
( 2)often within a framework of economic determinism.
A contrary view of the state, which plays down its economic
functionability for capital, locates state activity as primarily
political; the state thus possesses an autonomy from the 'logic' of
capital accumulation.^ But the formulation that the state is largely
unresponsive to the dictates of capital accumulation is just as
untenable as the functionalist position. Perhaps the most significant
contribution in recent years to overcome this juxtaposition of economic
determinism and policital autonomy is that of Holloway and Picciotto.
They argue that the state must be understood in terms of the outcome of
class struggle within the specifically capitalist mode of production,
characterised by the "capital relation" which simultaneously embraces
economic and political dimensions:
"The starting point must not be the specificity of the political 
nor the reduction of state action to the 'logic of capital', 
but an analysis which founds the specificity of the poiitical 
in the nature of the capital relation." (Holloway & Picciotto (1977) 
pp. 84-85).
!• Hyman (1975) p. 148 .. „
2. See~~Hollowav and Picciotto (1977) p. 81ff for a discussion of
functionalist views of the state.
3. See for instance, Poulantzas (1973)
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For Holloway and Picciotto, the "capital relation" is an 
"historically specific form of class domination",*1* which means 
it is derived from and reflects the struggle between classes which 
is peculiar to capitalism as a system based on the exploitation of 
surplus value. As such, the state necessarily embodies the 
contradictory bases of capitalism and reflects the balance of class 
forces:
"If the growth of state activity is seen merely as a shift 
in the form of capitalist domination... it is clear that 
it can do nothing to escape from the fundamental 
contradictions of that domination." (ibid, p.95)
Yet capital is not monolithic, and is composed of a variety of
different capitals, essentially in competition. This anarchy of
the market is necessarily reflected in the activities of the state:
"..... the reproduction of competition within the state
apparatus ensures an inevitable dislocation, an inevitable 
tension between state activity and the interests of capital 
in general - an inevitable arbitrariness and imbalance in 
the way that the state ensures the reproduction of capital."
(ibid p.95)
Thus while the form of the state is essentially capitalistic, state 
activity cannot be read off in any straightforward or unambiguous way: 
it embraces the general struggle within and between classes and 
reflects the contradictions within capitalism in its own contradictory 
activities.
It is this perspective of the state as inherently contradictory 
in form and activity that is developed and utilised in this chapter.
1. ibid, p.77
But as a preliminary, it is necessary to qualify the monolithic 
shorthand of the 'state'. In terms of activity, the state operates 
as a mediator of, primarily, legal and financial control. The use 
of coercion as a direct method of control is symptomatically hidden 
behind such 'legitimate' controls in the bourgeois s t a t e . I n  
terms of its form, the state comprises a range of institutions, which 
serve to carry out 'state' policies; such institutions have 
'institutional needs' and possess a degree of autonomy within the vast 
state structure; or, more correctly, reflect the competition of different 
capitals in the anarchy of the market.
Within and between these mediations and institutions the 
contradictions of state form and activity are expressed. In terms of 
the impact of state intervention on unionisation, it is important to 
examine these contradictions in relation to the industry concerned as 
well as the contradictions within labour legislation and between the 
legislation and the institutional arrangements for its implementation.
This is taken up in the next section. 1
1. This view is both historically contingent and related to a 
particular form of capitalist society; nevertheless, given the 
main characteristic of capitalist economy is wage labour, it is not 
surprising that the state should mirror the obscuring of the real 
relationships of class domination.
(b) General Contradictions in state activity: Bookmaking and
Labour Legislation.
The consideration of the impact of state intervention on 
unionisation in the bookmaking industry can be seen in terms of 
three general contradictions. The first concerns the relationship 
between the state and the bookmaking industry which indicates the 
divergent policies and practices of different state agencies; 
the second focusses on the generalisation of labour legislation and 
the unevenness of capital accumulation which brings out the inherent 
contradictory impact of labour legislation on unionisation; the 
third examines the contradictions between legislation and the institutional 
arrangements for implementation.
In order to carry out its various functions, the state must 
be provided with some means of finance - both to spend on desired 
projects and to support state institutions. The precise sources of 
taxation are a key political and administrative matter: new sources 
which are politically acceptable and relatively easy to collect are 
particularly attractive options. This underlies the continuing 
relationship between the bookmaking industry and the state for the past 
sixty years. As was shown in Chapter 3, successive governments showed 
more than a passing interest in the potential of a betting tax, a pressure 
which was an important contribution to the legalisation of cash 
betting in 1960. But of particular interest is the role of the
Treasury in promoting the development of large-scale betting chains as 
a direct consequence of fiscal requirements. The collection of tax from 
a large number of small firms was a very inefficient method, and the 
Rateable Value Tax of 1969 can only be seen as an effort to drive out
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many of the small concerns.
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The consequence of this policy was the active involvement of 
a range of state agencies in the promotion of changes in the industrial 
structure of the industry which would give rise to the alterations 
in the labour process underpinning the growth of unionisation amongst 
bookmaking employees. Yet simultaneously other state agencies, such 
as the Department of Employment, were involved in developing collective 
bargaining amongst employees in order to promote 'good' industrial 
relations. While one branch of the state was trying to push the 
expansion of the bookmaking industry in a particular direction, another 
was concerned with promoting collective bargaining which might 
effectively limit the extent and impact of this expansion.
The source of this contradiction is partly to be found in the 
essential generality of legislation. In some situations, the promotion 
of collective bargaining might assist capital; in others it will hinder 
it. The difficulty is in producing a legal enactment which will 
accommodate such differences; it is arguably impossible for the state 
to do so. It is this point which is central to the second general 
contradiction.
If legislation is to have a widespread effect, it must be 
generalised in its application; this, however, is also a source of 
limitation — in applying in such a general way it means there will be a 
different impact on different groups in society. In particular, it 
contrasts with the unevenness of capital accumulation, and in the 
context of interest here, the strength and spread of unionisation. In 
consequence, the impact of labour legislation can be seen as 
inherently contradictory. This is most clearly illustrated in the case 
°f the IRA 1971.
The IRA 1971 was introduced as the collapse of the post-war boom 
was making a definite impact on the British economy. It provided a 
Partial, yet significant string to the bow of government policy at that
time; a policy aimed at both the living standards(through incomes
policy) and the organisation (unions) of working people. It comprised
an attempt to reconstitute the relationship between capital and
labour in favour of a new expansion of capital accumulation and
profitability
Within the labour legislation, the Government sought to channel
trade union activity in a particular direction, constraining certain
This contradiction
of trade union activity against the necessity to accommodate it - runs
through all aspects of the IRA 1971; and this is because the generality
of the legislation comes up against the uneven development of the economy
Laws aimed at the
problem' of the unions in general terms also gave positive legal
benefits to some unions or employees: the recognition procedures did
not bring many of the major unions into line, but they did encourage
unionisation in new areas; the strongly unionised groups may not have
used the unfair dismissal provisions, but non-unionised employees
might gain some protection
While this contradiction is inherent in the legislation itself
although it is not necessarily even - there is also the relationship 
between the generality of the law and the way it is implemented. This
comprises the third general contradiction
students of industrial relations in a particular guise
"The judiciary for their part, show an interpretative 
skill which ordinary human understanding has not always 
been able to appreciate." (1)
The resourcefulness of the judiciary in watering down the meagre 
legal protections given to trade unionists is just one aspect of the 
potential conflict between the spirit and letter of the law and the
The IRA 1971 introducedinstitutional processes of legal regulation
a whole series of institutional structures, with legal powers, to handle
Clara Zetkin (1895) quoted in
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industrial relations matters: the cornerstone was the National
Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) where Justice Donaldson made his
several ill-conceived judgements on industrial relations; industrial
tribunals were set up on a regional basis to handle cases of unfair
dismissal and redundancy; while nationally, the Commission on
Industrial Relations (CIR) was utilised as an investigatory agent
in industrial relations generally and in recognition disputes specifically.
Such institutions were variably composed: the NIRC as the main
legal channel incorporated the legalistic ethos and persona. The
tribunals, however, were supposedly an attempt to escape legal
formalism and involved a degree of lay representation. The CIR had
existed prior to the IRA 1971 and was composed of non-legal representatives
at the policy making level, while the Executive was mainly civil
servants. The character of the CIR derived from its Donovan ancestry;
it embraced pluralistic notions of industrial relations and promoted
collective bargaining as a 'good thing'. As such its operation when
integrated into the IRA 1971 led one commentator to remark on
".... the relatively limited effect which the IRA had on 
the CIR's methods". (James (1977) p.30)
The overall philosophy of the CIR employees, as well as their activities,
could and did on occasions conflict with the intentions of the IRA 1971. ^
Such contradictions between the legal mediation of the state
its institutions - and indeed between the institutions themselves -
cannot merely be laid at the door of different interest groups, e.g.
the legislators against the civil service. They reflect the kinds of
contradiction inherent in the "capital relation": the policies for
expanding surplus value are not unambiguous - are the unions to be
forcibly repressed or accommodated? The dilemmas of capital are, quite
understandably, reflected in the state form and its institutions. 1
1- This is amply illustrated by the relationship between the CIR and 
TUBE which is examined later in this chapter.
. t a
-407-
The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the impact of the 
recognition and unfair dismissal provisions on union organisation 
and activity. The main sources of information derive from the 
period of the IRA 1971 rather than the EPA 1975; but it is 
interesting that despite the very different circumstances in which 
these pieces of legislation were introduced the essential core of 
the legislation is remarkably similar. ^  The conclusions that
are drawn would therefore have some kind of general validity for 
the operation of these procedures over the past decade.
1. The institutional arrangements under the different pieces 
of legislation are set out below.
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(c) The role of the state in the procedurisation of industrial 
relations; the impact on union growth, organisation and 
activity.
(i) The Role of state procedures
"Like the Donovan Commission, the authors of the Act 
proposed to create new rights for trade unions and for 
individual workers. They agreed with the Donovan 
Commission that the law should assist trade unions to 
secure recognition from employers, and offer protection 
to workers who had been unfairly dismissed." (Clegg (1976) 
p. 454).
This view of the legal procedures on recognition and unfair dismissal 
introduced in the IRA 1971 emphasises their position as 'new rights' 
for trade unionists and employees, categorising such provisions as 
'sweeteners' offsetting the more punitive sections of the legislation. ^  
Yet these new procedures were not simply a sop for the employees; 
they were the outcome of contradictory pressures, embraced differential 
aims and objectives and had a contradictory impact on union organisation 
and activity.
Insofar as they were indeed 'new rights', they reflected the
demands from certain sections of the trade union movement that such
( 2)legislation should be introduced. To that extent the state was
accommodating trade union pressure. Nevertheless, the ambitions of those
who designed the procedures and protections were not entirely concerned
with extending the rights and powers of employees.
The definitive work on the IRA 1971, for instance, succinctly
summarises the varied intentions behind the recognition procedure:
".... the IR Act's recognition procedure was intended to
be multifunctional. It was aimed at reducing multi-unionism 
and preventing industrial action over recognition as well as 
promoting union recognition and growth". (Weekes et al (1975) 
pp. 150-151. ) _______________
1.
2 . ibid, pp. 453-4NALGO and GMWU both argued for legal recognition procedures in
their evidence to the Donovan Commission. See Weekes et al (1975) p.120.
Recognition procedures were thus to be used to reform the 
'irrationality' of trade union structures and activity: on the 
one hand, they could reduce the 'problem' of multi-unionism and 
create 'rational' bargaining structures and thus assist 'good' 
industrial relations; on the other, recognition issues could now 
be removed from the arena of industrial conflict hence the strike 
'problem' would be reduced. ^
There are similar parallels in the intentions behind the unfair
dismissal provisions. These were hailed as the "least contentious and
( 2)most successful aspect" of the IRA 1971. This arose from the
assumption that rights against unfair dismissal were meaningful employee 
protections; a view earlier put forward by the Donovan Commission which 
argued that a legal right against unfair dismissal would promote job
security. ^
Yet Donovan also put forward other benefits which might be 
gained from such legislation: firstly, it would encourage the reform 
of voluntary disciplinary procedures; and, secondly, it would reduce 
the number of industrial disputes over dismissals. Thus, once again, 
as with recognition, the provisions on unfair dismissals aimed at 
tidying up the 'irrational' and 'arbitrary' procedural arrangements 
between unions and management; and to make a further contribution to the 
strike 'problem'.
1* "It will be unnecessary to strike over the question of deciding who 
belongs to whose union or whether an employer should recognise a 
particular union ... because an orderly procedure is laid down”.
E. Heath in 1970 quoted in Weekes et al (1975) p. 121.
2- Weekes et al (1975) p. 9 ... This may not be saying very much.
3. Donovan (1968) Ch.9. The 'successfulness' of the provisions in the IRA 
owed just as much to the limited effect they had on employers, see 
Weekes et al (1975) p. 224.
The provisions on recognition and unfair dismissals can scarcely 
be seen in the relatively simplistic view put forward by Clegg: they
unions
were they merely functional for capital, totally embracing the logic
of capitalist rationality
of the contemporary capitalist economy reflected in the role of the
state : the accommodation of trade union demands on one hand and
the need to suppress them on the other. This was not merely resolved
by the state in trading off concessions and restrictions: these
concessions and restrictions were inherent to any provisions introduced
Hence the new areas of legally backed recognition and unfair dismissal
necessarily involved the simultaneous accommodation and suppression
of organised labour
compar
The examination of the role of the procedures on recognition
and unfair dismissal provides some perspective for examining their
impact
intelligible, it is important to be aware of how the procedures were
formally constructed
In order to make use of the recognition procedures, a trade union
This would involve the
certification officer examining the union, especially the union rules
to ensure the union complied with the conditions of the IRA 1971
1. See Martin and Fryer (1973) for an excellent discussion of how the 
Redundancy Payments scheme operated to the advantage of employers although 
presented as an employee right.
2. The position outlined here for the EPA 1975 is that prior to the 
Employment Act 1980 and other changes on unfair dismissal introduced 
by the Conservative Government since May 1979.
It was the vetting of rules in this way which prompted much of the
union opposition to the IRA 1971 and few established unions registered
under the Act
But once a union had registered, the legal recognition procedure
was now available. Leaving aside some of the technical details, the
process was as follows: the union would initially approach the employer
in an attempt to effect a voluntary settlement. Once it was clear
that a voluntary recognition would not be forthcoming, the union would
notify the Secretary of State for Employment of the failure to agree
and make an application under Section 45 of the IRA 1971 for bargaining
Here the conciliation services of the Department
would intervene in an attempt to effect a voluntary agreement. If
they failed, the NIRC would hear the application and decide whether
the case was sufficiently strong for it to be referred to the CIR for
investigation. The CIR would encourage the employer and the union to
reach a voluntary settlement on the basis of their investigation
eventually, the CIR would produce a formal report on its findings which
could be used as a basis for resolving the dispute. If a voluntary
settlement was still not achieved, the CIR recommendations could be
made legally binding by the NIRC provided the majority of the employees 
involved voted in favour of the recommendations in a ballot.
The unfair dismissal procedure was, perhaps, less complex, but
( 2 )involved similar questions of eligibility and procedural adherence.
Only employees with two years continuous employment with their current 
employer were eligible, unless the dismissal was being contested on the
grounds of trade union activities as the alleged reason. There was also
a tight schedule for making an application for unfair dismissal: the requisite
Applications to the NIRC could be made not only by registered 
unions, but by employers and the Secretary of State for Employment 
See IRA 1971 section 45 (2).
The unfair dismissal provisions are contained in the IRA 1971 
Actions 22-23.
form had to bo obt ained from tlu Depart inonl of Employment and submitted 
to the Central Office of Tribunals within four weeks of the* dismissal.
At this stage the Department of Employment would attempt a 
conciliation, but if this failed the case would be listed for hearing 
at a Regional Office of Industrial Tribunals. The industrial tribunal 
notionally comprised three members based on the tripartite principle: 
one employers representative, one union representative, plus a legally 
qualified chairperson. ^  The burden of proof rested on the 
individual employer to show the dismissal was fair and ho had acted 
reasonably and correctly in dismissing the employee. The tribunal 
could either accept or reject the employer's view: if they accepted it, 
the application was dismissed; if they rejected it, they could award 
the employee financial compensation or recommend rc-ongagcment. There 
was an appeal against the tribunal decision only on a point of law.
It is useful to make a brief comment about the procedures set 
out here under the IRA 1971 and the EPA 1975, for in essence the 
underlying philosophy of how these procedures should operate remains 
the same - given the removal of the legalistic structures of the 
recognition procedure. Under the EPA 1975, the recognition procedure 
has been altered in detail, but not in essence: the penalty clauses of 
registration have gone as have the institutional arrangements of the 
NIRC and the CIR. Yet it still embraces the notions of voluntary 
agreement and conciliation rather than enforcement. The Department of 
Employment conciliation service and the CIR function have now been 
collapsed into a new enlarged body, the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) , but which necessarily carries out the similar 
functions of conciliation and investigation. Finally, there is recourse 
for legal enforcement to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), which 
parallels the IRA 1971 procedure though dispensing with the ballot.
• The non-co-operation of trade unions with the IRA 1971 meant the 
trade union side did not take up their options to sit on tribunals.
1
The unfair dismissals procedure is virtually identical, given 
the relaxation of criteria for qualification (reduced to six months 
continuous employment) and the extension of the time limits for 
application for unfair dismissal to three months. The only other 
difference (besides the co-operation of the trade union side in 
nominating union representatives to industrial tribunals) is the 
installation of the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) which performs 
the function its title indicates.
Given there are only differences in detail and not in the 
nature of the procedures, there is a strong argument that the 
experiences of TUBE under the IRA 1971 are essentially transferable 
to any consideration of similar state procedures on recognition and 
unfair dismissal. In other words, the experience of TUBE has immediate 
contemporary relevance and holds important lessons for trade union 
organisation.
(iii) The overall impact of procedural reform.
The commitment of the TUBE leadership, throughout the history 
of the union, to the legal procedures of the IRA 1971 is best 
understood in their hopes that these provisions would give them the 
legal rights and protections which would enable them to build the union. 
This made the recognition procedure and the unfair dismissal clauses 
the most potentially advantageous sections of the Act: the former 
to advance employer acceptance of the union, the latter to give legal 
protection against victimisation.
The important questions for trade unions are very basic: did 
the recognition procedure help TUBE gain recognition? Did the unfair 
dismissal provisions provide adequate support? Or were the legal 
provisions in these areas more successful in the other objectives of those 
who put them forward, i.e. to rationalise bargaining structures and 
defuse industrial conflict? In this section the general impact on TUBE
is examined; while in the following section these aspects are 
considered in more detail.
To begin with it is important to stress that the impact of 
the IRA 1971 on industrial relations has generally been considered 
insignificant:
"When the IRA Act is said to have had no effect, what is 
generally meant is that it was little used, either because 
unions, employers and workers (and even government) had 
little use for it, or because, if some saw its utility, 
the likely or actual reaction of others prevented them from 
using it ... Our evidence is that the Act had little 
influence on the general practice of industrial relations."
(Weekes et al(1975) p. 232)
One consequence of the lack of use of the IRA 1971 has been the
focussing of attention on the 'minnows' of the trade union movement
who did use the legislation. This has forced various commentators
into assessments of the use of the Act by these small unions, including
TUBE. Despite their general verdict on the IR Act, Weekes et al comment
that TUBE "had cause to be thankful to the Act's recognition procedure”.
(Weekes et al (1975) p. 232), while another study glibly suggests;
"The recognition provisions were also highly instrumental 
in stimulating collective bargaining in another relatively 
unorganised sector, that of bookmaking concerns."
(Thomson and Engleman (1975) p. 87).
Were such views justified? Table 8.1 details the progress of known 
efforts by TUBE to gain recognition in this period and give some 
general indication of the usage and effectiveness of the formal 
recognition procedure. A number of points can be made: firstly, the 
failure of TUBE to secure recognition, except in a handful of cases, 
through voluntary means is evident. This would seemingly make a legal 
procedure for recognition all the more important - yet less than 40% of 
known recognition claims were referred to the NIRC. Secondly, at the 
conciliation stage of the procedure, no employers were persuaded of the 
err°r of their ways; more is said about the impact of conciliation in
Table 8.1: 
TUBE and Formal Recognition 1971-1974: 
Details of Recognition attempts.
a later section. Thirdly, only 50% of the NIRC referrals actually
reached the CIR. In some cases this was due to the union withdrawing
from the hearing; in others, because the NIRC ordered a further 
period of conciliation. Fourthly, only five out of nine CIR 
references resulted in a favourable report for TUBE, while in only 
three of these cases was recognition actually achieved. In other words 
less than one fifth of the cases referred by TUBE to the NIRC resulted 
in recognition.
This is scarcely a story of unmitigated success. Certainly it 
is not clear that TUBE should be "thankful" for three successes when 
the hopes of fourteen others have been dashed; neither does it appear 
that the provisions were "highly instrumental" in "stimulating" anything, 
let alone collective bargaining.^
Still, it might be argued that it cannot be expected that every 
case will be successful and that at least the procedure provided 
recognition in three firms which might otherwise not have been achieved: 
hence the procedure was successful. Such a view, however, rests on 
two assumptions: that TUBE achieved recognition in these firms because 
of the legal procedures; and that the impact of the procedure is in 
some sense neutral when not recommending recognition. This demands a 
more detailed examination of the work of the CIR in these respects.
The CIR handled more recognition cases through TUBE'S applications 
than for any other trade union. In total, they undertook nine references, 
and these are spelt out in Table 8.2 A brief examination of the dates 
of reference illustrate the decision of the TUBE Executive to utilise 
the CIR, as the union declined. Six of the nine cases were referred to the 
CIR, by the NIRC, between 14.9.73 and 26.10.73, with each case 
involving a different branch of TUBE and predominantly localised firms.
1. Interestingly, the legal procedures have indeed legitimised multi­
unionism within the industry. Although TUBE (and thus the IGWU) has been 
the main union involved, ACAS recommended the recognition of the GMWU in 
one instance in 1977. See ACAS (1977)b.
TIGHTLY
BOUND
COPY
T.iblc 6.2
•»-races on the Betting Industry r.ao te th e  J.I."1. c.cr -errin' reco"nitlon rn mr rection 46 cf the
x k d u  : ? 3 i .v l  f i l m i c ; : :  -1 9 ?-, •
— ¿—
?C33£3 LT3
GO^ DGli
kuhiis
— nnTanx"
03G. r a t f h ; ---S T 0 ? Y  G’ ÍC U ? . o£I£<J C Y C A  L Y D . kÍLSS LT3
! ;C i  . : : j  
J C M G " . f jT A O S K .
H£GTGrt
M A C D C s .X
r: 44 59 63 64 ?i 72 73 74 81
:• c?_ 18.1.73. 1 3 .9.7 3. 2 1.3.7 3. 1 1 .1 0 .7 3. 14.9.73. 26.10.75. 1 3 .9.73 18.9.73. 23.3.74
*? CP 
"iST I 2.8.72. 2 5.3.74. 24.4.74. 2 5.4.74. 25.5.74. 25.5.74. 23.5.74 23.5.74. 26.7.74
cf
¿ 'X L  A F i liIC.'.TICNS madz 3 Y  T U B S
c?
,:cr:c V H I T 3 -C 0 L L . ' 3 :  S U > 3 R '/ I3 C 3 Y abb clssic L
r?
-ihi's 
'.'SF.lj E
535 18 3 ,5 1 4 165 104 56 34 194 250
AIL i!UL'II - E S T A 3 L I  i S S i : : c c i:F . . r i s s ,
1* rj 
:::
:: (s)
ai
v.ployees up .0 and 
including 
ID aren 
managers 
full-tine 
and regular 
part-tine |
All
betting
office
staff
.
Ml full-ti: 
and regular 
jart-tine 
ataff at an l 
DOlOW
aucervir.ory 
evel in 
lead office : 
and at and 
aelow the 
evel of
e
no unit
was
recontended 
/
All full-t: 
and part- 
tir.e
er.ployees 
up to but 
not
including
redor
managers
r.e
Mo unit 
was
recorjiendcd
’.0 unit
uns
rccon­
tended
M l  full 
tine end 
regular 
cert- 
tine
employcc 
up to bu 
not
ir.cludin
croa
m n.'»rr>r*e
Mo unit
was
recor_cende
209
-ended  
: (s) TUBS
13
This ir.el -11 .Socti
;:c:rs
area
superviso:
in
betting
offices
3,514 104
TU3H
1:0:^
ico refe 
n 46 reft er.ces exi rences rec
Trade V
::o agent vns 
reconnendea
Tv.-o staff condttees
.nod by the stur 
ived by the 00:
¡lor. P.eco'niticA ppendix 1a: p
-417-
TU3S
;:c:rs
■j teen*, it 
-.ission*
::o a^ent
wasreccnr’.ended
194
iocs not cov
: C.T .. ~ rr) :-rioncG
75-30.
TUBS
¡:c;r
;:o agent
vas
recommended
:;c:z
:-::3C,i97r)
• Table B. 2
'»nences on the Betting Induetry r..do te the J.Z. ’■ c: : - jrr.in • roao-yiitlon ur.aer -;ct;an 45 cf the
inxa.ti.al ag':.’:;.;n a:? i w ~
■--- CG:...G3 
?CH3£3 LTD irusss
— tffnârar
CSG. — aantfhr—STONY GYCUP.
ocihj
JCYC'l l t d. HAILES LTD
"TÜTZT3 
JCM J'. ifjiroES.
H£3?Gh
M-.CDTi.-vL
no 44 5 9 63 64 7 1 72 73 74 81
:• c?^ _
18.1.73. 13.9.73. 21.3.73. 11.10.7J. 14.9.73. 26.10.73. 1 3 .9 .7 3 18.9.73. 23.3.74
-r Qp
. C?.T J 2.8.72. 25.3.74. 24.4.74. 23.4.74. 2 3 .5 .7 4. 23.5.74. 2 3.5 .7 4 23.5.74. 26.7.74
c?
;XL APIblCATICNS MADE BY TUBS
:: c?
:LCYT3 WHITE-COLLA 2: SUP2KVI3CPY .asd c l es ic’L
iihirs
VîRïD Br
535 18 3,514 165 104 36 54 194 230
ALL l-IUL'
I
I-ESTA3LîïHKZ;: COM'..TIES
*7—Tri
........... 1
:: (s)
:c All
¡n.tloyees up 
-0 and 
including 
:o area 
mangers 
full-time 
and regular 
part-time
All
betting
office
staff
'
.11 full-ti: 
and regular 
nart-tine 
itaff at am 
jelov;
;uaervinory 
Level in 
aead office 
-nd at and 
>elow the
e
no unit
was
recommended
/
All full-t: 
and part- 
t ir.e
employees 
up to but 
not
including
senior
managers
me
Mo unit 
was
"ecommended
’: ' . o unit 
\;ns
recon­
tended
All full 
tine end 
regular 
part- 
time
employee 
up to bu 
not
ir.cludin
area
So unit
was
recomcendc
(«) 2 09
d'enled
*(•) TUBS
18
'U3E
* This ir.c.r. 
-11 Sectii
-co I C.I.2
: :c ; :s
area
superviso
in
betting
offices
3,514 104
TU3E
::o :rH
lea references ex 
n 4-6 references ree
Study 2re.de V
So agent was 
recommended
Tv.-o staff 
conr.ittees
nod by the stur 
;ived by the co:
lion Keco"nltic
Appendix 1a: jr
-417-
TU3E
; :c :n
y tonne it 
mission.
;.o agent
was
recommended
194
TUBE
roes not cov
0.T,E. Ermerionce.
73-30.
SOME
Do agent 
recommended
s c s s
: c : s c , i 9 7 - )
Adding the continuing reference
in William Hill, in the autumn of 1973, the CIR were involved in 
seven different references spread throughout England and Scotland.
The CIR was important in the recognition procedure because it 
could offer something positive - a favourable report leading to 
recognition; the NIRC, in contrast, was only a hurdle to be overcome.
But the other side of this coin was the conseguence of unfavourable 
reports; the impact of the CIR cannot merely be judged in relation to 
its favourable recommendations.
The two-edged impact of the CIR in this sense was distinctly 
uneven, proving far more favourable to employers than to TUBE: 
unfavourable reports from the CIR were associated with the total 
collapse of membership in those firms and branches, while favourable 
ones did not meet with unequivocal success.
For instance, in Blackpool, the Roland Jones membership had 
declined before the CIR investigation had been completed. There was 
no effort to reorganise the staff in the firm, or to reform the Blackpool 
branch. In Newcastle, the Ken Hailes membership disappeared altogether 
and only a handful of members throughout all the firms in the area 
remained.
In Manchester, the union lost the membership in Seymour and Story 
and eventually Jack Rashman as well, who decided to work within the staff 
committees given the lack of support from the TGWU. The branch itself 
was reformed in 1974 with the help of the local TGWU officials, but 
drew its membership from the William Hill employees, not from those in 
Seymour and Story. While the decline in union organisation was indeed 
complex, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the decline in 
specific sections of the membership can be at least partially attributed
to the activities of the CIR.
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Still# lsaving that aside there are still the successes 
after all. Or are there? Recognition, as Table 8.1 shows, 
did not automatically follow from favourable recommendations. In 
two cases, the intransigent Yorkshire employer Gordon Nunns and the 
ubiquitous William Hill organisation, the CIR recommendations were 
rejected by the employers and TUBE were unable to make further 
progress before the recognition procedure was wound up by the incoming 
Labour government. This leaves three firms: Connor and Forbes,
John Joyce, and Ken Munden Ltd, where recognition was achieved after 
supportive CIR recommendations.
Yet even in these cases, it is difficult to place the credit 
for success on the activities of the CIR. The Connor and Forbes 
employees had to return to the NIRC to make the CIR decision legally 
binding and, even then, close nearly all the LBOs on Grand National 
Day in March 1974 before the employers would negotiate. In John Joyce 
Ltd., the CIR had issued a favourable report as early as January 1974, 
but progress was slow. Not until the John Joyce members threatened 
industrial action in Mav 1974 unless the company entered into 
"meaninqful negotiations"(1* was recognition successfully achieved.
That leaves a third firm, Ken Munden Ltd., where the CIR report 
gave support to the membership in arguing against the efforts of the 
company to forestall recognition by expanding the bargaining unit.
In the short term, the company, in the face of the CIR recommendation 
and an exceptionally high level of union membership, agreed to recognise 
the union and signed agreements in mid-1974. Yet in 1975 the Munden 
management cancelled the agreement and, amid some confusion, the union 
became internally divided and was defeated.
1. Letter, G. Sawford to John Joyce 21.5.74
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The indications are, therefore, that the impact of the
recognition procedure cannot be taken at face value. Certainly there
are serious question marks over the assistance given to TUBE by the
procedures; also, it is clear they did not supercede industrial
action in the cases where effective recognition was finally achieved.
From TUBE'S standpoint, the outcome was clearly disappointing. The
following sections consider in more detail why this was the case and
identify more precisely the impact of the procedures on union
organisation and activity and thus provide a more sophisticated evaluation
than shown in the formal record.
What of the unfair dismissal provisions? Did they provide
adequate protection for the employees in the industry and, in particular,
those building the union? The unfair dismissal provisions were used
far more widely than the recognition procedures, since these were
'rights' given to employees, not registered trade unions. As such,
the judgements on the provisions have been general ones, rather than in
relation to specific industries. Weekes et al, despite their initial
comments on the success of the provisions, subsequently concluded:
".... the statutory remedies scarcely ensured security
of employment". (Weekes et al (1975) p. 27)
With many employees excluded by the length of the qualifying period
and the predominantly managerialist criteria adopted by the tribunals,
the conclusions of the Warwick study might be seen as over-cautious.
Less reticent in comments on the Redundancy Payments scheme, which
closely parallels the unfair dismissal provisions, Martin and Fryer
comment :
"The belief that the Redundancy Payments Act has to do with 
employment security is reflected by the inclusion of the 
legislation under this heading in legal text books. This 
mistaken classification is perhaps understandable in view 
of the fact that the reviewers of the statute have decided 
that :
'It was recognised at the outset that the restrictive 
attitudes and practices of workers were a legacy of years of
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economic insecurity, and that these could only be
reduced by tackling their source"’. (Martin and Fryer (1973)
p.245-6, quoting Parker et al (1971) p.3)
Just as the Redundancy Payments scheme was aimed at breaking down
'irrational' worker resistance rather than giving employee rights,
so the unfair dismissal provisions offered a (relatively meaningless)
protection against dismissal which necessarily and simultaneously
legitimised the principle of dismissal and tried to erode the
"restrictive" attitudes and practices of the workforce. In this
context, it is not altogether surprising that Weekcs ct al concluded
that while security of employment was not assisted, the main impact
of the legislation was to provide financial compensation for dismissal. ^
If the general effect of the provisions was to provide compensation
for dismissal rather than prevent dismissal in the first place, what
protections did this give to those trying to build and develop union
orgsniation? For once, Jenkins seems to have hit the nail squarely on
the head:
"Although the unfair dismissal procedures have been extended 
to dismissal for reasons of union activities this can be 
difficult to prove. If an employer is determined not to 
reinstate an employee, even if ordered to by the tribunal, 
the only penalty is a financial one. This is very small 
when compared with the overheads of the average-sized company 
and an employer may well calculate that it is a fair price 
to pay for thwarting a union." (2)
This would suggest the unfair dismissal provisions relating to trade
union activities ^  were relatively worthless in preventing victimisation
for trade union activities; that it was a difficult case to argue while
employers were prepared to pay the cost of individual compensation to
forestall or weaken collective organisation._____________________________
1. Weekes et al (1975) p. 32. See also Anderman (1973) p. 105
2. Jenkins (1979) p. 74. However, he quickly manages a 'U'-turn in
taking a generally supportive position on such protections; see ibid p.9^
3. See IR Act 1971 Section 5.
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Does the experience of TUBE suggest such pessimistic views
of the provisions are warranted? A major claim of the union
was the dramatic success achieved at industrial tribunals.
George Sawford claimed to have fought nearly eighty cases of unfair
dismissal and only losing t wo.^ It is not easy to trace all the
( 2 )records of unfair dismissal cases ; but in table 8.3 some 34 cases 
have been listed where TUBE was involved, providing details of the 
cases. Table 8.4 summarises and analyses some of the main results.
Initially three points can be made concerning the use by TUBE 
of the unfair dismissal provisions. Firstly, on the whole, the union 
were successful in gaining compensation for their members, although 
re-engagement was only achieved in a small number of cases. Some 75%
of the cases taken up by the union resulted in compensation or re- 
„ (4)engagement.
(3)
Interview George Sawford 23.7.74
The cases are derived from an examination of TUBE archives and 
the consequent co-operation of the Central and Regional Offices 
of Industrial Tribunals. It is unfortunate that unfair dismissal 
cases are listed by applicant and not respondent - which would have 
made possible a fuller investigation of cases in the bookmaking 
industry.
No unfair dismissal cases under the TGWU are included here.
This omits the two cases in the "others" column of Table 8.4(b) 
leaving a total of 32 cases of which 2 were withdrawn and 6 lost 
at tribunal.
Table 8.3: 
TUBE and the use of Industrial Tribunals 1971-1974. 
Page 1 of 3
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Table 8.4. Analysis of Industrial Tribunal Cases involving 
TUBE members.
(a) Details of Respondents.
Firm No. of cases % of all cases.
William Hill 12 35.3
Ladbrokes 10 29.4
Mecca (incl.City/Tote/ 4 11.8
A.Williams)
J.Coral 3 8.8
Others _5 14.7
Total 34 loo
(b) Outcome of Cases.
Total No. 
of Cases
Abandoned
Pre-Ind.
Tribunal
Settled out of I.T Heard at I.T. Others
Financial Re- 
compensa- Engage- 
tion. ment.
Financial Re- Dis- 
compensa- Engage- missed 
tion ment
34 2 15 3 
(14 + 1)
6 4 6 
(3 + 3) (-)
2
100% 5.9% 44.1% 8.8% 17.6% - 17.6% 5.9%
(c) Financial Compensa
Settled out of I.T. 
Award by I.T.
All Cases
tion. Compensation £
Mean Average Highest Lowest
285.30 450.00 41.00
165.46 427.00 45.00
251.06 450.00 41.00
Sources: TUBE Archives
Industrial Tribunal Decisions
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Over the three year period the compensation averaged 
approximately £250 which would support the general conclusions 
Weekes et al (1975) and Anderman (1973), that the provisions were 
primarily compensatory. Nevertheless, it was superficially an area 
of trade union success to gain compensation.
Secondly, while TUBE may have been successful in gaining 
compensation for union members, it resulted in severe financial cost 
to the union, especially in the early part of the union's history 
when using external legal representation. By the end of 1972, on 
the information available in Table 8.3, TUBE had spent some £260 on legal 
fees for the handling of unfair dismissal cases. This was an expense 
that could not be regularly sustained and, as Table 8.3 shows,
Sawford increasingly took over the role of representing union members 
at tribunals - which meant the cost to the union was less financially 
but greater in terms of human resources that would have been utilised 
elsewhere.
Finally, what can be said about the protections given to trade 
union activists in the industry? It will be remembered that the 
provisions had not been introduced when Goerge Sawford in London and 
Susan Heath in Manchester were dismissed by City Tote Limited and 
Ladbrokes respectively. In consequence the expanding TUBE organisation 
was kept under wraps until the provisions were introduced at the end of 
February 1972. Did, however, the rights on unfair dismissal offer any 
subsequent protection? Of the 34 cases listed in Table 8.3, some 15 
involved activists in the union. In some of these cases individual 
compensation was achieved, but collective organisation was weakened, in 
some instances severely, by the dismissals.
1. As shown in Table 8.4 (c). Interestingly, the financial settlements 
out of tribunal were somewhat higher than the national average, while the 
tribunal awards were lower. The latter, however, only covers a small 
number of cases where compensation was awarded and must be treated with 
caution. See Weekes et al (1975) p.17 for information on tribunal awards 
in this period.
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It is important to remember that the effectiveness of 
protections should be judged on the cases which did not come to 
tribunal; where the employer was reluctant to dismiss a trade union 
activist because of the provisions. However, bookmaking employers 
do not seem to have shown such reticence. For instance, Dennis Smith 
had successfully built up substantial membership in Hector McDonald 
by the autumn of 1972. In November he was summarily dismissed by a 
senior director of the company for disobeying the technical rule of 
leaving his LBO without permission. The tribunal subsequently found 
the dismissal to be unfair.^  ^ Smith received financial compensation 
and soon secured a new position (with Ken Munden Limited), but the 
union organisation in Hector McDonald fell away and took some months 
to rebuild.
A similar case was that of Brian Davis in Birmingham, who was 
dismissed in January 1974, some two weeks after Sawford had approached 
his firm, Tom Currigan Limited, for recognition:
"Tom Currigan wasn't going to stand for a union. He said
to me that anyone who wanted to be in the union was out". (2)
Eventually, the case went to tribunal, who were exceptionally dismissive 
about the alleged reasons for dismissal and the respondents in general. ^
In the course of evidence the employers (of some 24 full-time staff) 
expressed their ignorance of contracts of employment and the IRA 1971, 
let alone a disciplinary procedure. Not surprisingly, the tribunal took 
a strong line with such 'cowboy' employers, and Davis received financial 
compensation. Nevertheless, Davis had lost his job, had unaccountably
1. They also commented: "The provisions of the Code of PRactice relating 
to disciplinary action were totally ignored." Smith v Hector McDonald 
Ltd., London, case No. 11904/72.
2. Interview Brian Davis 3.12.75.
3. In a superbly sarcastic judgement, the tribunal referred to the 
respondents evidence as "sometimes vague, sometimes evasive and commented 
"we were not favourably impressed by them" explicitly favouring the evidence 
of the applicant. See F. Davis v. Tom Currigan Ltd, Birmingham, case No. 
1200/74.
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failed to obtain employment with any of the four multiples (who 
were advertising for staff at the time) and eventually found himself 
working for a small-scale employer in Birmingham - thus effectively 
excluded from activity in the betting chains. The membership in 
Currigan’s soon declined; the one member who did not leave the union 
found life difficult:
"They kept picking on him; all sorts of things; and 
eventually he got fed up and he came to work for us". (1)
In both the above cases, the union activist had only received financial
compensation, not protection, from the unfair dismissal provisions.
And in both cases the collective organisation had suffered crucial
setbacks. The similarities, however, go deeper: both dismissals
were undoubtedlyconnected with the trade union activities of the employees 
(2)concerned: yet in neither case did the union (i.e. Sawford or
his advisors) use the argument that trade union activities were the 
reason for dismissal. And this was generally true of all the cases 
involving union activists: Sawford chose to fight the employers on their 
own ground, rather than try to prove victimisation for trade union 
activities.
In part this was due to the difficulties of proving such an 
assertion; it also reflected the fact that most bookmaking employers 
were increasingly more sophisticated in how they dismissed union activists. 
Indeed one of the most pronounced effects of the unfair dismissal 
provisions and tribunal system was to ensure that employers 'covered all 
the angles' when dismissing employees. And the multiples were indeed 
the most adept in this respect. William Hill, for instance, dismissed 
the Leeds Branch Treasurer, Harry Kay, and the Branch Secretary for Scotland,
1. Interview B. Davis 3.12.75
2. In the case of Davis, the employers put forward "Personal activities 
being dealt with during working hours" - a reference to trade union 
activities - as a reason for dismissal; they did not pursue it, however, 
at the tribunal.
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and TUBE Vice-President, Laurie Gilmurray, on technicalities where 
both members had left themselves open to severe accusations. Both 
claims of unfair dismissal were dismissed by the tribunals. And in 
both instances any suggestion by the applicants that the reason had 
been trade union activities was refuted. Kay’s dismissal had come
at a time when the previously strong Leeds branch had diminished 
in active strength - albeit temporarily. Gilmurray's dismissal 
signalled the end of any active TUBE presence amongst William Hill 
employees in Scotland.
The section 5 defence was never used by Sawford. Perhaps the 
nearest occasion came when Ladbrokes dismissed the 'Nottingham Nine' 
after the one-day stoppage in March 1973. In three of the cases, 
the only possible way of taking them to tribunal would have been 
under section 5,given their ineligibility under the main provisions.
In the event, Ladbrokes settled out of tribunal to the tune of £3,000
much to the relief of TUBE'S legal advisors who were not at all confident 
(2)the cases would be won.
1. And, indeed,at the tribunals Sawford had obviously decided not to 
pursue the argument under section 5. In the case of H.Kay v. William Hill 
(NE) Ltd., Leeds, case no. 1301/74, the tribunal referred to Kay's 
submission prior to the hearing in which he suggested trade union 
activities were a contributory reason to dismissal: "But nothing at all has 
been said about those at the proceedings and, therefore, we are quite 
sure that the only reason for his dismissal was his conduct." Gilmurray 
had made similar, indeed more blatant, accusations regarding his dismissal 
in his original submission, yet again these were not mentioned at the tribunal 
hearing. The tribunal referred to these accusations, and the fact that 
they were not followed up at the hearing, in their decision; and as in 
the Kay case, there seems more than a suggestion that because these were 
not followed up at the hearing, the tribunal considered them ill-founded.
See L.Gilmurray v. William Hill Organisation, Glasgow, case no. IRS/635/73. 
Sawford, not without reason, was so incensed by the tribunal decision that 
he prepared a three page appeal within days of the decision. However, 
whatever the numerous mistakes and misunderstandings of the tribunal, 
their decision was not incorrect in law. The appeal was dropped.
2. See Letter O.H.Parsons to George Sawford 14.5.73
I
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To conclude: the unfair dismissal provisions do not seem
to have provided any real security for union members and activists 
and the general judgement that they were primarily concerned with 
compensating rather than preventing unfair dismissal seems well-founded 
on TUBE'S experience. The TUBE leadership set great store by 
tribunal victories as a real union achievement: this cannot be 
dismissed, but must be related to the overall consequences this held 
for the development of the union. Also, it has been shown that the 
provisions failed to amply compensate for the individual and collective 
consequences of dismissal; but can the provisions take the blame 
for these events? Certainly, those such as Mellish (1976), who argue 
that tribunals only really operated where no other option remained, 
must be treated with respect. But are tribunals really neutral in 
relation to union organisation and objectives?
These are similar kinds of questions to those raised under the 
examination of the recognition procedures; and they demand a deeper 
consideration of the impact of those legal provisions on union organisation 
and activity. To this end, four main aspects are examined: firstly, 
a closer look at the operation of the procedures, particularly in 
relation to recognition, and an area of common criticism: the time lags 
involved. Secondly, the question of trade union activity, where it 
is argued that the impact of the legislation on union activity is best 
understood in terms of contradictory pressures in the legislation 
generating both activity and passivity amongst employee groups. Thirdly, 
the important question of solidarity is taken up. Did the legislation 
break down collective solidarity or help create it? Fourthly there is 
the issue of dependency of trade union organisation on the law, discussing 
the extent to which TUBE became dependent on the legal procedure and 
the implications for the future of union organisation and activity.
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(iv) Aspects of State procedurisation.
(1) Time periods: the length of procedures
Anyone who has cast more than a cursory glance at the procedures 
for recognition under the IRA 1971 and the EPA 1975 has seemingly 
managed to conclude that the length of the procedures is scarcely 
helpful to extending recognition of trade unions. Earlier, more 
superficial, studies of union organisation in Bookmaking, suggested 
the time lag had set back the efforts of the union to sustain membership. ( 1 )
and how employers had utilised the breathing space this had given them. ( 2 )
(4)
Such findings have been exonerated by more general studies. Weekes et al
(1975) did not emphasise this aspect, but did note the lengthy hearings 
(3)
of the NIRC. The first general study to make the point
particularly forcibly was that of James (1977) , who took due note of
the representations made by trade union officials during his research
He concluded that the length of the CIR investigation had allowed
membership to "wane" and employers to organise. Furthermore:
"These moves could be timed to influence the actual 
level of membership, the attitudes expressed in the 
CIR's attitude survey, and the outcome of any 
recognition ballot which might be held." (ibid p.30)
Such comments are not merely reserved for the IRA Act 1971. They have
also appeared in connection with the supposedly superior EPA 1975
procedure. Dickens (1978) has received similar complaints iron trade
union officials in the course of the Warwick study, particularly in
(5)relation to the conciliation stage And, as she legitimately argues:
"Time is not neutral in a recognition dispute. The longer
the time which elapses before the workers' opinions are
surveyed, the more support for the union is likely to wane
as employees become exasperated with the lack of results
or are subjected to anti-union pressure from the employer", (ibid p.175)
1. Allum (1974)
2. Allum (1976)
3. Weekes et al (1975) p.138
4. James (1977) p. 38 "However, the suggestion was made by several trade 
union officers that the length of time taken by the inquiry had an 
adverse effect on recognition prospects."
5- Dickens (1978) p.174
Jenkins (1979) goes further and ascribes the delays almost entirely 
to employer procrastination (p.98). While McMullen (1978) has also 
warned of the long-winded" procedure and how employers are likely to 
force unions "through all the legal hoops." (1) Finally, Hart (1978) 
has coherently shown how the experience of U.S, unions in relation to 
legal procedures is relevant to the British unions and how procedural 
delay was one of the most significant problems (p.205).
Against such a plethora of assertions, it would indeed be 
surprising if the evidence from TUBE'S experience did not support the 
arguments put forward above. On the other hand, sane of the authors 
might be rather grateful for concrete evidence to support their positions 
given their reliance on interviews with trade union officials - who are
scarcely likely to comment that the procedures are too short! Table 8.5
( 2 )details the course of events in 16 of the 17 TUBE referrals to the NIRC, 
while Table 8.6 summarises the time scales involved at different stages 
of the procedure.
McMullen (1978) estimated, somewhat impressionistically, that it 
was "not unusual" for the ACAS procedure to take a year (p.251). The 
evidence from TUBE'S experience of the IRA 1971 suggests such an estimate 
is very close to the mark. On average, the institutional procedure, 
from the referral by the union to the NIRC until the issue of the CIR 
Report, took some ll*j months. But the formal procedure, which involved 
the union jumping "through all the legal hoops" to show it had done its 
best to effect a voluntary settlement, can be timed at an average of 
16 months; in one case it took more than two years; while the minimum 
period was 11 months. 12
1. McMullen (1878) p. 250-251. As he comments: "A slow procedure is no 
procedure."
2. There is insufficient information on T.Benfield Ltd., in the union 
archives for inclusion.
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Table 8.5: 
TUBE and Formal Recognition 1971-74: 
Details of Firms taken through the legal procedure.
Table 8.6 TUBE and the use of legal recognition procedures: 
the length of procedures involved.
Sample 
Size 
n = 16
TIME PERIOD (MONTHS)
Average LONGEST SHORTEST
Formal approach for 
recognition until 
union referral to 
Secretary of State n = 15 4.0 11 0.5
Referral to Secretary 
of State until 
NIRC hearing n = 12 4.2 9 2
NIRC hearing to 
CIR Report n = 9 7.4 13 4
From Formal approach 
to employer to CIR 
Report
= Total Formal Procedure
n = 9 15.9 26 11
From NIRC Referral to 
CIR Report
= Total legal procedure n = 8 11.5
. _ ______
20 8
Sources: TUBE Archives
CIR Recognition Reports.
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In disaggregating the time scale, it appears that, on average, 
TUBE took four months in trying to obtain voluntary recognition 
before a referral to the NIRC could be risked; then a further four 
months delay was likely while the Department of Employment tried to 
conciliate and before the case was heard by the NIRC; thus the union 
could expect to wait more than 8 months (and certainly longer since 
first recruiting members in the firm) before the NIRC would consider 
whether a recognition dispute existed and whether further attention 
by the state was warranted. Those cases which had survived to this 
stage could now wait another 7*3 months while the CIR carried out its 
investigation.
The point about the non-neutrality of time in recognition 
disputes has been adequately made by Dickens. In such a view, using 
the procedure (let alone successfully) might be seen as a supreme test 
of the collective organisation, given these delays . And, in more 
detail, the experiences of TUBE indicate just how the potential delays 
in the procedures provided opportunities for employers to counter the 
efforts of the union and make the task of sustaining membership 
increasingly difficult.
By the end of 1972, TUBE had spent 15 months in trying to utilise 
the legal procedures for recognition, but had yet to get beyond the 
hurdle of the NIRC. It had taken 9 months and a very valuable £350 
in legal fees to secure registration under the IRA 1971. The legal 
recognition procedure was, therefore, not even available to TUBE until 
June 1972. The employers knew the value of prolonging the procedure; 
the onus would be placed on the union to try and maintain the level 
of membership; yet, as was shown earlier, the difficulties of 
organising, recruitment, and retention of membership were immense in 
bookmaking, which meant the longer the procedure the more likely it was 
that the membership would dwindle.
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The legal procedure emphasised voluntary recognition where
possible; and astute employers could easily prolong the procedure
by showing a willingness to talk. Generally, the larger companies
were most adept here, in particular the 'Big Four', who managed to
keep TUBE at arms length in 1972 with the kind assistance of the NIRC.
The experience of TUBE with the J.Coral Group is perhaps typical.
Sawford applied to the company for recognition in June 1972 -
shortly after TUBE had received full registration. For three months,
Coral's prevaricated through asking for additional information on
membership in the company and for copies of the rule-book, through the
'necessary' steps of consulting the Board of Directors; and finally
through questioning exactly which employees TUBE sought to represent.
At the end of August, Sawford at last made the Section 45 application
and the case was heard on 2nd November 1972, at which it was suggested
the parties should go away and talk things over.^ These talks
eventually began in December. In August, TUBE had claimed 427 members
( 2)but by the end of November this figure had been reduced to 350.
Against this background, there was little chance the talks would succeed 
and, in January 1973,Coral's wrote to Sawford declining recognition 
rights. The Section 45 application, due to bo heard in March 1973, was 
dropped by the TUBE Executive.
TUBE had similar experiences with City Tote Ltd., (owned by 
Grand Metropolitan Hotels) and the William Hill organisation. In all 
these cases, the procedures under the Act had done little to help TUBE; 
far from arresting the delaying tactics of the employers, the recognition 
process, through its lengthy cumbersomeness, and emphasis on talking 
and conciliation had placed a most strenuous burden on TUBE'S limited 
resources; and had legitimised the companies'attempts to keep the union
at arms length at the same time.___________ _____ _________________________
1. Two other national companies had the applications against them treated in
a simiiar fashion at this hearing.
2. The bookmaking side of the J.Coral Group employed about 3,000 people
The emphasis of the initial stages of procedure on conciliation 
was further reflected in the activities of the CIR who were again 
committed to voluntary settlements where possible. Once more the 
procedure allowed employers to temporise and prolong the investigation 
in the hope that membership of the union would decline. This is best 
illustrated in the Roland Jones reference to the CIR which eventually 
resulted in a report unfavourable to TUBE.
The owner of Roland Jones, a relatively small Blackpool based 
firm, had decided she could do without the conciliation service of 
the Department of Employment and had refused to meet them. When the 
case was referred to the CIR in September 1973, they visited the owner, 
Dorothy Jones, who stated that she "did not consider the question of 
recognition an urgent matter." (CIR (1974f) p.3)
The CIR were, however, undaunted and pursued the possibilities 
of a voluntary settlement. Finding some support amongst the
employees, they suggested to Sawford that TUBE should make a formal 
approach for recognition. In November 1973, Sawford and Dorothy Jones 
met under the chairmanship of the CIR, where it was agreed the CIR 
should draft a recognition and procedure agreement. It was February 
1974 before it was ready. At this point Dorothy Jones rejected the 
agreement.
Now the CIR began again; but too late. The 50% union membership 
of October 1973 had disappeared, along with the disintegration of the 
local branch; many employees had sought other solutions, having waited 
for recognition for so long, and had left the firm. It might be argued, 
as did the CIR, that TUBE should accept the blame for the decline since 
they did not service their membership properly. This misses the point: 
if HJBE had been able to organise and maintain the membership effectively
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they would not have needed the CIR. Here, where the CIR could have
been most supportive, their willingness to seek voluntary settlements
and the length of the procedures involved, merely served to reinforce
the decline of TUBE membership in the area.
Observations on the delays in the CIR section of the procedure
are not restricted to the conciliatory efforts of the CIR. They must
also extend to its investigatory role. And criticisms here can be
levelled at delays both before and after the investigation.
In the Ken Hailes investigation, for instance, the local union
representative had a particular complaint regarding the CIR's activities:
"Of course, the length of time taken by the CIR to bring 
out the questionnaire did not help matters." (1)
In this case, the NIRC had referred the case to the CIR on 26th October
1973, yet it was mid-February 1974 before the ballot was held. Here
the management were particularly hostile to the union - even by
standards in the bookmaking industry - and the members in the Ken Hailes
organisation were subjected to 3*j months of crude anti-union pressure by
the management before the CIR held the Ballot. Arguably an earlier
( 2)ballot may have been more supportive to TUBE.
Yet even where the investigation had been prompt and the ballot 
had been held in the early stages there were problems with delays over 
the publication of the results. The CIR held an inquiry and disappeared 
back to London while the union members waited for the results. This 
happened with Seymour and Story, the Manchcster/Yorkshire firm. Here the 
NIRC referred the case to the CIR in mid-October 1973; by December, the CIR 
were holding a postal ballot. Yet in mid-February 1974, the members in 
Manchester still knew nothing of the o u t c o m e : _________________________
1. Letter David Petterson to George Sawford 28.4.74
2. See CIR (1974e) for the history of this dispute.
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I would appreciate, if possible, some information on any 
happenings. Things appear to be at a dead end and my 
members are constantly enquiring and asking for information, 
especially regarding the CIR inquiry regarding Seymour and 
Story." (1)
It was 1st March 1974 before the CIR issued the draft report and
mid-month before Rashman received a copy from Sawford. The report had not
given TUBE recognition rights which would no doubt depress enthusiasm
locally; but some of the members had already begun to lose patience:
".... a number of staff who joined the union have lapsed
membership and I suppose have lost interest because of 
the lack of any spectacular union happening." (2)
Whether the ballot was held at the start of the investigation or the
end, 7*j months was a long time to wait for what might, or might not be,
a favourable report.
The conclusion must be that the evidence from TUBE tends to 
support the general concern expressed over the time delays in the 
procedure. The Seymour and Story example shows the difficulties of 
sustaining interest amongst the membership, of the credibility of the 
union, during such a long process; the Ken Hailes example illustrates 
how the procedure encouraged anti-union activity on the part of the 
employers; while the J.Coral and Roland Jones examples indicate the 
problems thrown up by excessive concentration on conciliation.
But is the problem the time period itself or the activities which 
occur during it? Presumably both; but if this is the case, can these 
'defects' be remedied by shortening the time-scale or are they inherent 
in the procedures themselves? This is an important question since it goes 
to the heart of the problem as to whether trade unions should demand a 
legal recognition procedure. Furthermore, it has particular implications 
for the status of the time-scale c r i t i c i s m s . _______________________
1. Letter J. Rashman to George Sawford 18.2.74
2. Letter J. Rashman to George Sawford 27.3.74
Some of the above writers do not really go beyond criticising 
the delays in the procedure; for them the answer is to reduce the
time periods. James (1977), for instance, wonders "whether the time
taken by inquiries could not be lessened" and suggests the IRA 1971
procedure could be improved by holding recognition ballots "fairly
soon in the proceedings" (p.40). Dickens (1978) endorses this view,
arguing the inquiry stage in the ACAS procedure ought to be brought
forward; nevertheless, despite her evidence that trade union officials
object to the length of the conciliation procedures, she is reluctant
to close down this option to any great extent:
"The problem with attempting to speed up the procedure is 
that the conciliation stage is clearly valuable and by 
its very nature conciliation cannot be rushed." (1)
This very revealing passage gives an insight to the contradictions which
Dickens faces: how can the procedure be speeded up given the underlying
philosophy is "rooted .....  in voluntary agreement"? (2)
To the extent that James and Dickens attempt to resolve the
'problem' by suggesting changes in the existing procedure, they are
essentially caught in the Donovan trap of trying to resolve substantive
issues by procedural reform. In this sense criticisms about time
delays are reformist - and they allow the opening to those who pursue
such policies in terms of getting the 'right' procedures. Clegg, for
instance, saw in the EPA 1975 legislation, sufficient reforms of the
IRA 1971 to argue:
".... Britain will therefore now have an effective statutory 
procedure." (Clegg (1976) p.482)
Dickens (1978) p.175. Unfortunately there is no evidence in Dickens 
work which suggests conciliation is "clearly valuable"; and indeed the 
tube evidence suggests conciliation was largely a waste of time.
2’ ACAS Annual Report (1977) p.41
Given that they have "reasonable support" the established unions:
"... will have much to gain from seeking recognition and 
little to lose; many claims are likely to be received; by 
and large the recommendations are likely to favour the unions; 
and a rapid extension of recognition and trade union 
membership may be expected." (1)
The "rapid extension" is still awaited. Perhaps the procedures are not
quite 'right' yet. No doubt debate will continue around how the
(2)procedures can be improved. This, however, merely serves to
deflect from the inherent limitations of procedurisation for the extension 
of union recognition. It is a lesson easily learned from the American 
experience, as Hart suggests:
"... the administration of legal procedures can be cumbersome, 
and inherent delays can impede organising campaigns."
(Hart (1978) pp. 213-214. My italics) .
Time delays are inherent in procedures which involve litigation but
most importantly in the British context, conciliation. Any criticisms
of the time-scale of procedures quickly fall foul of the underlying
philosophy of the recognition procedure: conciliation and mediation.
In other words,the procedures, whether under the IRA 1971 or the EPA 1975,
are not about forcing recalcitrant employers to recognise trade unions,
but encouraging and educating employers into realising the benefits
of recognising trade unions and developing the practice of collective
bargaining*'"; this is not achieved, in such a view, by coercion
(leastways not of the employer), but rests on the tried and trusted
traditions of voluntarism in British industrial relations.
1. ibid.p.484. Jenkins (1979), a main advocate of the recognition 
procedure, is still able to argue the case for a procedure despite 
referring to the current provisions as "inoperable" after Grunwick (p.99); 
debate is centred around the potential powers of ACAS rather than the 
nature of the procedures themselves.
2. Under the new Employment Act, they will disappear altogether.
3* Or, in the words of the philosophical architects of the EPA 1975, 
to achieve "Management by agreement". See McCarthy (1973).
This is why the time period criticisms are such a sensitive 
issue. Can anything be done about the problem while the underlying 
philosophy of voluntarism remains intact? Possibly not. But how 
long can the visible inadequacies be allowed to continue and thus 
undermine the legal fiction of the procedure as an enforcement Process?^
The contradiction of a procedure aimed at having an educative impact 
is seen in the necessity on occasions to deliver the goods, while the 
employers most likely to respond to the 'good sense' of collective 
bargaining are not likely to be the ones taken through it.
Finally, the emphasis on time delays turns the main focus of
attention away from the impact on union organisation to the procedures
themselves. It might be argued that the major effect of the time delays
on TUBE was not so much the problems within individual firms of
sustaining membership and coping with anti-union pressure, but of
assisting the employers in reconstructing their business and reconstituting
employee relationships during the period of massive upheaval in the
industry. For instance, when TUBE had first approached William Hill
for recognition in 1972, the firm was operating as a series of relatively
autonomous regions with arbitrary, sometimes openly oppressive,
systems of control over their employees. When the CIR published their
report in 1974, there was an established centralised personnel department
with a standardisation process well under way; and the regions were
now under much firmer central control. A favourable CIR report, even
in 1973, might have had a galvanising effect on TUBE in its optimistic
expansion and could have led to a very strong challenge for recognition.
Issued in 1974, it was merely a lever to push TUBE into an amalgamation with
the TGWU,given the decline of the union. The impact of procedural delay is thu:
i. Nothing is said here about unfair dismissal provisions. Yet interestingly 
nothing appears in the literature about time delays in this context. The 
reason should now be apparent: tribunal delays do not challenge the validity 
°f the system in such an obvious way as the recognition delays. Nevertheless, 
the information on TUBE suggests a delay of some 3*s months between 
dismissal and tribunal decision (including out of tribunal settlements), 
during which time individuals suffer considerable trauma, and the "perishable" 
collective issue evaporates.
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contingent on other developments:the experience of TUBE thus 
suggests the specific conditions under which collective organisation 
emerges may not necessarily persist in precisely that form or 
intensity: hence the importance of time delays in the recognition 
procedure.
Thus if unions consider time delays are a crucial undermining 
feature of their efforts in using legal recognition, the only real 
option, if they wish to have a legal procedure, is to demand one which 
is based on the principle of enforcement rather than persuasion. The 
question then becomes whether such a procedure, on a new basis and 
in a shortened form, would be effective or in the best interests of 
union organisation. This necessarily leads on to questions of 
union activity which are taken up in the next section.
(2) The impact of the legislation on union activity
The architects of industrial relations reform from Donovan to 
the IRA 1971 through to the EPA 1975 at least shared one common 
prespective: the recognition procedure would replace the ‘traditional1
method - still favoured by the TUC - of employees relying on their own 
efforts to secure recognition; and the unfair dismissal provisions 
would simply deter employers from injudicious actions and simultaneously 
provide compensation for unjust dismissal: hence industrial action 
would be less necessary. As James (1977) argued in the context of
the CIR investigations, the objective of such institutional arrangements 
and processes was of "lowering temperatures raised in the dispute . (p.38)
Did this in fact happen? If so, how did it happen? And if 
not, what impact did the legislation have on trade union activity?
The experience of TUBE suggests that the impact was essentially 
contradictory; that the utilisation by the union of the legislative 
provisions generated both passivity and activity amongst employees, 
although this contradictory effect was not necessarily even. In the 
case of 'full-scale' industrial action the union did appear inhibited 
by the legal restrictions; this issue is dealt with separately, and 
in some detail, towards the end of the section.
Trade union activity is given a wide interpretation in this 
section: it is not just industrial action, but the task of building
and sustaining a cohesive, collective unity amongst employees which 
has an organisational presence distinct from, yet related to, the 
social organisation of work. As such it is a continuous process for 
those actively involved and demands are wideranging. The 
development of membership and branches in TUBE was necessarily dependent 
on the work of local activists. While Sawford and other members of 
the Executive worked tirelessly, the limitations of their resources 
meant their influence was spasmodic. It was up to the local activists 
to sustain a union presence in that area.
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To that extent any organisation built in a particular locality 
was the consequence of the efforts of workers in that area.(1*
Any subsequent efforts to gain substantial improvements and recognition 
from local employers were predominantly their issues.*2* In this way, 
union activity was a lived experience for those involved, in that it 
was their organisation, their issues, and their lives. They retained 
a measure of control over how disputes developed (given the refusal 
of employers to accede to their demands) which, at least partially, 
remained an area where their actions could determine the outcome. This 
is the essence of self activity.
One view of trying to gain recognition embraces just these notions: 
that workers should improve their position by their own efforts rather 
than rely on outside agencies, notably the state. Yet there are limits
to this perspective: what if the efforts of a group of workers are
insufficient to achieve their objectives? What if the physical problems 
of organising are too immense? Should not some assistance be supplied - 
such as a legal recognition procedure?
There is no easy answer to this dilemma; but it demands some 
examination of the impact of using such a legal procedure on the self­
activity of employees at the workplace, since this will indicate the extent 
to which the legislative procedures either foreclose or encourage the 
so-called 'traditional' methods.
This poses an interesting contradiction in the impact of the IRA 1971 
on the development of TUBE. While the formation of the union had been 
positively influenced by the introduction of the legislation, local support 
for unionisation seems to have gained some inspiration from the opposition 
to the Act by the labour movement generally. e.g. the disputes in the 
Docks in London and Liverpool and the UCS occupation in Glasgow and the 
formation of TUBE branches in these areas. It is impossible to establish 
definite relationships between these events; nevertheless, the expansion 
and contraction of TUBE does generally follow the active campaigns and 
defeats of workplace opposition in this period.
2- ALthough Sawford retained control of negotiations.
Taking an issue into a state procedure, whether in relation 
to recognition or unfair dismissal, has the same effect as any 
procedure: the dispute is removed from its local context and meaning 
and those directly involved at the workplace(s) lose a measure of control 
over it. With the 'voluntary' procedures in industrial relations the 
local membership concede overall control to local or even national 
union officials; the dispute disappears into the procedural hierarchy.
With state procedures this removal is compounded: the issue is also 
taken over by a state body, e.g. in relation to recognition, the 
NIRC or the CIR under the IRA 1971 or ACAS under the EPA 1975.
Furthermore, the issue may be geographically as well as institutionally 
removed: the institutions under the IRA 1971 were London-based, hence 
the removal of the dispute from its local context was also a move from 
that locality to London. ^  In addition, the formal channels of 
communication between the state institutions and the union necessarily 
involved the General Secretary of the union: hence Sawford played a key 
intermediary role in processing applications for recognition and handling 
unfair dismissal cases - thus reir.forcinq the seoaration of the issue 
from its local context.
The outcome of such processes was to qenerate inactivity on the
oart of the membership. Havinq larqely organised themselves they now waited
uoon the activities of other aqencies - the union, the leqal procedures
and institutions - for the results of their efforts. There was little
(2)they could do to influence a tribunal decision or that of the NIRC.
To a limited extent ACAS overcomes this through having regional 
offices; but essentially the argument is not altered.
2* At least not positively: see subsection on industrial action below.
-1-17-
Taking an issue into a state procedure, whether in relation 
to recognition or unfair dismissal, has the same effect as any 
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they could do to influence a tribunal decision or that of the NIRC.
To a limited extent ACAS overcomes this through having regional 
offices; but essentially the argument is not altered.
At least not positively: see subsection on industrial action below.
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The experience of TUBE suggests the generation of passivity 
on the part of the membership was particularly evident in the 
recognition procedure lasting to the NIRC stage. For instance in 
June 1972, Sawford made three section 45 applications against local 
Welsh employers. The consequences were similar: a conciliation attempt 
by the Department of Employment, a 'shelving' of the application, and 
no recognition. Certainly the time lag played a part. For instance, 
in the case of Jack Brown Ltd., the hearing was eventually set six 
months after the initial section 45 application. But the question of 
recognition had now also been removed from the hands of the employees 
at the place of dispute. The legal machinery in London effectively 
dissolved the issues of contention into a question of debate, thus the 
local employees had become hamstrung; and their collective strength 
consequently dissipated. For the law, which was supposedly supporting 
them and to which the TUBE Executive had given its backing, was considering 
the question of recognition; and it was up to them to await the decision; 
to await the outcome of endless conciliation; to do nothing. Their 
local dispute had been lost in a maze of legal and conciliatory machinery.
As shown in the Seymour and Story example, the CIR investigations could 
also have a similar effect: the local activists found themselves hamstrung 
awaiting the results of the inquiry; and devastated when it was 
unfavourable. There was little basis for activity given the content of 
the report, but this was also due to the ingrained passivity of the 
membership during the procedural stages.
But the CIR stage also prompted activity amongst the local 
membership. In contrast to the withdrawal of the issue from its local 
context by the NIRC process, the CIR investigation at the workplace level
necessarily reinvolved the employees within the firm concerned.
The investigation usually involved discussions with management and 
employees as well as a ballot of the membership. It now meant something 
was happening; something that local employees were in contact with and 
could influence, in contrast to previous stages of the procedure. The 
issue of unionisation had come alive, with the union and management 
trying to win support for their different positions and the CIR trying 
to sort out which recommendations to make. Just as the NIRC had 
removed the issue from its local context, so the CIR investigations 
served to bring it back.
The CIR investigation thus simultaneously denied and encouraged 
union activity; and the start of the investigation was indeed a focus 
for activity - but for both unions and employers. Sawford began to 
use the CIR investigations strategically. With the union resources 
increasingly of meagre proportions, he tried to establish just sufficient 
membership to warrant an NIRC referral to the CIR and then move in to 
help build the membership. In Seymour and Story, Sawford was timing 
his organising effort to coincide with the investigation. He dismissed 
Jack Rashman's worries on this score:
"Andrew Long has done a very good job in Yorkshire and
will do exactly the same for Manchester once an inquiry
is ordered." (1)
There was a similar story in John Joyce Ltd. The NIRC had referred the 
case to the CIR in mid-September 1973 - at which time the TUBE Stockton 
branch (in which the John Joyce members were organised) was virtually 
defunct. At the end of October 1973, Sawford made a lightening visit: 
on October 23rd, an open branch meeting was held in Stockton to rekindle
1. Letter George Sawford to Jack Rashman 9.10.73. My emphasis
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interest, while just two days later a special meeting for John Joyce
members was held. Sawford and the local committee were laying the
ground for a successful CIR ballot and report:
"At the time of the reference the union also carried 
out a successful recruitment campaign in John Joyce 
and reinstated many lapsed members." (CIR (1974)d p.3)
If the investigation provided a focus for union activity, it also
provided one for the employers. ^  In Seymour and Story for
instance the management had attempted to resuscitate some defunct staff
(2)committees in an effort to thwart TUBE. And by mid-November,
just as the CIR investigation was getting underway, they had achieved this.
At the same time Jack Rashman commented that the staff ".... are being
subjected to what is virtually a one-way political broadcast." (3)
In the Ken Hailes case anti-union pressure also came to a head as
the CIR investigation got under way. Here the employer deliberately
set out to intimidate his employees prior to the ballot -having failed
by equally crude means to stop the investigation earlier:
"The managing director said that if TUBE were to gain 
recognition he would seriously consider closing down 
all the betting offices as he was not dependent upon 
the betting industry. This position was restated to the 
staff in January and February 1974, shortly before our 
postal survey was conducted." (4)
!• This point is made above by James (1977).
2. They had tried, unsuccessfully, to pre-empt the legal procedure at 
the NIRC stage by showing their employees favoured the staff committees. 
In the Yorkshire offices, management had conducted a ballot with employee 
names on the forms; while in Manchester, the company "canvassed" their 
employees through telephones and personal visits.
3- Letter Jack Rashman to George Sawford 8.10.73
4- CIR (1974)e p.4. Evidence from both the CIR ballot returns and 
local union representatives suggest the ballot was lost because of this
intimidation.
Thus while the CIR investigation provided a focus for union and 
employer activity, the imbalance in the outcome is clear. The union 
were in no position to refute the claims of the owner of Ken Hailes Ltd, 
any more than they could compete with the "one-way" political broadcast 
of Seymour and Story. As Dickens commented on the ACAS inquiry 
procedure:
"There is nothing in the statute to prevent employer or 
union action designed to influence the way workers 
reply to the questions in an ACAS inquiry. The ability 
to influence employees is, however, not equal as between the 
parties. The very nature of the situation means an employer 
has ready access to the employees in a way an unrecognised 
union does not." (Dickens (1978) pp. 167-168).
Employers also tend to have greater and easier access to resources;
TUBE managed just one broadsheet to counteract the propaganda of the
Seymour and Story management.
Thus the impact of their utilisation of the recognition procedure 
was to largely forestall the very self-activity the TUBE leadership wished 
to supplement; the procedure developed as largely a substitute for - 
and not an adjunct to - union activity. Does such an opinion extend 
to the unfair dismissal protections? To act collectively over dismissal 
implies industrial action and this is left until the concluding part 
of this section.
In the context of the study of the Redundancy Payments Act, Martin and
Fryer noted that the "regulatory effect" of the Act
".... rather than restricting management, has been to take 
redundancy out of both conflict and the area of collective 
action and control by workers," (Martin and Fryer (1973) p.250)
Did the unfair dismissal provisions have a similar effect?
Weekes et al duck the question, arguing that you cannot tell what
otherwise would have happened without the provisions.
MelXish (1976), however, suggests those who used the provisions were
precisely those groups who had little option - otherwise, presumably, 
they would have taken it. Still, it is a difficult one to prove.
The evidence from TUBE, though, is clear in one respect: there is no 
recorded case of industrial action over a dismissal. Even when 
Sawford himself was sacked there was no response. This, however, is 
a long way from suggesting that had there not existed unfair dismissal 
provisions, then on some occasions the TUBE membership would have taken 
action in support of a dismissed colleague.
Nevertheless, the tribunal procedure does offer an alternative 
method of resolving dismissal from the union point of view; it is 
therefore continuously posed as an alternative to collective action and/or 
support and is necessarily divisive in the perspective the union 
membership may take. Certainly, for instance, over the Sawford dismissal 
the union spent a good deal of time trying to find out whether he would 
be covered by the protections, rather than organising support to fight 
the dismissal; while the alacrity with which TUBE processed unfair 
dismissal claims through the tribunal system suggests a reconciliation 
into not fighting dismissals. Essentially, this led the membership into 
a passive role over dismissals: it was not their issue, but one handled 
by the union machinery and the legal system. If the dismissal was 
unfair, then the individual involved would get compensation.
Such divisiveness, created by the existence of an alternative, 
seemingly rational and just, way of achieving objectives, is shown more 
clearly in relation to industrial action over recognition and substantive 
issues. Indeed, there is a period in TUBE'S history which shows particularly
Mellish (1976) p.177. He also comments "--- the tribunal has a duty
to settle the individual complaint it receives and so necessaril y treats it in 
relative isolation from the bargaining context whence it came", (p.176)
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well the uneasy co-existence of industrial action and the recognition 
procedures under the IRA 1971. This was in 1973, when a newly elected 
Executive Council decided to take a more militant stand against 
the major employers and counterposed a policy of industrial action 
against the accepted wisdom of using the legal recognition procedures.
In the event a compromise was reached: both avenues were 
explored. Yet this necessarily generated contradictory imperatives 
for the strategy towards recognition, affecting the potential solidarity 
of the national stoppages that March and endangering the possibilities 
of success in TUBE'S legal application under Section 45.
This contradiction arose most explicitly in the stoppage in 
William Hill, where a legal application under Section 45 co-existed 
with intended industrial action. On the other hand the dispute with 
Ladbrokes had not been taken into the legal procedure, thus there were 
no immediate complications regarding industrial action.
It is important here to pinpoint the background to the stoppages 
and the issues at stake. Firstly, Ladbrokes: TUBE had been relatively 
unsuccessful in building membership in the company in 1972. The main 
impetus had come later, rather than earlier in the year, with the 
substantial support from Newcastle. But in late 1972 and early 1973,
TUBE recruited widely from employees of firms recently taken over by 
Ladbrokes, in London and the Midlands. This gave TUBE solid support in 
different regions. Without the background of an NIRC applcation, the
This change in policy at this time can be seen against the background 
of rising militancy on the part of several employee groups who had not been 
noted for taking industrial action in the past. The media discovered 
the 'new militants' of the white-collar unions. To take strike action no 
longer seemed so unusual - an important consideration for the newly 
organised bookmaking employees. For an opportunist journalistic 
assessment of this rise of the new militants, see Ferris (1972).
options of which approach to utilise were open. The Executive, 
following an unfavourable response from the company, decided to stage 
a one-day stoppage on Saturday, 24th March 1973, when the first major 
race of the new flat racing season, the Lincolnshire Handicap, was due 
to take place. While the Ladbroke dispute was explicitly
over recognition, the William Hill one was nominally concerned with 
the differential conditions of service imposed on their Yorkshire 
employees. The proposed national stoppage on March 31st grew out of 
local stoppages in Hull and Leeds in December 1972 and February 1973 
respectively. TUBE membership in William Hill was widespread:
Scotland, Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the Midlands all had branches where 
William Hill employees dominated. Against the success of the local 
stoppages, the Executive hoped that the holding of a national stoppage
on Grand National day would be sufficient to ensure substantial
( 2)concessions from the company.
In order to explore the relationship between industrial action 
and the legal procedures for recognition, the dispute in William Hill 
is examined more closely. It is evident that the contradictions in 
this relationship emerged in two related forms: firstly, that the existence 
of different options necessarily made for divisions within the union 
and thus a weakening of the utilisation of resources; secondly, that 
the content of the legal process, and the terms of compliance, undermined 
industrial action.
1. The choice of a one-day stoppage is interesting. Quite clearly 
it was a demonstration of the extent of support for TUBE and a longer 
withdrawal of labour might not have received widespread support. But 
it should be seen against the regular use of one-day stoppages in this 
period, both against the IRA 1971 and as an industrial tactic, e.g. in 
the civil service, to draw attention to poor pay and conditions of
employment.
2* The two stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes were thus timed 
for successive Saturdays and aimed to hit the employers hardest within the 
limitations of a one-day stoppage, by focussing on big race days.
TUBE had been seeking recognition from William Hill through 
the legal procedure since mid-1972. Talks had taken place 
following NIRC directions, but in January 1973 William Hill gave a 
final, negative, answer to TUBE's requests. By now, however,the 
issue of the employment conditions for the ex-Windsor employees in 
William Hill was developing and the movement towards the February 
stoppage was building up. Yet, simultaneously, Sawford was handling 
the national question of recognition and decided to take the case back 
to the NIRC for directions. Consequently, just four days after the TUBE 
Executive decided to call a national stoppage in William Hill on March 
31st, the NIRC met, on February 22nd, to give directions on the 
recognition dispute.
This spelt problems for TUBE. Under the IRA 1971, no industrial 
action in furtherence of a recognition claim could be permitted if the 
case had been placed in the due legal process. It will be remembered 
that this part of the legislation was specifically intended to eliminate 
strikes and stoppages arising from recognition disputes. If the NIRC 
interpreted TUBE'S action as a stoppage related to the recognition issue, 
then the legal application might be ruled out. Taking industrial action 
thus became a calculated risk - was it worth it or should the union 
pursue the legal route alone? The dilemma was made more acute by the 
decision of the NIRC to have a full hearing of the case on March 21st - 
just ten days before the proposed stoppage. Here the NIRC decided the 
case should be referred to the CIR for investigation.
Hence the contradictory implications of the different options: 
the promise of a CIR investigation partially overcame the nine months 
°f frustration. Yet it was dependent on TUBE not taking industrial 
action on recognition. This constraint was further accentuated by the 
non-comparability between the legal separation of recognition and other
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issues and the day to day practice of employer and employee 
relationships. While the law might draw a distinction between wage 
demands and recognition demands, it is clearly rather fine. Regarding 
TUBE'S efforts to improve the conditions of the William Hill employess, 
this implied a de facto demand for recognition. As a fundamental
challenge to managerial prerogative, it demands that the employer must
consider the collective expression of his employees. Thus, despite
the specific objectives stipulated in the William Hill stoppages, these
issues necessarily spilled over into the realms of recognition.
Given this, the tensions in the policy of the Executive become 
apparent: taking a more militant position, using industrial action 
could have disastrous consequences for the alternative route of the 
legal process. Or, to put it another way, the introduction of a legal 
road to recognition inhibited the historical processes of collective 
struggle more usually associated with trade union activity. And for 
TUBE in early 1973, with a consciously more militant policy in the 
offing, this contradiction in methods was necesarily resolved in favour 
of the legal process. For the legal option always remained a live 
option, not so much due to relationships within the Executive, but 
in terms of the physical, material problems of organising the membership; 
and the legal process is self re-enforcing since it can break down the 
self-activity of the membership.
The compromise, therefore, between industrial action and the legal 
process was from the start unequal. Even in the period of TUBE'S 
history where conditions for industrial action and a militant strategy were 
most favourable, the legislative process could not be successfully 
challenged as the dominating principle of recognition policy - despite 
the aspirations of the Executive. The chances of success for the militant 
strategy were not great; and the debacle of the stoppages in March 1973
merely served to force the TUBE Executive to place increased reliance 
on the legal machinery.
To conclude: the experiences of TUBE suggest the recognition 
procedure is likely to adversely affect self-activity amongst local 
union membership. This may be achieved by attaching specific conditions 
to the procedure; yet it will also be the case because of the existence 
of the procedure itself. It is difficult, however, to be quite so 
conclusive about the unfair dismissal provisions; nevertheless, given the 
large number of activists dismissed, the provisions would scarcely 
have assisted any efforts to fight the dismissals.
Yet there are contradictions: aspects of the procedures did 
provide potential foci for self-activity, e.g. the CIR investigation 
or the result of a tribunal hearing. But activity for what? To 
pursue the demand of recognition? To demand a fairer tribunal hearing?
It is not enough to say that certain aspects of the legislation generated 
activity amongst employee groups. It is also necessary to explore 
the extent to which this was directed towards which particular issues. 
This is taken up in the section on dependency; but firstly there 
is the question of solidarity amongst employees. Any industrial 
action involves a degree of solidarity - what impact did the legislation 
have in this respect?
( 3) Legislation and worker solidarity
In terms of using the 'traditional' union methods of fighting 
for recognition or against dismissals, solidarity on the part of the 
membership is essential. This is not the case in relation to the 
'legal fiction' of the state procedures. All that is needed for the 
operation of the recognition procedure is a reasonable level of 
membership; while the unfair dismissal provisions suggest collective 
strength is largely unnecessary. Hence arguments have developed, 
particularly around unfair dismissal, that the legislation inhibits 
collective solidarity.
In the case of unfair dismissal, this is through the legitimising
of the grievance as individually rather than collectively based:
"The new dismissal law processed individual complaints,offered 
individual remedies, and - at least at tribunals - 
generally refrained from entering into the wider circumstances 
of the case. The law thus paid little regard to the 
collective interest which workers might express on the issue 
of an individual's dismissal." (Weekes et al (1975) p.225)
Mellish subsequently takes the argument a further stage:
"Individual cases might be test cases for other 
individuals, but otherwise they can scarcely be part 
of a collective strategy by a group engaged in group 
conflict with an employer. The individualising of 
conflicts in dismissal law is not accidental. Since 
Donovan the intention of unfair dismissal law has been 
to take dismissal questions out of the area of collective 
industrial disputes by providing an alternative individual 
remedy." (Mellish (1976) p. 176-177)
If the intentions and the impact of the unfair dismissal provisions
has been to individualise the question of dismissal to the detriment of
collective activity and organisation, the legislation in this area must
necessarily have weakened any solidarity (actual or potential) amongst
employees.^
i. Mellish is nearer the mark than Weekes et al (and thus his previous 
position) in that he seems to argue the individualisation of grievances 
is inherent in the provisions; on the other hand, Weekes et al seem to 
suggest that if the tribunal would only consider wider questions, collective 
interests could be accommodated.
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There is no comparable concern with the recognition procedures, 
however, and how these may affect collective unity; yet it is soon 
apparent there are parallels with the way the unfair dismissal 
provisions affected collective organisation. Firstly, it can be 
argued that the procedures necessarily promoted sectionalism through 
the focus on firm-based units for recognition. Secondly, the 
restrictions of the bargaining unit necessarily isolated groups of 
employees within the firms themselves.
TUBE had developed on a system of geographically based branches, 
where, in local branches, members from different firms were involved.
As such, the branch structure provided some potential for cutting across 
the narrow divisions of issues centred solely on firms. Yet the legal 
recognition procedure could only be used against individual firms, and 
in consequence, it can be argued had particular effects on how branch 
organisation developed both in terms of national union policy and local 
activity. This was particularly noticeable in 1973 as the union became
increasingly involved with the activities of the CIR, and when the union 
faced the major crisis of declining membership and organisation.
In January 1973, the CIR began its first investigation of a TUBE 
referral on recognition: Connor and Forbes, the Liverpool based company. 
Here TUBE had been in competition with a management sponsored staff 
association, which had affected membership levels. Throughout the first 
half of 1973, while TUBE had passed through optimism, the one-day stoppages 
and into decline, the CIR had investigated the affairs of the union and 
the recognition question in Connor and Forbes. In June 1973, Sawford 
was informed of the outcome of the CIR investigation: TUBE were to be 
recommended as sole bargaining agent for Connor and Forbes.
This decision of the CIR brought once again to life the potential 
of the legal road to recognition. Failures in national and local 
companies, where membership had been built only for the employers 
to deny the union, surrounded the Executive. The disappointing, 
lengthy procedures of the previous year were now offset by the prospects 
of enforced recognition.
This re-emergence of the legal road to recognition as an attractive 
proposition occurred at precisely that moment when the more militant 
policies of the Executive had apparently failed; when the aftermath of 
the stoppages had indicated the falling away of membership and the 
possibility of the widespread collapse of branch organisation. The CIR 
thus offered a potential policy direction when few other options seemed 
realistic. Hence the favourable report on Connor and Forbes became 
known at a time when movements both internal and external to TUBE had 
sunk the 'militant' option to a low point. The influence of the CIR was 
thus immediately far stronger than might otherwise have been accepted. 
Sawford immediately saw the CIR as a means of resolving various problems.
He was, in any case, predisposed towards the legal procedure - if it 
could succeed. Now there was a real possibility of taking further 
obstinate employers through the Courts, into a CIR investigation and get 
legal backing for recognition.
Sawford's enthusaism for the CIR meant that other options could now 
he closed. The dilemma over retaining full-time officials who failed to 
pay their way was now resolved: in Newcastle and Stockton, Sawford, having 
just received news of the union's success in Connor and Forbes, decided 
that Harry Kirtley and John Joyce could be handled the same way.
Walter Lavery, the Full-time officer, was now dispensable.
Thus, on one hand, there are the various aspects of TUBE'S 
development and the changing structure of the bookmaking industry itself 
which mitigated in favour of using the CIR: the defeats of the more
militant policies, the inability of TUBE to secure local successes, 
the collapse of branch organisation; all of which were brought 
sharply into focus with the Connor and Forbes recommendation. And, 
on the other, the way in which adopting the legislative road necessarily 
structured policies regarding union organisation. This was the 
significance of the Lavery dismissal: it emphasised that TUBE in 
the foreseeable future would give a priority to membership in firms 
rather than branches. The decline of branch organisation had shaped 
this tendency, illuminating the contradiction between supporting 
geographically based branches while needing to secure recognition in 
firms. In pursuing recognition as a priority over branch development, 
the decision to utilise the CIR would mean this process would be reinforced: 
the CIR would investigate firms not branches and the logic of 
organisation was now changed. It demanded a fire-fighting force rather 
than a stationed army of officials. Given TUBE'S diminishing financial 
resources, such flexibility could be seen as an advantage.
The price, however, of taking the legal road was severe. It 
meant the abandoning of branch organisation, as such, in favour of 
organising isolated firms. The necessary consequences were an increased 
emphasis on sectionalism - a process which the CIR served to reinforce.
If the effect of the recognition procedure was to pose dilemmas 
in the way of Sawford's policy towards both recognition and, at this stage, 
the organisation of the union, the processes also reinforced sectionalism 
and division within the local branches. Where members in local branches 
found that the issues concerning their firms were not really taken up by 
the branch, they generally disappeared from local branch affairs. This 
happened, for instance, in Liverpool, where the Connor and Forbes employees 
dominated the branch. The legal procedures exaggerated these differences 
of interests amongst the membership: why was one group selected for special 
treatment and not another? That one group was subject to a referral
under Section 45 was an immediate source of difference between union 
members.
The fragmentation of the union membership, generated and reinforced
by the recognition procedures, did not end with the division of firms
and branches; there was also the question of solidarity within firms.
Recognition could be claimed and granted for a specific section of the
workforce. Whichever groups were involved would then comprise a
bargaining unit. The CIR, during its investigation, would make recommendations
about the size of the bargaining unit, as to whether these were appropriate
groups for the union to represent. This almost certainly cut off certain
employees from some sections, and in one particular case eliminated a key
union activist. ^  On the whole, the CIR were consistent in their
recommendations on bargaining units which usually excluded managerial
levels external to the LBOs at the top end of the hierachy, and the
cleaners of the LBOs at the lower end. But TUBE were necessarily constrained
in relation to building membership by the existence of the 'appropriate'
bargaining unit; it was not so much a question of which employees TUBE
wished to represent, as to how the 'appropriate' bargaining unit was defined
( 2)
by the state institutions. On some occasions this hampered TUBE , while 
on others the union found this beneficial.^
!• Though not until after the CIR had been 'wound up'. In the Ken Munden 
case, Paddy Heenan, a leading TUBE member, was forced out of his position 
as union representative at Ken Munden by Sawford and the TGWU, because he had 
been promoted outside of the agreed bargaining unit.
2. In an early ballot for an Agency Shop agreement (the IRA 1971 watered-down 
closed shop), TUBE had been forced to include casual and part-time boardmen 
and LBO cleaners as part of the bargaining unit - even though they did not wish 
to represent those groups. The union lost a ballot it might otherwise have 
won. See Table 8.7
e.g. Ken Munden Ltd, where the CIR ruled against the employers efforts to 
widen the bargaining unit. Even so, in a period of continuing expansion, of 
concentration and centralisation, the bargaining unit in any firm was always 
increasing. TUBE, therefore, had to increase membership just to sustain the 
same union density.
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Tliis suggests, however, that contradictions in the impact did 
exist: if the bargaining unit, on one hand, splits off certain 
employee groups, on the other, it implies a unifying of those who are 
contained in the bargaining unit. Similarly, while the procedures may 
have emphasised firms and not geographical branches, simultaneously it 
might be seen as providing a unifying effect within the firms - of 
particular importance in relation to multiples, e.g. the William Hill 
reference. In other words, it may be incorrect to see the procedures 
as operating to break down collective strength, but rather as prompting 
a particular brand of solidarity: firm-oriented, with 'rational' 
divisions between groups to be represented and those who are not. Once 
again this raises the issue of union objectives and how these were 
structured by the commitment to and use of the legal procedures: this is 
taken up in the next and final section.
(4) Legislation and union dependency
"We were a little afraid of the law getting into the picture, 
on the theory you start to depend on the law to organise, the 
first thing you know you'll be controlled by law." (1)
The discussion in the previous sections has already touched on the question
of union dependency: firstly, in the extent to which the legal procedure
generates passivity amongst the local union membership and, insofar as
a measure of local activity is induced by the legislation, the ends
to which such activity is directed; secondly, in the way provisions on
recognition and unfair dismissal can promote divisions and sectionalist
tendencies amongst the membership, while, insofar as it brings groups
together, in the context of what objectives. In this section it is argued
that the full implications of union dependency on legal provisions must be
understood not merely in terms of debilitating activity and solidarity, but
in the way specific objectives of the union membership are supplanted.
1. George Meany quoted in Hart (1978) p. 214
It is not a question that, in these terras,has received a
great deal of attention. The objective of 'recognition', as shown 
in Chapter 6, has been used unproblematically in the mainstream 
approaches of British industrial relations; yet it is surely correct 
that the highly formalised, procedural, notion of recognition promoted 
by the institutions in the state procedure is rather different to the 
immediate objectives of employees in the workplace: their demands 
are for changes in substantive issues, not procedural containment. To 
that extent, the legal procedures tended to supplant the original 
objectives of the workforce through their involvement. 'Recognition'
was promoted as the key demand within the procedures and by the union 
leadership of TUBE; and this implied a particular policy orientation, 
fragmenting the demands of securing gains for the employees into gaining 
success at the NIRC and a favourable report from the CIR, as if the 
travelling was more important than where the union and its members 
eventually arrived. The argument pursued here is that the more the union 
embraced the legal procedures, the more objectives were defined in 
terms of formalistic recognition and the consequent changes in organisation 
made TUBE increasingly dependent upon the procedures and the sponsorship 
of state institutions.
A little more has been said which can help in understanding the 
way unfair dismissal provisions substituted a different objective for 
union activity. Weekes et al hint at this in their exposition of the 
provisions as oriented to compensation. Martin and Fryer, however, draw 
out the point most clearly in relation to the Redundancy Payments Act and 
the application of management philosophies in terms of 'formalism' and 
'human relations' :
"In short, the primary concern of both philosophies is
not so much to validate the worker's own definition of
the problem redundancy but rather to encourage him to
adapt himself to the managerial definition, which, in
turn, redefines the worker's problem to what happens to
him after he has been declared redundant." (Martin and Fryer
(1973) p. 242). ---
Using the tribunal system may therefore confuse union objectives; it
may channel resources away from fighting the dismissal to fighting for
compensation. This again has particular consequences for union
organisation and how it is developed: if the aim is to fight dismissal
this involves building a very different organisation to one which
specialises in compensation.
Mellish has taken the view that in practice unions are unlikely
to face the problem in such acute terms:
"It is extremely unlikely that where employees have a 
collective interest in a certain practice which 
contravenes employer’s rules, they will let an employer 
enforce such rules - albeit with procedural and other 
safeguards insisted on by tribunals - simply because 
of the availability of tribunals in cases where procedures 
or good personnel management practices have not been 
followed." (Mellish (1976) p. 177)
Those that possess collective strength, in this view, will not use
tribunal provisions; only the unorganised or those with "little collective
strength" will use the provisions, (ibid p. 177)
As a contemporary comment on these new "protections", this may
be a fair reflection of the impact of the IRA 1971. Yet as a more general
point it contains a severe flaw, for there is a certain circularity:
is it the case that those who are not organised use the unfair dismissal
provisions, or is it that those who use the unfair dismissal provisions
remain unorganised? The tribunal system is not merely an external
option which may be pulled into use as a last resort. Its existence
permeates the very nature of union organisation, carrying implications for
the way the organisation is developed. In this sense, the unfair dismissal
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provisions - as with the recognition procedure - divides the attention 
of employees, emphasising different objectives and different means 
of achieving them than the 'traditional' union self-activity. For 
a small union such as TUBE these contradictions were quickly resolved, 
within two years of its formation, in extreme dependency on the legal 
structures for its continued existence. As Hart argues in relation to 
America, the process of dependency with larger unions takes a longer time. 
(Hart (1978) p. 215)
How did TUBE become so dependent on the legal procedures - especially 
the recognition - and what were the consequences? Sawford and others 
on the TUBE Executive viewed the legal procedures as the means of 
resurrecting the union from its decline in 1973, yet the impact of the 
procedural emphasis was eventually to add to the decline of the union, 
rather than to support it. The dependence of TUBE on the CIR, especially 
in the latter part of 1973, was almost explicit and reached a new level 
in the Autumn of that year.
At this time, six new references were under investigation by the 
CIR. Elsewhere events were cementing the relationship between TUBE 
and the CIR. In September, the Connor and Forbes employees had 
returned to the NIRC to demand an enforcing ballot on the CIR 
recommendations; a ballot which TUBE duly won in November 1973, making the 
CIR recommendations legally binding. And while events progressed 
favourably in one long standing reference, in another, the William Hill 
reference, a critical stage had been reached. The preliminaries had at 
last been resolved and a ballot was scheduled for October 1973.
This deepseated involvement of the CIR with TUBE had important 
consequences for the future of the union. As the CIR became more involved
in the industrial relations of the bookmaking industry, those in charge 
of the investigations confronted problems regarding the viability of TUBE 
and the overall strategy they should take to employee representation. T1
problem was particularly acute in relation to William Hill, one of the 
largest bookmaking firms, and of key significance to the future 
of unionism in the industry.
This combined with a feeling among the CIR investigators and
shared by the Commissioner responsible, that this was an area where the
CIR could play a constructive role in promoting collective bargaining.
With the TUC unions not registering under the IRA 1971, such opportunities
were few and far between. As they became more involved, the CIR
began to 'sponsor' TUBE, taking on duties outside of their normal routines
and providing advice in an unofficial capacity; while the problems the
William Hill reference posed provided the CIR with the justification to
intervene in the general direction of the union and promote amalgamation
in a positive, yet delicate, manner.
To the CIR, TUBE appeared a most peculiar organisation and one
about which they were immediately unsure. Alan Scouller was the
Commissioner in Charge of the CIR investigations of TUBE:
"I had doubts as to whether the union could possibly survive.
It was a dilemma: chuck it up then no collective bargaining; 
or do you give it a chance and suggest a merger in the longer 
term." (1)
This was the CIR policy from their earliest involvement with TUBE
and Scouller soon broached the subject with Sawford and Don Bruce:
"We suggested mergers, but Don Bruce was very anti and 
George Sawford said the Executive were against." (2)
But in the Autumn of 1973, events came to a head. Greater CIR involvement
combined with the organisational and financial problems of TUBE, posed the
question of continued CIR support for TUBE in a more acute fashion:
"The union was running into debt by now and was pretty 
shaky. We were getting nervous about how far we could 
recommend them to stay alive." (3)
Interview Alan Scouller 24.8.76
ibid
ibid
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The crucial point of this dilemma came with the key William Hill
reference. The October ballot of the 3,500 employees had produced
real problems for the CIR investigators: a majority had wanted some
form of representation (63%), with most favouring TUBE (58.5%); but
only 16.4% were TUBE members. Could the CIR make a recommendation
supporting TUBE while the membership was that small?
The CIR investigators decided that it was now essential to tread
carefully in their recommendations and that this demanded a substantial
appraisal of TUBE as a viable union. At the same time, the William Hill
issue provided an excellent opportunity to promote their sponsorship
of TUBE and push the idea of an amalgamation. So the CIR took action
outside of their normal remit:
"We came to the conclusion we should try to sec the whole 
of the Executive of TUBE. It was very different normally.
But we met them in a hotel in London." (1)
That meeting took place on Sunday, November 25th 1973, and the CIR
attended in force. In addition to Scouller, at least four other CIR
representatives attended, including Bill Thomas, who was in immediate
charge of the investigations. The TUBE Executive had been given a
proposed agenda and had discussed these issues at a special meeting earlier
that month: finances, branch structure, union organisation, and strategy
towards recognition. The facts were dismal: debts of £5,000, poor
membership trends, and a collapsing branch structure.
TUBE strategy was to throw the problem back on the CIR. Success
would come if only the CIR would issue favourable reports. The CIR,
on the other hand, took a different line - success would come from a
secure financial organisation - and pushed the amalgamation:
"Although I'd been told by George Sawford that the Exedutive 
had thrown out a merger, I put it to them. I was surprised 
they didn't tell me to mind my own business ... When I 
suddenly suggested merging it was quite obvious they hadn't 
even discussed it." (2)
ibid 
ibid
1.
2 .
Over the next few months the CIR reinforced the notion of 
amalgamation. In January 1974 they told the TUBE Executive that 
specific conditions on financial and organisational stability would be 
attached to any favourable recommendation on William Hill. TUBE 
could never meet these conditions unless there was a major upturn in 
their fortunes. Hence the carrot of the William Hill reference was 
reinforced by the stick of organisational viability, raising continuously 
the issue of amalgamation. More positively, Scouller consulted a 
contact in the TGWU and gave Sawford his name. There can be little 
doubt that the advocacy of the CIR of the TGWU as a potential partner 
had a determining influence on the direction in which TUBE sought to 
amalgamate. (1)
So the impact of the CIR at national level was primarily to urge 
TUBE into the mainstream of the trade union movement. To this end, 
the William Hill reference was used as a suitable lever. By the time 
the final report had been issued, the TUBE Executive had already voted 
to join the TGWU. What can be drawn from TUBE’S experience with the 
CIR is the essentially contradictory role of that agency in the legal 
recognition procedure. It is important to note the centrality of the 
CIR stage in that procedure: the NIRC was a hurdle to overcome, but the 
CIR offered tangible support - an authoritative, potentially legal backing 
to a recognition claim. A favourable CIR report could become legally 
binding: it could mean legally enforced recognition. Employers would
thus break the law if they defied TUBE in such circumstances.
!• The repeal of the IRA 1971 by the newly elected Labour Government 
in 1974 was hailed as a major victory for the trade union movement.
For TUBE, however, both the threat and the actuality of the repeal prompted 
a whole area of uncertainty within the union. At the beginning of March 
1974, on the day before the formation of a Labour Government was 
announced, the TUBE Executive was in the midst of deciding to amalgamate 
with the TGWU. Within the month that decision had been made firm.
The indications are that TUBE found yet another pressure exerting on them 
bo join another union - the uncertain future of any legal recognition 
procedure.
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Yet this notion that the CIR could play a supportive role in 
collective bargaining, aiding groups such as bookmaking employees 
to overcome the physical problems of organising and intransigent 
employers, was immediately contradicted by the practice of the CIR in 
their investigations. The experience of TUBE illustrated earlier in 
this section shows how the time the investigations took made it difficult 
for the union to maintain membership; how delays in balloting could 
give employers the opportunity to pressurise their employees not to 
support the union; how delays in making decisions disillusioned local 
union organisation; and how an unwarranted preoccupation with conciliation 
compounded these problems. Where the TUBE membership was not already 
strong, the practice of the CIR investigations served to reinforce their 
weaknesses. In precisely those cases where TUBE needed the assistance 
of the CIR, it was not sufficiently forthcoming.
This contradiction between potential and practice of the CIR 
was reflected in the distinction between the national policy of the CIR 
towards TUBE and the local practice of the investigating teams. Investigations 
necessarily focussed on firms and it has been argued at length that this 
generated sectionalist tendencies within the membership and both prompted 
and reinforced the decline of branch organisation. Yet nationally, as 
the CIR became involved in TUBE'S internal affairs, one of the conditions 
of continued support for TUBE was the maintenance and reconstruction of 
branch organisation.
This disjuncture highlights a very important problem for weakly 
organised groups. For the CIR, favourable support on recognition issues 
depended on pre-existing financial and organisational viability. Yet for 
weakly organised groups - those who might see their only recourse in terms 
of such state agencies — the support of the CIR could provide the basis 
of such stability. Again, the position of the TUBE Executive illustrates 
this in their hopes of reforming branches and building membership on the 
basis of CIR recommendations.
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Given this, agencies such as the CIR can scarcely offer 
organisations like TUBE any continuity of support. Such unions are 
judged by the standards of the organisationally solid and financially 
sound trade unions in the mainstream of the movement. Which means the 
only long-term option for such agencies is to promote amalgamation as 
a lasting solution, to integrate unions and groups such as TUBE into 
the established trade unions - precisely the course taken by the CIR.
For the CIR this policy posed its very own peculiar contradiction: 
that an agency of a government who introduced the IRA 1971, was advocating 
that a trade union registered under this piece of legislation should 
join another who was not. Such a bizarre position reflected the shambles 
of the IRA 1971. Yet it does point to the autonomy the CIR enjoyed 
and actively pursued, prizing the objective of collective bargaining above 
that of legalistic obligations.
This leads to the concluding discussion concerning the sponsorship 
of TUBE by the CIR. This is central to the understanding of how the CIR 
acted towards TUBE and raises important questions regarding the dependence 
of unions on such agencies.
The CIR sponsorship of TUBE has been largely described in terms of 
national events: how the CIR urged TUBE to amalgamate; how the 
Commissioner and investigators had gone beyond their normal activities 
in meeting the Executive of TUBE to discuss and tentatively advise on their 
problems; how the groundwork was laid for a link-up with the TGWU; and 
so on. Such involvement also spilled over into the references 
themselves. These included services the CIR might have provided generally, 
but in relation to TUBE they seemed to border on the generous side, e.g. 
the organising of shop steward training in Liverpool for Connor and Forbes 
stewards; organising publicity for the publication of the William Hill 
report; and the provision of extensive comments on draft agreements
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as the views of the team investigating TUBE references, not to be 
confused with official Commission activity.
Sponsorship involved an increasing dependence for TUBE on the CIR, 
not merely as a source of authoritative support, but as a resource, as 
a purveyor of information and contacts. On one hand, that an agency 
such as the CIR might be necessary in such situations is a poor 
reflection on the trade union movement and on the attention paid to 
newly and/or weakly organised groups. On the other, the question of 
whether there should be an agency such as the CIR providing such information, 
embracing the values of 'responsible' collective bargaining is even more 
acute. It both denies the self-activity of the unionists concerned and 
structures the solutions to their problems in a specific way. And for 
organisations such as TUBE, such answers are incompatible with their 
continued, organisationally-independent, existence.
(v) Concluding Comments on TUBE and the procedurisation of Industrial
Relations through state intervention.
In conclusion the implications of TUBE'S experience must be 
broadened as widely as possible; and the argument that is put forward 
suggests the consequence of utilising the legal procedure is not only to 
prompt a reformulation of objectives of trade unions, but serves to emphasise 
a particular kind of unionism which is the mirror image of capitalist 
commodity production and exchange.
Consider unfair dismissal: the record of TUBE in unfair dismissal 
was certainly a good one - Sawford could and did claim this as a major 
success of the union and was broadcast to the membership (actual and 
potential) as such. Nevertheless, while it stands as a real achievement, 
it deprived scarce resources from building effective organisation to combat 
the dismissal in the first place. Arguably, it could show the union 
as doing something, which might be particularly important where membership
But it remains the casewas low and union organisation lacking.*1  ^
that this is a substitute objective for developing collective 
organisation; it is a second best 'soft' option whic’’ in the face 
of the daunting task of establishing a union organisation, both the 
union leadership and the membership are tempted to take.
Similarly with recognition. Using the procedure throws the 
emphasis away from the membership. This may not be conducive to 
self-activity,but it does seemingly remove the burden from the employees 
involved and render the local struggle less important - indeed irrelevant. 
Again the procedure appears as a 'soft' option, as a means of getting 
recognition without fighting for it.
The consequence is to generate a particular brand of trade unionism, 
and not one that is merely 'responsible' in collective bargaining and 
reluctant to take industrial action. It is one which separates the 
union and the membership, reifying the union as an organisation which
( 2)delivers the goods, provides the service, or indeed sells a commodity.
It is this crucial denial of self-activity, of the non-identification of 
the membership with the union, which underlies the failure of TUBE in 1973-74. 
The leadership could provide expert advice and representation at tribunals 
or in processing and supporting Section 45 applications, but the experience 
(and even the will on occasions) was lacking in helping the self-activity 
of the membership and in presenting the identity of the union and the 
membership. Perhaps the mo-t commonly heard phrase in talking to union 
activists (besides "if ever an industry needed a union this one does") was 
"nothing is happening" or the "union is doing nothing". But who is the 
"union"?
One TUBE representative in the Birmingham area was in such a position.
His response was to make employers pay as this was the only way to get at them.
2* Nichols and Beynon (1977)pp. 161-162 also discuss the union as a service 
organisation in the experience of workers, identifying a further aspect - that 
such a view tends to limit unionism to the workplace to the detriment of any 
wider union movement.
It might have been expected that this distinction between the 
"union" and the "membership" would have been overcome following the TGWU 
amalgamation. This, of course, would have reckoned without the TGWU 
organising policies. But now there was a 'good' piece of labour (sic) 
legislation on the statute books which was an entirely different matter 
to the 'pernicious' Tory model. Unfortunately, the EPA 1975 took some time 
to go through Parliament and for a long while there was no recognition 
procedure. Even so, this did not daunt the advocators of the state 
procedure. The cry was now "just wait till the legislation comes in"; and 
until then its really only a holding policy.^'
The consequences of such a policy have been two-fold: on the one 
hand TUBE developed as a 'slot-machine' union, where the union provided 
services in respect of subscriptions; on the other, the failure of the 
legal procedures in recognition is blamed diffusely at the door of the 
union - the union is "doing nothing", etc. These are the directions 
in which TUBE was pushed through the adherence of the union to legal 
procedures: it was not so much debilitating of the union as prompting the
union into a form reminiscent of the fetishism of capitalist economy.
1. Even when Ken Munden cancelled the recognition agreement in 1975, 
Sawford decided not to do anything until the EPA 1975 came into 
force. By that time, the membership was beyond recall.
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Part 3:
Conclusions
The intention of this concluding section is to return to some of the 
issues and problems which have been raised in previous chapters, in 
particular those which involve the use of the concepts set out in 
Part 1, and consider how those discussions can be informed by the 
bookmaking study. The crucial area concerns the basis of unionization 
as developed in Chapter 2. There it was argued that unionization 
is fundamentally located in the social antagonisms inherent in 
capitalist production and derives its main inspiration for both its 
collective nature and internal structure in the simultaneous social 
and technical differentiation of the labour process.
In this discussion a range of concepts were used and a series of 
questions can at this stage be raised. Firstly, what is the nature 
of the social antagonisms inherent in capitalist production? More 
specifically, is the distinction between those who own and control 
the means of production and those who are merely wage-labourers a 
viable one? In turn this leads to the use of the notion of interests 
as a way of exploring the implications of this division. Secondly, 
there is the process through which the socialization of the labour 
process generates both the basis for common interests and divisions amongst 
wage-labourers; this contradictory effect of the expansion of social 
productivity within capitalism necessarily informs the structure of 
workplace collectivities. But can unionization be seen as a particular 
form of workers resistance linked to phases of capitalist domination - 
in particular, formal and real subordination? Thirdly, the impact of 
the devaluation of labour power has frequently been discussed in terms 
of deskilling, a debate which in recent times has centred on Braverman's 
portrayal of the diminution of craft controls. Any analysis based on
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the labour process must consider the issues raised here; is the 
'deskilling hypothesis' valid and what are the implications for 
workers resistance?
1• Social Antagonisms in Capitalist Production: Interests reconsidered 
The concept of interests was introduced in Chapter 2. Here some 
attempt was made to show how the use of this concept varied between 
different theoretical approaches. In particular, how interests 
tend to be connected with expressed wants or actions in the broadly 
pluralist perspectives while more radical views tried to go beyond 
this reliance on subjectivity by relating interests to the position of 
people in society. Within Marxist frameworks the class division of 
interests has been emphasised, which implies the existence of inherent 
conflict between the owners of capital, the means of production, on one 
side and wage-labourers on the other.
In non-Marxist approaches, the existence of a fundamental class antagonism 
is problematic and necessarily refuted. Those adopting a 'unitary' 
perspective deny conflicts exist, while pluralists admit conflicts of 
interest, but not of a class nature and not ones that are irresolvable.
(Fox 1973). It is not usual for writers who claim to be writing within 
a Marxist tradition to argue that interests are not fundamentally 
conflictual; but recent contributions from Michael Burawoy attempt to 
do so and some consideration of his ideas provides a useful concluding 
discussion on the question of interests.*P
Burawoy (1978) notes the development by Marx - adopted in recent times
hy many writers on the labour process, including Braverman (1974) -
of the fundamental opposition between labour and capital. This he views
1. Burawoy's position is developed here rather than in Chapter 1 for two 
reasons. Firstly his formulation of interests would not have had any significant 
impact on the way the concept was subsequently utilised. Secondly, his 
approach can be usefully contrasted with the conclusions drawn from the 
Bookmaking study, which is most appropriately taken up at this stage.
in the following way:
"the economic relationship of capital to labour is zero 
sum - the gains of capital are always at the expense of 
labour." (Burawoy (1978) p. 255).
But in posing the question as to how the working class recognise 
that their interests are opposed to those of capital, Burawoy notes 
that class struggle, the process by which this recognition occurs, 
does not always act to expose their differences but may well be the 
motor which
".... mollifies the opposition of interests and frequently 
co-ordinates the interests of labour and capital."
(ibid, p.256) .
The analytical basis for this Burawoy characterises as the distinction 
between exchange value and use value. Whereas in terms of exchange 
value capital and labour are involved in a zero sum game, in terms 
of use-value the 'game' is non zero sum. ^  This is connected
to the expressed actions and needs of workers through their experience. 
Burawoy argues that workers do not understand their interests in terms 
of exchange value, but "in terms of the actual commodities they can 
purchase with their wage" (ibid p.256) . The ability of capital to 
make concessions to workers in advanced capitalist economies following 
increasing social productivity is therefore seen by Burawoy as the means 
of producing common interests between labour and capital: and is 
put forward in opposition to the orthodox Marxist view that interests 
are inherently antagonistic.
There is also a second theme to Burawoy's approach:
"The crucial issue is that the interests that organize the 
daily life of workers are not given irrevocably; they 
cannot be imputed; they are produced and reproduced in 
particular ways. To assume, without further specification, 
that the interests of capital and labour are opposed leads to 
serious misunderstandings over the nature of capitalist control 
if only because it provides an excuse to ignore the ideological 
terrain where interests are organised." (ibid p.256-257).
1. Burawoy's continuous use of game to describe the relationships between 
labour and capital is symptomatic of his position as an observer of that
lati°nship rather than a participant.
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The implications of this assertion are not spelt out until his 
book on manufacturing consent. Here, the notion of what Burawoy 
means by interests becomes more clear. Where do interests come from? 
They "clearly emerge out of ideology" (Burawoy (1979) p.19)
Burawoy, in attempting to escape from the continuing dichotomy of 
"actual and postulated behaviour" which underpins the distinctions
between
"rationality and irrationality, logical and non-logical 
behaviour, interests real and false, short and long-term, 
immediate and fundamental" (ibid p.19),
suggests that interests arise out of ideology. This would certainly *
seem to oppose the main strands of Marxist theory, and the position
taken in this thesis. It might be useful to ask what Burawoy means
by ideology. Unfortunately this is not clearly defined, but there
are some hints. For instance,
"ideology expresses the way people experience relations, 
so it is through ideology that men become conscious of 
conflict and fight it out." (ibid p.18).
Does this mean that interests arise out of experience? If so Burawoy 
would appear clearly aligned with Edward Thompson - and therefore 
subject to the same criticisms as made earlier in this thesis (see 
Chapter 4).
So while Burawoy makes a useful contribution in pointing out the 
mechanical nature of distinctions between short and long term interests, 
he does not seem in his theoretical sections to outline the sources 
of interests or how these can be analysed. Quite clearly he is 
correct to suggest that
"the problem is to explain interests in any given situation 
not to describe them empirically." (ibid p.19).
But the basis for that explanation cannot remain entirely in the realms
of ideology as he is suggesting. To argue that interests arise from
ideology (or experience) is merely to pose the guestion what determines
ideol,ogy or experience.
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Also problematic is Burawoy's distinction of exchange value and 
use value. Firstly, it would seem misplaced to make this separation 
at the level of analysis of workers' experience. To complain that 
wages are too low could be either a statement about the lack of use 
values that can be purchased or an expression of workers' dissatisfaction 
with the "effort bargain" at the workplace. Furthermore, it is 
entirely questionable whether workers do understand their interests in 
terms of use values rather than exchange values. Or - in Burawoy's 
terminology - it would seem unlikely that workers merely assess their 
position in terms of their absolute level of pay; the importance of pay 
differentials, employers' demands on productivity, and the extent of 
employers profits constitute important influences on how workers may assess 
their wage levels - independent of the use values that may be bought 
with their wage. The contradiction in Burawoy's approach is that it is 
in precisely those periods of increasing social productivity when 
interests would become co-ordinated because capital can make concessions, 
that workers may see opportunities to pursue wage demands as a consequence 
of increasing productivity; which may in turn provide further problems 
for capital as workers continue to demand wage increases at the expense 
of profits.
Finally, there is a tendency to reduce the relationships between use 
and exchange values to an entirely economic one. The range of issues 
that workers may take up do not only concern wages; other demands may 
reflect the exploitative basis of capitalist production. Irrespective 
of the 'concrete coordination' of interests over the economic aspect of 
use values, workers may still find themselves having conflicting interests 
with employers over other issues.
In Chapter 4, the complexity of the range of workers' expressed interests 
was developed; it was certainly not reducible to a general distinction 
between use value and exchange value. Expressed interests covered wide
ranging areas, and their coherence, it was argued, depended on a 
careful analysis of the changing labour process at that time; 
furthermore, they reflected the relations of production, whereby workers 
saw how the profits made within their industry were being used to 
finance other activities rather than their wage packet.
On the other hand, the position taken by Burawoy that interests are 
not given irrevocably does receive some support in the complexity of 
interests expressed by the Bookmaking employees. In particular, the 
introduction of retailing bookmaking had a contradictory effect, some 
for instance found workloads increased but others found they had 
decreased. Clearly, this brought some groups into conflict with retailing 
bookmaking and the efforts of employers to change the labour process; 
while others found they would certainly benefit in some way from these 
changes. But this proved to be far from a co-ordination of interests - 
merely a less dissatisfying exploitation.
If Burawoy is suggesting this kind of contradiction of interests cannot 
be determined in abstraction, then clearly the bookmaking study would 
confirm this view; yet to suggest that the basis of this conflict and 
contradiction must be derived from and within the ideological terrain 
appears a very strange conclusion to draw. The argument put forward in 
this thesis has been that the material development of the labour process 
and the contradictions inherent in capitalist development to throw up 
contradictions in interests. But this has not been by ideological analysis, 
but historical analysis: the attempt to comprehend the position of 
workers and why they unionise through studying the historical development 
of the Bookmaking industry within a capitalist economy - the construction 
of historical moments within a conceptual framework.
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Burawoy's conception of interests is perhaps a little too one-sided. 
He tends not to separate out different kinds of interests, but to 
assign them in a uniform way. Conflicts of interests are not 
evident - partly because he writes in opposition to the fairly crude 
dichotomies of Short/long term and immediate/fundamental interests. 
The bookmaking study does indeed give support to the view that these 
distinctions are not a useful way of approaching interests. The 
complexity and contradiction of the expressed wants of the bookmaking 
workers indicate that different interests are held concurrently in
their complexity and in contradiction.
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2. Unionisation and Formal and Real Subordination 
One important objective of this thesis was to establish a way in 
which the circularity of the industrial relations 'system' could be 
overcome. Consideration of the labour process was essential to this 
approach for it raised the relationships within and between employers 
and employees in such a way that explanations of 'industrial relations' 
did not merely rest on internal pressures. Unionization was 
therefore related to capitalist society via the labour process to 
patterns of capital accumulation and the traditions of workers' experience.
Some writers have been content, as seen in Chapter 1, to make limiting
assumptions about the nature of industrial relations systems, which
necessarily calls into question the validity and utility of their
approaches. ^  Others have, however, seen the importance of linking
the development of unionization to changes within the overall pattern
of the industry concerned. A good example is Hawkins (1973) in his
(2)study of the brewery industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
1. The mainstream industrial relations writers would fall into this 
category. Notably, in the UK context, Flanders and Bain. She above 
Chapter 1.
2. Hawkins (1973) outlines the transition of the brewery industry 
from predominantly "old-established family interests” to large-scale 
national companies by the end of the 1960s. The consequence was both
a restructuring in the commercial operations of public houses, involving 
extensive closures, and the reconstruction of relationships between the 
brewery owners and the licensed house tenants, with the companies attempting 
to utilise an increasing number of licensed house managers. The formation 
of tenants associations and the National Association of Licensed House 
Managers (NALHM) is seen against this background. While Hawkins provides 
virtually no useful connection between the changes in the industry and 
unionisation - it is virtually assumed that workers join unions - it is 
clear that without his analysis of the brewing industry and its historical 
changes, the growth of unionization cannot be adequately understood.
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While Mars and Mitchell (1976) illustrate the 'backcloth' approach - 
changes in the structure of the industry are identified as important, 
but remain unconnected (by the authors) to the growth of unionization.^
Arguably, the labour process approach would assist the explanations 
put forward in these - and similar - attempts to understand unionization.
For instance, Hawkins' tendency to 'read-off' unionization from wage-labour 
would surely be enhanced by a more thorough analysis of the differentiation 
of wage-labour in the brewery industry and a specific understanding of 
relationships between workers within the labour process. Mars and 
Mitchell's approach provides a direct comparison with the Bookmaking 
study given their emphasis on 'fiddling'. In this thesis an attempt 
has been made to show the historical relevance of 'fiddling' as a response 
by the Bookmaking workers and to indicate the pressures, both within 
the industry and outside it, which have encouraged or discouraged this 
kind of option.
There is little of this kind of discussion in Mars and Mitchell, where 
fiddling is presented as the crucial barrier to unionization and where the 
absence is seen as the explanation for the growth of collective organisation 
and action amongst hotel workers; they are forced into this unnecessary 
abstraction because they have not adequately specified the historical 
development of the labour process in relation to the changes in the hotel 
industry. 1
1. Mars and Mitchell (1976) is a good example of a recent approach where 
the authors clearly feel it is necessary to paint a background picture of 
the industry they are interested in, but fail to draw out the implications 
for the workforce. Despite the discussion of centralised ownership, the 
increasing central control over the unit managers, and the involvement of 
conglomerates in the Hotel and Catering Industry, Mars and Mitchell produce 
a monocausal explanation for unionization - that many employees receive a 
substantial proportion of their total "pay" in a form other than wages; 
unionization would reduce the scope for fiddling. Whether or not this 
represents a useful or accurate way of looking at unionization, it possesses 
an inherent weakness without any coherent discussion of the labour process. 
There is no discussion of the relationships between workers; indeed there 
is little information on the job structure in the industry and any bases for 
collective action amongst and between different groups of workers.
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This thesis therefore represents an attempt to move beyond the 
assumptions underlying mainstream industrial relations approaches 
concerning the developments in specific industries and their 
relationship to forms of workers organisations. In Bookmaking this 
involved the linking of the changes in the labour process to the wider 
industry reconstruction and the imperatives under which individual 
bookmaking firms operated, e.g. the pressures of legal restriction, 
the development of horseracing, and the involvement of established capital. 
Different phases of the bookmaking industry saw the continued reconstruction 
of the labour process and the consequential changes in the relationships 
between the workers involved.
The efforts of employers to change the social and technical organisation 
of work in this way underpinned both the potential for collective 
organisations and the forms of action workers were likely to take.
The response to this approach from other writers may well fall into two 
categories. No doubt those who have developed their understanding of 
industrial relations on the basis that capitalism does not exist will 
continue to do so and find the arguments in this thesis irrelevant. On 
the other hand, some may agree in spirit with the approach, accepting that 
the labour process must be understood in terms of the exigencies of 
valorisation, but may argue this is not done as precisely as it might be.
It is useful at this stage to open up a dialogue, if somewhat limited, 
with the second group and perhaps take up one issue that seems to deserve 
attention: the potential link between unionization and formal and real
subordination.
The potential significance of formal and real subordination is the way 
in which this distinction specifies a transition in the relationship 
between labour and capital. It therefore encapsulates a change which 
might delineate certain kinds of responses from workers rather than others 
and hence a link to unionisation may be inferred. To explore this further
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it is necessary to consider precisely what comprises the distinction 
between these different patterns of subordination. ^
The term 'Formal subordination' was used by Marx to indicate the 
initial dominance of the labour process by valorisation; it has 
become a capitalist and therefore exploitative relationship - one which 
necessarily involves the social relationship of wage-labour. For 
Marx, formal subordination implied a particular change in the labour 
process: it
".... does not in itself imply a fundamental modification in
the real nature of the labour process, the actual process 
of production. On the contrary, the fact is that capital 
subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, 
it takes over an existing labour process, developed by 
different and more archaic modes of production".
(Marx (1976) p.1021. Emphasis in original).
Operating within the constraints of a labour process not developed by
capital, but merely inherited, valorisation is confronted by inherent
limitations. Formal subordination is characterised by a particular
method of surplus value production :
".... given a pre-existing mode of labour ... surplus-value 
can be created only by lengthening the working day, i.e. 
by increasing absolute surplus-value. In the Formal
subsumption of labour under capital, this is the sole 
manner of producing surplus-value." (ibid p.1021)
Emphasis in original.
Real subordination, on the other hand, builds on formal subordination: 
and constitutes the development of a specifically capitalistic mode of 
production:
"On this foundation there now arises a technologically and 
otherwise specific mode of production - capitalist production - 
which transforms the nature of the labour process and its actual 
conditions. Only when that happens do we witness the real 
subsumption of labour under capital." (ibid pp. 1034-1035.Emphasis 
in original).
i- The term used here is 'subordination', while 'subsumption' appears 
in Marx (1976). It seems the precise characterization of this 
relationship cannot be adequately expressed in English, which accounts 
for different writers using different words. 'Subordination' possesses 
the dominance of capital over labour, but in a way which suggests their 
concrete independence of each other. Labour is part of Capital however 
and in this sense their relationship is more accurately presented as 
one where Capital subsumes Labour. 'Subsumption' does not however, 
contain any meaning within the English Language and for this reason 
'subordination* is preferred. See Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) p.24 F/N 12 
for different arguments as to w h y 'subordination is preferred.
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In this way
"--- capital employs labour materially as well as formally:
the production process is created by capital, the worker 
is slotted into it." (Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) p.8).
This transition creates new opportunities for valorisation with new
forms of surplus value production:
"If the production of absolute surplus value was the material 
expression of the formal subsumption of labour under capital, 
then the production of relative surplus value may be viewed as 
its real subsumption." (Marx (1976) p.1025)
The distinction between formal and real subordination possesses both
analytical and historical content for Marx. It enables him to
differentiate patterns of subordination in relation to valorisation;
yet these are simultaneously historical progressions which underpin his
comprehension of the development of British capitalism. ^  As such,
the developments involved in this transition necessarily impinge on
the organisation of the labour process:
"Whereas private ownership of the means of production, divorce 
of the workers from the means of subsistence, and the wage 
form give rise to a formal subordination of labour, it is 
only really materially subordinated when capital can control 
exactly what the worker does in the workplace, ensuring that 
the worker orders all his activities to one goal: valorisation". 
(Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) p.7).
If workers resistance and combinations are linked to the labour process,
it follows that different forms of workers' organisations and actions
will be connected with different phases of subordination.
"The collective nature of the labour process under capital, 
both in its early development with formal subordination 
and in its predominance with real subordination, has 
implications for the nature of workers' action. While 
the impulsion of workers to act on their own behalf derives 
from the nature of capitalist labour in itself, the collective 
form of the activity is structured in general by the 
collective form of the labour process." (2) 1
1. A position which Nichols (1980) seems to accept. For a succinct 
account of formal and real subordination see Nichols (1980) pp.26-27.
2. Anon (1979) p.174. This is an unpublished work on the nature of 
workers collectivities and combinations. Since it contains ideas which 
have influenced the discussion of formal and real subordination in these 
conclusions it is clearly desirable to refer to the work while respecting 
the author's wish for anonymity.
Once it is established that by real subordination, Eiger understands
"the development of a complex organisation of specialised 
labourers, and the intensification and co-ordination of work
in that context....." and that this constitutes "...... the
initial transformation of the labour process from its inherited 
basis into a specifically capitalist mode of production..."
(ibid p.65)
then workers combinations which develop from the collective worker 
would appear as necessarily located within the framework of real 
subordination. Eiger would therefore seem drawn into the conclusions
that
".. • • it seems to be the case that unions are connected
to the real subordination of labour to capital. So much
is this the case that some have associated unionization
with the collective labourer of this mode of capitalist
production (e.g. Crompton, following Carchedi)" (Anon (1979) p.228).
Two crucial questions arise from this discussion. Firstly, can
such a distinction about the forms of workers resistance be given any
general validity? Secondly, if so, can they be related to specific
labour processes?
In one sense the link between formal and real subordination to forms of 
workers resistance seems clearly made. The movement from formal to 
real subordination is not merely the working through of the law of value, 
but the reconstruction of social and political domination within capitalist 
society. To suggest that the nature of workers resistance to capitalism 
will remain unaffected by changes to the capitalist mode of production 
would be to deny the significance of wage-labour itself. But once it 
is seen this is little more than a truism - for the argument is essentially 
circular - the issue becomes whether changes in the capitalist mode 
are usefully explored in this way.
One approach which forcefully argues against the dichotomy of formal 
and real subordination is that of Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) .
There are a number of strands to their criticisms, but in particular 
they point out the way in which the progression of unproblematic capitalist 
control over labour implied by the distinction (and even in the
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terminology itself), masks the contradictions which capital faces 
during this process. ^
"It is precisely because capitalmust surrender the use
of its means of production to labour that capital must
to some degree seek a co-operative relationship with
it, unite labour with the means of production and maximise
the social productivity and powers of co-operation. Here
is the central point of our critique of the Real Subordination
of Labour. The two-fold nature of the relationship of
capital to labour in the workplace implies directly contradictory
strategies for both labour and capital which in turn
represent the working out of the contradictions between the
forces and relations of production at the level of the
workplace itself." (Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) p.14
Emphasis in original).
The implications of this critique - not only in relation to the general 
division of formal and real subordination, but to the relationship 
with specific labour processes - is immediately evident. Does the 
distinction obscure more than it reveals? Is it restricted to the 
highest levels of generality? Some writers have tried to connect 
formal and real subordination with specific labour processes. Marx's 
own discussion tends to be located in the transition of master- 
journeyman relationships to those of manufacture and then machinefacture 
It has a specific historical context - the early-mid 19th century in 
Britain; Braverman's analysis is largely based on the elimination of 
craft practice by capital between the 19th and 20th centuries, while 
Eiger's discussion of the transition of the movement from formal to 
real subordination (and corresponding surplus value production) tends 
to be located in late 19th and early 20th century, British and American 
capitalism.
The problem is clearly one of levels of analysis, the relationship 
between the general and the specific, how one informs the other. Marx, 
Braverman and Eiger are all attempting to locate the changing structure 
of work organisation within the general tendencies of capitalist economy
i. In particular they argue that the real subordination of labour fails 
to consider the significance of use-value production. See Cressey and 
Maclnnes (1980) ppl2 - 14.
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their understanding of specific labour processes both informs 
and depends upon these general tendencies. Yet all are concerned 
with particular historical epochs which are not chosen randomly but 
because they represent important stages, not only in the transition 
of specific industries, but of the economy as a whole. Arguably 
they might be seen as historical conjunctures where the processes 
of formal and real subordination are closely and directly entwined 
with developments in the social and technical organisation of work 
in crucial industries.
However, once those transitions have occurred the situation has 
changed. The utility of formal and real subordinates in relation 
to specific labour processes is diminished since the mode of production 
now embraces real subordination. To put the point bluntly, if 
the transition from formal and real subordination is used to explain 
the historical transitions of British industry in the 19th century, how 
can that analysis be utilised to the same effect and in the same way 
to labour processes in the latter half of the 20th century? In the 
former case the analysis concerned the mode of production as a whole and 
not just the specific industry. In the latter, it merely becomes 
nonsensical.
Consider the Bookmaking Industry. How would the progression from 
formal to real subordination provide an understanding of the labour 
process? Presumably the late 19th century and early 20th century 
represented growing formal subordination of labour as small bookmaking 
firms developed soon to be followed by real subordination with the 
division of labour in the credit offices. Yet what about the subsequent 
development of LBOs? In the 1960s this would seem to possess the 
characteristics of 'formal' subordination prior to the 'real' subordination 
of retailing bookmaking. The arguments of Cressey and Maclnnes do seem 
to have relevance here — why bother to use concepts which conflate the
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contradictions of capitalist economy and serve merely as a 'dustbin' 
for a range of influences?
Moving away from the specific labour processes of Bookmaking to the 
generalities of class relationships, the problem still remains.
If Marx did mean formal and real subordination to apply to capitalist 
economy as a whole (and the distinction is surely pointless if he 
did not), he was concerned with the real subordination of the working 
class and not just individual workers in specific labour processes.
Is it somehow possible to have the real subordination of the working 
class while individual workers are only formally subordinated?
These overwhelming problems in the use of formal and real subordination 
must not be passed over in the apparent attractiveness of linking 
unionization to real subordination. The tendency to do so may at least 
partly be understood in the way writers within a broadly Marxist approach 
perceive the objective of trade unions. If unions are seen as 
primarily concerned with the value of labour-power it may be irrestible 
to connect them with the phase of real subordination where valorisation 
is 'in command". ^
This would, however, represent a crude understanding of both valorisation
and trade unions. Such perspectives would seem to accentuate the
organisational and inter-capital activity of trade unions as against
( 2)activity within specific capitals. Workers resistance, as the
Bookmaking study once again shows, is not merely concerned with the value 
(or price) of their labour power, but with the many facets of the social 
antagonisms in wage-labour. So it is perhaps an unhelpful truism to
1. The phrase 'valorisation in command' was coined by the Brighton Labour 
Process Group of the CSE.
2. Anon (1979) draws a distinction between unions as regulators of the
law of value across different capitals and workers combinations which arise 
in connection with conditions in specific capitals. It should be noted 
that the author does eventually reject the notion that formal and real 
subordination are directly related to workers combinations/unionization, 
but nevertheless views trade unionism largely in terms of the operation 
of the law of value.
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suggest that unionization is connected with real subordination.
It might be more useful to look at the processes which Marx outlined 
as characteristic of real subordination and apply those to the 
question of how unionization develops.
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3. Skill, the Labour Process and Workers Resistance 
The tendency within capitalist production to increasingly socialise 
the labour process goes hand in hand with the devaluation of labour 
power; this was identified in Chapter 2. ^  Here it was shown that 
labour power can be devalued in two ways: a general reduction in 
the value of all labour-power, for instance through failing food 
prices; or a fall in the value of specific labour powers through 
the reconstruction of the labour process. The second process has 
become more commonly known as deskilling.
This is often linked to proletarianization as the outcome of deskilling; 
but Carchedi (1975) has identified a second aspect of the process 
leading to proletarianization where ambiguous class positions increasingly
tend to perform the function of the collective worker at the expense of
(2)the global function of capital. Crompton (1979) has adopted these
two aspects and attempts to link this "double proletarianization" to 
white-collar unionism.
In this final concluding discussion it is useful to consider the 
'deskilling' and 'double proletarianization' approaches and identify how 
the bookmaking study can contribute to these’ debates.
The concept of skill ^
The notion that labour-power is continually devalued can certainly be
derived from Marx's writings. The development of the capitalist mode
of production is characterised by a process where:
".... the capitalist buys with the same capital a greater mass 
of labour-power, as he progressively replaces skilled workers 
by less skilled, mature labour-power by immature, male by 
female, that of adults by that of young persons or children."
(Marx, 1976 p.788). 1
1. See above p.46ff
2. See above p.55ff
3. The ambiguities in 'skill' have already been noted. See above p.47.
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The logic of valorisation is the continual reduction of labour 
costs. The socialisation of the labour process involves the 
development of the division of labour; this is both the potential 
and the actuality of the fragmentation of the activities of "skilled 
workers" and which results in the 'progressive' reduction of skill 
component of the jobs of successive generations of workers.
The response to this process within the Marxist tradition has tended 
to be ambivalent. The breakdown of jobs into less skilled occupations 
has arguably provided a greater mass of homogenous labour, thus 
enhancing the potential for collective action by the working class. 
Divisions are continually reduced by the perpetual process of deskilling.
On the other hand sane writers in more recent times, most notably 
Braverman (1974) , have focussed on the inherent degradation of the 
deskilling process and have lamented the loss of craft expertise and 
control over the production of use values which this implies.
Braverman and deskilling
Braverman's analysis of the impact of deskilling as a consequence of 
the restructuring of the labour process is a major contribution to 
work in this area. He writes in opposition to orthodox social scientists 
who have played their part in trying to convince workers that skill 
is something demanded of them in 20th century capitalist production; that 
skills are increasing in occupations. Braverman exposes the shaky 
foundations of this perspective. He identifies the way in which the 
term 'semi-skilled' has been used to give credence to a particular 
layer of occupations which appear to have little technical skill warranting 
this description. Furthermore his analysis of the way occupational 
statistics are constructed amplifies the potential for creating skills 
"with a mere stroke of a pen" (Braverman (1974) p.49). Far from being
an assessment of the "broad range of abilities" (ibid p.434) required
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of workers, the category of skill may be little more than "promotional 
labelling" (ibid.p.434)
But in developing his argument in opposition to these perspectives,
Braverman tends to overstate the process of deskilling; skill
clearly fluctuates in meaning in his own mind. One strand of his
definition is that skill is connected to craft - "craft mastery":
"For the worker, the concept of skill is traditionally 
bound up with craft mastery - that is to say, the 
combination of knowledge of materials and processes 
with the practiced manual dexterities required to carry on 
a specific branch of production. The break up of craft 
skills and the reconstruction of production as a collective 
or social process have destroyed the traditional concept of 
skill and opened up only one way for mastery over labour 
processes to develop: in and through scientific, technical, 
and engineering knowledge." (ibid p.443)
Such a loss of "craft and traditional abilities" (ibid p.425) may
be absolute - they may disappear altogether - or relative - where
the craft remains, but the technology of the labour process alters.^
But that is only one side of Braverman's definition of skill; it is
also implied that deskilling involves a loss of control by workers
over the labour process (ibid.p.425)
Braverman's analysis of skill within the labour process then has 
three components: primarily it is in terms of craft expertise and 
its elimination; secondly it involves the loss of control by individual 
workers over craft activity; thirdly, the way in which skill embraces
an ideological meaning in its continuing redefinition.
Eiger's Critique
Braverman is not so informative as to how workers respond to changes 
in skill; he explicitly rules out workers resistance and organisation 
from his analysis, thus little can be said about the links between skill 
and workers resistance. This forms part of a recurrent criticism of 
Braverman and there are many critiques of his work. Perhaps the most
!• See Braverman (1974) p.425. "The more science is incorporated into the 
labour process, the less the worker understands the process; the more 
sophisticated an intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control 
and comprehension of the machine the worker has.'
-496-
significant is Eiger (1979) , who takes up several issues with 
Braverman, but in relation to skill he raises three particular 
points. Firstly, there is Braverman’s juxtaposition of craft and 
capitalist control. Eiger suggests:
"There is a strong tendency in Braverman's account to 
conceptualise the transformation in terms of a switch 
from thoroughgoing craft controls to pervasive capitalist 
direction of the labour process." (Eiger (1979) p.63)
For Braverman the erosion of craft controls i£ the assertion of
capitalist control. A second related point concerns the subordination
of craft competance within capitalism and the way in which "a complex
structure of collective labour" is "effectively subordinated to capital
accumulation." (Eiger (1979) p.63) For Braverman, capitalist
control and craft competance seem necessarily opposed, yet concretely
it appears entirely possible for craft controls to be subject and
entwined with capitalist control. Finally, Braverman fails to raise
the question where skill is not based upon craft, other than when it
is ideologically created by social scientists, employers, and governments.
As Eiger suggests:
"Collective organisation may gain increased wages and the 
status of skilled worker with little evidence of craft 
expertise." (ibid p.64)
Braverman fails to take on board the possibility that workers themselves 
may secure skill status, that it is not merely the ruling class and 
their supporters who can construct skill in a social rather than technical
sense.
All of these points constitute significant criticisms of Braverman's 
approach; but the first is perhaps the most relevant here, since 
Braverman fails to realise that the potential of workers resistance is 
not necessarily related to individual craft control. The consequence 
of doing so would be to suggest, firstly, that craft competance may 
remain but without any effective strength in resisting capitalist control; 
or secondly, that effective resistance can be established against capital 
which is not based on "craft mastery."
The Bookmaking study does add some light to this discussion. There 
are indications how the 'craft' of settling survived throughout the 
period examined and, generally speaking, remained with the same 
group of workers who possessed continuity in the handing down of the 
craft in the different phases of the industry's development. Yet the 
diminishing importance of settling as a craft is also evident.
With the growth of the large bookmaking firms the importance of correct 
settling was modified. The introduction of security systems and 
monitoring techniques constituted an attempt to control that craft 
even though the technical component of settling scarcely altered.
In terms of workers resistance the significance of that craft control 
as an instrument of resistance against capitalist control was different 
in different phases of the development of the industry. In the inter-war 
period when credit bookmaking was in the forefront, the refusal of 
workers to settle bets could, broadly, only result in the delay in 
payment of winning bets. Since accounts were based on credit, clients
could continue to bet in the knowledge that they had secured winnings 
or had lost, irrespective as to whether settlers had actually calculated 
them. Yet in the period of LBOs, refusal to settle bets implied that 
bets could not be restaked, unless the backers had the necessary cash 
in order to bet without drawing any winnings. The potential for 
resistance in these different periods was scarcely even, despite the 
similar levels of technical skill involved; and insofar as it did change 
it no doubt diminished between credit offices and LBOs.
Rubery : Skill and Bargaining Strength
This non-correspondence between skill and bargaining strength has been 
taken up amongst others by Jill Rubery in her discussion of labour markets. 
She comments on Braverman's analysis:
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"It was the ability of craftsmen in manufacturing industry 
to use their specialised knowledge as a basis for 
organisation and to control entry into the craft which 
improved their bargaining position. The resultant ability 
to control the work process was both important in 
maintaining their privileged in the labour force, and costly 
for management. What may therefore be crucial for the mass 
of workers in their relations with their employers is not 
whether mechanisation and scientific management techniques 
decrease their opportunities to use judgement and knowledge, 
but how they affect their bargaining opportunities."
(Rubery (1978) p.256).
What does Rubery mean by "bargaining opportunities"?
"The bargaining position of workers did not enter directly 
into Braverman's study, because he was deliberately 
excluding considerations of working-class consciousness 
and organisation (ibid.p.256-257)
So it seems that bargaining position is a mixture of labour market 
position plus consciousno . Bubery is not quite certain of this 
however: She also suggests that bargaining opportunities are connected 
with output control:
"There may or may not have been more skill, according to the 
Braverman definition, in pick-and-shovel work,than there 
is in operating a machine, but it is certain that the 
transformation of many labouring jobs into operating jobs, 
where workers were in direct contact with the machine and 
thus exercised some control over a greater output than their 
own unassisted labour could produce, created improved 
bargaining opportunities for the mass of workers." (ibid p.256)
Unfortunately, Rubery does not develop her analysis any further.
Bargaining position will be dependent on a wide range of influences.
Yet this does not mean that the source of those influences cannot be
identified. Both Braverman and Rubery tend to concentrate on the
changing position of a particular aspect of concrete labour - the movement
of individual workers from one job to another, e.g. 'pick and shovel'
work to machine work; consequently, they have failed to indicate
precisely the implications in terms of the potential of workers resistance
This point has already been made. What might be added:it is necessary
to look at the labour process as a whole to identify why certain groups
of workers who possess technical abilities may be able to exert
resistance in positions where according to Braverman's approach that
potential has been reduced or even does not exist. In Bookmaking
the devaluation of the position of the settler manager achieved or
carried two implications; firstly they were brought into a
cooperative relationship with each other for the first time in the
history of the industry; secondly, the reconstruction of the labour
process brought them directly into contact and shared experience with
other workers in LBOs, whose work had been performed in relative
isolation before that time. To refer to workers resistance in isolation
from the relationships between workers is certainly problematic.
A further point also emerges: the one-sidedness of the deskilling
argument. It suggests that resistance is not possible, certainly not
within craft controls and competance; in this way the contradictions
inherent in the efforts of employers to control the labour process
through the devaluation of labour power tend to be overlooked.
"The problem of control for capitalists, is not just one of 
preventing the development of class consciousness, but of 
organising the social relations of production." (Rubery (1978) p.259)
How do employers effect those changes?
"The development of capitalism not only presents problems for 
worker control and organisation, inducing defensive tactics 
on the part of existing trade union organisations, but it also 
offers new opportunities for organisation." (ibid p.261)
The contradictions in changing methods of work is that while certain
groups may lose aspects of their control, it may increase it in other
ways or it may increase the potential for resistance amonst other groups
of workers. It would have been one thing for management to overcome
the refusal of the phone room workers in the credit offices to take
bets - by use of other workers in the building or temporary staff from
outside ; but the difficulties which counter clerks faced in developing
unionisation when working in the widely distributed LBOs, also went hand
in hand with the problems it creates for management in covering any
general action by counterclerks who refused to take bets.
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The complexity of skill may be assisted by a more thorough analysis 
of the social relationships between workers, of the way in which 
the labour process changes, rather than a concentration on particular 
groups of workers and how their individual skills may alter. If 
the crucial question is concerned with workers resistance, then it 
would seem that any discussion of technical skill must be approached 
in this broader context.
Crompton and 'double proletarianisation1.
'Skill' does not merely involve technical ability, as was seen earlier, 
it also implies a measure of control; deskilling may involve the 
notion of the loss of control. In Braverman's analysis this usually 
means the loss of craft competance, i.e. control over the technical 
aspects of performing a use-value. But within the context of ambiguous 
class positions control diminishes in another sense, the reduction of 
that element of capitalist control. This approach in terms of the 
performance of functions was developed and utilised in relation to the 
unionisation of the Bookmaking workers; but Crompton (1979) has also 
attempted to establish a similar link with unionisation in the Insurance 
industry and initially this is worth consideration.
Crompton has produced three contributions which indicate how she sees
the link between unionisation and 'double proletarianisation'.
The two articles, Crompton (1976) and Crompton (1979) should really be
taken together. The former is largely concerned with a critique of
other approaches to white-collar unionism and only tentatively suggests
her own approach. This is subsequently put forward in Crompton (1979)
where she attempts to develop Carchedi's analysis, slightly modified,
( 2)
to explain white-collar unionism amongst office Insurance workers. 12
1. These are Crompton (1976), Crompton (1977) and Crompton (1979).
See also the continuing debate with Heritage (1980) and Crompton (1980)
2. The confusions in Crompton (1976) are indicated above pp.9-10 and are not 
repeated here. The important article at this stage is Crompton (1979).
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In between she has co-authored a book which addresses the nature of 
class relationships in both Western and Eastern economies and which 
necessarily underpins her approach to white-collar unionism.(1)
Crompton follows what is now becoming a familiar path: production
relations are the fundamental area of class delineation (Crompton (1979)
p.404); the distinction between ’productive* and 'unproductive' labour
is rejected as a "major axis of class differentiation" (ibid p.405.
Emphasis in original); and the ambiguity of class positions is a more
fruitful approach (ibid pp. 406-407). In consequence:
"The 'proletarianisation' of the white-collar worker, therefore, 
may occur in two ways: i) the 'unproductive' labour process 
may, in Braverman's terms, be 'deskilled'; that is 'conception' 
split off from 'execution' and work reduced to a series of 
fragmented, repetitive operations; ii) the extent to which the 
white-collar worker carries out the function of capital may be 
progressively reduced, rendering the worker nothing more nor 
less than unproductive labour." (ibid p.407)
These are the elements of 'double proletarianisation' which may
"empirically.... occur as different aspects of the same process" (ibid
p. 407) .
Crompton then argues that 'double proletarianisation' has been of 
"considerable importance" in the unionisation of insurance clerks.
To do justice to Crompton's argument it is useful to consider her case 
study in more detail and indicate how she links 'double proletarianisation' 
to changes in the Insurance industry as a whole.
The combination of declining profitability in the Insurance Industry 
in the late 1950s and 1960s and the increasing size of risks resulting 
from technological change, she suggests, prompted a range of mergers: 
while 21 composite firms existed in 1956, only 8 major composite groups 
remained in 1968. The impact was a decline in job security for many
1. Crompton and Gubbay (1977). Inconsistencies between the book 
and the articles are presumably due to joint-authorship.
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employees and the introduction of 'modern management techniques' 
and computerisation. In consequence, the productivity of labour 
was increased; the labour force was rationalised with a sharp 
division between the managers and the data processors; and there was 
an imposition of centralised computer control, allowing the reconstruction 
of internal labour markets and the reduction of promotion possibilities.
In Crompton's framework, the class position of the insurance clerk 
altered in this period which can be connected with the growth of 
ASTMS membership and staff associations in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
'Double proletarianisation' has indeed occurred. The nature of the 
work has been deskilled, while control has been centralised through 
computerisation.
The next stages of the argument are perhaps more contentious. Crompton
still clings to the terms 'market' and 'work situations' which seem to
provide the concretization of class positions:
"The changes in the class situation of the insurance clerk have 
been reflected in changes in their market and work situations."
(ibid p.418)
Given these changes, the links with trade unionism follow, although this
seems more an historical coincidence than an analytical connection:
"I would argue that the evidence presented above demonstrates 
that the increase in trade union membership amongst insurance 
clerks from 1970 onwards was immediately preceded by a radical 
alteration in their class situation and, therefore, that the 
classification of particular groups i_£ an important factor 
in the understanding of the growth and nature of white-collar 
unionism." (ibid p. 418).
The connections, baldly stated, run as follows: changes in the industry 
result in 'double proletarianisation' of insurance clerks which implies 
declining market and work situations; hence unionisation. 1
1. This makes the argument in Crompton and Gubbay ^„aaerial
one: «.... with the contemporary spread of unionism into the managerial
hierarchy, trade union activity encompasses conflicts °_w^ as well as
sections of global capital over the allocation of surp >
between capital and labour." p.192.
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Crompton's analysis has been challenged by Banks (1978) and 
Heritage (1980). The more serious critique is that of the latter,
who takes issue on a number of points. In particular he criticises 
her efforts to validate 'double proletarianisation' in her empirical 
w o r k . H e  argues that she overestimates the extent of double 
proletarianisation in insurance; that the extent of deskilling, 
promotion blockages, and falling pay relativities are not proven 
empirically and that Crompton does not show any indication that 
workers so affected joined trade unions. From his own research in 
Banking he asserts:
'"Proletarianisation' ... has not contributed to 
unionisation in the financial industries in any direct 
or unmediated fashion". (Heritage (1980) p.288)
and he questions whether the approach has any wider validity:
"..... whilst the formation of an office proletariat
may be a necessary condition for the substantial unionisation 
of workers in white-collar industries, it is by no means 
a sufficient one." (ibid p.288)
Furthermore, the "organisational forms" of proletarianisation may
inhibit rather than encourage unionisation through drawing a sharp
sexual division of labour within banking and presumably white-collar
( 2 )work in general. In the broadest sense, Heritage seems eventually
to argue that the 'industrial relations' approaches are more fruitful in 
understanding white-collar unionism.
For many of his arguments Heritage can be rightly taken to task. Crompton 
(1980) in reply notes the crudeness of some of his points, notably 
the fatuous assertion, quoted above, that there was no "direct or 
unmediated" link between proletarianisation and unionisation. Since 
few sociologists - and certainly not Crompton - would ever entertain
"Crompton's initial intimations of its empirical consequences tend 
to be both over-simplified and implausible." Heritage (1980) p.283 
This concerns Crompton's discussion of the relationship between proletarian' 
isation and the options of trade unionism and staff associations in 
Crompton (1976).
2. The feminization of clerical work is seen as a way in which employers 
may secure a "docile and undemanding labour force."
the thought this might be the case, the comment is scarcely the 
earthshattering condemnation Heritage tries to make it. It is 
reminiscent of an earlier approach to white-collar unionism, which 
Crompton aptly points out:
"In short, Heritage seems to be recommending a methodology 
which closely parallels that of the 'industrial relations' 
school - where variables are taken one at a time and if 
they fail to correlate with the dependent variable (union 
membership) are subsequently rejected." (1 )
Heritage, in that sense, clearly stands within (though not of) the
'industrial relations' tradition. Unionization is about membership
rather than social processes and like Bain before him, Heritage is
(2)largely concerned to count the numbers. This is unfortunate in
more senses than one. Firstly, it means that Heritage has little 
positive to offer in this debate; secondly, his critique of Crompton 
can be - and is - comprehensively refuted, although her approach is 
open to criticism and Heritage has the information, though not 
apparently the perspective, to do it.
The weakness of Crompton's approach is not, directly, her use of 'double 
proletarianisation'. After all, it does encapsulate a range of 
economic and social processes which are concretely identifiable; and, 
essentially, it is an elaboration of her previous ideas on class situation.
1. Crompton (1980) pp.449-450. The most striking parallel is the way 
in which Heritage links the notion of 'double proletarianisation with 
measures of empirical validation. This echoes Bain (1973)in his effort 
to deny the links between class and unionisation. Bain at least has 
the excuse he is not a sociologist. See above pp. 12-15, for critical 
discussion of this specific point in relation to Bain.
2. For instance "I have tried to indicate where, within the membership 
statistics of the collective organisations catering to insurance workers, 
one might look to locate the impact of computerisation." Heritage (1980) 
p.287. The limitations of the 'Membership Figures' approach can be nicely 
illustrated in the way workers themselves define whether they are members. 
The CIR ballot in the William Hill Organisation showed remarkably high 
figures for paid union membership. For instance, the Scotland branch had 
virtually collapsed by the time of the ballot, yet TUBE apparently had 71 
members. See CIR (1974)b.
3. It may, of course, not be the best terminology, or Crompton may be too 
demanding of it as a conceptual category, but that is a different question.
Consequently it does not affect the conceptualisation of mediations 
of class position which prompt unionization. These do not change 
throughout her writing: 'market' and 'work situations'. The
crucial problem is the movement from the structural determination 
of class position to social activity on the part of actual (or potential) 
trade unionists.
It is in this sense that the discussion of the empirical work in the 
Insurance industry becomes important. This is not to be conducted 
at the level of the extent ASTMS cook the membership books,^ but 
whether Crompton's case study provides any understanding why 
unionisation should develop. Is the insurance work 'deskilled'?
Does double proletarianisation occur? If it does, what are the effects 
on the insurance workers and why does this mean they unionise? It 
is this third question where the weaknesses are most glaring and rests 
on a fundamental problem with her approach: the inadequacy and indeed
lack of conceptual categories.
In brief, Crompton does not develop a concept which allows her analysis
to move from structural position to social process. 'Market' and 'Work
Situation' are shifted in from their Neo-Weberian context, but Crompton
cannot (and does not) use them: they do not enable her to consider
(2)social relationships, only social position. This places extra
pressure on 'double proletarianisation' as an explanatory force and 
it is found wanting.^
In particular, Crompton's desire to keep a tight grip on 'double 
proletarianisation' restricts any perspective of contradiction in this 
process in its impact on workers. 1
1. Possibly one of Heritage's more accurate comments.
2. See above p. 16ff for a discussion of these concepts in Lockwood's 
framework.
3. Since Heritage (1980) does not seem to possess any better concepts 
than Crompton, it is not surprising he cannot articulate the critique 
he implies.
As Heritage (1980) notes, more bemused than triumphant, deskilling 
may be beneficial to staff:
"Complex controls and checks over cash flows have always 
existed in the financial industries - in the first 
instance to prevent theft and fraud on the part of 
customers and employees. The mechanisation of such checks 
with associated "higher deadlines" may actually benefit staff.
In banking, for example, the mechanisation of 'balancing' 
after business hours has resulted in greater predictability 
of banking hours - the previous unpredictability of which had 
been a widespread source of complaint." (Heritage (1980) 
p. 292 F/N 18) .
While his understanding is questionable, Heritage at last begins to 
put forward a meaningful critique of Crompton. ^  'Double 
Proletarianisation' involves processes which are contradictory: it
may affect different groups of workers in different ways and also have 
more than one effect on the same group of workers.
Now it is the case that Crompton does make some distinctions in the 
impact of changes in the insurance industry on workers: the separation
of the managers and data processors (Crompton (1979) p.414); the 
disproportionate effect on the "older and long-serving managers"
(ibid p.  417); and the male-female differentiation (ibid p.418)
Yet she tends not to use this information to understand the growth (or 
otherwise) of unionisation, but instead orients the material back 
towards proletarianisation. Hence, her discussion of the sexual 
division of labour is whether the men are as proletaranised as the 
women (ibid p. 418). This would seem further evidence to suggest 
Crompton's difficulty in moving from the structural position of clerks 
to their social activity.
In the end, Crompton's understanding of unionization depends on class 
position and, in turn, 'double proltearianisation'; yet this must be 
inadequate. Not in the common sensical approach of Heritage that other
1. It is symptomatic of his approach that he discards it in a footnote
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'factors' are involved as well, but in the way it only provides 
a partial insight on relationships within and between workers and 
employers and provides little or no basis for understanding the
M )influences of wider social processes.
The fundamental problem is that she tries to use 'market' and 'work 
situation' rather than the Marxist category of the labour process, 
which would have allowed the discussion of social relationships between 
workers,and permitted an understanding of unionization arising from 
the collective organisation of the work rather than the restrictive, 
often undifferentiated, categorisations of class position.
The double proletarianisation thesis might add usefully to an 
understanding of the labour process, but it cannot substitute for it, 
even when disguised in its Neo-Weberian cloaks.
The contrast with the way Bookmaking has been analysed in this thesis 
may prove instructive. Using Crompton's approach, the settler- 
managers were clearly 'doubly proletarianised';their 'market' and 
'work situations' were declining in consequence; and they formed a 
union. In view of the discussions of Chapters 3 and 4, the problems 
of this analysis are somewhat clearer. In .the first instance, the 
one-sidedness of the approach is evident. The settler-manager
(like the insurance clerk and technician in Crompton's own work) appears 
as an unproblematic occupational category. The contradictory impact 
of proletarianisation is not developed at least partly because there 
is no appreciation, however imprecise, of the unevenness of capitalist 
economy. The Pookmaking industry, like the Insurance industry, is not 
a monolith of firms in exactly the same position with workers doing 
exactly the same work in the same relationship to their employers. 1
1. Consider Crompton's approach to Government influence or union 
growth in Crompton (1979). It stands almost entirely separate from the 
main body of the argument and is only introduced because Government 
intervention seems to have been important. But she has no basis to 
introduce it in any other way.
The terms are a short-hand for a range of complex processes and
structures and 'double proletarianization' will not affect the
( 1 )
position of all workers in the same way. This does deny the validity 
of 'double proletarianisation' but indicates it should be used 
in a less determinist fashion.
This leads to a second point, since to do this would demand an 
examination of the labour process within any industry as a whole, 
and not just the position (whether 'class', 'market', or 'work') of 
one employee group. Where would the other bookmaking workers 
appear in Crompton's analysis? If at all, they would be analysed 
only insofar as they impinged on the 'market', or 'work situation' of 
the settler-manager. But this is a reversal of what is happening: 
job structures arise from the labour process, not the other way around. 
The position of workers must be analysed in relation to the labour 
process as a whole, otherwise only partial understanding is obtained.
Or, put slightly different, 'double proletarianisation' is both a 
determinant and consequence of the reconstruction of the labour process 
and must be understood in relation to it.
Thirdly, this would provide two subsequent advantages of the labour
process approach over that of Crompton. In the first instance, it
enables a more complete understanding of workers' experience. Clearly,
'double proletarianisation' would provide some context for the settler-
manager's experience, - the diminuition of control within the I.BO
together with the decline of (and need for) settling skills - yet this
is only one aspect of their experience of the changing labour process.
This necessarily forces attention on the way job tasks are constructed,
not merely proletarianised, for instance, in the way the settler-manager
became a salesman; it allows consideration of the changing relationships
within the 'collective worker', in particular those between the settler-
manager and counterclerk; and it provides insights into the forms of
The detailed arguments are not repeated here, but a central argument 
of this thesis has concerned the differential impact of changes in the
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workers' response, which means not only that it prevents any 
"reading-off" of unionisation from proletarianisation, but allows 
consideration of how the options for responding change historically, 
e.g. the potential for fiddling or job quitting.
The second point "•oncerns the way in which wider social processes 
impinge on unionisation. In Crompton's work 'double proletarianisation' 
and government policy simply do not meet; yet Chapter 8 is concerned to
show, in some detail, how government policy had a varying impact on 
unionisation depending on the development of the labour process at 
that time. That is only possible because labour process analysis 
allows for a continual relationship between social and economic processes, 
and not the once and for all effect implied by 'proletarianisation'.
In short, the argument that class ambiguity and the derivative 'double 
proletarianisation' may have potential in understanding unionization 
can be supported by the Bookmaking study, but only insofar as these 
influences are understood in relation to the labour process. The desire 
to continually redefine and reshape the processes of proletarianisation 
is an understandable consequence of t^e deskilling debate; but the 
links between proletarianisation and unionization have remained largely 
untouched within Marxist perspectives. This thesis is a tentative 
step to move beyond the blind alleys of proletarianisation and to 
locate the important processes involved in a more useful explanatory 
framework. This has led to a 'rediscovery' of the importance of the 
labour process in an effort to offset the obscuring of the basis of 
unionization in much of the current literature on industrial relations.
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